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**Chairman: Mr. Mario AMADEO (Argentina).**

AGENDA ITEM 78

**Complaint by Cuba of threats to international peace and security arising from new plans of aggression and acts of intervention being executed by the Government of the United States of America against the Revolutionary Government of Cuba (A/4832 and Add.1, A/5072, A/C.1/845, A/C.1/847, A/C.1/851, A/C.1/854, A/C.1/866, A/C.1/L.309) (continued)**

1. Mr. BENHIMA (Morocco) said it was to have been predicted that in the process of transforming their country, the Cuban people would employ drastic revolutionary methods; with the progressive restoration of stability, freedom would return to Cuba. Since the nature of the previous régime's relations with certain neighbouring countries had been determined by the economic system then prevailing, it was also natural that the economic and social changes now under way should affect the present Cuban Government's foreign relations.

2. The appeal that had been made the previous year to the parties concerned to settle the dispute in a peaceful manner on the basis of the principle of non-intervention in the domestic affairs of States was still valid. Although his delegation had every respect for peaceful regional groupings and held the members of the Organization of American States in high esteem, it felt that the decisions taken at the Eighth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the American States, held at Punta del Este in January 1962, challenged the existence of a State and were at variance with the principles of the United Nations Charter, the provisions of which clearly took precedence over those of the charter of the Organization of American States.<sup>1/</sup>

3. Throughout history, nations had sought to gain security by ensuring the existence in neighbouring countries of political régimes similar to their own. In recent times, however, the evolution of political thought had given birth to the idea that relations between neighbouring countries with different political systems and conflicting ideologies should be based

on mutual tolerance. It would be futile to attempt to transform geographical boundaries in the Americas into lines of ideological demarcation. The Punta del Este meeting had established certain dangerous principles which might one day have adverse effects for other small countries that had powerful neighbours. To remain indifferent in the face of that situation would be a crime.

4. Although his delegation welcomed the fact that the United States and Cuban representatives had made statements ruling out the possibility of aggression, it was disturbed by the tendency on the part of certain representatives to make a distinction between unilateral and collective intervention. The Committee would surely wish to receive assurances in that regard.

5. His delegation would support any draft resolution which would enable the United Nations to discharge its obligation to maintain international peace and security.

6. Mr. KOIRALA (Nepal) said that the three basic principles involved in the item under discussion were those of non-intervention in the domestic affairs of States, self-determination, and the peaceful settlement of disputes; all three were embodied in the United Nations Charter and in the Declaration adopted by the Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held at Belgrade in September 1961. The primary task facing the General Assembly in the present dispute was to allay the fear that action might be taken in violation of the principles of self-determination and non-intervention. He wished to reiterate his delegation's belief that active participation by a foreign country in counter-revolutionary or subversive activities was barred by the United Nations Charter and by international law. In that connexion, his delegation welcomed the assurance given by the United States representative that the United States was not preparing to commit aggression against Cuba and the assurance given by the Cuban representative that his country was not attempting to export its revolution. The parties concerned should now take positive steps to relieve each other's apprehensions. Furthermore, the United Nations should, in general, play a more active role in protecting the sovereignty and territorial integrity of small countries against the pressure often exerted by more powerful States.

7. Mr. ZORIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) said that the debate had demonstrated that the issue at present before the Committee was exclusively one between the United States and Cuba, not one between the Latin American countries and Cuba, as the United States representative had contended. A majority of those who had spoken, including representatives of countries belonging to the OAS, had acknowledged that Members of the United Nations had certain obligations under the United Nations Charter which must

<sup>1/</sup> United Nations, *Treaty Series*, vol. 119 (1952), No. 1609.

be carried out regardless of their possible membership in a regional organization. Member States were pledged, in particular, to maintain international peace and security, to develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, to settle international disputes by peaceful means, to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force, and to refrain from intervention in the domestic affairs of other States.

8. The thesis that the present Cuban political system was incompatible with the inter-American system had been advanced by a number of delegations as justification for violations of the United Nations Charter. But, as he had already stated, the Soviet delegation was not persuaded of the advantages of the system of so-called "representative democracy" which certain States wished to force upon Cuba. It was convinced that it was the socialist system, rather than formal democracy, that best served to ensure the participation of the broad masses in the administration of the State. If the advocates of "representative democracy" wished to demonstrate its advantages, they should do so by means of peaceful competition, instead of trying to impose it on other countries by force. It was not only the socialist countries that had found "representative democracy" unsuited to their needs. For example, the representatives of Indonesia and Iraq—countries which did not belong to any bloc—had stated in the Committee that so-called "Western democracy" did not meet the needs of their countries, which were going through a process of revolutionary change. Furthermore, it could hardly be seriously contended that there was any "representative democracy" at all in such Latin American countries as Paraguay, which was ruled by an overt dictatorship, or Guatemala and the Dominican Republic, whose Governments had been installed as a result of direct United States intervention. It was curious that the criterion of "representative democracy" was being applied to Cuba alone.

9. It was illogical, then, to suggest that the present order in Cuba was incompatible with the inter-American system, considering that the latter had in the past tolerated the dictatorship of Batista in Cuba and at present tolerated that of Stroessner in Paraguay. But the question was not really one of logic, for it was clear that the theory of incompatibility had been invented simply as an excuse for the imposition of sanctions against Cuba and its revolution by those who wished to exclude Cuba from the OAS in order to continue their intervention in its internal affairs. Such interference was in point of fact a flagrant violation of article 15 of the charter of the Organization of American States, which provided that no State or group of States had the right to intervene, either directly or indirectly, in the internal or external affairs of any other State. A number of representatives of important Latin American countries had in their statements specifically affirmed their support for that principle, a fact which showed that they well understood the hypocritical nature of the theory of incompatibility put forward at the Punta del Este meeting. The representative of Brazil, echoing the remarks of that country's Minister for Foreign Affairs, had gone so far as to say that Brazil would prefer coexistence, subject to certain freely accepted limitations, to any formula in the nature of exclusion. He had gone on to state that within the United Nations an American State was entitled to adopt the form of

government it considered best suited its internal needs, and that any pressure exercised against it on that account would be a violation of the principle of non-intervention contained in Article 2 of the United Nations Charter.

10. Certain representatives, such as those of the Dominican Republic and Colombia, had engaged in special pleading on behalf of the OAS, suggesting that States which were members of that regional organization were not subject to the same principles of international law as all other Members of the United Nations. Such arguments were entirely unacceptable: all Members of the United Nations, to whatever regional organization they might belong, owed allegiance first and foremost to the United Nations Charter, which clearly prevailed over the rules of any regional organization. That was stated unambiguously in Article 52 of the United Nations Charter, a provision which had its counterpart in article 102 of the charter of the Organization of American States. Thus, the very terms of both instruments precluded any attempt to interpret the provisions of the charter of the regional organization as permitting the violation of obligations assumed under the Charter of the world Organization.

11. The representatives of some neutralist countries had argued that it was improper for the United Nations to discuss matters within the province of regional organizations. That would be true if the matters in question were truly regional in scope; but in the present instance that was not the case, as representatives of the Latin American countries themselves had recognized. The question was a general one, a matter of principle, that of actions of a regional organization which were essentially at variance with the principles of the United Nations. For at the recent Meeting of Consultation at Punta del Este the OAS had adopted measures contrary not only to Article 2 but also to Article 53 of the United Nations Charter, which provided that no enforcement action should be taken under regional arrangements or by regional agencies without the authorization of the Security Council. Yet the decisions of the Punta del Este meeting amounted essentially to enforcement action, providing for sanctions of various kinds against Cuba. The Security Council had certainly not authorized such action. It was the bounden duty of all Members of the United Nations to ensure the strictest respect for the principles of the Charter; if regional organizations were to continue to take actions which violated those principles, the very foundations of the world Organization would be placed in jeopardy. Admittedly, however, the regional organization in question had been persuaded to take that course by one Member of the United Nations, the United States of America, which wished to defy the basic provisions of the United Nations Charter in its relations with another Member, Cuba.

12. The United States, ignoring both the important provisions of Article 2 of the United Nations Charter and resolution 1236 (XII) of the General Assembly, had already, in April 1961, organized an armed intervention against Cuba. Despite all that had been said since then in condemnation of that action, it was again interfering in the internal affairs of Cuba and preparing for further military aggression against that country, at the same time compelling the Organization of American States, which it was in fact attempting to convert into a military bloc of its own, to join it in its violation of the United Nations Charter.

Not content with that, it was now going so far as to call on the United Nations, in effect, to endorse its illegal activities, for it had indicated to a number of countries that it would find their support for the draft resolution before the Committee (A/C.1/L.309) entirely unacceptable, even though that resolution merely confirmed the provisions of the Charter. If the United States was in favour of compliance with the Charter it could not possibly object to a simple reaffirmation of certain of the latter's basic provisions. The conclusion was thus inescapable that it was the United States intention to continue to violate those basic provisions, continuing its interference in the internal affairs of Cuba and its preparations for further aggression against that country. The concern felt by his country, as by most other countries of the world, at the implications of that conclusion was understandable.

13. Nor was any comfort to be derived from the ambiguous assurances offered by the representative of the United States, for such assurances had in the past been quite belied by events. Certain representatives, notably the representative of Guatemala, had denied that those events had ever taken place, and were attempting to stand the truth on its head by declaring that it was not the United States which was preparing aggression against Cuba but Cuba which was preparing aggression against the United States and virtually the whole of Latin America. Even the representative of Guatemala, however, had not been able to deny the admissions of the President of his country regarding its role in the preparations for the venture of April 1961. Furthermore, the many specific questions which the Soviet delegation had put to the representative of the United States at the Committee's 1232nd meeting had remained without reply. It could only be supposed, then, that those questions had pointed to the truth, namely, that the United States was in fact preparing for further aggression against the Republic of Cuba. In any event, there was ample evidence to that effect in United States press reports describing the concentration of United States land forces and marines in the south-eastern part of the country and the strengthening of United States forces at the Guantánamo base, including the stationing there of two additional aircraft carriers. In addition secret meetings had been held by the military group of the OAS at Washington to prepare against what were termed the threats created by communism in Cuba. There was even talk in certain circles, as reported in The New York Times of 11 February 1962, of setting up a Cuban Government in exile and assisting it in invasion and subversion activities. But the representative of the United States still had time to answer the questions put to him and to explain away those facts.

14. The United Nations must defend its principles, notably the principle of non-intervention in the internal affairs of other countries, or the example of United States intervention in Cuba would inevitably be followed by interventions of other kinds in other countries, not only in Latin America but all over the world. The United Nations must decide whether it intended to protect small countries and to uphold the principles of its own Charter. To support the draft resolution, which affirmed those principles, was thus the least that any Member could do.

15. Mr. STEVENSON (United States of America) said that now that the Committee was approaching the end of its prolonged and unnecessary debate on the com-

plaint by Cuba, he would like to try to place the Cuban charge against the United States in its proper perspective. So far, the sixteenth session of the General Assembly had compiled a creditable record. It had dealt reasonably and responsibly with the most important items on the agenda, those items having been worthy of responsible discussion and responsible action. Now, however, at the very end of its session, the Assembly had been forced to deal for ten precious days with cold-war propaganda charges that were irresponsible, unsupported and wholly false. The item had been placed on the agenda by Cuba not in an emergency, as its language suggested, but in August 1961; and now, six months later, the Committee had been obliged to listen to repetitive and interminable harangues which had produced all the abusive, false and tired phrases in the communist lexicon but nothing resembling proof of the charges made.

16. The Charter spoke of the United Nations as a centre for harmonizing the actions of nations. But could anything be more disharmonizing than the unbridled vituperation to which the United States had been subjected by the Castro delegation and its communist colleagues? The fact that charges of aggression and intervention, unsupported by evidence and solemnly denied, had been dredged up after lying dormant for six months and solemnly paraded for ten days before the representatives of 104 nations could not enhance the reputation of the Organization for seriousness or efficiency. It was a pity, moreover, that at a time when there were some signs of sincere efforts to diminish the tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union, the latter should have ordered its satellites to unleash such an unprincipled, unjustified and unsupported attack on the United States.

17. What was the reason for such an outburst of cold-war violence after the item had been pending for six months? Clearly, it was an attempt to drown in a torrent of words the unanimous conclusion of the American republics that it was the communist offensive, of which Cuba was a part, which was trying to intervene in their domestic affairs and to destroy their free democratic institutions. It was an attempt to obscure the unanimous decision reached at the Eighth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs at Punta del Este by all the American States that the Castro régime was incompatible with the principles and objectives of the inter-American system.

18. In resolution I, entitled "Communist offensive in America", and adopted unanimously, the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the American States had declared that the continental unity and the democratic institutions of the hemisphere were now in danger; that one of the principal objectives of the intensified communist offensive was the establishment of communist régimes in the under-developed countries and in Latin America; that the subversive methods of communist Governments and their agents constituted one of the most subtle and dangerous forms of intervention in the internal affairs of other countries; that the peoples of the hemisphere should be alerted against such methods; and, finally, that the principles of communism were incompatible with the principles of the inter-American system. Those were the words of the Foreign Ministers of all the American republics, except Cuba. They were based on a mass of evidence accumulated over the years by the OAS and by the member States themselves, and in particular on a

report made by the Inter-American Peace Committee in January 1962.

19. The facts showed clearly that the Castro régime, with the assistance of local communist parties, was employing a wide variety of techniques and practices to overthrow the free democratic institutions of Latin America. It was bringing hundreds of Latin American students, labour leaders, intellectuals and dissident political leaders to Cuba for indoctrination and training, to be sent back to their countries for the double purpose of agitating in favour of the Castro régime and undermining their own Governments. It was fostering the establishment in other Latin American countries of "committees of solidarity with the Cuban revolution" for the same dual purpose. Cuban diplomatic personnel encouraged and financed agitation and subversion by dissident elements seeking to overthrow established Governments by force. The Cuban régime was flooding the hemisphere with propaganda and with printed material. The recent inauguration of a powerful short-wave radio station in Cuba now enabled the régime to broadcast its propaganda to every corner of the hemisphere, and those broadcasts had not hesitated to call for the violent overthrow of established Governments. Such appeals had been directed to Peru, Guatemala and, most recently, the Dominican Republic. On 22 January 1962, Radio Havana had beamed a broadcast to the Dominican Republic calling on the people to overthrow the Council of State—a democratic Council expressing the will of the Dominican people to be free of the last remnants of the Trujillo dictatorship. The military training of Latin Americans in Cuba by the Castro régime and the wide distribution throughout the hemisphere of the treatise on guerrilla warfare by "Che" Guevara, Castro's chief lieutenant, were clear evidence that the Castro régime was bent on guerrilla operations as another means of gaining its objectives.

20. The large amounts of arms which Castro boasted of having obtained from the communist military bloc enabled him to support such guerrilla operations, and he had in fact aided or supported armed invasion in other Caribbean countries, notably Panama and the Dominican Republic. If Castro's threats made prior to and during the Punta del Este meeting were to be believed, there would almost certainly be further Cuban-inspired guerrilla operations against the Latin American nations. In other words, Cuba today represented a bridgehead of Sino-Soviet imperialism and a base for communist aggression, intervention, agitation and subversion against the American republics. It was small wonder that the American republics unanimously recognized such a situation as being a serious threat to their security and their peoples' ability to choose freely their own form of government and to pursue freely their goals of economic well-being and social justice. It was small wonder that they had unanimously adopted the resolution in question and small wonder that the communists were throwing up a smoke-screen in an attempt to conceal that unanimity.

21. The first two operative paragraphs of resolution VI adopted at Punta del Este and entitled "Exclusion of the present Government of Cuba from participation in the inter-American system" declared that adherence by any member of the Organization of American States to Marxism-Leninism was incompatible with the inter-American system, and that the present Government of Cuba, which had officially identified itself as a Marxist-Leninist Government,

was incompatible with the principles and objectives of the inter-American system. Those two paragraphs had been agreed to by the unanimous vote of the twenty American republics, with Cuba alone dissenting. There were two further operative paragraphs, in which the Foreign Ministers resolved that the incompatibility in question excluded the present Government of Cuba from participation in the inter-American system and that the Council of the Organization of American States and the other organs and organizations of the inter-American system should adopt without delay the measures necessary to carry out the resolution. Fourteen countries, i.e., two-thirds of the membership, had voted in favour of those two paragraphs; one, Cuba, had voted against them; and six, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, Bolivia and Ecuador, had abstained. Their abstention in no way affected the decision that the Castro régime was incompatible with the American system of democratic freedom, but merely evidenced doubts as to the legal procedures involved in the exclusion caused by that incompatibility.

22. The Cuban representative had informed the Committee (1231st meeting) that on 9 October 1961 the Revolutionary Government had published a list of military bases, both within and outside the United States, in which it alleged, the American Government was training mercenaries in order to use them against Cuba. But not a shred of evidence had been produced to show that the United States Government was training anyone anywhere to attack Cuba. The Cuban representative had also quoted from The New York Times of 23 December 1961 an alleged statement by one Luis Manuel Martfnez that about 400 Cuban exiles had left Guatemala for the United States in the previous six weeks, to be used as guerrillas in Cuba. It might very well be that a Cuban patriot had made such a statement, but it must be repeated that the United States was not training any Cuban exiled fighters anywhere to attack Cuba.

23. Those two items—Castro's own assertion and the Martfnez quotation—were the only evidence advanced for the charge that the United States was now planning aggression against Cuba. All the charges which the Castro régime had made against the United States during the discussion of the current item had been made at Punta del Este, and the American republics, which really knew the facts, had brushed those charges aside just as they should be brushed aside in the First Committee.

24. He wished now to deal with the Soviet representative's attempt to turn the debate into a propaganda quiz programme—though most of the so-called questions asked by the Soviet representative related to the events of April 1961, which had been thoroughly discussed at the time by the First Committee and the General Assembly. Firstly, it must be stated categorically that the United States was not training anyone for an invasion of Cuba at the bases mentioned by the Cuban representative. Neither the Soviet representative nor the Cuban representative nor anyone else had brought forth the slightest evidence to the contrary.

25. Secondly, Cubans could indeed enlist in the armed forces of the United States, as could any permanent resident of the country. The latest count, made two weeks previously, showed that the number of Cubans in the three armed services of the United States amounted to a grand total of eighty-eight.

26. Thirdly, the decisions adopted at the Punta del Este meeting had not all been unanimous. It had not been a meeting of the Warsaw military pact; it had been a meeting of free and independent sovereign States, proudly insistent on the democratic rights of freedom of speech and freedom of decision. However, Cuba had received no support on any point; no State had voted with Cuba on any point. Cuba had joined the other States in voting for only one paragraph of one resolution, and there had not been a single negative vote other than Cuba's on any resolution or any paragraph of any resolution. In other words, the newest associate of the communist bloc stood alone in the self-imposed isolation which its intervention and disregard of human rights had brought upon it. Those were the facts about Punta del Este, and they showed that the matter before the Committee was not a bilateral issue between the Castro Government and the United States but a broad multilateral problem involving a self-declared communist régime's aggressive hostility against all the free nations of the Latin American world.

27. He would like to inform the Soviet representative, finally, that the United States did believe in the principle of non-intervention in the affairs of other countries, and it strongly recommended that principle to the Cuban régime, especially with reference to its neighbours in the hemisphere. It would also recommend that principle to the Soviet Union. Some events of recent years which were still on the General Assembly's agenda had not been forgotten.

28. During the previous fortnight there had been repeated contemptuous references to the Cuban patriots who had escaped from the oppression of the Cuban dictatorship. But there had been no mention of the 150,000 Cubans who had fled from tyranny to liberty, the fortunate ones who had escaped the drumhead justice and the firing squads that had slaughtered so many of Castro's countrymen. Those of Castro's comrades who had escaped to freedom included his first Prime Minister, the first Provisional President of the Revolutionary Government, his Chief Justice, nearly two-thirds of the nineteen members of his first Cabinet, the military commander of Camagüey Province, his appointees as Presidents of the National Bank and the Agricultural and Industrial Development Bank, the Chief of his Air Force, his personal pilot, the editor of the anti-Batista magazine *Bohemia*, those responsible for the publication in Cuba of his revolutionary exhortation "History Will Absolve Me", and countless other editors, radio commentators and public figures.

29. It had been suggested repeatedly that the American republics were in some way interfering with Cuba's right of self-determination. That was not true. The American republics believed in and practised self-determination. It was the Castro régime itself that had deprived the Cuban people of that right. The charter of the Organization of American States stated in article 5 that the solidarity of the American States required the political organization of those States on the basis of the effective exercise of representative democracy. Through the OAS, the American republics had recently enabled the voice of the people of the Dominican Republic, long stifled by dictatorship, to be heard again. The voice of the Cuban people had also been stifled by dictatorship, a dictatorship conceived in deceit and now maintained by force. The voice now being heard was not the voice of the Cuban people; Castro's plaintive plea for the right of self-

determination was in fact a cynical demand that he and his foreign masters should be left to crush the will of the Cuban people in furthering the objectives of communist imperialism throughout the hemisphere.

30. How could Castro, who had first deceived his people and now refused to let them speak for themselves, speak for them as to the form of Government they desired? How could a man who had betrayed his country and delivered it to an international conspiracy speak for a people to which he denied the fundamental right of self-determination? In Castro's first political statements from the Sierra Maestra in July 1957 he had promised that if the revolution triumphed, there would be general elections after the end of one year, an absolute guarantee of freedom of information and all civil and political rights, in accordance with Cuba's 1940 Constitution. In an article written in February 1958 he had stated that he was fighting for a genuine representative Government and—the greatest irony of all—had denied the charge of plotting to replace the military dictatorship by a revolutionary dictatorship. It was small wonder that the Cuban people had welcomed those promises; but in fact Castro had given them a dictatorship under which free expression and free elections no longer existed. He had given them a Government-controlled Press. He had confiscated their property, terrorized their religion and suppressed all civil and political liberty. And to cap it all, at Punta del Este, he had voted against even the principle of free elections.

31. It must be clear to all that the present rulers of Cuba had engaged in a classic example of communist subversion from within. They had sought to gain power over Cuba not to free the Cubans but to enslave them, not to serve Cuban interests but to serve the interests of that world-wide imperialism which wanted Cuba as a bridgehead for its ambitions in the rest of Latin America. The free peoples of Latin America would not permit that; that was the reason for the decisions they had taken at Punta del Este. Since the end of the Second World War, the free nations had sought by every means to defend their freedom. The United Nations had witnessed many of the battles in what had come to be known as the cold war, of which Cuba and the present debate offered but the latest example. The American republics had hoped to keep the cold war from their shores; but one of the American States had been subverted and was being used as a vehicle for pressing the cold war against the United States and its American friends. The United States had not brought the cold war to the Committee; it was the Castro régime and its masters that had done so. As the United States Secretary of State had said at Punta del Este, the cold war was really a struggle in the long story of human freedom, between those who would destroy it and those who were determined to preserve it. If every nation were genuinely independent and left alone to work out its relations with its neighbours by common agreement, the tensions between Washington and Moscow would vanish overnight.

32. Latin America was a continent in ferment. To satisfy its hopes the Western hemisphere had embarked upon a positive programme of unparalleled magnitude, the Alliance for Progress. The United States was ready to contribute over a thousand million dollars a year to that great humanitarian undertaking, and to do its full part in helping to recreate a new world for the peoples of Latin America. That was the project which the Castro régime and its communist masters were trying to subvert. Accord-

ingly, the communist bloc, in the closing days of the General Assembly's sixteenth session, had taxed the Committee's patience, abused its procedures, unleashed all their tired invective and scattered groundless charges in order to arrest the forward march of the American republics to a better life and to democratic freedom. It was to be hoped that the Committee would resoundingly defeat any draft resolution that

equated unsupported charges with the decisions of the American States to defend themselves from subversion and to work together for a better life in full conformity with the principles of the United Nations Charter.

The meeting rose at 5.40 p.m.