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Chairman: Mr. Mario AMADEO (Argentina).

AGENDA ITEM 78

Complaint by Cuba of threats to international peace and security arising from new plans of aggression and acts of intervention being executed by the Government of the United States of America against the Revolutionary Government of Cuba (A/4832 and Add.1, A/5072, A/C.1/845, A/C.1/847, A/C.1/851, A/C.1/854, A/C.1/866, A/C.1/L.309) (continued)

1. Mr. FLORES AVENDAÑO (Guatemala) said that the charges made by the Cuban representative at the 1231st meeting were similar to those made in the Committee in April 1961 at the time of the invasion of Cuba. He had mentioned training camps and the concentration of mercenaries—the expression used by the Cuban representative to describe the Cuban patriots who wished to save their country from the communist system—and the support the United States fleet had given to the landing operations. He had quoted numerous newspaper reports in such detail that he had even given the exact number of dollars used for financing operations designed to overthrow the Cuban dictator. As a new element, he had referred to the so-called act of intervention constituted by the Eighth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the American States, held at Punta del Este in January 1962, which, according to the Cuban representative, was subordinated to the interests of United States imperialism.

2. Having examined all those charges, the Guatemalan delegation felt that they had been dressed up in heavy armour in order to conceal their basic weakness, for in fact no new plans of aggression or acts of intervention had been brought forward, unless the Punta del Este meeting could be considered in that light. In that case, the accusation against the Government of the United States must be extended to all the Governments that were represented at Punta del Este, in other words, to all the American countries.

3. The item now under discussion could be added to those already being discussed in the United Nations under the general heading of "cold-war items". They were designed to serve the interests of the countries of the Soviet bloc, a bloc at whose disposal the com-

munist régime of Dr. Fidel Castro had publicly and unconditionally placed itself. That was one of the reasons why his delegation would vote against the draft resolution submitted by Czechoslovakia and Romania (A/C.1/L.309) and any other proposal pursuing similar aims.

4. Since the delegation of Guatemala and Guatemala itself had been mentioned in connexion with the accusation levelled against the United States, not only by the Cuban representative but by another representative who had supported the accusation, he was forced to intervene in the debate in order to explain the conduct of the Guatemalan Government and to repeat what had already been said in the Committee the previous April.

5. However, there was one basic point which he would like to make and which concerned not only the American hemisphere but also the world at large. At the root of the delicate problems that were not only exacerbating tension in the Caribbean but also endangering the peace of the American continent and perhaps of the world lay the clash of the two philosophies which divided the world. On the one hand, there were those who believed that in order to attain social justice, humanity must bow to the will of a totalitarian State, thereby sacrificing the fundamental rights of man; on the other, there were those who believed that social justice could be attained by advancing along the broad avenue of freedom in democratic States and systems and for whom justice without freedom was not justice. Guatemala and the American republics belonged to the latter group.

6. What did the Revolutionary Government of Cuba mean to Guatemala? Ever since its first struggles for independence, Cuba had been linked with Guatemala and an indissoluble bond had been forged between the two peoples. Guatemala, having itself achieved freedom and justice after a painful process of national integration, had welcomed the triumph of the Cuban patriots under Dr. Fidel Castro. Neither the people nor the Government of Guatemala had any reason to bear the Cubans ill will and they sincerely wished them the happiness which was their birthright. In view of that background of fraternal relations, why had Guatemala broken off relations with the Government of Cuba only a few months after the triumph of the Cuban revolution?

7. It had done so because the Revolutionary Government of Guatemala of 1944 had been criminally diverted from its true course and had conferred very few benefits on the people. International communism had infiltrated the régime and instead of a functional democracy a unilateral democracy had been set up; instead of social justice being established, violence had been unleashed; instead of the promised economic emancipation of the workers, the economy had been undermined and a class struggle had been instituted. In short, the betrayers of democracy had taken advantage of the revolution. Atrocities without parallel in Guatemala's history had been committed. That

period of government had been characterized by public association with international communism.

8. In a message to the Guatemalan Congress on 1 March 1954, Lieutenant-Colonel Jacobo Arbenz Guzmán had stated quite openly that during the régime of Dr. Arévalo there had been no Marxist party such as the one which existed in Guatemala in 1954, in other words, that his Government was sanctioning the existence and activities of the communist party in the country. Such action was a complete violation of article 32 of the 1945 Constitution, and that article 32 had provided the legal basis for the liberation movement of 1954, which had overthrown the illegal government and rescued Guatemala from the clutches of communism.

9. As soon as the Revolutionary Government had been established in Cuba, its main spokesman, Mr. Fidel Castro, had invited Arbenz Guzmán to set himself up in Havana and organize commandos to invade Guatemala for the criminal purpose of regaining power. The intention was to impose on Guatemala a system within the communist orbit, such as the one to which the heroic Cuban people was now subjected. It was easy to see why Mr. Castro had chosen Guatemala as the immediate target for his design of exporting the Cuban revolution. As a result of the tolerance shown by the Guatemalan liberation movement, the deposed leaders were able to work clandestinely or to put on new disguise and await orders.

10. There were many events which, without exaggeration, could be called acts of intervention in Guatemala by the Castro-Arbenz Guzmán coalition. Such events had already been described to the Committee in April 1961. Those acts of intervention were, however, not limited to Guatemala. Panama had been the first victim of attacks by commandos organized by the Cuban régime. The security of Nicaragua, Costa Rica, Honduras, El Salvador, in fact of all the countries of Central America, had been similarly threatened. Finally, with the help of Cuban agents, the international communist movement had appeared in South American countries, threatening the stability of their legally constituted Governments and democratic institutions. It might be recalled that, in the euphoria of his first triumph, Mr. Castro had stated that the Andes would become a new Sierra Maestra. Guatemala wished to make it clear that it did not regard Castro as Cuba nor did it consider that the system he was trying to export was representative of the Cuban people. During the debate in April 1961, the Ecuadorian representative had said^{1/} that attempts to export revolutions were always the product of megalomania.

11. So far as Guatemala itself was concerned, the revolution of 1944, freed of communist attempts to capitalize on the efforts of a people struggling for its freedom and for justice, had consolidated its gains and, within the democratic system on which Guatemala's institutions were based, had attained the objectives of social justice, economic independence and political freedom. Guatemala had not the slightest intention of changing its system of government. Both its Government and people were following the path of constructive evolution. Nor did it need the example of subversive Castroism to transform the economic and social situation by land reform, literacy campaigns, public health programmes and the exploitation of natural resources.

^{1/} Official Records of the General Assembly, Fifteenth Session (Part II), 1153rd meeting, para. 13.

12. For all those reasons, it could be stated that the Revolutionary Government of Cuba represented a threat to Guatemala's peace and security inasmuch as it sought to overthrow the legally constituted Government and to create an atmosphere of confusion propitious to the extension of communist doctrine. That Government, with its disregard for the standards of peaceful coexistence, represented an equal danger to the other Latin American republics. The matter before the Committee was not only one between the Revolutionary Government of Cuba and the United States of America; it was also of concern to the other American republics, as had been established by the resolutions adopted at Punta del Este declaring that the communist doctrine was incompatible with American democracy.

13. The maintenance of the inter-American system was the sole means of preserving peace and democracy in the American continent. That system safeguarded peace among States, guaranteed the freedom and independence of nations and proclaimed, as basic tenets of representative democracy, the principles of non-intervention and respect for human rights. At each of the many inter-American conferences which had been held, resolutions had been adopted strengthening faith in the future of the American continent. In 1948, the charter of the Organization of American States^{2/} had been drafted at Bogotá. At the Tenth International Conference of American States, held at Caracas in 1954, communist political action had been declared incompatible with the concept of American freedom and stress had been laid on the danger of communist infiltration into the inter-American system. At that conference the representative of El Salvador, Mr. Urquía, had stated that communism was ready to use socialist régimes as a bridgehead for the establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat and to resort to force and any licit or illicit means at its disposal for the achievement of its ends. At that same meeting, Mr. Nuñez Portuondo, then the representative of Cuba, had referred to the draft resolution drawn up in 1938 in which all the countries of the continent bound themselves never to engage in the practices of nazism. As though already aware of the dangers looming over Cuba, he had gone on to state that the horrors perpetrated by Nazi Germany could not be compared with the persecution of defenceless European countries by the Soviet Union. The Chilean representative at Caracas had said that the intervention of communist imperialism in America was not only an attack upon the inter-American system but an attempt to destroy the spiritual basis of Western civilization.

14. Since 1954, the prohibition of political infiltration in the American continent had been one of the basic aims of the OAS. In the interests of maintaining peace and democracy throughout the continent through the defence of fundamental human rights, the upholding of republican régimes and the reinforcement of continental solidarity, the inter-American system had condemned Marxist action because of its interventionist tendencies and its anti-democratic character. It was hardly surprising that the Latin American States had accused the Revolutionary Government of Cuba of communist affiliation and totalitarian methods, of being an agent conspiring against the peace and freedom of the continent and of serving the interests of extra-continental Powers.

^{2/} United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 119 (1952), No. 1609.

15. There was no question of trying to impose on the Cuban people a way of life or a government that was to the liking of the United States of America, as the Czechoslovak representative had wrongly stated. The real issue was the maintenance of peace and democracy in the continent. The American States were striving to ensure that the Revolutionary Government of Cuba respected human rights and the principles of non-intervention and self-determination of peoples, which it was constantly violating. Finally, they were attempting to prevent interference by extra-continental Powers seeking to change the American way of life and the social and political institutions which the American countries had inherited from the past. While coexistence between countries with different political, economic and social systems was feasible at the international level and within the United Nations, it was not feasible in the inter-American system, because the American continent formed an organized unit and because, ever since the time of their liberation, Americans could not conceive of life without freedom or of a political system that was not based on popular consultation.

16. The principle of self-determination of peoples, which was set forth in the United Nations Charter and was inherent in democracy, was completely inoperative in totalitarian régimes, whether they were called nazism, fascism or communism. How could self-determination be exercised where there was no freedom? Freedom was the essence of American life and Americans could not live except under systems which upheld popular sovereignty. On the other hand, communism was a system of life and government which destroyed that basic principle because it treated man merely as a cog in a piece of machinery and denied him freedom of opinion, freedom to travel, freedom of employment, and freedom of religious expression. Was it conceivable that any of the American republics should wish to change their democratic régime for a communist régime or that an American people should seek to place itself voluntarily under a government with totalitarian leanings?

17. An unequivocal reply to those questions had already been given by the Cuban martyrs who had preferred death to submission to the dictatorship of Dr. Fidel Castro. A reply had also been given by the 200,000 Cuban patriots who had voluntarily chosen exile in preference to life without freedom.

18. It was possible—and unfortunately that was happening in Cuba—that a group of mistaken men, betraying the aims of their revolution and using the argument of force, should seek to impose on their country a totalitarian régime within the orbit of the communist States, that class struggles should be started and social vengeance used as a mistaken means of correcting inequalities, that a group of men, assuming a representative character they lacked, since they exercised power by force, should attempt to divorce their country from the American community and incorporate it in the communist bloc, and that such false apostles, using resources provided by the communist countries, should try to undermine order in certain Latin American republics for the purpose of provoking the violent overthrow of their Governments and creating a climate ripe for systems such as that to which the heroic Cuban people was being subjugated. All those possibilities might occur, but they would not result from application of the principle of self-determination. They would be the outcome of the use of force and the violation of human rights and fundamental freedoms.

They would involve the breaking of international agreements for the deliberate purpose of undermining the inter-American system and endangering the peace of the continent.

19. In conclusion, the Guatemalan delegation reaffirmed the position it had taken at the recent Punta del Este meeting with regard to the resolutions excluding the Revolutionary Government of Cuba from the OAS and declaring the communist system to be incompatible with American freedom and democracy. It asserted that the accusation levelled by the Revolutionary Government of Cuba against the United States Government was a problem of the American continent and had implications for the world as a whole. It intended to vote against the draft resolution submitted by Czechoslovakia and Romania, since the accusation it contained was merely a new item in the cold war.

20. Mr. ZORIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) observed that the representative of Guatemala, in the statement he had just made, had defended not so much the position of his own country as that of the United States of America; but that was hardly surprising, for the Government of Guatemala was the direct outcome of measures taken by the United States Government in 1954, when its Central Intelligence Agency had organized the armed invasion of Guatemala, the overthrow of Guatemala's legitimate Government and the installation of a Government sympathetic to the United States. The remarks of the representative of Guatemala did not reflect the true attitude of the Guatemalan people to events taking place in Cuba, for the real voice of the Guatemalan people had not been heard since 1954. What was interesting about the statement of the representative of Guatemala, however, was that he had not been able to deny or refute any of the facts cited by previous speakers, especially the representatives of Cuba and Czechoslovakia—in particular, the damaging admissions of the President of Guatemala on 31 December 1961 concerning that country's part in the preparations for the United States intervention in Cuba in April 1961. The representative of Guatemala had not been able to deny them because they were the truth. The United States position must, he felt, be very weak if Guatemala was the only Latin American country willing to defend it in the Committee; that defence merely showed how strong a hold the CIA still had on the Government of that country. It would be interesting to hear, as he hoped members would do later in the debate, the authentic voice of the independent countries of Latin America instead of an echo of the pronouncements of the United States Department of State.

21. At the previous meeting the Soviet delegation had put a number of questions to the United States delegation. The United States representative had not yet replied and did not, apparently, intend to reply to those questions, from which it was clear that the United States had no answer to them—that in fact the propositions formulated by the Soviet Union delegation had been correct. Without waiting any longer, therefore, for a reply from the United States delegation, he would set out the position of the Soviet Union on the question now before the Committee.

22. The question was one which had already been debated by the General Assembly at its fifteenth session in the extraordinary circumstances of an armed attack on Cuba. The General Assembly was now compelled to discuss the question again because of the

threats to international peace and security arising from the new plans of aggression and acts of intervention being executed by the Government of the United States of America against the Revolutionary Government of Cuba. That, indeed, was the item before the Committee, but the representative of the United States, while accusing the representative of Cuba of attempting to distract the attention of the Committee from the substance of the issue, had himself spoken about practically everything but that. The facts, however, were clear. In 1961 the United States, in violation of the elementary rules of international law and the basic principles of the United Nations, which categorically prohibited interference in the domestic affairs of other States, had organized an armed intervention by mercenaries against the Republic of Cuba. The United States Government was at the present time completing preparations for the launching of a new attack upon the Cuban people. The invasion forces were this time being trained within the ranks of the United States Army itself, in the territory of Guatemala, Nicaragua, Colombia and Panama. The situation was more than alarming: the threat of the renewed invasion of Cuba was immediate. It was no longer a secret from anyone that the United States Government had deliberately set as its goal the overthrow, by whatever means offered, of the democratic régime in Cuba. The statement just made by the representative of Guatemala merely confirmed that fact.

23. The United Nations Charter required States to settle their differences by peaceful means, which included negotiations. But the United States Government had not only persistently refused to take part in negotiations with Cuba, but had officially declared that it would never do so, thereby revealing that its policy towards Cuba was exclusively one of hostility, violence and direct intervention in Cuba's domestic affairs. Hence the threat now hanging over Cuba. The reason for the present state of affairs lay in the refusal of the United States monopolies, whose interests the United States Government served, to recognize that the Cuban people now wished to be the masters of their own fate and did not intend to allow those monopolies to plunder their country's natural wealth any longer. Until recently United States monopolies had held a controlling interest in Cuba's economy. United States capital investments in that small country had totalled well over \$1,000 million. The fantastic profits had lavishly repaid the original investment. Some striking facts about the position occupied by the United States monopolies in Cuba's economy had, incidentally, been given in a February 1961 issue of the London weekly, *The Observer*, according to which the United States had tolerated a succession of puppet dictators so long as they had not interfered with United States business. Batista had been one of those dictators. The representative of Guatemala had referred to Mr. Nuñez Portuondo, Batista's representative in the United Nations; it was thus clear what kind of democracy the representative of Guatemala was concerned about. The United States had not merely tolerated Batista but actively supported him and supplied him with weapons for the suppression of the Cuban people. When the collapse of the Batista régime had been imminent, the United States Department of State and the CIA had attempted to set up a new military junta in Cuba solely in order to frustrate the victory of the Cuban revolution. In the light of the facts, the statement of Secretary of State Rusk, upon his return from Punta del Este on 2 February 1962, that the United States itself had banished colonialism from Cuba and

provided the conditions for independence appeared cynical indeed.

24. As everyone knew, the determination of the Cuban people and the Revolutionary Government of Cuba to stop their country's wealth flowing into the pockets of foreign monopolies had enraged the monopolists of the United States. And business and government were one in the United States: the President of the United States, Mr. Kennedy, himself had said that business was the silent partner of the Federal Government, and that government and business were essential allies. Acting in the interests of the monopolies, the Government of the United States, resorting to the most shameful methods, had from the spring of 1960 onwards attempted to bring the Cuban people to their knees, to strangle Cuba economically and to isolate it politically. All that, however, had been merely a prelude to direct military intervention in Cuba. The facts were now known—they had been openly admitted by former President Eisenhower and freely published in the United States Press—about the part played by the United States Government in the training of the Cuban counter-revolutionaries for an attack on Cuba.

25. Who, precisely, were those counter-revolutionaries and, more particularly, their leaders? They were for the most part former capitalists or large landowners. One of them, Manuel Antonio de Varona, had, according to a United States newspaper report, expressed the view that all the land which had formerly belonged to the large landowners and had since been nationalized and distributed among the peasants by the Castro Government, should be returned to the original owners, save for some 15 per cent which was not suitable for cultivation. Thus, the allies of the United States in its scheme to overthrow the democratic régime in Cuba were the most arrant reactionaries—the big landowners and capitalists who had been expelled from the country by the Cuban people and were hoping to return with the help of the United States Government, as had been the case in Guatemala.

26. A key element in United States preparations for the military invasion of Cuba had been the establishment of bases and training centres, not only in the territory of the United States itself, but also in that of a number of Latin American countries, foremost among them being Guatemala, as President Ydígoras Fuentes himself had admitted in his New Year's Eve speech already referred to in the course of the debate. Indeed, the United States had been so anxious to secure bases in Guatemala for the launching of its aggression against Cuba that it had been prepared to sacrifice the interests of its NATO ally, the United Kingdom by promising Guatemala, in payment for its services, the territory of British Honduras.

27. Preparations had thus been made for the invasion of Cuba by bands of counter-revolutionaries and mercenaries trained, equipped and transported by the United States, according to a plan drawn up by United States military experts, at a cost to the United States of \$45 million. The President of the United States had himself publicly assumed responsibility for the intervention in a statement issued on 24 April 1961. The role of United States diplomacy in the whole affair had been a sorry one. The United States representatives in the United Nations had continued, until the very last moment, to assure the world that the United States was contemplating no aggressive action against Cuba.

28. In fact the intervention in Cuba organized and prepared by the United States Government had, as

everyone knew, failed dismally. The proud and freedom-loving Cuban people had risen as one man in defence of their fatherland against invasion by mercenaries trained, armed, clothed and brought to their landing-place with the aid of United States dollars. But the Cuban people and the Revolutionary Government of Cuba had not been alone in their struggle; they had had with them the sympathies and the moral support of all peace-loving peoples of the world. The Soviet Government, in an official statement of 18 April 1961 (A/C.1/839) had promised the Republic of Cuba all the support needed in its struggle for freedom and independence. The victory of the Cuban people had been warmly welcomed all over the world as the victory of the forces of peace and social progress over those of aggression and reaction, as the end of the attempts by the United States to revive gunboat diplomacy in the second half of the twentieth century. The Cuban people had clearly shown, in their routing of the mercenaries of a foreign Power, their support for the new democratic régime in their country, for the Revolutionary Government of Mr. Fidel Castro. With their weapons in their hands, they had voted for the preservation of the democratic conquests in Cuba, for Cuba's right to a free and independent life and its right to conduct its internal affairs as it thought fit. There should be no doubt now, therefore, in anyone's mind as to the real will of the Cuban people. The United States, however, appeared unwilling to draw the proper conclusions from the failure of its attempts to invade Cuba.

29. Indeed, it was now apparent that the United States was not merely continuing but was intensifying its aggressive policy towards the Government and people of Cuba. In the sphere of propaganda, it had begun a new campaign of slander designed to denigrate the Cuban revolution and to present its goals in a distorted light. The United States Department of State had recently issued a white paper entitled "The Castro régime in Cuba". The previous year it had published a similar document entitled, simply, "Cuba" (A/4725) which had been circulated on 6 April 1961, a little over a week before the start of the invasion prepared and organized by the United States against the Republic of Cuba. The new white paper was full of slanderous allegations against that country, the absurdity of which could be gauged from the fact that the authors were now blaming Cuba because the greater part of its trade was at present conducted with the countries of the socialist camp, when in fact it was the United States, which had formerly absorbed the greater part of Cuba's foreign trade, that had placed a virtual embargo on trade with Cuba. Moreover, the United States had done everything in its power to force other countries, also, to stop trading with Cuba. The intention of the United States to strangle Cuba economically had thus been evident from the very beginning. When that plan had failed and Cuba had found other sources of trade among countries which sincerely wished to help in its development, the United States had again tried to turn that fact against Cuba.

30. The United States white paper further declared that Cuba's armed forces were now more numerous than they had been in the time of Batista. But the dictator Batista had had nothing to fear from the United States, which had supported and protected his régime and supplied him with weapons to combat the Cuban people. Revolutionary, democratic Cuba, however, had already been the victim of one armed intervention on the part of the United States, which was now preparing another. It was fortunate for Cuba that its leaders

were not deceived by the reassuring statements of the United States that it had no intention of committing armed aggression against Cuba, and were strengthening Cuba's defences. The hypocritical declarations of the United States were intended simply to disarm Cuba and to leave the Cuban people defenceless against the intervention now being prepared. Unlike the armed forces of the United States, however, the revolutionary armed forces of Cuba were intended solely for purposes of self-defence as sanctioned by the Charter of the United Nations. The very weapons with which the Cuban army was equipped were purely defensive in character. That had been made abundantly clear by the Cuban Prime Minister, Mr. Fidel Castro, in a statement made on 2 January 1962, in which he had declared that Cuba had no means of transporting troops and tanks to the territory of other countries, a fact confirmed in a United States Government report recently made public. Thus, the United States Government itself was well aware that Cuba was not acquiring the means of conducting aggression against other countries but only those necessary for its own self-defence.

31. There was another important fact, to which the President of Cuba had drawn attention in his statement at Punta del Este in January 1962, namely, that unlike the United States, Cuba had no military pacts or links with any State outside the American continent, nor had any Power outside the American continent any military base on Cuban soil: the only foreign military base on Cuban soil was the United States base set up at Guantánamo Bay by force and without the consent of the Cuban people. It was hardly surprising, in those circumstances, that Cuba did not wish to remain without defence.

32. The white paper further stated that the United States was not pleased with the new order which had come into being in Cuba as the result of the revolution. Each to his taste. It was not the concern of the Soviet Union that the United States preferred to choose as its allies such disreputable dictators as Franco and Salazar or such bankrupt personalities as Chiang Kai-shek, Syngman Rhee and now General Park Chung Hee.

33. But it was one thing for the United States Government to dislike the Cuban régime and quite another thing for it to take action against that régime. The United States was bound to respect the United Nations Charter, the charter of the Organization of American States and the fundamental principles of international law, all of which prohibited interference in the domestic affairs of a State. The present régime in Cuba was that country's own affair and derived its power directly from the Cuban people. The United States President himself had told Congress on 11 January 1962, in his "State of the Union" message, that his country was in favour of a community of free and independent States—free to choose their own future and their own systems, whether or not they followed the same path as the United States. But was that a genuine expression of the policy of the United States or merely a cover for interference in countries whose systems did not suit it?

34. The charges put forward against Cuba in the white paper were clearly absurd. It was accused of taking part in cultural exchanges with the socialist countries and extolling the economic and social achievements of the Soviet Union. But exactly the same could be said of the United States. The fact that the charges were so flimsy indicated that they were merely a part of a

propaganda campaign to prepare the ground for further aggression against Cuba.

35. Against that background the economic sanctions adopted by the United States against Cuba were particularly significant. Trade between the two countries had been reduced almost to a standstill; the value of United States exports to Cuba had fallen from \$546 million in 1958 to \$15 million in 1961, and that of its imports from Cuba from \$528 million to \$35 million. In December 1961, the United States Government had announced that measures would be taken against certain companies and individuals in order to reduce trade still further. Even that had not satisfied it, and on 3 February 1962 it had declared a complete embargo on trade with Cuba. Still worse, it was trying to compel other countries to take similar measures. On 6 February, The New York Times had quoted the United States Secretary of State as saying that countries outside the Western hemisphere would have to reconsider their policy towards Cuba, a statement which amounted to an order. But no self-respecting country could allow such interference in its domestic affairs, and the Secretary of State for External Affairs of Canada, for example, had been driven to describe the United States action as highly unusual and inappropriate.

36. In the political field, the United States was making ever-increasing efforts to isolate Cuba. Wide publicity had recently been given to its attempts to touse the OAS for its aggressive ends. The OAS, as a regional agency within the framework of the United Nations, was, of course, entitled to deal with questions within its competence. But it was not legitimate for the United States to seek to impose its will on the other members and threaten reprisals against those which did not follow its line. That, however, was exactly what the United States had been doing at the Eighth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the American States at Punta del Este. Even before the meeting, on 13 January 1962, the New York Herald Tribune had described the United States tactics towards the Latin American countries as arm-twisting at the highest diplomatic level. The United States had even resorted to blackmail against the Latin Americans, threatening to deny them aid under the Alliance for Progress if they refused to toe the line.

37. Threats of that kind had been made first in the United States Press, then by members of Congress and finally by the Secretary of State himself, upon his arrival at Montevideo on 21 January 1962. Even United States newspapers—for example, the New York Herald Tribune—had been shocked by the attempt to make economic aid conditional on a certain course of foreign policy. The United States representative had told the Committee that the Cuban problem was a multilateral one, but that was scarcely a justification for such methods. In any case, those methods had failed, since the United States had not succeeded in persuading the largest Latin American countries to agree to certain measures which would have given it the green light for further aggressive action against Cuba. Brazil, Ecuador, Mexico and Chile had not agreed with the decision to suspend trade with Cuba in arms and implements of war, a suspension which was later to be extended to other items. Similarly, Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador and Mexico, representing three-quarters of the population of Latin America, had refused to support the proposal to exclude Cuba from the OAS. Even in the countries whose Governments had voted with the United States, the overwhelming

majority of the people sympathized with Cuba. The United States had also been unable to gain approval for the thesis that Cuba was a threat to peace in the Western hemisphere and was guilty of aggressive acts against its neighbours. Such charges were obviously fantastic, considering that Cuba had itself recently been the victim of an attack by the United States. Finally, the United States had put forward the argument that the Cuban régime was incompatible with the principles of the inter-American system. Was it incompatible with the inter-American system for standards of living to rise, for peasants to be given land, for unemployment to be eliminated, for there to be no racial discrimination or for the illiteracy rate to be reduced below the level in the United States, all of which had happened in Cuba since the revolution? Or was it that the United States could not agree to any Latin American country being free to choose its own way of life?

38. The United States representative had stated in the Committee that the American republics were determined to prove that man's aspirations for economic progress and social justice could best be achieved through free and democratic institutions. If that was what they wanted to prove, they should do so by lawful and peaceful means in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations. Cuba, for its part, had already shown that its social system yielded benefits unknown in the countries which enjoyed United States aid. Peaceful competition to demonstrate the advantages of one system or another was perfectly acceptable. But the United States was trying to conceal the fact that the social revolution in Cuba had been made by the people and for the people by raising the bogey of Marxist-Leninist doctrine and communism. There was nothing new about attempts to slander communism, which had been going on for over a hundred years. But communism had resisted all efforts to destroy it and now had the adherence of over 1,000 million people. The history of the twentieth century had shown the profound truth of Lenin's statement that Marx's thought was all-powerful because it was true. No slanders could prevent communism being the force of the future. The United States, however, only raised the question of communism in connexion with Cuba as a means of reconciling its policy of interference in Cuba with the principle of non-interference in the domestic affairs of other countries. So much was clear from an article in The New York Times of 31 January 1962. However, the two were clearly irreconcilable. The United States was planning further aggression against Cuba and had introduced the idea of "incompatibility", entailing the exclusion of Cuba from the OAS, merely as a preparation for such aggression.

39. The idea of incompatibility itself conflicted with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, an organization which by its nature included States with many different political and social systems. It also conflicted with the charter of the Organization of American States. As the President of Argentina had said on 3 February 1962, with reference to the attempts made at Punta del Este to exclude Cuba from the OAS, no inter-American treaty made provision for such arbitrary action.

40. The political manoeuvres of the United States were all the more disquieting in that they were accompanied by preparations for military aggression. Since July 1961, thousands of counter-revolutionaries, who had been used by the United States in the attack on Cuba in April 1961, had enlisted in the United States

armed forces, where they were being trained for another invasion. Some 800 men were being trained in partisan tactics in Guatemala under the leadership of José Eleuterio Pedraza, formerly a Batista general. According to The New York Times of 23 December 1961 some 400 trained mercenaries had left Guatemala for the United States in November-December 1961 and a spokesman for the counter-revolutionaries, Luis Manuel Martínez, had implied that some were already fighting in Cuba. Training camps for counter-revolutionaries had also been set up in Colombia, according to an Associated Press report from Bogotá dated 18 December 1961, and it was admitted that the counter-revolutionaries would make their way to the Escambray mountains as soon as they were trained and armed. The preparations, however, were not limited to landing small groups of mercenaries in Cuba, but included the organization of another attack on the country on an even larger scale than before. The leader of the counter-revolutionaries in Colombia had openly stated that they were only waiting for the outcome of the Punta del Este meeting before launching a full-scale military operation against Cuba. Dr. José Miró Cardona, the head of the so-called Cuban Revolutionary Council, had declared that the expulsion of Cuba from the OAS would speed up direct military action to overthrow the Castro régime. The Associated Press had reported statements made by him at a press conference on 6 February 1962 to the effect that the aim was to overthrow Castro by force and that the peoples of other Latin American countries were being mobilized in support of that aim.

41. It was particularly alarming to note that all reports agreed on the date for which the attack was planned. On 18 August 1961, Le Monde had said that the invasion would take place within six months and in October 1961 a Cuban counter-revolutionary leader had mentioned a period of four months; in both cases, February 1962 was the indicated date.

42. All the evidence showed that the United States was preparing to use force to impose the régime of its choice on the Cuban people. Its attempts to legalize international banditry were fraught with danger for the peace of the world. Cuba was not, however, alone, but could rely on the support of all peace-loving countries in its struggle for peace and independence and for social progress. The Soviet Union had made its position quite clear in a message sent by the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR to the Prime Minister of Cuba on 3 February 1962, expressing complete solidarity with the Cuban people in their struggle. But the defence of a small country against aggression by a major Power was not the concern only of individual States. The United Nations could not accept such attempts to settle disputes by economic pressure, political blackmail and military intervention, instead of by peaceful means. It was the duty of every Member State and of the Organization as a whole to prevent the imperialists' plans from reaching fruition and thus ward off the danger to the peace of the world. But it was not only Cuba's fate that was at stake, however important that might be. The action taken by the United Nations would determine how far the small countries could trust it as a safeguard against arbitrary international action; Cuba was in danger at the present time, but it might be the turn of an Asian or African country next. The principles of self-determination and non-interference must be reaffirmed in practice and compliance with the provisions

of the United Nations Charter must be ensured, in order to guarantee lasting peace.

43. For those reasons, the Soviet delegation wholeheartedly supported the draft resolution submitted by Romania and Czechoslovakia (A/C.1/L.309), which put forward the minimum requirements for reaching a solution in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and which must have the support of all who were concerned to preserve peace in the Caribbean and throughout the world.

44. Mr. GARCIA INCHAUSTEGUI (Cuba), speaking in exercise of his right of reply, said that the representative of Guatemala had confined himself to repeating what had already been said by the United States representative. But the latter had denied none of the Cuban accusations, particularly in respect to his Government's responsibility for the acts committed before and after the Playa Girón invasion, a responsibility which was evident from the statements made by the President of Guatemala himself.

45. However, he did not intend to distract the attention of the Committee by replying to the representative of a Government which, through the mouth of its own President, had confessed to being an accomplice in the aggression against Cuba. He wished, however, to comment on the so-called problem of exporting revolution. In the Second Declaration of Havana, the Cuban people had said, in reply to the accusation that Cuba was attempting to export revolution, that revolutions were not for export, but were made by peoples; what Cuba could give to peoples, and had already given, was an example. The Cuban revolution had shown that in the contemporary world there was no force capable of arresting the movement for the liberation of peoples.

46. The United States Government was attempting, through procedures which it had repeatedly employed in the regional organization, to exert pressure on delegations not to approve any kind of resolution in the current discussion, a position summarized, in fact, in that day's edition of The New York Times. Furthermore, after the Committee's previous meeting, the United States representative had called together a group of Latin American representatives to inform them of his Government's firm opposition to the adoption of any resolution. He also understood that the United States had approached other non-Latin American Member States.

47. If the United States had a completely different point of view from that of Cuba, why did it not submit draft resolutions in support of it? The explanation was to be found in the fact that Cuba's request to the Committee was based on the principles of the United Nations Charter, whereas the position of the United States, as an aggressor, was against every principle of the Charter and the most elementary principles of international law.

48. In his view, no one could have any doubt of the existence of a serious problem between two Member States of the Organization. He hoped that the fact that one of those States was small and the other large and powerful would not prevent Cuba from being given the protection to which it was entitled under international law and the Charter of the United Nations. Cuba, by defending its right not to tolerate interference or aggression, was defending the right of all States, regardless of their size, to their own sovereignty.

Cuba intended to defend that right in its own country to the last drop of Cuban blood. It also intended to defend that same right within the international family, not merely in order to safeguard Cuba's independence but also in order to protect the sovereignty and independence of all Member States of the United Nations.

49. Mr. PLIMPTON (United States of America), speaking in exercise of his right of reply, said he wished to repeat that the United States was not planning the slightest armed attack on Cuba. The only threat to the Castro dictatorship was the longing of the Cuban people for freedom, a longing which could not for ever be kept shackled by an iron totalitarian repression. The only threat to peace and security in the Western hemisphere was the aggressive attempts by the Castro régime to interfere in the domestic affairs of the American republics and to overthrow their free institutions by outside force.

50. At the Eighth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the American States, held at Punta del Este in January 1962, all the American republics except Cuba had rejected the Cuban charges and had declared that it was Cuban Marxism-Leninism which was a threat to the peace and security of the Americas. He urged all representatives to read the resolution entitled "Communist offensive in America", adopted at Punta del Este, which gave a complete answer to the unbridled accusations of the Cuban régime and of the other communist totalitarian representatives who had spoken in the debate.

51. His delegation would make a full reply at a later stage of the debate.

The meeting rose at 1.45 p.m.