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CONTENTS

	Page
Agenda item 103: The strengthening of international security ( <i>continued</i> )	1

*Chairman: Mr. Agha SHAHI (Pakistan).*

**AGENDA ITEM 103**

**The strengthening of international security (*continued*)  
(A/7654; A/C.1/L.468)**

1. Mr. GAUCI (Malta): Mr. Chairman, the delegation of Malta, which has already experienced your wise counsel, is particularly pleased to see you presiding over this Committee, and we express the sincere hope that under your Chairmanship this session will bear positive results. In extending our sincere congratulations to you on your unanimous election, we express the same sentiments to the Vice-Chairman and to the Rapporteur.

2. There appear to be two ways of viewing the item before us today. The first is to consider the draft appeal [A/C.1/L.468] to all States of the world for the strengthening of international security as an enterprising attempt by a Power with worldwide ambitions to obtain United Nations endorsement of its policies. The second is to accept the Soviet proposal as indicative of a sincere desire by a major Power voluntarily to correct any errors which may have occurred in the past, in order to strengthen the United Nations and world security, particularly the security of small States. In this latter case, the Soviet proposal must be evaluated in the framework of its ideological roots and of the accuracy with which it pinpoints both the root causes of world insecurity and proposes effective actions for the strengthening of world security.

3. The first interpretation is negative and pessimistic. My delegation cannot accept it since we have an implicit, perhaps even a naive, faith in the good intentions and sincere desire for peaceful co-operation of the major Powers. Whatever observations we shall make, therefore, will be from the point of view of the ideological foundations of the Soviet initiative and of the relevance of this initiative to the real problems of the world.

4. Let me immediately say that my delegation has no quarrel with the timing of the Soviet initiative, which coincides not only with the approach of the twenty-fifth anniversary of the United Nations, but also with important international political developments. It is highly appropriate that the United Nations should seek to guide those

developments in a way most beneficial to peace and security.

5. An appeal by the United Nations to the peoples of the world for the strengthening of international security would have immense value if, after recalling the relevant paragraphs of the Charter and the ideals and aspirations of all mankind, and after pinpointing objectively and impartially the major causes of world insecurity, it were to give a clear indication of a firm resolve by all of us to rectify, as soon as possible and as far as practicable, the festering consequences of past aggression and of present oppression and to live in future as good neighbours in one world. Such an appeal could, with advantage, contain proposed measures to reactivate or to improve United Nations mechanisms for dealing with the maintenance of international peace and security. On the other hand, the United Nations in its present plight, and when so many resolutions both of the Security Council and of the General Assembly remain ignored, cannot afford to launch with deafening publicity one more appeal which is obviously inadequate, partisan or lacking in credibility.

6. Viewed in the light of the considerations which I have just mentioned, we regret to say that the proposed text of the Soviet draft appeal, as distinguished from the general concept of the Soviet initiative, is somewhat unsatisfactory. We cannot help noticing, for instance, that the text appears to have been drafted in some haste; thus snippets of quotations from the Charter of the United Nations appear to have been thrown together in something less than logical order and with the omission of important concepts. More important, the text of the appeal does not appear to reflect in their entirety the intentions of the Soviet Government itself. The leading article of the 30 September issue of *The New Times*, dedicated to explaining the importance of the Soviet initiative and the favourable world reaction to it, comments:

"The Charter also gives the (Security) Council powers to take action of a more general nature to promote the maintenance of international peace, notably to work for termination of the arms race and for disarmament. What the Soviet Government proposes is that these latent potentialities should be brought into play."

7. From this it might not be unreasonable to conclude that what the Soviet Government might have in mind is to transfer, at least in part, disarmament negotiations from the Committee on Disarmament to the Security Council. Yet there is no hint of such a very important concept in part V of the text of the Soviet draft appeal dealing with the recommendations to the Security Council. If it is indeed the intention to transfer disarmament negotiations from the Committee on Disarmament to the Security Council, we

feel that it is important to make explicit mention of that fact.

8. Apart from evidences of bureaucratic haste in drafting, there is some doubt in our mind whether the text before us faithfully reproduces Marxist-Leninist ideology—which I assume to be the ideological foundation of the present appeal—or whether it clearly pinpoints the major root-causes of world insecurity and tension. We do not wish to take up the time of this Committee by making an extensive analysis; a few examples will suffice.

9. We would, for instance, wish to contrast the contorted and restrictive formulation contained in paragraph 1 of section II of the text before us:

“the withdrawal of troops from territories occupied as a result of action by the armed forces of some States against other States and peoples defending the independence they have won as a result of the collapse of the colonial system, and their territorial integrity;

“the cessation of all measures for the suppression of the liberation movements of the peoples still under colonial rule and the granting of independence to all such peoples;” [A/C.1/L.468].

10. We would compare that restrictive formulation with the prophetic and unambiguous sweep of the celebrated decree on peace signed by Vladimir Ilyich Lenin on 26 October 1917, immediately after the triumph of the October revolution. With an apology for the unofficial and unidiomatic translation, I shall quote some paragraphs from that decree:

“In accordance with democratic principles and in particular with those of the working class, the Government considers the union of a small or weak nation to a large or strong State to be annexation or conquest unless the consent of the small nation has been precisely, clearly and freely given; and this regardless of the point in time when force was used to ensure the union with the stronger State or how developed or undeveloped the small nation may be . . . and also regardless of whether the small nation is located in a faraway overseas continent or in Europe.

“If any people or any nation whatsoever is kept with force within the frontiers of a State, . . . if it does not receive the right itself to decide on its own future through a free vote and without the slightest constraint, after the annexing or stronger nation has completely withdrawn its forces”—

I repeat: “after the annexing or stronger nation has completely withdrawn its forces”—

“this constitutes annexation, that is, this constitutes both conquest and aggression.”

11. There is no question but that Lenin saw clearly. The denial of the right of self-determination of peoples, not only of those peoples coming under the conventional definition of colonial peoples under Chapters XI and XII of the Charter, but of all peoples wherever they may live, is a

root-cause of international insecurity. Until the domination and exploitation by a stronger State of weak peoples, wherever they may be, disappears from the face of the earth there can be no real peace, no real security, particularly for small countries.

12. Yet this domination and this exploitation are widespread from Namibia to Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia, from Angola to Armenia, Georgia and Azerbaijan. In none of these cases was the consent of the weaker nation clearly and freely given; in none did the annexing or stronger nation completely withdraw its forces before proceeding to organize the expression of the will of the smaller and weaker people. Indeed such expressions of the will of the smaller nation as are said to exist in the cases I have just mentioned, and in many more I could mention, are so obviously tainted by constraint, contrary to Lenin's teaching and ideals, as to constitute an insult to the intelligence of mankind. We do not take a particularistic anti-historic view of the principles of self-determination of peoples. The modern world and modern technology postulate the interdependence of peoples; but it must be an interdependence in freedom, in dignity and in complete equality.

13. There cannot be the slightest doubt that the formulation of the principle of self-determination by Lenin is broader, clearer and more precisely descriptive of one of the contemporary causes of world insecurity than the text contained in section II of document A/C.1/L.468. Consequently we would suggest that this text be largely replaced by an exact quotation of the appropriate paragraphs from the 1917 decree on peace.

14. Again, the third paragraph of section I of document A/C.1/L.468 reveals a strange ambiguity in its reference to attempts being “made to revise the results of the Second World War, which ended in victory over the fascist aggressors”. That is a very indirect and most unsatisfactory way of referring to one of the main causes of tension and insecurity in Europe. Let there be no mistake: my own country, having suffered in proportion to its size as much as, if not more than, any other country during the Second World War, is firmly opposed to the return of fascism in any form. At the same time we do not close our eyes to the fact that some of the *de facto* results of the war are an obstacle to the achievement of an acceptable system of European security and are a continuing threat to peace in Europe. They are a threat to peace because these *de facto* results negate some of the fundamental postulates on which contemporary international policies are professedly based, including of course the principle of self-determination of peoples everywhere.

15. The United Nations arose as the political continuation of the victorious coalition of 1945 with the unstated primary purpose of freezing the political and strategic situation of that time. However, the future of the United Nations and its continued viability and relevance to the contemporary world lie, not in the unstated objective of its establishment but in its stated principles and purposes which aim at achieving not only peace, but peace with justice and dignity to all mankind. Hence, attempts to revise the results of the Second World War may be condemned or may be highly praised, according to their objective. We should state this quite clearly. Here again the

statements of the apostles of socialism can fruitfully serve to guide us.

16. We could well replace the weak and ambiguous formulation of the third paragraph of section I, with one of the many statements found in older but none the less highly authoritative Soviet documents emphasizing that peace must be concluded without annexations and without indemnities. Should this not be found to be entirely appropriate, we would be quite satisfied with a quotation from the appeal of 17 December 1917 addressed to the peoples of Europe by the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs then headed by Leon Trotsky who, as you will recall, Sir, was murdered 30 years ago. That appeal said: "Peace can only be built on the basis of complete and unconditional recognition of the principle of self-determination of peoples."

17. There are many other places in the document before us where the text requires to be made more specific. Without engaging in detailed examination, I would draw attention to the bureaucratic formulation of section III, particularly the third paragraph, which gives the surely unintended impression of an absent-minded genuflection to all icons. It is imperative that the text be made sharper and clearer. For instance, the words "non-interference in internal affairs" have little meaning in their present context, yet non-interference in the internal affairs of weaker nations is a fundamental principle which must always be respected by strong States, even when the highest and most unselfish motives of brotherly solidarity might counsel intervention, if we are to have any hope at all of strengthening international security. This is a fundamental point which, if implemented, would remove many of the reasons for fear and insecurity in the world.

18. When a strong State interferes in the internal affairs of a weak nation, it not only shows contempt for the human dignity of the people but also sets in motion political and social processes which can slowly kill the very life of a nation. As that famous revolutionary, Rosa Luxemburg, whose death was solemnly commemorated recently in the Soviet zone of occupation of Germany, wrote in her well-known book on the Russian revolution:

"When political life is stifled in a country, life itself is gradually paralysed. Without general elections, complete freedom of press and assembly and free competition between different points of view, life dies... and is transformed into a bureaucracy... When the *élite* of the working class assemble only to applaud the speeches of their leaders and unanimously to adopt prepared resolutions, what we have then is fundamentally the rule of a clique; a dictatorship perhaps, not however the dictatorship of the proletariat but the dictatorship of a handful of politicians and bureaucrats."

19. In these circumstances the life of the nation dies, only the shell remains. This has already happened over vast areas; many fear that the process will continue. In any solemn appeal addressed to the world the United Nations must clearly identify these consequences of the disregard of the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of States and categorically affirm the universal validity of this principle whatever the social system, whether capitalist, non-capitalist or socialist.

20. Again, in the same paragraph of section III there is the usual ritualistic reference to the principle of peaceful coexistence of States irrespective of their social systems. When first proclaimed this principle was of immense ideological and political significance. Stripped of the accompanying rhetoric, however, it meant that logical conclusions had been drawn from the fact that nuclear war was not only prohibitively costly in lives and potential destruction, as most wars are, but suicidal both for victors and vanquished. Proclamation of this principle did not, however, mean cessation of the ideological war but rather its intensification by means not likely to provoke nuclear war. This has resulted not in a lessening, but rather in an increase in the pressure exerted by certain Powers on small countries; almost any measure designed to constrain the will of small countries is tolerated as long as nuclear war is not the probable consequence. Is this truly and completely in harmony with the stated aims and purposes of the United Nations Charter?

21. Of equal importance is the fact that technology has developed with astounding rapidity since the principle of peaceful coexistence was first proclaimed. We are now on the threshold of a new era, from which neither we nor mankind can fully benefit unless lines of convergence are emphasized. Surely the United Nations should show an awareness of the irresistible forces and the requirements of history and proclaim the need not only for peaceful coexistence but also for peaceful co-operation between nations large and small and irrespective of their social systems.

22. We would much appreciate some clarification of the meaning of section IV of the draft appeal. Does it, for instance, reflect a desire to obtain indirect United Nations endorsement of certain political initiatives taken by the Soviet Union in Europe and Asia? Such a desire is not unusual at the United Nations and does not necessarily reflect adversely on the substance of the initiative for which endorsement is sought, but is it really necessary in the case at hand? Do certain initiatives have so little merit that prior United Nations endorsement is required before they can obtain careful consideration by the States principally concerned in that region?

23. Whatever may be the answer to these respectful queries, I wonder whether it might not be appropriate to add to section IV an additional paragraph to the effect that a regional security system which excludes one or more States in a region or which does not fully recognize the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples is not contemplated by the regional arrangements mentioned in Article 52-54 of the Charter. We feel that such an addition might be useful since the type of security system I have mentioned, while perhaps necessary in the present state of the world, is unlikely to develop the friendly relations between nations mentioned in Article 1, paragraph 2, of the Charter, and, on occasion, has been known to give rise to tensions.

24. Section V of document A/C.1/L.468 deals with matters on which my country, as a non-member of and non-aspirant to the Security Council, would not presume to comment at length. We note, however, that the first subparagraph of paragraph 2 makes a suggestion which was

in substance made several years ago by another permanent member of the Security Council and which was then rejected by the Soviet Union. As for the second subparagraph of paragraph 2, I would only note that when acts having the appearance of aggression have taken place, there has quite often been a difference of opinion among the permanent members of the Security Council in the evaluation of such acts. It is that which has prevented the full powers vested in the Security Council by the United Nations Charter from being used whenever required.

25. Thus there would appear to be little point in the General Assembly urging the Security Council to use powers which the Council has been unable to use in the past because of differences of opinion among the permanent members, unless, of course, it is now intended to abolish the principle of unanimity. If that is the intention, we would have no objection to having the fact clearly stated and we would associate ourselves with the effort to make the appropriate amendments to the Charter.

26. Section VI of document A/C.1/L.468 calls for no particular comment. It is a reaffirmation of good intentions, affirmed by the General Assembly many times in the past. We are, however, rather surprised by section VII of the draft before us. There is little point in calling upon "all States of the World to inform the General Assembly and the Security Council of the steps they will undertake in connexion with this appeal for the strengthening of international security", since several of the recommendations contained in the appeal can be implemented only by members of the Security Council and most of the others can be implemented only by a limited group of States, including, of course, the Soviet Union itself. Thus, in our view the call for information should be addressed not to all States indiscriminately, but to the permanent members of the Security Council or perhaps to all nuclear-weapon States and, in the second place, to those States that are embroiled in situations that have been recognized by the General Assembly as dangerous to international peace and security.

27. In conclusion, while congratulating the Soviet Union on the timing and on the concept of an appeal to all States of the world, we must confess a deep disappointment with the text before us, which unfortunately bears the marks of superficiality and haste. I am not sure whether it is intended to press the text of document A/C.1/L.468 to a vote. Certainly it requires drastic revision and I rather doubt whether time will permit the necessary revision to be completed at this session of the General Assembly.

28. It would be a pity, however, to reject completely the concept of an appeal to all States of the world for the strengthening of international security on the occasion of the twenty-fifth anniversary of the United Nations. Such an appeal, however, in our view, should avoid ambiguities, banalities and generalities. It should acknowledge, frankly, past failures of the United Nations. It should identify, clearly and objectively without regard to partisan positions the root-causes of international tension and insecurity. It should contain an indication of the precise steps that all of us, but particularly the permanent members of the Security Council, will undertake in order to strengthen international peace, remove the causes of fear and strengthen the

mechanism of the United Nations. It should, finally, demonstrate an awareness of the need for co-operation between States and social systems in order to take full advantage of the new era which technology is opening to mankind.

29. The drafting of an effective appeal on the lines indicated will require some thought and also some time. We would thus suggest that the matter be taken up by us again next year. That would give Governments time carefully to consider what the main points should be of an effective and credible appeal to the States of the world for the strengthening of international security. If we are capable of drafting an appeal with such a clarion call, we may still kindle the fire of hope in the hearts of men everywhere.

30. The CHAIRMAN: I thank the representative of Malta for the friendly sentiments that he expressed in regard to my election as Chairman of this Committee.

31. Mr. ÅSTRÖM (Sweden): The Swedish delegation would like, at this stage of our debate, to make a few preliminary remarks on the important item now before the Committee, entitled "The strengthening of international security".

32. Let me say, first of all, that the Swedish delegation welcomes the initiative taken by the Soviet Government in bringing this matter before the General Assembly. To strengthen security is, and remains, the basic purpose of the United Nations. It is useful and it is necessary to review periodically how the United Nations fulfils this fundamental task and what can be done to increase its capacity to do so. At this time, when we are preparing to commemorate the twenty-fifth anniversary of the Organization, such a discussion is particularly appropriate.

33. Indeed, if the anniversary is to become something more than a display of fine rhetoric and ceremonial choreography, it is necessary to try to work out certain guidelines for the activities of the United Nations in various fields; to try to define, as it were, a work programme for the years ahead. One component of such a programme will have to be a statement on the role of the United Nations in strengthening the security of nations on a global scale, and in achieving disarmament. The Soviet proposal, therefore, deserves our most serious attention.

34. The debate that has now started in the Committee will indicate the views of Member States and, hopefully, lay the groundwork of the kind of statement to which I have just referred. It will no doubt bring out, and remind us of, the many changes which have occurred during the last 25 years in world relationships and which have determined the conditions under which the United Nations has now to fulfil its function as an instrument for peace and security. Suffice it to mention the advent of nuclear weapons, the emergence of many new countries and the recognition of the urgent necessity of bridging the gap between low-income and higher-income countries, ultimately in the interest of peace; also, the acknowledgement that the application of the results of modern science and technology has to be brought under responsible social control if the physical and cultural environment of men is not to be imperilled.

35. If this debate is to serve its purpose, it should look to the future. It should not revive the controversies of the past. We note with satisfaction that the Soviet delegation presented the item last Friday [*1652nd meeting*] in this very spirit.

36. Irrespective of the changes that have occurred in the world situation during the last 25 years, the Charter remains a valid statement of the principles that must guide the international behaviour of States if conflict is to be avoided and peace preserved. All too often, these principles are honoured more in the breach than in the observance. All too often, governments act to further only narrowly defined national interests. The ideals and principles they have pledged themselves to observe as Members of the United Nations are proclaimed and asserted on ceremonial occasions, as well as in debates in the United Nations, but they are left unheeded in day-to-day practice.

37. This reminds one a little of the pictures we have all seen from the 1890s of old-fashioned parlours with family heirlooms, a potted palm tree and a golden clock on the mantelpiece; all this to be proudly shown and respectfully admired at occasional celebrations such as weddings and funerals, and evidently out of function in the everyday life of the families concerned.

38. If the debate following upon the Soviet proposal can make ideal and practice come a little closer together, and if States are led thereby to make greater use of the United Nations in response to the needs created by the ever-increasing interdependence between all States in war and in peace, then it will have a beneficial effect of wide significance.

39. To strengthen the capacity of the United Nations to deal with matters of peace and security is, of course, a complicated and many-faceted problem. It requires the establishment of a balanced programme related to the requirements of the present world situation. The programme has to be realistic and it has to be forward looking.

40. One of the difficulties in working out such a programme is that at the present time this has to be done in the absence of representatives of the People's Republic of China. The Swedish Government has always stressed that the United Nations should keep the door open for, and, indeed, welcome the People's Republic of China and that it is vitally important to do what is possible to enable that country to take part in active international co-operation, not least in the fields of disarmament and security. Consequently, it is our view that whatever progress we can make on the item now before us, nothing should be said or done that could make the participation of the People's Republic of China in the work of the United Nations more difficult.

41. After these preliminary remarks of a more general character, I would now turn to the contents of a possible statement by the General Assembly, whether such a statement ultimately takes the form of an appeal, a resolution or a declaration. The Swedish delegation has studied with interest the suggestions made in the Soviet proposal.

42. First, as to the question of the withdrawal of troops, we feel that it would be advisable to attempt to confirm the general principle that troops cannot legally be stationed on the territory of another country without the consent of the Government of that country. The principle should thus not be limited only to former colonial territories. There could hardly be any disagreement on this general principle. However, if we wish to be realistic, we have to recognize that the practical application of such a principle is often complicated by the fact that the consent of the government of a small country may not always be the expression of the free will of that nation, but may have been brought about under duress or under conditions of dependence. We feel that this problem should in some way be reflected in the formulation of the principle of withdrawal so that the independence of the smaller countries is fully recognized and respected.

43. We also find it possible to support the Soviet suggestion that peaceful coexistence be affirmed as one of the fundamental principles for the proper conduct of international relations. This maxim of peaceful coexistence is insolubly linked with the principles of sovereignty, equality, territorial inviolability of each State, non-interference in internal affairs and respect for the rights of all peoples freely to choose their social system. In accordance with the Charter, all of these principles are equally applicable to relations between big and small States, between States with differing social and political systems, and between States with the same social and political systems. This general applicability of these principles should be clearly brought out in the formulation of the document that may eventually emerge from our discussion. We should like to add at this point that a free and open flow of information between all peoples is a further prerequisite of long-term peaceful coexistence and co-operation on a global scale.

44. As to the question of regional security organizations, the Swedish delegation would have no objections to the insertion of a reference to the relevant Charter provisions, in accordance with the Soviet proposal. Indeed, we think that such a reference would be timely if it were coupled with a reminder that regional organizations have to act in strict accordance with the principles and purposes of the Charter. In particular, it has to be kept in mind that, important as the work of such organizations may be in settling local disputes and creating conditions for peaceful relations between their members, no enforcement action can be taken without the authorization of the Security Council.

45. It is also with satisfaction that the Swedish delegation greets the proposal to activate the second paragraph of Article 28 of the Charter, according to which the Security Council shall hold periodic meetings at which each of its members may, if it so desires, be represented by a member of the Government or by some other specially designated representative.

46. We feel that such meetings could indeed serve a useful purpose by providing one more opportunity for consultations between Member countries, big and small, on the vital questions of security. They could thus help to reduce tension and to defuse dangerous situations which might arise as a result of error or miscalculation.



47. The Soviet delegation has pointed out that meetings of the Council might be preceded by certain preparatory work in the form of consultations between the States members of the Council. It seems obvious that all members of the Council must take part in such consultations so that the interests and views of the smaller member countries, representing the overwhelming majority of the total membership of the United Nations, are fully taken into account. It is also clear that discussions in the Council in accordance with Article 28, paragraph 2, of the Charter, and consultations preceding such discussions, will take on their full significance, in the context of efforts to preserve world peace, only at the time when the People's Republic of China has taken its seat in the Council.

48. Finally, as to the three questions, also mentioned in the Soviet proposal, relating to a definition of aggression, principles of friendly relations and peace-keeping operations, the Swedish delegation considers it desirable to include these questions in any statement on security-issued by the General Assembly. However, in view of the complexity of these questions and taking into account the present stage of the work of the three relevant Committees, we do not think it would be feasible to formulate any conclusions at very short notice. We are hopeful, however, that the necessary conclusions will be reached and formulated in time for the inclusion in such declaration or declarations as it might be possible to prepare for the twenty-fifth anniversary of the United Nations.

49. The Swedish delegation agrees with the Soviet delegation that a statement of the general character which is here envisaged should be addressed to all States of the world. According to Article 2, paragraph 6, the Organization shall ensure that States not members of the United Nations act in accordance with the Charter and it would therefore seem logical that the message going out from the General Assembly be pondered by all States whether they are now Members of the United Nations or not. However, we do not agree with the provision in the Soviet proposal that the Secretary-General be requested to transmit a possible appeal or resolution of the General Assembly to the Governments of all States. That would, in our view, place upon the Secretary-General the delicate task of drawing up a list of addressees. We feel that the General Assembly is the only organ which would be competent to establish such a list if the need arose.

50. It seems obvious to us that, valuable as many of them are, the suggestions put forward in the Soviet proposal do not exhaust the list of topics which would have to be included in any statement by the General Assembly on world security. One subject which would necessarily have to figure very prominently in such topics is disarmament.

51. As Foreign Minister Gromyko pointed out, security and disarmament are closely interrelated problems; but work on one problem should not be allowed to delay work on the other. He added: "The immutable fact is that measures to limit the arms race, and disarmament measures, invariably strengthen international security, while the strengthening of security in its turn facilitates progress towards disarmament" [1756th plenary meeting, para. 165].

52. There is no doubt that even limited progress in disarmament would in fact reduce tension and relieve

somewhat the anxiety which is now felt all over the world. An atmosphere would be created in which an advance towards security arrangements would become somewhat more likely. Of particular importance would be progress in the field of nuclear disarmament. The non-nuclear Powers must not tire of emphasizing, clearly and forcefully, the duty of the nuclear powers, confirmed by contractual commitments, to make a start on the road of genuine disarmament.

53. We have a right to expect serious negotiations in good faith to achieve some progress not only towards the goal of freezing the military balance but also towards the goal of reducing the present over-kill capacity. We repeat that such risks as may follow from commitments to disarm are infinitely small in relation to the certain dangers following from the continued arms race. While waiting for results we are certainly entitled to demand that the nuclear powers, in response to the clearly expressed wishes of the Members of the United Nations, discontinue the perfection by means of nuclear tests, of ever more devastating weapons.

54. Furthermore the need for economic and social development will also have to be strongly stressed in any statement on world security. Many of the tensions and conflicts which now pit people against people and group against group have as their primary cause conditions of economic misery and social injustice. Only if we succeed in changing these conditions for the better, through national and international efforts, shall we improve the likelihood of peace and strengthen security in the long run.

55. The work now in progress as part of the preparations for the Second United Nations Development Decade aims at establishing goals and commitments which would help to bridge the dangerous gap which now separates the developing from the industrially developed countries. A great responsibility now rests upon the industrialized countries, in particular those possessing the largest economic potential, to increase their support of the multilateral programmes of economic co-operation. If we try to achieve realistically the goal of strengthened security which is the subject matter of this debate, we have to aim at an increase that goes far beyond the targets which have so far been considered realistic.

56. Finally, any statement on world security would have to comment on the occurrence of racial discrimination and colonial domination. These remnants of dangerous prejudices and outmoded power positions create a permanent threat to peaceful relations and they hinder the establishment, in many parts of the world, of that calm and stability which is necessary for peace and progress.

57. In conclusion, may I say again that the Swedish delegation has welcomed this opportunity to debate the general problem of strengthening international security through the United Nations. We hope that it will be possible to arrive at wide agreement on a statement setting out the basic conditions under which progress towards the goal of security can be achieved.

58. If the work on such a statement cannot be concluded during the present session we feel that the present debate has nevertheless served a most useful purpose in preparing

the ground for a statement or declaration next year. The commemorative period of the twenty-fifth session seems to us to be ideally suited as the proper time and place for a solemn declaration. The presence of many heads of State and heads of Governments would give special significance to such a document.

59. But principles, however solemnly declared and however eloquently phrased, are no substitute for day-to-day observance of those principles. This, it seems to us, is the message which this debate should signal to all States in the world. It is a message easy to express in words; it is difficult to practise in deeds.

60. Mr. JACKOBSON (Finland): I am happy to have this opportunity to extend to you, Mr. Chairman, to the Vice-Chairman and to the Rapporteur the very best wishes of my delegation.

61. Finland has a vital interest in the strengthening of the universal collective security system provided for by the United Nations Charter. The views of my Government on this subject have been stated on many occasions, most recently by the Foreign Minister of Finland, Dr. Ahti Karjalainen, in the general debate of this session of the General Assembly on 19 September [1756th plenary meeting]. As he pointed out, Finland is a neutral country which bases its security, not on military alliances or the protection of one Power or group of Powers against others, but on a foreign policy designed to keep it outside of international conflicts. It follows that it is in the Finnish interest to work for a peaceful and rational world order anchored in the United Nations Charter. It is natural, therefore, for Finland to take an active interest in any proposal designed to strengthen the United Nations and to make it more effective in maintaining international peace and security.

62. It is in this spirit that my delegation welcomes the initiative taken by the Government of the Soviet Union to include on the agenda of this session of the General Assembly the item entitled "The strengthening of international security". It focuses our attention on the main purpose of this Organization which is the maintenance of international peace and security, and it provides us with an opportunity for a constructive debate on questions of fundamental importance to this Organization as a whole and to each of its Members. In the view of my delegation, the conclusions or recommendations we shall adopt should reflect the common interest we all have in strengthening the United Nations and making it a truly effective instrument for peace. Such an outcome would be especially appropriate at this time, on the eve of the twenty-fifth anniversary of the United Nations.

63. The fact that it should be considered necessary to direct the attention of Member States to the primary purpose of this Organization is revealing in itself. The United Nations was created to keep the peace in the world. Yet today we tend to look to this Organization for other purposes—as a forum for debate and negotiation or as an instrument for freeing the peoples still living under colonial rule, for economic advancement, for the elimination of racial and other discrimination, and for the development of international law. These are indeed all important purposes.

None is irrelevant to world peace. Each is an indispensable element in the intricate fabric of a peaceful international order. Yet, in the final analysis, the success or failure of the United Nations will be judged in history by its contribution to the maintenance of international peace and security.

64. The atrophy of the primary function of the United Nations can be seen in the relatively limited role played by the Security Council in international affairs. The Council was intended to act as the supreme organ of a world-wide collective security system and for this purpose it was vested with the power to make decisions binding upon Member States, a supranational authority over all but its permanent Members. Yet too often during the past quarter of a century, at moments of crisis or conflict threatening the peace of the world, the Security Council has been reduced to sterile debate or been completely by-passed by events.

65. The reason for this is of course not any institutional weakness but the lack of agreement between the major Powers on making use of the Council for the purpose it was created. The effective functioning of the Council, and therefore of the whole system of collective security of the United Nations, presupposes a measure of common purpose among its Members and particularly among the major Powers, permanent Members of the Council. During the period of the cold war this common purpose was manifestly lacking. In recent years, while the rivalry between them continues in many areas, the major Powers have shown a greater measure of willingness to work together for the preservation of peace. As a result the effectiveness of the Security Council has clearly increased. At least the Council has been able to take action to contain some conflicts which otherwise might have endangered international security.

66. A significant expression of this new trend was the resolution [255 (1968)] adopted by the Security Council in June 1968 on security assurances in connexion with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons [see resolution 2373 (XXII)]. It was pointed out at the time by the Finnish delegation<sup>1</sup> that although it might be too bold to say that this resolution foreshadowed the transformation of the balance of terror into an internationalized nuclear deterrent within the framework of the United Nations, it did carry the promise that the collective security system of the Charter, based as it is on co-operation between the permanent members of the Security Council, could be revitalized in the interest of peace and security for all nations.

67. A further step in this direction could be to make use of the provisions of Article 28 of the Charter on the holding of periodic meetings of the Council, as now has been suggested by the delegation of the Soviet Union. At the time the Charter was framed such meetings were intended to enable the Security Council actively to direct events in the interest of maintaining international peace and security. But this intention was never carried out. Each of the three Secretaries-General who have served this Organization, in turn has proposed that such meetings be held, the

<sup>1</sup> Official Records of the General Assembly, Twenty-second Session, First Committee, 1559th meeting.

most recent being Secretary-General U Thant in the introduction to his annual report for 1966-1967. He wrote that:

"... I have little doubt that, once initiated, such periodic meetings will provide an outstanding opportunity for a general review of matters relating to international peace and security which are within the competence of the United Nations and for seeking a consensus approach to such matters".<sup>2</sup>

68. Too often in the past, and even in recent years, the Security Council has been unable to take action in time to forestall a conflict. Generally the Council has merely reacted to violent events. In many cases this has been due to lack of agreement on how to deal with the underlying political issues. But at times the difficulties in the way of constructive international action for the maintenance of peace have been compounded by the absence of established procedures or adequate institutional arrangements for advance consultations between the Powers concerned. A more imaginative use of the Security Council could remove such difficulties. Consultations within the Security Council can be held at any time without preliminary argument about the shape of the conference table. Periodic meetings of the Council on the level of Government Members, in the event that such meetings were to become customary, would also eliminate the risk of creating exaggerated hopes among the public which often inhibit Governments from arranging high-level meetings.

69. The exceptional powers conferred upon the Security Council in the provisions of Chapter VII of the Charter carry with them exceptional responsibility. When these provisions are invoked we must be sure that the will of the Council will actually prevail. Otherwise the credibility of its decisions is weakened and the whole structure of international security is impaired. Since the Members of the United Nations have empowered the Security Council to act on their behalf in matters concerning the maintenance of international peace and security and pledged themselves to accept and carry out its decisions, it should be in the common interest of all Members to uphold and enhance the authority of the Council as the guardian of world peace.

70. The effectiveness of the United Nations in maintaining international peace and security can be further improved through the use of various peace-keeping and peace-making methods. The subject of peace-keeping holds a special interest for my delegation. As a neutral country which maintains friendly relations with all States across the dividing lines of ideology and military blocs, Finland has been called upon time and again to provide personnel and other services to the peace-keeping activities of the United Nations. We have in fact contributed men or money to each of the peace-keeping operations mounted by the United Nations so far—in most cases both men and money. We are prepared to continue to do our share in making this Organization an effective instrument for keeping the peace. We are convinced that the use of United Nations observers or forces or other similar services has become an indispensable tool in the hands of the international community for the prevention or containment of crises and conflicts that might endanger world peace.

71. It is of course essential that the peace-keeping activities of the United Nations should be based on the wide support of Member States and in particular on agreement between the permanent members of the Security Council. We therefore welcome the emphasis given in the Soviet proposals on the present item to the question of peace-keeping and the new constructive spirit that appears to prevail in the Committee of Thirty-three.<sup>3</sup> Although concrete results are still lacking, it is encouraging that at long last the major Powers are engaged in serious negotiations on how peace-keeping operations should be carried out in the future, instead of arguing about what was right and what was wrong about past operations.

72. It would be even more encouraging if also in the matter of voluntary financial contributions a line could be drawn over past differences about procedure and precedence and if all those who have not yet done so would now make together their contributions, so as to enable the Organization to enter its anniversary year without a deficit. Such an act would be tangible proof of the willingness of Members to strengthen the United Nations in practical terms.

73. It used to be that international security was virtually synonymous with European security. But in Europe today the realization seems to have taken root that the political structure of the continent that has emerged in the quarter century since the end of the last war cannot be altered by military force without destroying all. And yet, paradoxically, in Europe the forces of two military blocs continue to face each other. Europe is still the scene of the deadliest concentration of modern weapons in the world. Not surprisingly, more and more Europeans, beginning to feel that the guns of Europe are pointing at the shadows of the past, are now searching for a new approach to the question of European security.

74. As is well known, the Finnish Government has taken an initiative in this matter and announced its readiness to act as host for a European security conference. We believe that Finland is qualified for this task for we maintain good relations with all the Governments concerned and we adhere to a neutral position on the central issues dividing Europe, notably on the German question.

75. In May of this year a memorandum outlining the views of my Government was delivered to all European Governments and to the Governments of the United States and Canada, suggesting that a conference on European security questions should be carefully prepared so as to ensure its success and that preparations begin through consultations between the Governments concerned. Such consultations have now been under way for five months. Replies and reactions of most of the Governments approached have been received by now and it is to be expected that the rest of the replies will be forthcoming by the turn of the year. At that stage it will be the intention of the Finnish Government to proceed to further consultations on the basis of the views expressed by the Governments concerned. We have also been gratified to note that in the course of the general debate at this session of the General Assembly several speakers, among them representatives of

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, Twenty-second Session, Supplement No. 1A, para. 159.

<sup>3</sup> Special Committee on Peace-keeping Operations.



countries belonging to military alliances, as well as of the neutral countries of Europe, welcomed our initiative and made favourable comments on it. A constructive exchange of views on European questions is thus in progress and it is our hope that it will lead to substantial results.

76. Mr. PUJA (Hungary) (*translated from Russian*): Mr. Chairman, as you have requested delegations to refrain from congratulating you, I shall merely express the hope, on behalf of the Hungarian delegation, that the Committee may do useful work under your guidance. My delegation assures you of its support and assistance with a view to achieving good results. I also wish success to the Vice-Chairman and the Rapporteur.

77. My delegation is gratified at the fact that the USSR draft Appeal to All States of the World on the strengthening of international security [A/7654] has been unanimously included in the General Assembly's agenda and is being discussed by this Committee as the first item of its agenda. This shows that the States Members of the United Nations recognize and duly appreciate the special importance of strengthening international peace and security.

78. As my delegation stated during the general debate [1782nd plenary meeting], the Hungarian People's Republic deems the consideration and adoption at this session of the draft Appeal proposed by the USSR Government to be of great significance. Our position on this question is readily explained by our historical past and our present political and social structure.

79. The Hungarian people has known centuries of bloodshed. Our country suffered many invasions on the part of foreign aggressors, who caused great loss of life and destruction. It was forced to fight both in the First and in the Second World War to defend alien interests. During the Second World War, Hungary, which then had a population of 9 million, lost hundreds of thousands of men, or slightly more than the United States. Hitler's hordes looted and ruined our country. It will therefore readily be understood that the Hungarian people is opposed to war and that its older as well as its younger generation will do all they can to defend peace and avert another war.

80. The Hungarian People's Republic, being a socialist country, is inherently opposed to war, because the building of socialism requires peace and peaceful creative labour. This is reflected in our foreign policy. One of the most important goals of that policy is the peaceful coexistence of countries with different social systems, i.e., ensuring that international disputes are resolved not by armed force but by negotiation; that an end is put to the interference of certain Powers in the internal affairs of independent and sovereign countries; that every people enjoys the right to genuine self-determination and is free to choose the social system it prefers; and that, owing to the observance of these rules, the international atmosphere is improved and that there is broader communication and greater co-operation between countries with different social systems.

81. This should, I believe, make it clear why the policy of the Hungarian People's Republic should be aimed at the defence of peace, not only in its own continent of Europe,

but in the world as a whole, at strengthening international peace and security and at preventing both a thermonuclear world war and local wars. The Hungarian people, like the peoples of other countries, wants to live in peace and security. It wants a peace which is not constantly threatened by the danger of war and which would allow it to work unafraid for a beautiful future.

82. The present world situation, however, is unlike the picture I have drawn. It is true that 25 years have now elapsed since the guns of the Second World War were stilled. It is true that the peoples and countries fighting for peace have been successful in averting a world war more dreadful than those of the past. But it is also true that even now mankind does not enjoy a genuine peace. There is still no solid foundation for international peace and security. The dark clouds of a third world war have not yet been dispelled. The foci of crisis which were formed after the Second World War are still in existence. We have not yet succeeded in fully resolving any one of the international problems that represent a potential threat to peace. War is still being waged in some parts of the world, for example, in Viet-Nam. The Israel aggressors do their bandit work with impunity in the Middle East. Men fighting for freedom are being killed by the thousands in Portuguese colonies. There are still forces which, motivated by the desire to solve internal problems and by greed, incite certain imperialist Powers recklessly to launch fresh wars; the spirit of revanchism is still abroad, seeking to change the situation resulting from the Second World War; and the arms race is still going on. Upon analysing all these international trends my Government has come to the conclusion that unless immediate steps are taken, international tension is virtually bound to increase and that the danger is not only that the international situation may be suddenly exacerbated but that the forces of militarism and aggression may propel the world on a course where it would be difficult to avert an outbreak of armed hostilities and even, possibly, of a thermonuclear world war.

83. That being its evaluation of the situation, the Hungarian People's Republic whole-heartedly supports, accepts and invites other countries to accept the USSR proposal [A/C.1/L.468], which offers a basis for discussion. It regards this proposal as a document whose adoption by the United Nations would greatly advance the cause of international peace and security.

84. The USSR draft Appeal which is now under discussion could of course be discussed in great detail, for its significance can hardly be overestimated. Nevertheless, I shall not comment on all the points in it. First, some of the preceding speakers have already done so and I associate myself with their favourable opinion. Secondly, my delegation has clearly stated its position on the most important points of the draft Appeal during the general debate in plenary session. It has briefly expounded its views on the draft Appeal as a whole, on the regional security systems, on the European and Asian security systems, on the liberation of territories still under colonial domination, etc. Moreover, the positive position of the Hungarian Government on such matters as the withdrawal of foreign troops from territories occupied as a result of action by the armed forces of some States against other States or against peoples defending the independence they have won as a result of

the collapse of the colonial system is known to all. My delegation also emphasized in the general debate that it regards strict observance of the relevant decisions of the Security Council to be obligatory. For this reason, I shall refrain from fully analysing the USSR draft Appeal and shall draw attention only to two important features of it.

85. Section I of the USSR draft Appeal calls for a fresh collective effort, fresh initiatives and fresh action to strengthen international security, for "The fate of the world today and tomorrow and the fate of future generations largely depend on these actions" (*ibid.*). I believe that this Appeal is of great importance and that its profound meaning must be closely analysed. The essence of this Appeal is that international peace and security can be strengthened only by a collective effort, to be distinguished from previous efforts by fresh initiatives and fresh action, and that there is need—in my view, a most urgent need—for specific practical measures to strengthen international peace and security.

86. In considering this question, a historical parallel naturally springs to mind. I would remind the Committee that this is not the first time that the USSR Government has called for a collective effort, fresh initiatives and fresh action. Before the Second World War, that Government also called for a collective effort to avert and repel the Nazi attack. No one can doubt today that if the Western Powers had heeded the Soviet Union's appeal at that time and supported the idea of a collective effort and joint measures, the Second World War, which lasted for six years, cost many millions of human lives and resulted in immeasurable property damage, could have been avoided, for the aggressor could have been stopped by timely action.

87. There are some people today who feel that no collective effort is required, for even an unsatisfactory international situation does not necessarily mean that there is danger of a third world war. They say that no one wants a world war, and that everyone wants peace. But it should not be forgotten—as we have often said before—that, in fact, unresolved international disputes may dangerously exacerbate the situation in a single day; in fact, there are in certain countries economically powerful forces which fan the flames of military hostilities, plan and carry out aggressive acts, and indeed call for preparations for a third world war in the hope of multiplying their riches; in fact, they have several times succeeded in pushing the world to the brink of a world war. That is why collective efforts and practical measures to strengthen peace and security are not only not superfluous, but are urgently needed.

88. The other important feature of the USSR draft Appeal to which I would draw attention is its desire to enhance the role and authority of the United Nations in strengthening peace and security, since the peoples created the United Nations a quarter of a century ago precisely in order to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war and to have it ensure a stable peace and the security of all peoples, nations and countries. The United Nations is in duty bound to discharge this noble task. However, it cannot do so unless it follows the course charted in the USSR draft Appeal.

89. It should also be remembered that the States Members of the United Nations laid the primary responsibility for

the maintenance of international peace and security on the Security Council. I am convinced that if the Security Council, as proposed in the USSR draft Appeal, should convene periodic meetings with the participation of Members of Governments or other specially designated representatives, at which it considered the general state of international security, formulated specific measures to strengthen peace and security and took effective practical steps to arrest aggressive action, the international atmosphere would be greatly improved, potential aggressors would be deterred and aggressive actions prevented, and in consequence the great peace-loving masses would have much greater confidence in the United Nations.

90. I have one more comment to make concerning the role of the Security Council. We have heard well-meant remarks to the effect that adoption of the draft Appeal would do too much honour to the Security Council and would presumably automatically diminish the role and importance of small and medium-sized countries in the United Nations. I believe this view to be mistaken. Any weakening of the role of the Security Council, far from increasing, would diminish the part played by small and medium-sized countries in settling international questions. The fact is that any measure to curtail the rights of the Security Council as laid down in the Charter, directly or indirectly, deliberately or unintentionally, would in the end undermine the existence of the United Nations itself. Any increase in the effectiveness of the Security Council would be particularly in the interests of the peace and security of small and medium-sized countries.

91. One last remark. I am convinced that most delegations are in favour of the proposals contained in the draft Appeal. This is encouraging. Those who oppose the Appeal are in a difficult position; an example is afforded by the representative of Malta, who looked for arguments against the USSR proposal and, as its wisdom is hard to argue against, resorted instead to slander and distortion. Such statements do nothing to promote the cause of international co-operation. The interests of the world's peoples today demand that all Governments participate in a joint effort and in the elaboration and implementation of the fresh collective measures proposed by the USSR.

92. The CHAIRMAN: There are no other speakers on my list. As no representative wishes to take the floor on the item before us, and as there are no speakers listed for this afternoon either, the next meeting of the Committee will be held at 10.30 a.m. tomorrow, 16 October.

93. I should like to point out that this week we have hardly utilized one-third of the time that has been available to us. I should like to propose, following consultations, that the Committee decide to close the list of speakers in the general debate on the item under discussion at 12 o'clock noon on Friday, 17 October, and if I hear no objections I shall consider that the Committee agrees to this.

*It was so decided.*

94. The CHAIRMAN: There will be two meetings tomorrow. There are four speakers listed for the morning

meeting, and two, possibly three, for the afternoon meeting.

95. Mr. BAROODY (Saudi Arabia): May I request you, Mr. Chairman, to be kind enough to ask the Secretary of the Committee to read out to us slowly the names of the delegations that will be participating tomorrow. This may help some of us in registering our names.

96. Mr. CHACKO (Secretary of the Committee): The delegations listed to speak tomorrow are the following: in the morning, Iraq, Canada, Yugoslavia and the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic; in the afternoon, the United Kingdom, Greece and the United States.

*The meeting rose at 12.30 p.m.*