

UNITED NATIONS  
**General Assembly**

FORTY-SIXTH SESSION

*Official Records*

FIRST COMMITTEE  
Fourth meeting  
held on  
Tuesday, 15 October 1991  
at 10 a.m.  
New York

---

VERBATIM RECORD OF **THE** 4th MEETING

**Chairman:** Mr. **MROZIEWICZ** (Poland)  
**later:** Mr. **ALPMAN** (Turkey)  
{Vice-Chairman}

CONTENTS

**GENERAL DEBATE ON ALL DISARMAMENT ITEMS** (continued)

---

This record is subject to correction.  
Corrections should be sent under the signature of a member of the delegation concerned  
within one week of the date of publication to the Chief of the Official Records Editing Section, Room DC2 750,  
2 United Nations Plaza, and incorporated in a copy of the record

Corrections will be issued after the end of the session, in a separate corrigendum for each Committee.

**Distr. GENERAL  
A/C.1/46/PV.4  
25 October 1991**

**ENGLISH**

**91-61451 65718 (E)**

230

The meeting was called to order at 10.20 a.m.

AGENDA ITEMS 47 TO 65 (continued)

GENERAL DEBATE ON ALL **DISARMAMENT** ITEMS

The CHAIRMAN: Before calling on the first speaker, I **should like** at this stage to welcome participants in the United Nations disarmament fellowship programme who are present at today's meeting. I trust that they will benefit *from* observing the work of the Committee, and I wish them every success in their work.

I now call on the Under-Secretary-General for Disarmament Affairs, Mr. Yasushi Akashi.

Mr. AKASHI (Under-Secretary-General **for** Disarmament Affairs): First, let me congratulate you most warmly, Sir, **on** your election to the chairmanship **of** this important Committee.

The First Committee is commencing its work this year in a dramatically altered situation, especially in relation to the bilateral nuclear issues between the United States and the Soviet Union and in the conventional weapons area in the context **of** East-West negotiations. The conclusion of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) in Paris last November, the signing of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) in Moscow in July, and the recent announcements by President Bush on 27 September and President Gorbachev on 5 October on major reductions in their nuclear arsenals and **changes** in their nuclear postures are all remarkable developments opening a brighter vista for a more peaceful future. At long last they are reversing the trend towards the constant increase in nuclear weapons that has **been** in evidence over the last four decades, **since** the end of the Second World War. It **is** earnestly *hoped* that **progress** will continue to be made in these and related

(Mr. Akashi)

areas so that the' nuclear arms race and the confrontational military situation in Europe **will** at last become features of the past.

The international community, however, is faced with a new series of conflicts and disputes involving national, ethnic or religious differences between and within some States. Since this Committee last met, the world has again been ravaged by wars. In several areas of the world, **boundaries are** still ill-defined. Old disputes remain unresolved and some new ones are emerging. Others are awakening from the slumber of history. In this context, the United Nations is called upon to perform numerous new tasks and face mounting challenges. This is certainly a time **of** enormous opportunity for the global Organisation. Arms control and disarmament now constitute essential parts of the complex process **of** consolidating peace, together with peace-keeping, diplomatic mediation, judicial settlements and other efforts for enhancing international cooperation. What is needed is a sustained, well-coordinated and non-compartmentalized approach to new global issues.

It is generally accepted that in the Middle East, in Central **America** and in the Korean peninsula, to mention just a few regions, arms control **and** arms limitation are part and parcel of constructing an enduring edifice of stability, peace and justice. In this connection, the United Nations agencies dealing with development and assistance have come to realise the close interrelationship between their efforts to create a better livelihood **for** all **and** the great expenditure involved in maintaining high military establishments and large procurements of weapons. **The** interrelationship is a complex one, as the protracted debate on disarmament and development has demonstrated, and it has to be linked to new perceptions of broader security.

(Mr. Akashi)

The international community has to espouse a multidimensional approach to peace and security in which the military aspect will not dominate but will be considered in relation to other priorities such as development, welfare, environment and the protection of human rights.

In this age of information, computing and the spread of scientific and technical knowledge, it is urgent and vital to exercise effective control over the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, comprising nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, as well as the means of their delivery. At the same time, it is realized that because of the inherently dualistic nature of knowledge itself it is far from simple to channel the dissemination of knowledge into solely peaceful directions.

How can we assure the equitable and peaceful **use** of the fruits of science and technology without intensifying the danger that the ensnaring attraction of highly dangerous and lethal weapons will eventually engulf all nations? The impact of high technology on research, development and production has often made even the so-called conventional weapons far from conventional.

Vastly improved relations between the major Powers and among the countries **of** the European region are very welcome but are obviously **not enough** to assure global peace. Bilateral and regional progress has therefore to be reinforced by multilateral efforts. Disarmament *in* the fields **of** nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction has to be accompanied by greater constraints on conventional weapons everywhere. From this perspective, it is not without good reason that **the** General Assembly and the United Nations Disarmament Commission have *been* placing increasing emphasis on regional disarmament and regional confidence-building measures.

**(Mr. Akashi)**

In its anticipatory wisdom, the General Assembly has in the last few years established three regional disarmament centres in, respectively, Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean, and Asia and the Pacific. The Department for Disarmament Affairs will continue to make the best use of these centres that resources allow by intensifying dialogue and discussions organized by the centres, which have been deemed valuable by Governments and others. I hope that the General Assembly will be able to review these regional and subregional activities and to strengthen them as appropriate.

Global disarmament has now moved away from the traditional realm of deliberations **or** negotiations confined largely to the consideration and adoption of resolutions, declarations, conventions or treaties. While these are extremely important endeavours, efforts are now being directed also to enlarging areas of understanding and agreement among Governments on specific issues, such as improved security at lower levels of arms and armed **forces**, confidence-building measures, transparency **of** information, data collection, verification **and** the safe and economical destruction of weapons.

(Mr. Akashi)

Subjects such as the conversion of military industry into civilian industries, **the** technology of weapons destruction and the development of appropriate means **of** verifying compliance with agreements reached have in the last few **years** become focal points of intensive work. Positive results in these practical matters will aid in the acceleration of negotiation and agreement.

The enormous work carried out in Iraq by the Special Commission established by the Security Council in order to implement resolution 687 **(1991)**, Part C, should not be overlooked. Conducted in the context of enforcement action under Chapter VII of the Charter, the activities of the Special **Commission** are a unique response to unique circumstances. Even so, they are evidence **of** a vigorous United Nations in action and they provide a most **valuable** experience in on-site inspection and destruction of weapons.

(spoke in French)

Our world is unmistakably moving towards greater openness and transparency, providing an excellent opportunity for lowering mutual suspicion and attaining a more accurate perception of each other. Thus, conditions are being created for concrete measures of arms reduction rather than indulging in incantations of pious phrases, as was so often the case in the cold-war period.

The Third Review Conference of the Biological Weapons Convention, held in Geneva last month, reflected the common interest of the States parties to the Convention to improve confidence-building measures and exchange of relevant information. The agreement reached at the Review Conference was most gratifying, while one regrets that on some other matters consensus eluded the membership.

(Mr. Akashi)

Having consulted a number of **Member** States and members of the Conference on Disarmament, the Department for Disarmament Affairs is now **proceeding** to respond to an ever-increasing need to **modernize** its disarmament database, with the help of the Electronic Services Division. In January we shall be commencing work to design and install a better and more responsive database, relying at the outset largely on voluntary resources. I am gratified to see widespread interest in this project, **which** should provide widely accessible, up-to-date information on disarmament matters, not just to Secretariat units, but to all interested Governments, non-governmental and academic institutions and specialists. However, it has to be borne in mind that as the database expands, its resource implications will also increase .

In a related but separate area, the dissemination of accurate and balanced information on disarmament to the public continues to be our concern, and the Department is engaged in a constant effort to improve the quality of such information and the effectiveness of its dissemination and impact.

The World Disarmament Campaign, launched in 1982, provides an excellent means of strengthening our information activities. One special project is the making of a major documentary film on chemical weapons with a view to sensitizing the public to the prospective chemical-weapons convention that is, hopefully, now close to completion. I note with pleasure the support of eight Governments **for** this project, as well as **from** Nippon Rosho **Kyokai (NRK)** Creative, which has committed itself to combining its *resources* with others to produce such a documentary for international use.

We also attach great importance to inculcating in the minds of the younger generation methods of resolving international disputes peacefully, **of** making better use of United Nations institutions and of better understanding

**(Mr. Akashi)**

arms control and disarmament. The Department has assembled an able group of educators and administrators from 12 countries to advise **it** on ways and means of devising instructional methods at college and university levels.

I have spoken in this Committee in the past on the priority I attach to stimulating informal discussions on disarmament and security issues through seminars, symposia and conferences under the Department's auspices, in which participating officials mix with parliamentarians, non-governmental representatives, academics, researchers and others, in their personal capacity, for a frank and free exchange of information and ideas. If topics and **speakers** are carefully chosen and the discussions are structured in such a way as not to **force** conclusions but to produce a synthesis of diverse viewpoints, I believe that these meetings can be very useful.

**(spoke in English)**

The General Assembly has also benefited from a somewhat more formalised format of **groups** of governmental experts financed from the regular budget. **Two** of these groups have completed their studies this year. One, under the Chairmanship of Ambassador Maj Britt Theorin of Sweden, has delved into the potential use of resources allocated to military activities for civilian endeavours to protect the environment (**A/46/364**). The other group, chaired first by Ambassador Eugenio Plaja **of** Italy and later by Mr. Ian S. McDonald of the United Kingdom, has made useful recommendations on transparency **in conventional-arms** transfers (**A/46/301**), a subject of much topical interest and **a** matter to **which** the Secretary-General has repeatedly called attention.

Still another **expert** group, under Ambassador Boris **Krasulin** of the Soviet Union, is engaged **in** exploring defensive military concepts and doctrines - a subject on which the Department **for** Disarmament Affairs also intends to

(Mr. Akashi)

organise an informal **seminar** in New York next January, in order to hear a broader circle of scholars and specialists. Still another expert **group**, chaired by Ambassador Roberto Garcia Moritan of Argentina, has been exploring measures of confidence-building in outer space. In addition, under General **Assembly resolution 45/56** A, the Department has worked with the **Organization** of African Unity to obtain an expert view on the modalities and elements **for** the establishment of a nuclear-weapons-free zone in Africa.

Stimulating discussions have taken place at regional workshops on disarmament, held in **Bandung** for Asian and Pacific States and *in* Mexico City for the Latin American and Caribbean countries, with the full support of the Indonesian *and* Mexican Governments respectively.

In addition, the Department organised a useful seminar on confidence-building measures in South-East Asia and North-East Asia at its regional centre in Kathmandu. A seminar on a similar subject was **successfully** held among 10 Central African States in Yaounde, Cameroon. A pertinent communication from the Minister of Foreign Affairs *of* Cameroon can **be found** in document *A/46/307*.

(Mr. Akashi)

Furthermore, in February the Department **organized** in Vienna an **interregional** seminar on **confidence-** and security-building measures with the unstinting support **of the** Austrian Government. It was a first attempt at a dialogue between Europeans, **who** have been working **for** many years on matters related to the *Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe* (CSCB), and **Africans, Latin Americans and Asians**, who are anxious to learn **about** the **Europeans'** experience with a view to developing their own confidence-building **measures**. We also convened a major conference in Kyoto, Japan in May on the subject of **"A post-cold war and post-Gulf War international system and challenges to multilateral disarmament"**. Discussions were conducted **on three subjects - namely**, "Global security and disarmament in reference to regional approaches", "Proliferation of weapons systems and disarmament issues", and "Problems arising from the implementation of disarmament measures". The **meeting brought** together scholars, politicians and non-governmental **organizations, together** with Ambassadors from **New York and** from the Conference on **Disarmament in Geneva**. I **take** this opportunity to thank all the **Governments** concerned for hosting **these** highly useful meetings and for their **generous support**.

Resources permitting, we have every intention of deepening these **dialogues**, thereby **widening** the circle **of discussion** and delving into new or **under-explored subjects**. **These** events *often function* as a kind of **intellectual trail-blazer, preparing** the ground **on** which a **more official consideration** can fruitfully take place at a later stage. Questions such as **disarmament and development and the implications of science and technology for security are among** the **subjects** which may be looked **at with the fresh minds of students representing different disciplines**. We have **to open ourselves** to new **issues while** at the **same time reviewing and revisiting old issues**, such as

(Mr. Akashi)

nuclear non-proliferation and restraints on nuclear testing, leading to a comprehensive test ban,

The Department for Disarmament Affairs is well known for its **meagre** budget and a small but highly motivated staff. It has endeavoured to make up for its limitation of resources by focusing on highest priority areas and appealing **for** voluntary contributions, as appropriate. We have **been** rather fortunate in finding the necessary means to undertake urgent activities. I **feel** particularly gratified to find strong political support from Member **Governments** in our endeavours.

I regret to state to the Committee, however, that there is a serious constraint on our resources. The Department is able and willing to undertake **more tasks**, but Member States must understand that there is no **capacity** for further absorption. New tasks will therefore require additional resources, unless our mandates are revised to reduce the existing workload.

The work of the Department has been expanding rapidly. I see that **more** meetings can usefully take place on interregional, regional and subregional arrangements concerning confidence-building measures on the basis of the wishes expressed by the States concerned, and provided the necessary resources are **identified**. I am sure that the **First Committee** will act in a responsible and prudent manner, as **it** has in the past, in relation to the agenda items which **may** impinge on the implementation **of** tasks by the Secretariat.

In closing, **may** I **express** my confidence that this first post-Gulf War session **of** the **First Committee** will engage in a thorough **assessment of** where we stand in arms-limitation and disarmament **issues**, and produce **some** concrete and forward-looking decisions and agreements. The Committee's deliberations will be facilitated by the prevailing spirit of cooperation, pragmatism and

(Mr. Akaahi)

willingness to expand on the positive steps recently taken on the **multilateral**, as well as bilateral, scenes. **The** Department for Disarmament Affairs and its staff stand ready to assist the Committee, as appropriate.

The CHAIRMAN: I call **on** the representative **of** Venezuela, Ambassador **Horacio** Arteaga, **who**, in his capacity as current President of the Conference on **Disarmament**, will **introduce** the report of the Conference.

Mr. ARTEAGA (Venezuela), President of the Conference on Disarmament (**interpretation** from Spanish): I should first like to offer you, Sir, my warmest congratulations **on** your election as Chairman of this Committee, which **has the** sensitive responsibility **of** dealing exclusively with disarmament and related international security questions. I am convinced that, thanks to your competence, tact **and** diplomacy, we shall be able to conclude our work **successfully**. I also extend **my** sincerest congratulations to the **other** officers of **the Committee**.

I **am** speaking today in my capacity as President of the **Conference** on Disarmament in order to present to the General Assembly the report of the **Conference** on its work in 1991. **This** presentation, which is made each year, is particularly significant on this occasion because of the decisive turn that has been taken **by** the negotiation<sup>6</sup> on the complete prohibition of all chemical **weapons**. **This** question, which is among those that have the highest priority on **the** Conference's agenda, is entering its final stage after many years **of** difficult and **sometimes** fruitless **negotiations**.

**Much** of the report of the Conference, which has been distributed as *supplement 27* of the *Official Records* **of** the General Assembly under the symbol A/46/27, contains **detailed** information on the present state **of** the Geneva negotiations on chemical weapons, I am sure that the presentation of **this**

**(Mr. Arteaga, President,  
Conference on Disarmament)**

report will be **very** useful for those Member States that are still not participating in those negotiations.

I should like to **stress** the latter point since, as maybe inferred from what I have just said, the content **of** the section **of** the report on chemical weapons is substantially different from the content **of previous** reports, in that for the first time it submits for consideration by the General Assembly, in appendix I to the report of the Ad Hoc Committee responsible for the negotiations, the full text - and I **emphasize** the words "**the full text**" - of the preliminary structure of the multilateral convention on the complete **and** effective prohibition of the development, **production**, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons and on their destruction.

As a result **of** the initiative announced on 13 May last by the President **of** the United States of America, which was widely welcomed **by** the members **of** *the Conference*, the negotiations on this question were stepped up **considerably** - indeed, **work** went on continuously from that time until the 1991 annual session concluded **and** a decision was taken to continue **work** on **the** convention until the beginning **of the** 1992 session. **The Conference** has also set itself the goal **of reaching** a definitive agreement next year.

(Mr. Arteaga, President,  
Conference on Disarmament)

If the progress achieved in 1991 is taken into account, it will be seen that **that** goal can be achieved without serious difficulties. Without prejudice to the fuller information that can be given by the Chairman of the Ad Hoc **Committee** on Chemical Weapons, who is also participating in the deliberations of the First **Committee**, I shall take the liberty of indicating the questions on which substantial progress has been achieved during 1991.

First, there is now a consensus on the scope **of** prohibition. In accordance with article I, the parties undertake **never** under **any** circumstances to develop, produce, otherwise **acquire**, stockpile or retain chemical weapons, or **transfer**, directly or indirectly, chemical weapons to anyone or to use **them**. Similarly, agreement has been reached on the destruction of the chemical **weapons** possessed by the States parties or under their jurisdiction or control. **It** has further been possible to incorporate in the preliminary structure **of** the convention texts on assistance and protection against chemical weapons. **economic** and technological development, and measures to redress a situation **and** to ensure compliance, including sanctions.

Secondly, other provisions which had already been the subject of negotiations but on which agreement was far off have now been agreed or are very close to being agreed. This is the case with the relation to **other** international agreements, in particular the Geneva Protocol **of** 1925, on which **a** provision has been completed; and with relation to the settlement **of** disputes, in regard to which little remains to be **done** in **order** to consolidate **a** generally acceptable text.

Lastly, progress *has* also been made on subjects such as amendments to the convention, the organisation to be established by the convention, and **the**

**(Mr. Arteaga, President,  
Conference on Disarmament)**

question of jurisdiction and control. The Conference is continuing work on aspects **of** the verification system which are still outstanding, in particular the monitoring **of** the civilian chemical **industry and** challenge inspection.

These observations indicate that almost certainly - and this is **indeed** our hope - this will be the last time the Conference on Disarmament will submit to the General Assembly a progress report on the prohibition **of** chemical weapons. I am **confident** that the next report will contain the complete text of the **convention**, in order that it may receive the support of our Organisation, **the** most representative organisation **of** the international community. In this respect, I should like to **remind** members that the need to ensure the universality of the convention is a constant concern in the Geneva negotiations, on the part of both the States **members of** the Conference **and** States which are not **members** but are participating in the work on chemical weapons. In **addition** to the 39 members, during 1991 the **unprecedented** number of 37 non-member States joined *in our* negotiations. The total **of** 76 countries participating in *one* capacity or another gives a clear idea of the **importance** assumed by the universality of the convention. In **referring** to this aspect, which is closely connected with the success of the convention, I wish to point out that the rules *of* **procedure** of the Conference contain specific provisions to facilitate the participation of non-member States **in** its work. I am convinced that the *members of* the Conference will receive with pleasure any indication **of** interest on the part of those States in joining our work on chemical weapons, especially at times such as the present, when we are entering the final stage of the negotiation of the convention.

(Mr. Arteaga, President  
Conference on Disarmament)

It is also worth while pointing out on this occasion that on **20** June 1991 the then President of the Conference and the Chairman *of* the Ad Hoc Committee on **Chemical** Weapons sent to all Ministers for **Foreign** Affairs a joint **communication** which had been unanimously approved by the Conference. In that **communication** they expressed the hope that Governments would actively follow the progress *of* our negotiations with the aim of acceding to the convention without delay once it had been concluded.

The convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons will mean the complete elimination *of* a whole category of weapons **of mass** destruction which have caused great losses of **human** life since they were first used in combat. Notwithstanding the valuable contribution of the Geneva Protocol of 1925 in prohibiting the use of these weapons, it is quite clear that the only solution that will guarantee their eradication is the complete prohibition embodied in the convention being negotiated in Geneva. The importance **of** this agreement and its contribution to the strengthening of international peace **and** security **require** that we should, immediately, unite our efforts to secure the accession *of* the States Members of our **Organization**.

For the reasons I have explained, I have considered it appropriate to **emphasize** in this statement the importance that has been assumed by our negotiations on chemical weapons. I shall now refer to other aspects *of* the report *of* the Conference to the General Assembly.

Chapter II *of* the report of the Conference refers to the **organization of its** work. The **agenda** and **programme of** work *for* the session were adopted without delay. During the time allotted **for** organisational decisions, five **subsidiary** bodies on various **items** of the agenda were re-established and their

**(Mr. Arteaga, President,  
Conference on Disarmament)**

chairmen designated. Invitations were sent to all non-member States which had expressed interest in participating in the work of the Conference. Chapter II of the report also contains a description **of** our work on questions relating to the expansion **of** the **membership of** the *Conference* and its improved and effective functioning.

Chapter III deals **with** the substantive **work** of the Conference during the 1991 session: in other words, the consideration of the substantive items that make up its agenda. I have already **commented** on the considerable progress achieved in the field of chemical weapons **and the** undoubted prospects of success in our negotiations. I shall now move on to the other substantive items which the **Conference** considered this year. In this **respect**, it is worth emphasising that the Conference managed to reach agreement on the procedure **for** appropriately taking up almost all the items on its agenda and **programme of work**.

Agenda item 1, entitled "Nuclear-test ban", was considered by an Ad Hoc **Committee**, which met throughout the session. Although that Committee had begun its **work** during the latter part **of** the 1990 session, it **was** in the course **of** the current year that it was able to carry out a *more* detailed substantive analysis of the various aspects **of** the **item**. Its work has been extremely useful in developing a number **of** questions that **require further** consideration. **For** this reason, the report contains a **recommendation** that the Ad **Hoc Committee** should be re-established at the beginning **of** the 1992 session.

**(Mr. Arteaga, President,  
Conference on Disarmament)**

Agenda items 2 and 3, entitled "**Cessation of** the nuclear-arms race and nuclear disarmament" and "Prevention of nuclear war, including all related **matters**", were considered **at** a series **of** informal meetings on the substantive questions arising from both items. The Conference held 15 meetings to consider various aspects of these questions, and was also informed by the heads **of** delegation **of the United States of America** and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in the bilateral talks **on** strategic nuclear weapons about relevant developments and the conclusion of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START). It is interesting to note on this occasion that several of the measures recently announced by the Presidents of the United States and the Soviet Union concerning nuclear disarmament - measures to which there have been positive reactions **within the international community** - were mentioned during **the informal** meetings **of** the Conference as steps that might contribute significantly to the process of disarmament and international **détente**.

**Item 5**, "Prevention **of** an arms race in outer **space**", was considered by an Ad Hoc **Committee**, in which it was apparent that **work** is now being concentrated **on** various substantive aspects and the deliberations are moving towards a more orderly and systematic dialogue. As a result **of the** contribution **of** experts to the **work on** this item, it **was** possible to gain a clearer **idea of** the various points **of** view. In this case, too, the report contains a **recommendation that** the Ad Hoc Committee should be re-established at the beginning **of** next year.

In the case of item 6, relating to "**Effective** international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat **of** use **of** nuclear weapons", as indicated in the **report of the Ad Hoc Committee, specific** difficulties remain, **concerning** different perceptions **of** the security

(Mr. Arteaga, President,  
Conference on Disarmament)

interests of States. **This** Committee has nevertheless recommended that the search for means of overcoming these **difficulties** should be continued **and**, with that **aim** in mind, it is recommended that the Committee should be re-established at the beginning of 1992.

The Ad Hoc Committee on Radiological Weapons, **item 7** of our agenda, has also made a recommendation that it should **be** re-established at the **commencement of** next **year's** session. This Committee continued work on the two aspects which it is considering: the prohibition of radiological weapons in the "traditional" **sense** and issues relevant to the prohibition **of** attacks against nuclear **facilities**. Although the work done was useful, this **item** clearly requires further efforts **if** progress is to be made in its consideration.

As to **item 8, entitled** "Comprehensive programme of disarmament", it was not possible to agree on a generally acceptable **organizational** arrangement **for** its continued consideration. This question will be taken up again at the beginning of 1992.

Lastly, I should like to emphasise the positive atmosphere which surrounded the **work** of the Conference during 1991, albeit in **times** of international tension. Now that the ideological confrontations of the so-called cold war have been overcome, and in the light of the **arms** limitation agreements concluded recently, the Conference has worked hard this **year** and is able to present a balance sheet for that work which is reflected in **the** report I am introducing today, in particular as regards chemical weapons. In inviting the **members** of the First Committee to consider the report, I consider it necessary to emphasise once again that we are close to reaching **agreement** on those weapons whose significance is by any reckoning obvious. This

(Mr. Arteaga, President,  
Conference on Disarmament)

**agreement**, together with other **measures that may arise** in the **framework** of the **new** international dynamism that is becoming apparent in the field of disarmament, will constitute a valuable contribution by the Conference to the strengthening of international peace and cooperation.

Mr. LEHMAN (United States of America): I congratulate you, Sir, on your selection to the chairmanship of the First Committee. We know that **your** task is not an easy one. We have a full agenda before us, but the United States has full confidence that your skill and dedication will lead us through a productive and successful session. I want to assure you that the United States delegation will lend its full support to your endeavours.

**This** morning Under-Secretary-General Akashi has given us an incisive presentation recording recent historic achievements and also highlighting the challenges and opportunities now before us. In that regard I listened with great interest to the report on the activities of the **Conference on Disarmament** Ambassador **Arteaga** has just introduced to the First **Committee**. I **was struck by**, and wish strongly to reinforce, his **message that** the negotiation on the chemical weapons convention has come a **long** way and that we hope to conclude negotiations in 1992. For this reason I would **encourage** as many countries as possible to become **acquainted** with these negotiations and to offer their ideas to **the** negotiators in Geneva. More importantly, we urge that all nations be prepared to become original parties to the convention when it is **opened for** signature and ratification. There should be no higher priority **than** the completion **of** this convention and its coming into force as soon as possible with the widest possible number **of** adherents. Only in this way can all **of** us end the proliferation of **chemical** weapons throughout **the**

(Mr. Lehman, United States)

world, eliminate chemical weapons themselves **both** universally and equally, and rfd ourselves once and *for* all of this horrible weapon.

It is an honour for me once again to address this body and to share with members the views of my Government on the important issues facing this **Committee**. As the United Nations **forum** for discussions on issues of international security and arms control, the First **Committee** is an important component of the global effort to establish lasting peace and stability. We are here to take **stock** of how well this work is progressing and to see how **together we may** further advance the frontiers *of peace*.

(Mr. Lehman, United States)

In this regard, allow **me to** welcome *the* newest Members of the **United Nations**. During these pivotal times, **fresh** ideas are very important as we chart the future course of arms control and disarmament. On behalf of the United States Government, **I** offer all new Members a sincere welcome.

Against the backdrop of the radically changing world scene, many have asked if there is a continued role for arms control and disarmament. Indeed, early in August, with the Strategic **Arms** Reduction Treaty (START) signed and relations between the United States and the Soviet Union moving beyond cold-war confrontation, there were predictions that arms control had fulfilled its destiny, and that the arms control process had **come to** an end. Those predictions could not have been more wrong. The failed coup **in Moscow** and the resulting dramatic changes in the Soviet Union. the events in Iraq in the aftermath of the Gulf War, and the continuing violence in other parts **of** the world all remind us that arms control must remain a critical component **of** foreign **policy and** international security.

Yet, as we scan the arms control landscape, we must recognise that we stand at a crossroad, at a juncture where the old **meets the** new. Traditional features of the arms control landscape remain; but new elements have been **added**. **Increasingly, our most** urgent **arms** control tasks centre less on the traditional **questions** of the East-West military balance and more on problems of instability and violence that have little or no ideological character, that erupt in **unexpected** places and in unanticipated ways, and that threaten the peace and well-being of each and every one of us. These problems **are a threat** made more **severe** by the proliferation **of** weapons of **mass** destruction and their means of delivery. **They are a danger that threatens to shatter** the fragile **movement around** the globe towards democracy and freedom *that has been the* hallmark **of the end of** the cold-war **era**.

(Mr. Lehman, United States)

Standing at 'this **crossroad** provides us with a particularly good vantage point to view the **arms** control landscape. Please allow **me** to provide a summary assessment of the United States view of where we are and where we must go in arms **control** in the future,

In scanning the current landscape and **in** looking across the future horizon, we must appreciate that past choices have determined where we are today, just as our *choices* at this current juncture will determine our path to the future.

During the tensions of the cold-war era the foundation was laid for the current agenda. During those days of uncertainty, the United States provided protection to its allies and **championed** the **cause** of freedom around the world. The United States, with its allies, insisted that the key to global stability rested on maintaining a vigilant defence combined with a willingness **to** engage potential adversaries in a process, if not of resolving our differences, then of negotiating a stable framework to manage them. Arms control was a critical component of that framework. But the United States also demanded that negotiations be based on sound concepts and principles that would produce meaningful agreements, not rhetorical **gestures** that did nothing to bolster stability. Those concepts and principles - effective verification, equitable **outcomes** and strict adherence to treaty provisions - remain critical to the important arms control efforts that lie ahead.

While the days of the cold war era were often dark indeed, they were not without their **successes**. Before **the** end of the cold war, the United States became party to **more** than a dozen **major** arms control agreements that strengthened both United States and international security.

These developments served as an important contribution to the positive changes we have witnessed in recent years and provided an important foundation

(Mr. Lehman, United States)

for the architecture **of** the new world order. The United States is proud of its *arms control record* **and** believes its efforts were decisive in moving the world back **from** the possibility of nuclear confrontation *and* into the present era, where prospects **for** peace appear so promising.

It is said, however, that the past is **mere** prologue to the future. Our job is not done, and I would like to consider our current arms control problems *and* summarise our efforts to address them.

As we look at **the** traditional features *of* the arms control landscape, one immediate priority **of** the United States will be to assure that the **stabilizing** achievements of the Strategic **Arms** Reduction Treaty are not lost. That Treaty is designed to produce substantial stabilising reductions in the strategic **offensive** weapons of the United States and the Soviet Union. The Treaty contains **equal** ceilings, and focuses **on** constraining the most destabilising weapons, **that** is, ballistic missiles. One of its **key** contributions to stability is its counting rules. These rules involve stricter limits in terms of warheads **on** ballistic missiles, which are fast-flying **and**, unlike slower **bombers** that can be recalled, **are** well-suited **for** a **disarming** first strike. The Treaty also constrains ballistic missiles *through* numerical limits, **especially** a 50 per cent reduction in Soviet heavy intercontinental ballistic missiles (**ICBMs**) - the *most* destabilising strategic nuclear weapons; a ban on increasing **the number of** warheads per missile *and* an aggregate throw-weight **ceiling; and** a limit on throw-weight increases.

**The START Treaty** also reflects the revolution that has taken place in recent **years** regarding verification **of** arms control **agreements**. The verification measures *of* the Treaty, which include extensive exchange *of* data, cooperative **measures and** on-site inspection, including perimeter portal **monitoring and** intrusive on-site inspection, are **important additions** to

(Mr. Lehman, United States)

monitoring by national technical means of verification. These **measures are** now accepted principles of international **arms** reductions. Under START, they have been expanded. Indeed, START broke new ground even during its negotiation. **As** an experiment to help design re-entry-vehicle on-site inspection procedures, inspectors from each side were allowed to examine front sections **of** the re-entry vehicle of the other **side's most** important intercontinental ballistic missiles. The Treaty provides for a number of such inspections to ensure that deployed missiles are not being equipped with a greater **number** of warheads than are permitted. Another feature is nuclear risk reduction centre notifications. Under the START Treaty they are expected to increase 20-fold from those required under the Treaty on the Elimination **of** Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles (INF Treaty).

The United States has every intention of ratifying the START Treaty and **trusts** that **the** Soviet Union will do the **same**. **We** believe it is in the interest of both parties **to** lock in the **major** reduction and verification commitments of START. Despite its domestic transition, the Soviet Union has made assurances that it intends to live up to its **arms** control obligations. Implementation of START will increase the transparency of the military and the military-industrial complex in the Soviet Union and, in addition, complement economic objectives in defence conversion - key goals of Soviet **reformers**. The START Treaty also providee a solid basis for follow-on efforts.

On 27 September, President Bush announced his dramatic initiative affecting the entire spectrum of United States nuclear weapons. He decided to take this initiative to reduce the size and nature of United States nuclear deployments world-wide, **enhance** stability, and take advantage of recent major changes in the Soviet Union.

(Mr. Lehman, United States)

The President's initiative includes the following steps:

Withdrawal and destruction of all nuclear artillery shells and all nuclear warheads for short-range ballistic missiles;

Withdrawal **of** all tactical nuclear weapons and nuclear cruise missiles from surface ships and attack submarines, as well as those nuclear weapons associated with our land-based naval aircraft. This means the removal of all nuclear cruise missiles from United States ships and submarines, as well as nuclear bombs aboard aircraft carriers;

Removal of all strategic bombers from day-to-day alert status and their weapons placed in storage;

(~~Mr. Lehman,~~ United States)

The immediate stand-down from alert of all intercontinental ballistic missiles scheduled for deactivation under START and their accelerated elimination once START is ratified;

Termination of the Peacekeeper ICBM Rail Garrison System and the mobile portion of the small **ICBM**;

Cancellation of the short-range attack **missile**; and

Creation of a new United States Strategic Command, designed to improve command and control of all United States strategic nuclear forces.

The President urged the Soviet Union to take comparable steps. In addition, he proposed that the United States and the Soviet Union seek early agreements to eliminate all land-based **ICBMs** with multiple warheads, systems that are clearly the most **destabilizing**. The President also called on the Soviet Union to join in taking concrete steps to permit the limited deployment of non-nuclear defences to protect against limited ballistic missile strikes, whatever their source.

The United States was gratified by the rapid and positive response to these proposals by the Soviet leadership. While not all of President Gorbachev's decisions and ideas match our own, there is a great deal of common ground as both the United States and the USSR have decided to take **steps** significantly to reduce further the number and kinds of nuclear weapons in both arsenals. We have already had discussions in Moscow on these **decisions** and proposals and we are hopeful that the process will continue in an expeditious manner. The outcome of the President's initiatives should be no less dramatic than the changes in the world to which it responds.

The world can **now see** clearly that the two major nuclear Powers have begun to step down the thermonuclear ladder after some 40 years. This is truly an historic turning-point.

(Mr. Lehman, United States)

The second major feature of the current **arms** control landscape is the Treaty on Conventional **Armed** Forces in Europe (CFE). The CFE Treaty is a **landmark** in the history **of** efforts by the United States and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) to build a more secure and stable Europe.

The CFE Treaty establishes a balance of conventional forces in Europe at lower levels and eliminates the capability for surprise **attacks** or large-scale conventional offensive actions in the European theatre. The Treaty will dramatically reduce the burden of armaments in Europe and thus will help eliminate a major source **of** instability in Europe. It contains far-reaching verification provisions, institutionalising transparency and openness. In short, the CFE Treaty will provide a foundation of stability and predictability during a period of uncertainty and transition *in* Europe and, as **a** result, will provide **a** firm basis for future cooperation.

East-West arms control has been an important United States objective because of the need to address the threat that tensions might erupt that could involve nations with nuclear arsenals or conventional forces in Europe. The risk of war in Europe may have been low, but the consequences of war would **have** been catastrophic. The United States, however, is increasingly concerned about threats, **instabilities** and dangerous capabilities in other parts of the world where the risk of **war** is higher and the danger **of** proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is **growing**. **Among** these troubled regions are the Middle East, the Korean peninsula and the south Asian subcontinent. Stabilising **measures** resulting from the CFE Treaty **and** the various **confidence-** and security-building measures negotiated in the *Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE)* may not necessarily **be** transferrable to other **regions**. They can, **however**, serve as a source of inspiration and experience

(Mr. Lehman, United States)

for appropriate **arrangements** beyond Europe. We are redoubling our **efforts** to encourage the pursuit **of** such an approach towards relieving regional tensions.

In addition, proliferation **of** weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery is at the top **of** the arms control agenda. Recent discoveries by the United Nations team<sup>8</sup> inspecting Iraq's nuclear, chemical, biological and ballistic missile facilities can leave no one complacent about the challenge posed by *the* need to stem proliferation **of** these dangerous and **destabilizing** weapons.

United States<sup>8</sup> efforts to curb proliferation of weapons of mass destruction have a long history, beginning with the Baruch Plan of 1946. Those efforts include the nuclear non-proliferation Treaty (**NPT**), the biological weapons Convention, the establishment of the missile technology control regime and the Australia Group, and the current negotiations **in** Geneva **on** a global ban on chemical weapons.

Today the United States is **pursuing** a multi-tiered non-proliferation strategy: first, strengthening existing non-proliferation regimes by expanding adherence to and membership in multilateral non-proliferation regimes; and, secondly, undertaking new **initiatives**, such as conventional weapons restraint and information sharing, using appropriate arms control approaches to establish regimes that reduce incentives to acquire **weapons** of mass destruction and their means **of** delivery.

The United States has long placed special emphasis **on** preventing the spread of nuclear weapons. We are **committed** to strengthening implementation of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (**NPT**) and gaining its indefinite extension at the 1995 NPT Conference, **preparations** for which should begin in 1993. We are especially encouraged **by** the **accession** to the **NPT** of four African States **this year, namely**, South Africa, **Tanzania**, Zambia

(Mr. Lehman, United States)

and Zimbabwe, and the recently announced intention of France and China, both nuclear Powers, to become parties to the Treaty. We are also happy to announce that Lithuania acceded to the NPT on 23 September. We look forward to full participation in the nuclear non-proliferation regime by new parties and to the early adherence of those intending to join. We are also committed to strengthening the International Atomic Energy Agency and its vital safeguards system.

Our efforts to prevent the proliferation of destabilizing missiles centre on the missile technology control regime (**MTCR**). Cooperation among the 17 member States of the **MTCR** has been instrumental in slowing or derailing a number of missile projects **of** concern in unstable regions. Key priorities of the **MTCR** will continue to be those of convincing non-member suppliers to avoid technology exports that undercut the regime's non-proliferation controls, and expanding its membership.

A top priority **of** United States foreign policy continues to be a global ban on chemical **weapons**, which I believe is the best way to control such weapons. As a priority matter, the United States urges all nations to join in facilitating expeditiously the completion of negotiations on the global ban on chemical weapons as well as in observing the biological and toxic weapons Convention. However, proliferation of chemical weapons and use **of** such weapons represent immediate security threats and make more difficult the achievement of a global ban. Therefore, while we continue to make every effort to continue negotiations on a ban, we also continue to pursue unilateral and cooperative action to support these chemical weapons negotiations and to inhibit the proliferation and use of chemical weapons.

(Mt. Lehman, United States)

Under our enhanced proliferation control initiative, export licences are now required on chemical plants and their designs, equipment related to chemical and biological weapons, and for 50 chemical-weapon precursors. We have also tightened controls and accountability over equipment and technology transfers where an exporter knows or is informed by the United States Government that an export may be destined for use in missile, chemical or biological weapons design, development or production. Moreover, United States law provides for criminal sanctions against United States **citizens** who knowingly assist foreign chemical or biological weapons or missile programmes.

Multilaterally, the United States participates actively in international efforts to curb chemical weapons proliferation. The United States informally consults with 20 Western nations on ways and means to address the proliferation and use of chemical weapons. This informal group, presided over by Australia, was formed in 1984 in response to the use of chemical weapons in the Iran-Iraq war. Recently, members of the group agreed to expand their national controls to cover also equipment usable in chemical weapons manufacture.

(Mr. Lehman, United States)

As I mentioned earlier, we remain committed to the early conclusion of a chemical-weapons convention as the best means to address chemical-weapons proliferation. This commitment was reaffirmed by President Bush's announcement in May of this year of further steps to accelerate the Geneva negotiations. In particular, the President announced that the United States would formally forswear the use of chemical weapons for any reason, including retaliation in kind with chemical weapons against any State, effective when the chemical-weapons convention enters into force. Further, the United States **committed** itself to destroying all its stocks of chemical weapons within 10 years of the convention's entry into force.

In addition, we have made clear our willingness to share technology to bring about the **safe** destruction of the world's chemical arsenals. Together with several other States, the United States presented in Geneva this summer a practical proposal for challenge inspection, a key element of the **chemical-**weapons convention verification regime. We are committed to doing everything in our power to complete the convention. We call upon the Conference **on** Disarmament to complete the chemical-weapons convention by the end **of** May 1992, and we urge all other States to become original parties.

The Third Review Conference of the biological and toxin weapons Convention was recently **completed** in Geneva. From my Government's viewpoint the **Conference** was a success. The package **of** confidence-building measures adopted by the Review Conference will significantly increase transparency, openness and, hence, confidence in the Convention. We call on all parties to participate in implementation **of** these confidence-building measures. Among **the** other significant agreements was that on an enhanced set **of** procedures for consultation and cooperation designed to discourage violations. In addition,

(Mr. Lehman, United States)

the Conference decided that an ad hoc group of experts should examine **the** scientific and technical aspects **of** potential verification measures, among others agreed. Participants also strongly reasserted the importance **of** compliance with all the Convention's obligations. All these measures reflect the international **community's** realisation that biological weapons are not a theoretical but a very real threat, and the community's commitment to do something about **it**.

The world community's experience with Iraq over the past year highlights the danger of proliferation and underlines the challenge we all confront in preventing it. Security Council resolutions 687 **(1991)**, 707 (1991) and 715 (1991) provide the most far-reaching arms-elimination and verification regime ever developed. They stipulate not only an arms **embargo on** Iraq but also an intensive inspection regime to be carried out by the United Nations and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) **for** the elimination of chemical and biological **weapons**, certain missiles and Iraq's now-revealed nuclear-weapons programme. In addition, they put in place **a** long-term monitoring **programme** to prevent Iraq from rebuilding its conventional **weapons**.<sup>\*</sup> The world is depending on the *demonstrated* resolve of the United Nations effectively to prevent a stubborn outlaw regime from threatening others with weapons of mass destruction. We must be clear, however, that what is now occurring in Iraq is the consequence of failed aggression: it is not voluntary arms control.

On the other hand, the arms-control agenda I outlined earlier encompasses challenges *and* **new** possibilities in *the* entire Middle **East** region. To be

---

<sup>\*</sup> See **A/C.1/46/PV.17**, page 41.

(Mr. Lehman, United States)

effective, arms-control agreements will have to address military risks in a war-torn region where **even** the first small steps will be difficult and complex. An important initial goal will be basic confidence-building measures. Just as such arms-control measures were able to contribute to the easing **of** East-West tensions, they may offer assistance to the Middle East peace process. Arms control cannot substitute for a full peace process, **of course**, but it does provide opportunities for dialogue and a step-by-step **means** of testing intentions. Nations far outside the region also have a useful role to play.

With that in mind, President Bush put forward in May an initiative for arms control in the region. **Under** the President's initiative, the five States which provide perhaps 85 per **cent** of the conventional arms that enter the Middle **East** are seeking to develop guidelines for arms shipment to the area. Ultimately, we envisage a **broad** regime emphasising responsibility in transfers and effective export controls. To deal with the nuclear danger in the region, the President has suggested that the States **of the Middle East** as a first step implement a verifiable ban on the production **of** weapons-usable **enriched** uranium or separated plutonium. **As** part of this **process**, acquisition **of** the means to produce weapons-grade materials also would be banned. All nuclear facilities in the area would be placed under the safeguards of the **IAEA**. Finally, President Bush **has** proposed a **freeze** on the procurement, production and **testing of** surface-to-surface missiles by Middle Eastern States. Ultimately the United States would like to see these missiles and all weapons of mass destruction eliminated from the region entirely,

The United Nations is in **an** excellent position to **assist** in realising these goals. Its influence **has never been greater**, and realisation **of its promise** never **more evident**.

(Mr. Lehman. United States)

The United Nations can play a vital part in promoting an increasingly dynamic role for arms control in preventing and limiting conflict. Education is a large part of the work before us. With its wrld-wide membership and renewed vitality, tha United Nations is well placed to convince troubled nations **of** the necessity **of** preventing weapons imbalances and modulating excesses before they create real instability. Just as the United Nations has virtually rid the world of smallpox, so **shoul<sup>d</sup>** it help eliminate the scourge of chemical **and** biological weapons and the threat **of** irresponsible arms build-ups.

As my agency, the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, celebrates its thirtieth anniversary, the United States looks back at the role that arms control **and** disarmament have played in the evolution of United States **national-security** policy and in our efforts to strengthen International security. For whatever success we have had, however, the credit must be shared with other countries. Like the United States, **many** of these countries, through governmental leadership **and** the public *debates*'of their **citizens**, have **made** arms control a central feature of national strategy and national goals. Our **commitment** to the success of these efforts is intimately tied to our belief that democracy, peace and stability go hand in hand.

As **we** witness the crumbling of old **antagonisms** between East **and** West, **we** see them replaced by hostilities, **some** new, some deeply rooted, in some regions **of** the wrld. At the name time that unprecedented opportunities for building peace in Europe appear on the **horizon** we see regional and ethnic strife casting its dark **shadow**.

What is **disquieting** about this turn **of events is** that some *of* the strongest **proponents of arms** control - so long as **itis** restricted to **the major Powers** - are **often** the most **reluctant** to engage in meaningful

(Mr. Lehman, United States)

arms-control efforts in their own regions. These champions of the reduction of **weapons of others** practice a double standarda they consistently fail to see any value in reducing their own weapons.

The arms-control agenda of the future is already being written. It promises to be different from that **of** the past. It is increasingly clear that those who **have** been most deeply involved in the arms-control agenda pursued thus far cannot carry the new agenda all alone. As far as the United States is concerned, we shall continue to be involved in the pursuit of arms control. But the responsibility is not entirely ours. The future agenda of arms control will require that States in other areas of the world, especially in areas where turmoil and strife threaten violence and chaos, be engaged, in deeds as well as in words.

( M r , )

The international community is beginning **to** understand that concepts of security, if they **are** to **have real** meaning, must be broader than the number of weapons in national arsenals. **And** they must include economic well-being **and** the **general quality of** life, human rights and **freedoms**.

The train is leaving **the station**. Its destination is greater **freedom**, **stable democracy**, **economic prosperity**, cooperative security and **a just peace**. **More** and **more** States are climbing aboard for this exhilarating **ride** that **has** **so** captured **our** imaginations, It is **our** fervent hope that no one **will be** left behind. We have **made our** choice; others **must make** theirs.

**Mr. O'SULLIVAN (Australia):** The Australian delegation congratulates you, Sir, **on** your election as our presiding **officer**, **and assures you of** our full cooperation in the discharge of your **duties**. We are also pleased to **see** our friend, Under-Secretary-General Akashi, with us again today.

Tremendous changes have **taken place in the** international **environment** since the General **Assembly** last **met to consider security, arms control** and **disarmament** issues. Those **major developments are**, first, the **resolution** demonstrated by the international community in rejecting and **reversing** the Iraqi aggression against Kuwait, **an** effort that reached its culmination in **the** first **half** of 1991, **and**, secondly, the **revolution** inside the Soviet Union which took place after the failed coup attempt in August.

**Those** two **major events will** have ongoing consequences which will extend in **time** well beyond this year and in scope well beyond the areas appropriately considered by the First Committee.

**While** these consequences are still being worked through - indeed, it **may** **be some** years **before we** are able to appreciate **the** full historical significance of the events **of** 1991 - **there** are nevertheless already **some**

identifiable implications in the areas that concern this Committee. I would

(Mr. O'Sullivan, Australia)

one lesson **of** the Gulf war is the inadmissibility of force as a mechanism for the resolution of inter-State disputes, and more particularly the affirmation of legal principles embodied in the Charter of the United Nations as the proper basis for States\* conduct. **One** lesson of the revolution in the Soviet Union is that States' authority has to flow from their citizens and that a proper legal framework has to rest on the consent of the governed. **Thus** the major events of the past year vividly illustrate the role for arms-control and disarmament agreements in regulating the peaceful and legal conduct among States.

These simple but powerful ideas are reshaping the world **order** that has existed for the previous four decades. In the arms control and disarmament areas some important consequences follow from these new developments. There are certainly opportunities to enhance openness and transparency and to devise arms-control agreements which have practical effect and which additionally function as confidence-building measures. All nations need now to participate in joint efforts to negotiate and to codify in legally binding instruments a set of new security arrangements. Opportunities exist in bilateral, regional and multilateral contexts. Some are already in the process **of** development; others await decisions by national Governments. I will touch on some of these of particular concern to Australia later in this statement.

Another consequence is an increased appreciation that the processes of arms control and disarmament are fully legitimate and necessary elements for defining and enhancing security. With the revolution in political choices and the reversal **of** armed aggression it is increasingly obvious that there **is** no longer the need, or indeed a basis, **for** characterising the security environment of the international system in the same way and with the same

(Mr. O'Sullivan, Australia)

precautions as were necessary in years past. We applaud the recognition of this in the statement by President Bush on 27 September and the response by President Gorbachev on 5 October.

Nevertheless, there remains considerable scope for **reducing** further **the** force levels that were necessary to meet the challenges **of** those earlier times. Our task here in the First Committee must be to take advantage of the new environment to advance further our multilateral efforts in the area of control and disarmament. The announcements by the United States and Soviet Presidents affirm the utility of creative approaches in breaking log jams and give direction, impetus and leadership to the disarmament process.

In moving out of the ideological and intellectual categories of the cold war, we see that arms-control and disarmament agreements have an important part to play. In this new environment not only are there new and welcome ideas, such as restraints on conventional-arms transfers and the proposal to have a register of such arms flows to help facilitate the goal of avoiding destabilising and excessive conventional-arms build-ups, but old ideas, such as sharp reductions in nuclear weapons, are now seen in a new light. This gives hope for substantial progress on further reductions in the numbers of nuclear warheads and other aspects of disarmament which offer greater stability at lower levels of weapons. The notable achievements of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (**CFE**) and the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) are welcome in themselves and as signposts towards a more stable and less threatening world.

In order to take advantage of these new opportunities the agenda for multilateral negotiations needs to be refurbished and the priority **of** elements on that agenda reconsidered. We should take opportunities as they arise to

(Mr. O'Sullivan, Australia)

solve arms-control challenges on their own terms and eschew artificial linkages that threaten immobility and risk lost opportunities. For example, we should take heart from the successful conclusion last month **of the** biological weapons Convention Review Conference. We should now use the opportunity of this General Assembly session to embody in a resolution acceptable to all the various aspects of that Convention which the Review Conference identified that could and should be strengthened.

We need to make a more determined and committed effort in the chemical-weapons negotiations. We need to **capitalize** quickly on the valuable progress that **has** been made in finalising what is essentially an almost complete treaty **text**. I would like to take the occasion of a statement in the First Committee, where all Member States are represented, to urge all non-member8 **of** the Conference on Disarmament to take an active role in the Conference'8 Ad Hoc **Committee** on Chemical Weapons. This year 37 States availed themselves of this opportunity, and we hope that more States will do so in 1992 as we conclude the Convention.

I would also like to underline again how critical it is to conclude the Treaty in the period immediately ahead. It is worth recalling in this connection that it is in the third world that chemical weapons have been used on each occasion after the initial use in the First World War, and it is in situations of regional tension in the third world where the temptation to use chemical weapon8 is the greatest. It follows that the enhancement **of** security by the removal of such a threat will be greatest in the third world, although, **of course**, the consequences of any chemical-weapons use would have security implication8 for all **States**. That is why Australia is working for a multilateral treaty as the effective long-term solution to the problems **of** chemical **weapons**.

(Mr. O'Sullivan, Australia)

Australia has some practical proposals to make about how the chemical-weapons Convention can be concluded next year.

First, a greater involvement by capital-based *officials* in the negotiations **might** help inject a firmer concentration on the security benefits that this treaty will provide.

(Mr. O'Sullivan, Australia)

**Second, another** improvement would be to have a less formalistic structure in the negotiations. In part, this has to do with the drain on resources that multiple **working** groups demand, especially for small delegations. In part, it has to do with a sense that real negotiating is awaiting the involvement of more senior officials than those participating in the working groups. In turn this sense produces an atmosphere of game playing rather than carefully weighed and **nuanced** negotiation. More generally, it could be argued that the current group structures **are** not flexible enough to reflect new realities and that these structures are in fact impeding progress in **the** negotiations.

Third, in particular it may be time, if the negotiations are to be concluded **next** year, **for the Conference to** select several key "Friends of the Chair", who should **work** on the principal remaining matters, such as verification, assistance and **universality**, and structural questions related to the chemical-weapons Convention organisation. It is also the case that more private **consultations** via a system of **\*\*Friends of the Chair**" would allow for compromises to emerge without having to be publicly viewed and without negotiators being seen as gaining or losing face.

Fourth, it should be accepted in principle that a meeting of the Ad Hoc **Committee** at the ministerial level could be scheduled for early 1992. This would in itself impart a discipline and sense of urgency to the negotiations either **to** conclude the negotiations so that the Ministers could ratify the agreement at such a meeting or, if that **were** not possible, to clearly delineate options on the outstanding issues so that they could consider an overall package that might clinch the deal. The response to the letter on this issue *from* the Australian Foreign Minister to his colleagues in the Conference on Disarmament and his Asia-Pacific colleagues has been very **encouraging**.

(Mr. O'Sullivan, Australia)

Fifth, it is also time to encourage greater regional efforts to initiate a dialogue on the practical requirements that this Convention will impose. Such a dialogue is continuing in South-East Asia and the South Pacific regions subsequent to an initiative launched by the Australian Prime Minister in 1988, and has also been undertaken in Latin America under United Nations auspices. There are proposals for similar efforts in Africa. Obvious areas where this approach might **be** taken further are the Middle East, the *subcontinent* **and** East Asia. A regional dialogue could help prepare **for** the Convention and help assuage false fears about the security intentions **of** key regional States. The efforts **of** such non-governmental organisations as the Quakers, who have been active in seeking a **common** ground to conduct such a dialogue in the Middle East, are to be heartily encouraged.

Sixth, and finally, the time will shortly be upon **us**, if we are to *adhere* to the **schedule** outlined in the Committee's mandate, when it becomes important to have a meeting of the prospective **or** acting **heads** of national implementation authorities, a group which will have to be established under the chemical-weapons Convention. Such a meeting will play an important role in standardising implementation requirements so that each State party could be confident that it would not be commercially **penalized** by the way it interpreted its obligations. *It* would also have an important function in educating those who had only recently turned their minds to the requirements laid down in the chemical-weapons Convention about how to implement their obligations thereunder. Australia has circulated in the Conference on Disarmament an **extensive** description **of** how we have approached the task **of implementing** the Convention through the operation **of** a national secretariat for that purpose. We would be happy to share that **experience** with all interested States.

(Mr. O'Sullivan. Australia)

The past year has demonstrated in stark terms the urgent need to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and the importance **of** an effective international non-proliferation **regime**. The nuclear non-proliferation Treaty has a position of irreducible importance for the international community and it is more necessary for global security now than ever before.

It has been a remarkable year for the non-proliferation Treaty. Australia has welcomed the decisions of France, China, South Africa, **Zambia**, **Tanzania** and Zimbabwe to accede to the Treaty. We also note with great satisfaction that Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia and the Ukraine intend to become parties to the Treaty as non-nuclear-weapon States.

The changes in the Soviet Union raise the possibility that a number **of** new States might possess nuclear weapons. Accordingly, we urge any other States emerging from the Soviet Union to make an early public decision to forswear nuclear weapons and to give practical effect to that commitment by acceding to the non-proliferation Treaty.

We should not be complacent about the Treaty. Its strength comes from the commitment **of its** parties. For the first time the world has witnessed a State deliberately disregarding its obligations **wider** the Treaty. Iraq has been condemned by the Security Council and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) **for doing** so. It is regrettable also that many States parties to the Treaty have still not concluded their obligatory safeguards agreements. Failure to conclude **such** agreements is a breach **of** the Treaty and **affects** the security **of** all. It is therefore not to be dismissed lightly. We **are** concerned in particular that one such State is operating unsafeguarded facilities and has by its own inaction on a safeguards agreement raised serious doubts about its nuclear intentions. The Democratic **People's**

(Australia) \_\_\_\_\_

Republic of Korea has been called on by **the Board of Governors of IAEA** to sign and bring about the entry into **force** and full implementation **of its** safeguards agreement at an **early** date. **We** urge **the** Democratic People's Republic of Korea to do so without further delay.

We welcome the important decisions taken by Argentina and **Brazil** to enter into bilateral and international non-proliferation commitments and hope that Israel, Pakistan and India, which operate significant unsafeguarded facilities, will follow their lead.

The Gulf **war** has also starkly illustrated the need to strengthen the effectiveness of **IAEA** safeguards as an essential part of strengthening the nuclear non-proliferation **regime**. The recent **IAEA** General Conference has called **for** early action on this **matter**.

Australia wants to see early decisions from the **IAEA Board** of Governors, in particular on the provision of design information on nuclear facilities and the conduct of special inspections. **We** also support action to tighten nuclear export controls and nuclear supply policies. Australia has long urged the adoption of full-scope **IAEA** safeguards as the standard **for new** nuclear **supply**. We are pleased with the recent announcement by the United Kingdom and France that they have responded to the call by the Fourth Review Conference of the non-proliferation Treaty, on full-scope safeguards, and have adopted such a policy. **We** urge all remaining supplier countries, particularly the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and China, as **members of** the Security Council, to follow suit.

The dramatically changed international environment resulting from the recent proposals and unilateral decisions by the United States and the Soviet Union are entirely welcomed and strongly supported in Australia. In this new environment we look forward to enhanced security and sharply reduced levels of

(Mr. O'Sullivan, Australia)

nuclear weapons. Similarly, we encourage all nuclear-weapon States to seize these **new** opportunities and drastically cut their nuclear arsenals. We **hope** the nuclear-weapon States will **be** prepared to re-examine their pledges with regard to first use of nuclear weapons.\*

Stopping nuclear testing is a **long-standing** Australian disarmament objective. **We** urge all nuclear-weapon States to reconsider the political costs and technical aspects of their testing programmes. It is difficult to see a rationale for testing **if** there is no political purpose or military need for a new generation **of** nuclear weapons. Accordingly, the Australian Foreign Minister, Senator **Evans**, publicly welcomed the announcement by President Gorbachev of a moratorium on Soviet nuclear testing for the next year. as a **good** start, and called upon other nuclear-testing States to do likewise.

We are aware of argument<sup>8</sup> about how far the debate on structure and **scope**, verification and compliance can be taken in **the** Conference on Disarmament's Ad Hoc **Committee** on a nuclear-test ban under its current mandate, While we are ready to begin negotiations forthwith, **we recognize** the problems in realising such **an** ambition. But we believe that, at least, this session **of** the General **Assembly** should be able to express its views on an end to nuclear testing in a single resolution. We **are** strongly convinced that **there** could hardly be a **more** propitious time for such a unified approach.

As I mentioned earlier, another example where this **Committee** could forge ahead with practical arms-control effort<sup>8</sup> would be in the area of **conventional-arms** transfers. We welcome, accordingly, the Secretary-General's

---

\* **Mr. Alpman** (Turkey), Vice-Chairman, took the Chair.

(Mr. O'Sullivan, Australia)

**s cudy (A/46/301)** on ways and means of promoting transparency in international transfers of conventional **arms**. Australia hopes that we **shal**. agree this year on a resolution establishing a convention-arms-transfer register, whose **objective wculd** be to achieve a sufficient degree **of** transparency in order to assist in addressing the **destabilizing effects of arms** build-ups both global and regional - the latter most recently exemplified by Iraq's invasion of Kuwait.

(Mr. O'Sullivan. Australia)

Finally, as I said at the beginning, the dramatic developments **of** 1991 will have many ongoing **effects**. I have focused today on those areas of principal concern to the Australian Government - the inadmissibility of force as an instrument **of** political change and the value **of** arms control and **disarmament** agreements in codifying the new arrangements for enhanced security and improved stability. Those changes should be reflected in a more pragmatic approach to the **work** of the General **Assembly** with greater expectation that we should be **able** to reflect the rich texture of the views represented here and embody more fully and adequately our shared desire **for** a safer, more secure and more peaceful world.

Mr. DONOWAKI (Japan): My delegation wishes to join others in extending to Mr, **Mroziewicz** its sincere congratulations upon his election to the chairmanship **of** this important Committee. My delegation is convinced that, under his able guidance and skill, the Committee will be able to fulfil its tasks successfully. My delegation also wishes to congratulate the other members **of** the Bureau on their appointments.

At this historic time in the wake **of** the East-West cold war and of the Gulf war, the world **is** moving **from** confrontation to cooperation, opening up tremendous possibilities **for** progress. **At** the same time, however, it must be **recognized** that the world is **beset** by the uncertainty and instability **common** to any time **of transition**. It is essential hereafter that we fully understand the characteristic features **of** this time of transition and respond unerringly. For **instance**, various epoch-making achievements made in the arms control and **disarmament** field as a result of the **dismantling of** the East-West **and** the United States-Soviet rivalry will have to be made irreversible and pushed forward further. On the other hand, the international community coalesced **magnificently** around the United Nations in **response** to the **crisis** in the

(Mr. Donowaki, Japan)

Gulf. It is hoped that the United Nations will play a central role in international cooperation for the creation of a new world order.

In order to meet this expectation, the functions **of** the United Nations will have to be strengthened and it will be essential that the **Secretary-General**, the Security Council and the General Assembly each function effectively within its realm **of** responsibility. From this viewpoint, **the** strengthening of the functions of the First Committee of the General Assembly, which deals mostly with arms control and disarmament issues, will be a matter of particular urgency. **For** the past several **years**, efforts have been made, with some measure of success, to **merge** and reduce the number of resolutions to be adopted in the First Committee, and for the resolutions adopted to be done as much as possible **by** consensus. Hereafter, we will have to make a much greater effort to take up such agenda items **as** may meet the needs of the changing world, without being bound by past practices in conducting meaningful and in-depth deliberation of such items and in adopting resolutions that would contribute to fashioning a new world order.

One of the lessons to be learned from the Gulf crisis **is** that the amassing of massive arsenals by one country through international transfer and proliferation contributes to aggressive behaviour **when** such actions are tied to that **country's** political aims. Thus, the most important issue in the wake of the Gulf crisis is that **of** strengthening efforts in the fields of international transfer **of** conventional weapons and of non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and missiles.

There **is** an urgent **need** to establish a United Nations reporting system that would enhance the transparency **of** such international transfers **of** **conventional weapons**. Japan has advocated the establishment **of** just such a system since **March of** this **year**. **Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu** announced at

(Mr. Donowaki, Japan)

the **Kyoto** Conference on disarmament issues in May that Japan would be submitting a resolution to this **effect** to this session of the General Assembly. At present, we are consulting with those interested States, including the European Community member States, in preparing a draft resolution. In doing **so**, we are making efforts to reflect as much as possible the **views** expressed in the course **of** fruitful consultations by those States concerned so that the draft resolution will receive active and overwhelming support from all the Member States. Some basic concepts on which such a draft resolution should be based have become clearer.

First, **a** universal and non-discriminatory arms transfer register under the auspices **of** the United Nations should be established as soon as possible, as recommended in the report of the Group of Experts appointed by the Secretary-General in accordance with General Assembly resolution **43/75** I of 1988.

Second, since a United Nations arms transfer register is only meant for greater transparency as a first step in confidence building, due note should be taken of the importance of the exercise of careful restraint in arms transfers, of the efforts to settle underlying political disputes, and of the efforts to promote disarmament in all its aspects.

**Third**, such a register should not be expected to be a perfect one from the beginning, but should rather **be** established as early as possible, improved **upon** by trial and **error**, and gradually completed as a universal and non-discriminatory system.

Fourth, there is the question of the adequacy of an arms transfer register **if** indigenous arms production and the transfer of components and related **armstechnology are** not to be included. In particular, those nations that depend on **arms** imports rather than on indigenous production are **afraid**

(Mr. Donowaki, Japan)

that the **enhanced transparency** of **arms** transfers might endanger their national security. Indeed, transparency with respect to **arms** production and **arms** components will also have to be promoted. In this case, however, the volume of information to be reported will increase tremendously. Therefore, a realistic way would be to begin with what is immediately feasible, while at the **same time** to keep studying the ways to expand the register to cover production and components.

Fifth, there **is** the question of how to deal with **smuggling** and other forms of illicit **arms** transfers, including **arms** supply to terrorists and subversive forces. As the report of the Group of Experts appointed by the Secretary-General points out, the illicit **arms** trade is by definition clandestine, **so** that transparency per se has only an indirect role to play in dealing with this phenomenon. However, the **report recommends** several concrete steps that can be taken at present by the international community, and the question will **have** to be dealt with by our taking these recommendations into account.

(Mr. Donowaki, Japan)

Japan is convinced **that the** adoption of a resolution to establish a United **Nations system of** reporting arms transfers that reflects the basic concepts I have just described will serve as an important first step by which the United Nations can contribute to fashioning a new world order. Recognising that there may be **some** technical issues involved in ensuring that such **a system** operates smoothly, Japan is prepared to cooperate with the United Nations by hosting a meeting next year to assist in the elaboration of these issues. Likewise, should the need arise, Japan is prepared to offer appropriate cooperation to enhance the database capabilities of the Department for Disarmament Affairs for the implementation of this **system**.

Before leaving the subject **of** international transfers of conventional arms and taking up the question **of weapons** of mass destruction, I should like to touch upon a view held by some nations **that** perhaps international transfers of weapons of **mass** destruction should also be made transparent and be included in the United Nations **reporting system. However, as a matter of fact,** weapons, of **mass destruction, such as** nuclear, chemical and biological **weapons,** and missiles are already under far-stricter controls by the international community. It should be recognised that the non-proliferation and elimination of those weapons are precisely the issues of today, going beyond the **stage of** the transparency **of** their *transfers*.

Let me take up first **the** question of nuclear disarmament. Japan highly values **the** signing **of** the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) Treaty between the United **States** and the Soviet Union as a historic event, *and we all* hope for its early ratification by both **States. However, the more recent announcements** made by President Bush that the United States would take unilateral **measures** to dismantle all land-based tactical nuclear **weapons,**

**(Mr. Donowaki, Japan)**

withdraw all sea-based tactical nuclear weapons and dismantle many of them, and would eliminate by agreement with the Soviet Union all intercontinental ballistic missiles (**ICBMs**) with multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles (**MIRVs**), among other things, should indeed be acclaimed as a brave decision of unprecedented magnitude. President Gorbachev's positive response to President Bush's initiative, followed by the initiation of talks between the United States and the Soviet Union, serves as a further source of encouragement to the entire international community. Let us hope that these moves signify a genuine beginning of the end of the nuclear age.

We may recall that the **wave** of upheavals in the Soviet Union caused some concern about its command and control capability over its nuclear weapons, with possible grave consequences to international peace and security. **The** announcement made by Foreign Minister **Pankin** of the Soviet Union to **the** effect that the central government would be in control of all nuclear weapons helped to dispel such a concern, and we welcome this. However, the problem of the control of nuclear weapons, or rather the problem posed by the danger **of** proliferation within a nuclear-weapon State, has to be taken seriously, and continuous efforts will have to be made in order to exercise stricter controls.

In view of the encouraging developments in the talks between the United States and the Soviet Union in the sphere of nuclear-arms control and disarmament, Japan wishes to call upon the United Kingdom, France and China to tackle the question of nuclear disarmament with more determination and vigour.

As for the question of a nuclear-test ban, Japan highly values the lively discussions conducted under the chairmanship of Ambassador **Chadha** of India this year in the nuclear-test ban Ad Hoc Committee of the **Conference** on

(Mr. Donowaki, Japan)

Disarmament. In particular, the deliberation on the question of the verification of a nuclear-test ban proved to be very useful since a genuine dialogue took place on this matter between the nuclear-weapon States and the non-nuclear-weapon States. It should be **recognized** that the materials and proposals submitted to the Amendment Conference of the Partial Test Ban Treaty in January this year also served to enrich the deliberation on the question in the Conference on Disarmament. It is Japan's expectation that the substantial **work of** the Ad Hoc Committee will be continued next year with the re-establishment of the Committee under the-same mandate as it had this year.

In connection with the verification of a nuclear-test ban, Japan is also pleased with the successful completion of the second large-scale test (GSETT II) conducted by the Group of Scientific Experts of the Conference on Disarmament. A final report on the test is scheduled to be submitted next spring, and Japan looks forward to this report since the future direction of our efforts might become clearer then. At the same time, the post-GSETT II activities of the Group of Scientific Experts will have to be considered. Also, **from** this viewpoint, the re-establishment of the nuclear-test ban Ad Hoc **Committee** next year will be desirable.

The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons serves as the most important international framework **for** preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Universal adherence to the Treaty is an important goal to be **achieved**. **Therefore**, Japan **was** pleased to see - after last **year's** accession of **Mozambique** to the Treaty - Zambia, **Tanzania** and South Africa acceding to **the** Treaty. Also, Japan highly values the announcement of willingness to join the Treaty made by France in June **and** by China in August, at the time of Prime Minister **Kaifu's** visit to China, and **hopes** that these two nuclear-weapon States will take prompt action to implement their decisions.

**(Mr. Donowaki, Japan)**

On the other hand, compliance with Treaty obligations by the States parties to the Treaty is of vital importance for securing confidence in the Treaty among its States parties. Japan wishes strongly to call upon a country that, while being a party to the Treaty, has not yet concluded a *safeguard* agreement with the International Atomic **Energy Agency (IAEA)** to do **so** without any further delay.

Furthermore, Japan is in favour of a long-term **extension** of the non-proliferation Treaty after 1995. Of course, the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and nuclear disarmament **are** important **objectives** to be pursued in parallel under the Treaty regime. However, Japan **does** not **share** the view that there should be a linkage between the extension of the Treaty and a comprehensive nuclear-*test* ban.

Together with the question of the non-proliferation of weapons of **mass destruction**, the importance of the non-proliferation of missiles should not be overlooked. Japan calls upon all States to adopt the Missile Technology Control Regime **(MTCR)** guidelines in **response** to the appeal made by the Tokyo **MTCR** Conference in March this year.

**As for** the chemical-weapons Convention negotiations held in Geneva, **it** now appears that all the remaining major issues requiring solution are laid out on the table. If the negotiations fail to be concluded during 1993, there is a danger that the momentum brought about by the Gulf crisis and boosted by President **Bush's** statement of 13 May will be lost **forever**. It *may* not be an exaggeration to say that the **raison d'être** of the *Conference on Disarmament* **is** at stake in the outcome of the negotiations. The member States of the Conference on **Disarmament** should make an all-out *effort*, even during the **course of** the current **session of** the **First** Committee, to accelerate the

(Mr. Donowaki. Japan)

**negotiations.** Also, Japan strongly hopes that States that are not members of the Conference on **Disarmament** will take a greater interest in following the negotiations.

With **respect** to the **Third Review Conference of** the biological weapons Convention, the agreement reached on convening a meeting of experts on verification and on improving and supplementing confidence-building measures **may** be regarded as major achievements. Japan wishes to see the **confidence-** building measures implemented by all the State<sup>s</sup> parties to the Convention and also **wishes** to appeal to other States not parties to the Convention to accede to it.

(Mr. Donowaki, Japan)

Before concluding this **statement**, my delegation **wishes** to refer to the **difficulties** with which the nuclear weapon8 and **other inspection** teams of the United **Nations Special Commission** were confronted in Iraq in recent months. **The difficulties represented** a **serious** challenge not only to the **authority of** the United **Nations** but **also** to the **efforts** of the international **community** centred around **it** to bring about peace **and stability** to the Middle East, and to prevent the recurrence of military **aggression** in the region. **We** certainly should not be deterred **by this** experience **from the** urgent task of making **renewed** efforts to strengthen the function8 of the United Nations. **Successful** accomplishment of **the tasks of the** United **Nations Special Commission** will be vital in order not to create any adverse **effect8** on the IAEA **safeguard mechanism** and on the verification and **inspection** mechanism of the Ongoing chemical weapon8 convention **negotiations**. **From this viewpoint**, the Government of Japan ha8 volunteered - in addition to the **appointment** of a **Japanese expert** a8 a **member** of the United **Nations Special Commission** and the contribution of \$2.5 **million** to the funding **of the Commission** - to send two **experts** a8 **members** of the **sixth** chemical weapon8 inspection team to **Iraq**.

We have **witnessed** over the last 12 **months very fast** development8 in the arms control and **disarmament field**, and at **this time of historic** change a new wave of disarmament appear8 to be gathering **momentum**. Parallel with the major cut8 in the **United States-Soviet** nuclear **arsenals** and in the **East-West** military **forces**, **greater emphasis is** being placed **on** regional and arms transfer-proliferation **aspects** in dealing with **arms** control and **disarmament problems**. **Also**, we will have to **keep** in mind that the **settlement** of regional conflict8 **requires an** overall approach that **deals not** only with the **hardware aspects** of **arms** control and disarmament but **also** with the **software aspects** of

(Mr. Donowaki. Japan)

resolving underlying political issuer. What we need **may** be a new way of thinking to cope with the new wave **of** disarmament. It **may** well be that the time has **come** for all nations, developed and developing, arms supplier<sup>8</sup> and arms recipients, to be called upon to participate in the international **efforts** to solve the problem<sup>8</sup> **of** the proliferation of weapons of **mass** destruction and missiles and the problems of the transfer of conventional weapons.

Mr. SAETHER (Norway): Allow **me** to congratulate the representative of Poland **on** his election as Chairman of the First Committee at the forty-sixth **session** of the General Assembly. I should also like to extend my congratulations to the other officers of the Committee. I am sure that under **your** able leadership the Committee can look forward to a successful session.

This General Assembly takes place against the background of unprecedented developments in nuclear-arms control and disarmament. Entirely new avenues have been opened as a result of the far-reaching and enlightened initiatives of Presidents Bush and Gorbachev. Today, there is a real chance **of** breaking and reversing the relentless spiral of the **arms** race. We **may** even be on the brink **of** a disarmament **race**.

It **may** not be **possible**, as the old saying has it, to put the nuclear genie back in the bottle. But the genie's potential to wreak havoc will be significantly curtailed once the unilateral reduction<sup>8</sup> and associated measures contained in the **two** initiatives have been implemented. The nuclear threshold will clearly be raised and strategic stability **strengthened**. The risk of a devastating nuclear **first strike** has been significantly diminished, and the entire world **community and** future generations **stand** to benefit.

**(Mr. Saether, Norway)**

From a North European perspective, it **is** particularly gratifying **that** the United States and the Soviet Union have agreed between themselves that in the new Europe of the 1990s, there is no longer any justification either for ground-launched theatre nuclear weapons or **for** tactical nuclear weapons on surface vessels *and* submarines. The elimination of these **systems** will **fundamentally** enhance security in the **north** of **Europe** and **elsewhere** on the continent. These initiatives have our enthusiastic **support**.

It is also clear that the sweeping proposals made by the United States and the Soviet President with regard to **strategic** nuclear arms are of **historic significance**. They have set the stage for follow-up Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) negotiations in the near future. **A window of** opportunity has been opened, which must not be closed until **sizeable** reductions beyond those mandated by the START have been achieved. It **is** vitally important that the parties stand by their shared **vision** of a safer and more stable world.

To that end, it is essential that the nuclear-arms dialogue continue without excluding any issue, including the question of a total **ban** on nuclear testing,

Much **has also** been achieved in the domain of conventional arms control. The Conventional **Forces** in Europe (**CFE**) Treaty **is** a major contribution to the new European **security** order which is emerging. It **should** be ratified *and* **implemented as soon as possible**. Recent events in the Soviet Union **and the achievement** of national independence by **Estonia**, Latvia and Lithuania may have **implications** for the **CFE** Treaty. However, this should not be allowed to delay the Treaty's **entry into force** at the **earliest possible** date.

(Mr. Saether, Norway)

This would not of course be the end of the road **for** conventional **arms** control. We **hope that** the ongoing negotiations on CFE (IA) and **confidence-** and security-building measures can be concluded **with** tangible results before next year's Helsinki **follow-up** meeting. **At** the same time, we are looking beyond that to the establishment next year of a new all-European forum for security **and** conventional arms control.

The new forum will represent a new departure in conventional arms control. In addition to classical arms control, which primarily comprises stabilising measurea, **a broad** dialogue **on security issues** and issues related to crisis management and conflict prevention, should be included.

As a result of political developments as well as breakthroughs in **arms** control, **the danger of a major** military confrontation in Europe has all but disappeared. Nevertheleaa, the **crisis** in Yugoslavia provides a vivid **illustratioa** of **the** fact that the continent will face other risks and potential instability in the years to come. There is an urgent need for **cooperative approaches** to the kind of conflict epitomised by the tragic events in Yugoslavia. In the new Europe of the **1990s**, security can only be a shared and common security.

**Norway** fully supports the untiring **efforts** of the European Community and its member State8 to arrive **at a** peaceful and negotiated aolutioa to the problems in Yugoslavia. Similarly, we believe the work undertaken within the **Conference** on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) has been important in creating broad international support for an end to the conflict. Also the action undertaken by the Security Council **has** been most valuable. The continuing violence is a serious challenge to all these efforts. The use of force to achieve political objectives remains unacceptable. The shooting **must** stop and peace **must** be **given** a real chance.

(Mr. Saether, Norway)

The Yugoslav crisis has demonstrated the importance of thorough preparations on the part of the international community to meet future crises of a similar kind. The European family of nations must accept a special responsibility for keeping its own house in order. To that end, it is essential that the CSCE be made capable of dealing quickly and effectively with emerging conflicts as well as acute crises. In short, the conflict management aspect of the all-European process must be strengthened.

The elaboration of a broad range of CSCE crisis-management procedures and mechanisms must be given priority. Such procedures and mechanisms should include observer and rapporteur missions, good offices and various forms of arbitration and mediation. In cases where hostilities have already erupted, the opportunity of utilising CSCE peace-keeping forces should be an option, as should monitoring of cease-fires and disengagement of troops. However, there should be no question of deploying CSCE peace-keeping forces unless this is accepted by the parties concerned. By the same token, peace-keeping operations should not be fielded unless a cease-fire is already in existence. Painfully gained experience in connection with United Nations peace-keeping efforts underlines the importance of those two basic principles.

No time should be lost in bringing the negotiations in Geneva on a convention on chemical weapons to a successful conclusion. President Bush's initiative on chemical weapons last spring was a significant effort in that direction. The decision by the United States Government to accept unconditional prohibition of the use of and total destruction of all its chemical weapons within the first 10 years of the coming into force of the convention was a major step forward for the negotiations. With that decision, the target date of 1992 came within reach.

**(Mr. Saether, Norway)**

However, some obstacles still remain. In particular, the differing views on the verification regime impede progress towards a final negotiating package. As regards the challenge inspection issue, it is important to find a workable compromise between the need of all States parties to be confident that all parties are implementing the convention and their need to protect information considered essential to their own security interests. The time has now come for all delegations taking part in the negotiations to waive some of their ideal demands in order to reach such a compromise. This would make it possible for the convention to be realized next year, as spelt out in the revised mandate of the Ad Hoc Committee. Similarly, the routine inspection system should soon be **finalized** with the necessary flexibility on the part of all parties.

In the field of chemical weapons, openness and transparency are of fundamental importance. All chemical-weapon States should provide information about the location, composition **and** size of their stocks, and all countries not in possession of chemical weapons should make declarations to that effect.

**For** ten years Norway has been conducting **a** research programme on verification of alleged use of chemical weapons. This **research** is carried **out** by experts at the **Norwegian** Defence Research Establishment, **and** annual reports have been presented to the Conference on Disarmament. We are now considering how to extend the scope of this programme to allow scientists and scholars from developing countries to share our expertise in methods of verification of alleged use of chemical weapons.

This Committee should send a clear signal to the Conference on Disarmament that it should exert all possible efforts during the forthcoming months to resolve outstanding issues and to achieve a final agreement by the middle of 1992.

(Mr. Saether, Norway)

The Third Review Conference of the Parties to the Convention on biological weapons was concluded in Geneva only a few **weeks** ago. The Final Declaration by the Conference represents a significant step towards the implementation **of** the provisions contained in **the** Convention. The international norm set by this Convention has been clearly reaffirmed. Furthermore, the confidence-building measures adopted in 1987 have been revised and extended, thus increasing the openness and transparency we need in this very important field. Norway hopes that the **declarations** concerning the confidence-building measures will be more comprehensive and that **far** more States parties from all regional groups will **respond** than in the past.

The Conference also agreed to take a step forward in the difficult field of **verification** of the Convention by establishing an ad hoc group of **experts** to identify and examine potential verification methods from a scientific and technical standpoint. We look forward to taking **part in this work**.

There will be relatively modest costs associated with putting into practice the decisions of the Review Conference. We should try to resolve this issue, preferably during the deliberations **of** this Committee.

The achievement of a total and permanent ban **on** all nuclear testing remains an important **disarmament** objective for Norway. A comprehensive nuclear-test-ban **treaty** is essential in order to halt both the vertical and the horizontal proliferation of **nuclear** weapons effectively. The concern that has been expressed about the environmental and health **risks** associated with nuclear testing is an additional argument for discontinuing such testing.

We greatly appreciate the **work** of the Ad Hoc Committee on a **Nuclear** Test Ban **established** by the Conference on Disarmament in **Geneva** this year under the able leadership of India. We also attach great importance to the work of the

(Mr. Saether, Norway)

Ad **Hoc** Group of Scientific **Experts** and its second **major** technical experiment (**GSETT-2**), the results of which will now be analysed and evaluated before the Group's next meeting early next year. A global **network** for the exchange of seismic data must serve as the most important basis for a future **system of** verification of a test-ban treaty. We should now give careful thought to the question how the work **of** the Group and the results of the global experiment could be used as a basis for a treaty-verification system, *and* how the future *work* of the Group could be organised to include other means of verification relevant to a comprehensive test-ban treaty.

Norway has for **many** years been co-sponsoring a draft resolution put forward **by** Australia and New Zealand on the urgent need for a comprehensive test-ban treaty. That draft resolution reflects our basic views on this important issue. We should like to see the re-establishment of the Ad Hoc **Committee** on a Nuclear Test Ban in 1992 with an appropriate mandate, as spelt out in that draft resolution.

**Developments** since the last session of the General Assembly have confirmed the need to establish a **mechanism** for consultation in situations where there appears **to be an** excessive build-up of arms. As a welcome first step, China, **France**, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States have initiated a dialogue related to conventional arms transfers, based on the Middle **East** arms-control initiative launched by President Bush on 29 May. The recent G-7 London **summit** meeting also addressed that **issue**.

A **common** approach to the guidelines applicable to transfers **of** conventional **weapons is** highly desirable, In **fact, the** support of both arms exporters and importers will be essential to the **success of efforts to**

(Mr. Saether, Norway)

restrain transfers of **conventional** weapons. In this **respect**, Norway wholeheartedly supports the proposal for **a universal register of arms** transfers under the auspices of **the** United Nations. **Such a register** would promote greater openness in international **arms transfers and help to discourage destabilizing sales.**

(Mr. Saether, Norway)

The Gulf War **and its aftermath** have clearly highlighted the threat to international security posed by the danger of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The findings of the United Nations Special **Commission** in Iraq have **given us** all cause for deep concern. The time has **come for** the international community to **make** every effort to ensure **the** elimination of chemical and biological weapons and the prevention of nuclear proliferation.

The non-proliferation Treaty remains the cornerstone of the international regime of nuclear non-proliferation. Norway welcomes the recent accession of more States to the Treaty. The announced intended accessions of France and China will further strengthen **the** universality of the Treaty.

The spread of ballistic missile **systems** has gained momentum throughout the world. The Missile Technology Control Regime, which is supportive of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, provides a useful means of curbing the spread of missile systems capable **of** carrying nuclear warheads. It is a positive trend that the number of nations which apply the guidelines for sensitive missile-relevant **technology** is increasing.

Finally, **I** should like to emphasize the growing international acceptance of a wider definition of security and stability. Too often these two concepts have **been** referred to in terms of military factors **alone. A common** understanding of the interdependence that exists between military, economic **and** ecological factors is of vital importance, It **is our hope** that in time to come **it** will be possible for **the** world community to make a significant shift **in** the allocation **of resources, away from** armaments and over to development and **environment in the broad sense.** This Committee should **take** the lead in preparing future guidelines in the field **of** security and disarmament. Norway is prepared to contribute its share to that endeavour.

(Mr. Saethsr Norway)

**My** country is the endorsed Western candidate for membership of the **Conference** on Disarmament. Despite **serious efforts** in **Geneva** during this **year's session**, it remained **impossible** for the **Conference** to agree to implement the decision to increase the membership **of** the Conference. We hope that the decision to accept Norway as a member of the Conference will be taken in 1992.

Mr. SARDENBERG (Braail): The Brazilian delegation congratulates Ambassador Robert **Mroziewicz** of Poland on his election to the chairmanship **of** the First Committee. I wish also to express our satisfaction at seeing Ambassador **Sedfrey Ordonez**, of the **Philippines**; Mr. **Alpman**, of Turkey; and Mr. Pablo Sader, of Uruguay, taking part **in** the Bureau. I am sure that they will steer our **work** with competence, ensuring that it will be fruitful. The Bureau can count on the full cooperation of the Brazilian **delegation to** that end. A word **of** appreciation is also in order for the excellent work done by Ambassador Jai **Rana**, of Nepal, as Chairman of the First Committee last year.

Despite recent claims to the contrary, it seems **quite** clear that **the** flow of history has resumed. In fact, as long as man **exists** history will always flow. Although it may be difficult to have a clear sense **of** history when one is living through it, we are always reminded of its pedagogic function - namely, **as** witness to the past, **reference** for **tha** present and warning for the future . **as** once again we are being taught that peace rests **not on** the might of arms alone but, more importantly, on the will **of** peoples.

We **have** seen in recent times an unprecedented momentum in the search for a reduction **in** the most destabilising types **of** armaments deployed around the globe, in parallel with the **affirmation of democratic values** throughout the world. The relationship between democracy and **disarmament** is not fortuitous.

(Mr. Sardenberg, Brazil)

As democratic values gain the upper hand internationally, the perceived **need for** armaments decreases sharply, and there is a renewed awareness of the disproportion between the quest for the absolute security of States in purely military terms and the economic and social sacrifices imposed on peoples.

**This** brings about a second important relationship - namely, that between democracy and development. It is nowadays widely **recognized** that economic progress is the soil in which democracy grows best. Therefore it is imperative that the resources of our interdependent world economy be allocated to urgent priorities of international cooperation for development in order to strengthen democratic processes not only in some but in all regions.

In turn this leads to a third relationship that completes the equation - namely, the relationship between disarmament and development. As disarmament processes gain momentum, **more** resources should be made available to civilian priorities. **This** applies both to the reallocation of resources inside a country and to the international flow of goods, financial resources and technology among nations. The peace dividends to be derived from reductions in the major arsenals of the globe should help the many resources-strapped democracies, especially in developing areas. As we turn a new page in history, democracy, development and disarmament should constitute the **foundations** supporting the new structure **of** peace.

Decisive progress in the process **of** universal disarmament should spur the **revitalization** of domestic and international economic growth. This, in turn, should strengthen democracies the world over, enhancing peace and stability *for* all. The international advance **of** democracies should translate into the democratisation of international relations, where the peace and the security **of** nations **grsst and small are ssfgustded by right, not by might.**

(Mr. Sardenberg, Brazil)

**The** time **may be** ripe for a fundamental reversal of the arms race on a global scale. The Government of **Brazil** welcomes the important initiatives announced by President George Bush on 27 September 1991 and the equally important response of President **Mikhail** Gorbachev on 5 October 1991. We believe they are steps in the right direction, as they can begin to address the question **of** the curbing of vertical and geographical proliferation **of** nuclear weapons - something that has been demanded for a long time.

However, as the remaining nuclear arsenals are still large enough to destroy the world **many** times over, we urge the leaders of the two major nuclear-weapon States, as well as the other nuclear-weapon States, to advance expeditiously towards the elimination **of** all nuclear weapons at the earliest possible date. Recent events have demonstrated that nuclear proliferation is a permanent possibility as long as nuclear weapons exist. No **State, no** matter how security conscious, can be deemed to be free of the risk that its nuclear arsenals might fall into irresponsible or unauthorised hands.

We believe, therefore, that the international community should resolutely move beyond **the** current concept of non-proliferation. What we ultimately need is a universal and non-discriminatory convention **on** the prohibition of the use, development, production and stockpiling of nuclear weapons and on their destruction. As in the case of other weapons of mass destruction, we know how difficult it is to put the genie back in the bottle once it is out. But **it is** precisely to prevent the escaping of new genies that we must get rid of those bottles. We must strive for a new consensus on the total elimination of nuclear weapons, on the basis **of** the strictest verification measures, applied on a universal and non-discriminatory basis **and** preserving the legitimate, **peaceful** uses of nuclear **energy**.

(Mr. Sardenberu. Brazil)

A crucial step towards moving beyond non-proliferation would be the complete banning of nuclear testing. Last year, President Fernando Collor announced before the General Assembly that Brazil renounced its right to conduct any kind of nuclear testing, even for peaceful purposes. My delegation welcomes the unilateral **moratorium** announced by President Gorbachev and urges other nuclear-weapon States to follow suit, with a view to **contributing** to the preservation of peace, the well-being of peoples and the environment.

My delegation will also cooperate constructively in the consultations being undertaken by the Chairman of the Amendment Conference of the partial test-ban Treaty, Minister for Foreign Affairs **Ali Alatas** of **Indonesia**, in order to achieve progress in concrete areas identified in the discussions, including the question of reconvening the Conference at an appropriate time.

On 18 August 1991, Argentina and Brazil signed in Guadalajara the Agreement **on** the Uses **of Nuclear** Energy Exclusively for Peaceful Purposes. The Agreement is of high significance for our two countries and also in itself, since it demonstrates that it is possible to ensure security and development through peaceful nuclear cooperation.

Argentina and **Brazil** are proceeding with their negotiations with the International Atomic Energy Agency for the safeguards agreement stipulated in the Guadalajara Agreement. The document will provide all elements necessary for the verification of our undertakings and will protect the technological advances achieved by our two countries in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

The Declaration of Mendoza on Chemical and Biological Weapons, signed by Argentina, Brazil and Chile on 5 September 1991, and now also joined by Uruguay, was another relevant contribution of Latin American countries to the

(Mr. Sardenberg, Brazil)

objective of an early and total elimination of those categories of weapons **of mass** destruction. It was a clear demonstration of aversion to the existence of such a cruel and indiscriminate type of **arms**. It is our expectation that this exemplary act **may** spur the negotiations at the Conference on Disarmament for the conclusion, in 1992, of a universal and non-discriminatory convention for the total elimination of chemical weapons.

My delegation hails with satisfaction the successful conclusion of the Third Review Conference of the States Parties to the biological weapons Convention and sincerely hopes that the decisions adopted will greatly contribute to the strengthening of the regime of that instrument. We pay a special tribute to the Chairman of the Review Conference, Ambassador Roberto Garcia **Moritán** of Argentina, whose well-known diplomatic skills and untiring dedication were fundamental to the important results achieved.

**The** driving force of recent transformations in the international structure **was man's** quest for freedom. There is, in this regard, a widely shared perception that an ideal world order should ensure the **free** flow of peoples, the free flow of ideas and the free flow of goods. But we note that even in the freest of **systems**, there is an underlying tension between the uncertainties of boundless freedom and the need for certain restraints by means of control. In varying degrees, it is a fact that, in different countries and situations, the free flow of peoples is subject to immigration controls; the free flow of goods to import controls; **and** the free flow of ideas to censorship. The fundamental difference **between** democratic and non-democratic forms of control resides in the degree of accountability, predictability, transparency and agreement among all the interested parties. The question of the international flow of goods, services and **know-how**

(Mr. Sardenberg, Brazil)

relating sensitive technologies constitutes today a crucial theme on the international agenda.

Owing to the dual nature of many items of high technology, there are justified concerns that they may be used for destabilizing military purposes, for example in the making **of** weapons of mass destruction. On the other hand, they have a vital role to play in accelerating economic modernization, especially in countries where scientific and technological resources are urgently needed. The international community is therefore called upon to find possible consensual formulas, taking into account the security concerns of the supplying countries and the technological needs **of** the recipient countries, in order to promote an international flow of sensitive technologies with an adequate balance of accessibility and control.

In this respect, we wish to stress **our** strong interest in the promotion of a constructive follow-up to the deliberations undertaken at the 1991 session of the Disarmament Commission concerning the international transfer of sensitive technologies. We are fully aware of the complexities involved in the discussion of **a theme** that has strategic, industrial, commercial, intellectual, legal and many other aspects. None the less, it is **our** hope that an honest effort towards clarifying many of those questions, from the perspective of both the suppliers and the recipients, would be highly beneficial to all parties concerned.

We would hope that the discussions on this theme at this session of the General Assembly, as well as at the forthcoming sessions **of** the Disarmament Commission, could be instrumental in arriving at a kind of regime that would be effective, non-discriminatory, predictable, transparent, verifiable and universally acceptable. We believe **that** the consolidation **of** a market for safe transfers of sensitive **technologies for** peaceful purposes would respond

(Mr. Sardenberu, Brazil)

to the needs of **economic** modernisation and technological capacitation of developing countries, as well as to the security and commercial **interests** of the **more** industrially and technologically advanced countries.

Finally, let **me** address the question of transparency in international arms transfers. My delegation welcomes the study **on** ways and means of promoting transparency in the international transfers of conventional **arms**, prepared by the Group **of** Governmental Experts (A/46/301).

The Brazilian Government upholds the principle **of** transparency in disarmament **matters**, as shown by the initiatives already mentioned in the fields **of** nuclear cooperation, renunciation **of** nuclear tests and rejection of chemical and biological weapons. Brazil has also submitted to the United Nations this year its report on military expenditures in standardized form, as contained in the report of the Secretary-General in document **A/46/381. Brazil** understands that transparency is not an end **in** itself but a step towards the adoption of effective measures in arms limitation and disarmament. We expect that initiatives to be discussed at the current session on this subject should contribute to that aim.

My delegation is prepared to participate constructively in the discussions on this and all other items on the agenda of the First Committee, with a view to enhancing the role and prestige of **the** United Nations in the field of disarmament.

The CHAIRMAN: I should like to remind members of the Committee that the list of speakers for the general debate on all disarmament agenda items will be closed today at 6 p.m.

The meeting rose at 1 p.m.