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Chairman: Mr. TAYLHARDAT (Venezuela)

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The meeting was called to order at 10.15 a.m.

EXPRESSION OF SYMPATHY TO THE GOVERNMENT AND PEOPLE OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

The PRESIDENT (interpretation from Spanish) : We have heard with great distress and sorrow reports of the earthquake that struck the city of San Francisco yesterday. I am sure that I voice the feelings of the First Committee when I express to the delegation of the United States of America our solidarity with the people and Government of the United States, and I extend our sincere condolences to the victims of the earthquake.

AGENDA ITEMS 49 TO 69 AND 151 (continued)

GENERAL DEBATE ON ALL DISARMAMENT ITEMS

The PRESIDENT (interpretation from Spanish) : I call first upon the current Chairman of the Conference on Disarmament, who will introduce the report of the Conference for this year to the First Committee.

Mr. BENHIMA (Morocco), President of the Conference on Disarmament (interpretation from French) : It is a pleasure for me to express to you, Sir, on my own behalf and as current Chairman of the Conference on Disarmament, my warm congratulations on your election as Chairman of the First Committee. Your long diplomatic career, one that has been marked by important functions in multilateral diplomacy and especially in the field of disarmament, in which your abilities as an able negotiator have been greatly appreciated, augurs well for the success of this important Committee.

I have asked to speak as Chairman of the Conference on Disarmament to introduce the report of the Conference on its 1989 session. The report, document CD/956, is published as Supplement 27 to the Official Records of the General Assembly, document A/44/27.

Chapter IX of the report covers the organization of work. The Conference held its 1989 session from 7 February to 27 April and from 13 June to 31 August. That

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chapter also contains a summary of different issues in the field, including the attendance and participation of member States in the work of the Conference, the aqenda and proqramme of work of the annual sess ion, the attendance and participation of States not members of the **Conference,** the expansion of the membership of the Conference and the improved and effective functioninq of the Conferenoe. It also covers measures adopted by the Conference relatinq to the financial situation of the United Nations and communications from non-qovernmental orqanizations,

The substantive work of the Conference durinq its 1989 session is the subject of chapter III of the report. That part of the report lists the documents made available to members. It summarizes the deliberations of the Conference on the various questions before it and the positions expressed by qroups and deleqations on all the aqenda items.

At the 1989 session individual consultations were held on an informal basis by the Chairman for the month of March, Ambassador Yamada of Japan, with a view to reachinq a consensus on the terms of the mandate of an ad hoc committee to be established under aqenda item 1, "Nuclear-test ban". subs tan t ial proqr ess was achieved in those consultations. Indeed, it was poss ible to reduce cons fderablv the differences amonq deleqations and to harmonize positions. **Therefore,** as noted in paraqraph 38 of the report, many members of the Conference expressed the view that such consultations should continue until aqreement wae reached on a mandate for the ad hoc committee,

For its part, the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events continued its deliberations on plans. for a larqe-scale exper iment known as the Group of Scientific Experts' Technical Test (GSETT- 2), aimed at tes tinq the proposed

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initial concepts for a modern international seismic data exchange system to be established within the framework of a nuclear-test-ban treaty, in accordance with the terms of reference given to the Ad Hoc Group In 1979.

Consultation8 also continued in the Conference on the procedures to be followed in consideration of aqenda item 2, "Cessation of the nuclear-arms race and nuclear disarmament" and aqenda item 3, "Prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters". Unfortunately , it was not possible to reach aqreement on an appropriate structure for the consideration of those aqenda items. The discuss ions that took place on those subjects, as well as the discussions on the substantive issues under those item, are reflected in the relevant sections of the *annual report.

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The historic consensus achieved at the Paris Conference of States Parties to the Geneva Protocol of 1925 and of other States concerned, held at the beginning of the year, brought about a major breakthrough in the negotiations conducted for a decade now in the Conference on Diearmament with a view to concluding a convention on prohibition of the development, production, atookpilinq and use of all chemical weapons and on their destruction. The success of the Government-Industry Conference aqa ins t Chemical Weapons, held recently in Canberra, and the recent statements in the General Assembly, especially the statements made by the two qreat Powers, warrant hiqh hopes that the negotiations in Geneva on the draft convention on chemical weapons will be intensified.

The report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons is contained in paraqraph 87 of the Conference's annual report. Appendix I contains the preliminary structure of a Convention on chemical weapons and other relevant documents. The documents container] in appendix II reflect the results of work undertaken on questions relatinq to the convention, and this work will serve as a basis for the future work of that Ad Hoc Committee.

I would like to stress, in this respect, thet the work on the convention, work presided over competently by Ambassador Pierre Morel of France, will resume in open-ended consultations from 28 November to 14 December, as well as in a session of limited duration of the Ad Hoc Committee, to be held from 16 January to 1 February 1990.

As is reflected in the report, the Conference on Disarmament also established subsidiary bodies to deal with the followinq aqenda items: item 5: Prevention of an arms race in outer space; item 6: Effective international arranqements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapon; item 7: New types of weapons of mass destruction and new sys tems of such

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weapons; radiological weapons; and item 8: Comprehensive programme of disarmament. The deliberations of the Conference and of its Ad Hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space are contained in paragraph 88 of the annual report. These deliberations particularly emphasized the importance and urgency of preventing an arms race in outer space, especially since a number of delegations have declared their readiness to work towards the attainment of that shared objective. Towards this end, the Ad Hoc Committee recommended in its conclusions, contained in paragraph 78 of its report, that the Conference on Disarmament re-establish the Ad Hoc Committee at the beginning of the 1990 session, and that it give it an appropriate mandate, taking into account all relevant factors, including the work done by the Committee since 1985.

The report of the Ad Hoc Committee on effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons is contained in paragraph 93 of the annual report of the Conference. In paragraph 13 of its report, the Ad Hoc Committee recommends to the Conference that ways and means should continue to be explored to overcome the difficulties encountered in its work in carrying out negotiations on this question. It was also agreed that the Ad Hoc Committee should be reestablished at the beginning of the 1990 session.

The Ad Hoc Committee on Radiological Weapons, whose deliberations are reflected in paragraph 96 of the report, continued its work in two Contact Groups. Group A considered the question of the prohibition of radiological weapons in the traditional sense, and Group B considered the question of the prohibition of attacks against nuclear facilities. In the conclusions and recommendations that it adopted in paragraph 12 of its report, the Ad hoc Committee declares that the work conducted in 1989 was useful in that it contributed to clarify and make more

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concise *the* different approaches with regard to these two important subjects. It also recommended that the Ad Hoc Committee be re-established at the beginning of the 1990 session and that it *draw* upon the annexes to its report of 1989 as a basis for its tuture work.

Lastly, the report of the Ad hoc Committee on the Comprehensive Programme ot Disarmament is contained in paragraph 100 of the report of the Conference. Dur ing 1989, the Ad Hoo Committee continued its negotiations on this programme with the firm intention of? completing the elaboration of the Programme tor its submission to the General Assembly at this session. Although progress was achieved on certain subjects, it was not possible to reconcile differences on other issues, and it was theretore impossible to aomplete the elaboration of the programme this year. In paraqraph 7 of its report the Ad Hoc Committee, bearing in mind the terms of its mandate, agreed to submit to the General Assembly the results ot its work, and to resume work with a view to resolving the outstanding issues in the near future, when circumstances were more conducive to making progress in this regard.

By way of conclusion to this introduction to the report of the Conference on Disarmament, I would like to emphasize the excellent climate in which the 1989 session was conducted, It is true that East-West detente *and* the dialogue that has been prevailing in international relations for some time, as well as the beginnings of political settlement to many reqional conflicts, contributed greatly to the serenity of the debates in the Conference. A bolder pol itical w ill and a more resolute spirit of responsibility also emerged, and this was a valuable contribution on *the* part *of* all *the* members of the Conference.

It is this tirmer commitment to the common cause of diearmament that made it possible for slow but steady progress to be achieved under the terms ot the mandate of the Committee on the prohibition of nuclear weapons. And it is that same

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commitment that made it possible eubetantklly to improve the draft text of a convention on chemical weapons. We hope that that. same commitment will make it possible for the Conferenoe to progress in its efforts to accomplish the mission given it by the General Assembly. The annual report of the Conference which I have just introduoed reflects the oolleotfve efforts of the members of the Conference. It also refleate their will to succeed, in spite of existinq differences, in achieving a qrowinq harmonisation of our views on disarmament.

May the report br inq to the First Committee of the General Assembly elements that will enrich its debates and help in the adoption of resolutions that will meet the expectations of the international community in the field of disarmament.

I would like my last words to be words of qratitude to all the members of the Conference on Disarmament, the Chairmen of its Ad Hoc Committees and all of the eecretar lat. Their unanimous support and their co-operation were of qreat help to me and facilitated my task, especially that ever-difficult task of prepar inq the annua 1 report of th e Conference.

The CHAIRMAN (interpretation *from* Spanieh) : I thank the current President of the Conference on Disarmament *for* introducinq the report of the Conference.

Mr. LEHMAN (United States of America) : I wish to express my qratitude, Mr. Chairman, for your extension of condolence6 to the victims of the earthquake in northern California. I eay this not s imply because that is my home , but becaus e your expression of sympathy reflects the finest instincts of humanity. Aqain, I thank you.

I also wish to conqratulate you, Sir, on your election to the chairmanship of the First Committee. On behalf of the entire United States deleqation, I wish you well as you lead us throuqh a challenqinq and comprehensive aqenda.

(Mr. Lehman, United States)

The United States delegation welcomes this opportunity to share views with other delegations on the full range of arms limitation and disarmament issues. We hope to expand common ground where consensus can be achieved, and to understand better the concerns of other Member States when differences must remain.

(Mr. Lehman, United States)

The United States of America is proud of its central role in achieving numerous historic agreements in behalf of arms control and disarmament. The rapid pace in recent months continues to demonstrate strong American leadership in this revolutionary process. At the same time, we recoqnize that success has only been possible because other parties to these neqotiations have been willinq to work towards resolution of differences on matters of qreat importance. In particular, the major nuclear Powers and their allies have set examples in dealinq with global and regional security problems which are worthy of emulation by all nations.

At the end of this session, when each deleqation evaluates the siqnificance Of the votes taken and statements made, let us recoqnize also that deeds are to be weighed more heavily than words. The time has come in the First Committee for all nations to move beyond posturinq and polemics. There are hopeful siqns in this reoard. The talks between the United States and the Soviet Union on arms control, security and human riqhts are more honest and serious than at any other time in the past 45 years. Furthermore, the clear, more concise and more moderate declaration of the ninth non-aligned summit, recently concluded in Belgrade, auqurs well for a more constructive exchanqe of views in the First Committee.

When President Bush returned to the United Nations last month to address the General Assembly, he said that open and innovative measures can move disarmament forward and also ease international tensions. As we carry out our work in the First Committee, let us search for those innovative and realistic ideas that can be used to move disarmament forward.

For the first time in many qenerations, the prospects for qenuine peace on a global basis seem promisinq. Unfortunately, even as major proqress continues in nwotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union on nuclear weapons and in negotiations between East and West on conventional armed forces in Europe,

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lonqstandinq disputes, and tensions that threaten the peace persist amonq Other nations and in other reqions.

The time has oome for progress in the peace process in the Middle East, in Africa, in Asia - werywhere. The time has come to brinq the Treaty of Tlatelolco, and its Protoools, fully into force. The time has come for all nations to adhere to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear weapons. The time has come for an end to tolerance of any violations of the prohibitions of the 1925 Geneva Protocol against chemical and biological weapons use. Indeed, the time has come to turn rhetoric on the reduction and elimination of chemical weapons into bold actions, such as President Bush has already demonstrated the United States is prepared to undertake unilaterally, bilaterally and multilaterally. Our work at the United Nations this fall can stimulate and qive impetus to the broad, innovative steps that are required by our times,

Fa all the people of the qlobe, arms limitation and disarmament is s er ious business, for it deals with fundamental precepts of security, The first concern of any prudent nation is to provide for its security. The United Nations Charter and customary international law recognize the right of all nations to defend themselves from aggression. The riqht of states to join toqether in arranqements for their collective security is also quaranteed.

The United States itself maintains' a substantial defence establishment to defend its Cons titu tion, its citizens and its allies. To the extent that the threats to these vital interests can be reduced or eliminated through neqotiations and positive unilateral a ctions, the United States stands ready to reduce or adjust its military capabilities accordingly. In a democratic society, such as we have in the United States, where issues are debated openly and freely, we do not maintain an excessive military capability. Our people would not support it and our Conqress

(Mr. Lehman, United States)

would not fund it. The American publio and the United States Conqress expect our defence policy and our arms oontrol endeavours to • □□❖ℳ tho same purposes, that is, to enhance our security, promote peace and reduoe the burdens of armament, This in turn requires that we work toqether with other nations in seeking these qoalr.

An • xoellent example of how nations with qreat differences OM nevertheless work toqether was provided by the recent Wyominq minister ial meeting. The discoussions between American Secretary of State James Baker and Soviet Foreiqn Minister Eduard Shevardnadze took plaoe in the hiqh oountry of the American West, in the midst of olean air and clear water, The eettinq was most appropriate. The discussions cleared the way for a number of additional aqreements to be eiqned and for the completion of others to be accelerated. At the Wyominq meetinq itself, a number *of* important new aqreements were oonoludrd.

First, an aqreement on advanoe notification of strateqic exercises was eiqned that will further expend the use of the nuclear risk reduotion centres established in 1987. This new aqreement also complements the aqreement on advanoe notification of strateqic ballistic missile launches, eiqned last year, and the milestone agreement on the prevention of danqerous military aotivitiee, siqned this year.

Secondly, Secretary Baker and Foreiqn Minister Shevardnadze siqned a joint statement on a uniform interpretation of rule8 *of* international law qoverninq innocent passaqe in the territorial sea, which should help reduce mieunderrtandinqe.

Thirdly, to further the cause of confidence-buildinq, predictability and stability, the United States extended an invitation for a qroup of Soviet experts to visit two research and testinq facilities associated with the United States Strateqic Defence Initiative.

(Mr. Lehman, United States)

Fourthly, in the same spirit, the two Ministers signed an umbrella agreement on verification and stability *propoeed* by the Soviet Union in response to President Bush's initiative designed to expedite conclusion of a strategic-arms reduction treaty and to prwide greater oonfidenoe and stability even prior to oonoluuion of that treaty. In this reqard, the United States has proposed a halt to ballistic missile telemetry data denial, inoludinq encryption; the early ● xohanqe of data; early eatabliehment of on-site perimeter/portal monitorinq of missile production facilities; demonstration of missile taqqinq and ballirtia missile warhead counting; and an approaoh to the problem of rhort time-of-fliqht submarine-launched ball is tic miss iles.

In advanoe of the Foreiqn Ministers' meetinq, Secretary Baker announced a new United States position on mobile land-based missiles. Subrequently , addi tiona 1 elements *of* common qround on ver ification of mobile intercontinental ballistic missiles *were* agreed whioh will help quide our neqotiations in Geneva. overall, discussions in Wyominq prwided insiqht into a number of difficult questions, but important deta ile remain to be resolved, and my experience as an arms oontrol neqotiator has reinfotoed my appreciation of the axiom that indeed the devil is in the details. However, the United States and the Soviet Union have reached a clear underetandinq that the time has come to br inq tho etrateqic arms neqotiations to a successful cone lus ion, I can assure you that for its part the United States is makinq certain that the proqress achieved in Wyominq is beinq translated into further action *at* the onqoinq neqotiations in Geneva.

(Mr. Lehman, United States)

The Wyoming Foreign Ministers' meeting focused largely on bilateral negotiations, but the United States is a leader and an active participant in oritioal multilateral negotiatione as well.

The 16 members *of* the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the seven members of the Warsaw Pact started new negotiations on oonventional forces in Europe on 9 March of this year. The objective of that 23-nation negotiation is to s trenqthen stability and secur ity in Europe through the es tabliehment of a s table and secure balanoe of conventional forces at lower levels. To achieve that cbjeotive it will be neceeeary to eliminate disparities prejudicial to stability and security and to eliminate the capability for launching surprise attack and initiating larqe-scale offensive action.

On the first day of those negotiatione, the Weet presented a proposal for eubrtantial reductions in military quipment requiring each allianoe system to reduce its holdinqa in Europe, from the Atlantic to the Urals, to 20,000 main battle tanks, 16,500 artillery pieces, and 28,000 armour& troop carriers. Two of those three ceilinqe have already been aqreed to by the Eastern qroup of nations.

Durinq the May 1969 Nato Summit, Western alliance leaders, at the initiative of President Bush, aqreed to expand the Western propoeal to call for reducinq levels of land-breed combat aircraft to 5,700 and land-based oombat helicopters to 1,900 in Europe for each side, and for limiting United States and Soviet pereonnel stationed in Europe outside of their cwn national territories to 275,000 each. The enhanoed NATO proposal also calls for the members of the two alliances to oonclude a treaty in six to twelve months.

In order to expedite the achievement of that objective, the NATO side recently proposed provisions on information exchanqe, verification and stabilizinq measures, and non-circumvention. Those proposals have reeulted in a comprehensive Western proposal that provides a sound bas is far a treaty on conventional forces in

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Europe. The negotia tionr are well under way. We look *forward* to continued progress and to their prompt oonolueion.

In addition to the negotiations on conventional forces in Europe, there are also neqotiations in Vienna on oonfidenoe and security-buildinq measures. Those neqotiations inoludr the neutral and non-aligned European States in addition to the members of the two alllancer - a total of 35 nations. The objective of those neqotiations is to reduce mistrust *and* misunderstandinq about militarv capabilities and intention8 by increasinq openness and predictabilitv in the military environment .

The Western allies hava presented in the 35-nation talks important proposals reqardinq data exchanqe and measures to evaluate information. The West has also proposed holding a seminar cn military doctrine as it applies to actual-force deploy men ts. While details remain to be worked out, all participants in the talks have aqreed both to convene the military doctrine seminar and to a comprehensive information exch anqe. Thoee neqotiations cn confidence- *and* security-buildinq measures are makinq progress towards the objective set by President Bush to lift the veil of secrecy from certain military activities and thus contribute to a more stable Europe,

The winds of ohanqe that are blcwinq thtouqh Europa and beyond provide unique opportunities to lift the veil of secrecy and encouraqe broader public dissemination of information on disarmament and related international security issues. In presenting his open-skies initiative this May, President Bush wanted to build on the lonq-rtandinq Western tradition of transparency with reqard to fundamental military intentlone. He recoqnized the new at titudes reqardinq openneee on the part of the East and eouqht to turn rhetorio into realitv. He proposed that the Soviet Union and its allies open their skies to reciprocal, unarmed aerial surveillance fliqhts, conducted routinely. we welcome the positive

(Mr. Lehman, United States)

response of the Soviet Union end look forward to working out the details of an open-skies régime in the near future. The United States also made an open-lands proposal with a view to opening more of the territory of the United States and the Soviet Union to diplomats of the other nation, thus increasing transparency.

Through the strategic review he initiated earlier this year, President Bush has clearly established the basic direction of United States policy on chemical weapons. The United States is committed to pureuinq aqqreeeively the elimination of chemical weapons from the Earth. The United States considers the early conclusion and entry into force of a multilateral oonventicn tc be one of the highest priorities for the international community and the means to halt and reverse the growing spread and use of thoee weapons of mass destruction.

In his statement to the General Assembly on 25 September, President Bush proposed several dramatic initiatives aimed at stimulating specific action on chemical-weapons arms control and energizing the multilateral negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament. We will be meetinq soon with the Soviet Union to discuss how we miqht work out additional bilateral arrangements for destroyinq tens of thousands of tons of chemical weapons - which would include more than 80 Per cent of the current United States stockpile - starting now, in advance of the conclueicn of a multilateral ban.

After a multilateral ban is concluded, which we hope will be soon, the United States is prepared to destroy 98 per cent of its current stockpile in the first eiqht years, provided that the Soviet Union joins the ban. That is significantly more than is celled for in the current rolling text of the draft treaty under negotiation in the Conference on Disarmament. And, in the subsequent two years, if all nations capable of building chemical weapons have become party to the comprehensive chemical-weapons ban, the United States will have destroyed all of its chemical weapons and its chemical-weapons production facilities.

(Mr. Lehman, United States)

The United States and the Soviet Union reaffirmed at the Foreiqn Ministers' meetinq in Wyominq, just two days before President Bush addressed the United Nations last month, the objective of a multilateral ban that would eliminate all chemical weapons. The memorandum of understandinq aqreed to in Wyominq on a bilateral verification experiment involvinq the exchanqe of data on United States and Soviet Union chemical-weapons stockpiles, and visits and inspections of chemical-weapons sites to verify those data, should add immediate further impetus to those efforts.

Increasinq international concern about the proliferation of chemical weapons and the urqent need for a qlobal ban resulted in two recent international meetinqs - the Conference on restorinq the international norm aqainst chemical-weapons use, held in Par is in January of th is year , and the Government-Industry Conference aqainet Chemical Weapons held in Canberra laat month. The United Sta tee was instrumental in br inqinq about both of those conferences and participated enerqetioally in both.

At the Paris Conferenoe, 149 States reaffirmed their commitment to the Geneva Protocol of 1925, endoreed neqotiations in the Confetenoe on Diearmament for a qlobal chemical-weapons ban, expressed qrave concern about the proliferation Of chemical weapons, and confirmed their support for the Secretary-General in oarryinq out his responsibility for investiqatinq alleqed violations of the Geneva Protocol.

Subsequently, the qroup of qualified experts appointad by the Secretary-General completed its work on technical quidelines and procedure8 for investiqation of possible use of chemical and biological or toxin weapons that may constitute a violation of the 1925 Geneva Protocol or other relevant rules of customary international law. The United States deleqation welcomes the repor t of the qroup of experts and will support its endoreement in an appropriate resolution.

(Mr. Lehman, United States)

The Canberra Conference brouqht toqether for the first time representatives Of some 70 Governments, as well a8 of the world's ma jor chemical manufacturers. The world industry endorsed a global convention banninq chemical weapons and announced plane for voluntary self-requlation to avoid *the* misuse of chemicals.

On behalf of my Government I want tc extend a special word of thank8 to both France and Australia for the conatruotive role that they have played this past year in hostinq these important conferences and in prwidinq leadership to restore the international norm aqainst chemical-weapons use and to promote a comprehensive ban.

For arms control measures to remain effective they require continued care and attention. In this regard it is worth notinq that the parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuolear Weapons will meet next year, just prior to the forty-fifth session of the General Assembly, to review the operation of the *Treaty,* That will be an important event, beoauae the non-proliferation Treaty is an important undertakinq that has served all members of the international community well, The United States looks forward to a full and fair review of all *of the* Treaty's provisions. We are confident that the parties will aqain reaffirm the role of the non-proliferation *Treaty* in helping to prevent nuclear proliferation, in assistinq the development of peaceful uses of nuclear enerqy and in ccntributinq to the security of all na tione, especially the non-nuclear-weapon States, some cf which are located in the world's most troubled reqione.

I should also like to note that the parties tc the 1971 sea-bed Treaty conducted a review of that Treaty last month and aqain confirmed that it was functioninq well and that no problems had arisen since the previous review in 1983. My Government urges those States that have siqned the Treaty but not yet ratified it, and other non-partiee, to study the Final Declaration of the recent Review Conference and qive serious consideration to joininq the 82 States already particle to the Treaty.

(*Mr.* Lehman, United States)

My Government continues to hold the view that the success of arms control is dependent on compliance with all. obligations. While arms-oontrol treaties and other related measures stand on their awn, damaqe to one aqreement brouqht on by a lack of compliance oan have a negative effect on others. That is one reason why so many States took an interest in restoring the international norms aqainst the use Of chemical weapons represented by the 1925 Geneva Protocol, Violation of those norms has hiqhliqhted the urqent need for conclusion *of the* neqotiations on a comprehensive chemical-weapons ban. Confidence in the effeotiveneea of existinq aqreements is an important part. of building the foundation for future aqreements. Parties to arms-control treaties should welcome verification *of* their activities as an opportunity to demonstrate their full canplianoe, without leavinq room for any doubts. Only under those circumstances - full compliance demonstrated and oonf irmed - are all parties able to realize the full benefits of arms-limitation and disarmament measures.

The United States is partioipatinq in the onqoinq study of the role of the United Nations in acme-control verification. It is anticipated that the results of that s tudy will be available next year, pr ior to the forty-fifth sess ion *of* the General Assembly . Last year the United States delegation did not support the relevant r esolution. My Government remains opposed to the establishment of qeneric verification machinery within the United Nations. The responsibilities for verification of an aqteement rest with the parties themselves. Should the parties call on the Secretary-General for assistance, however, as was the case in recent investigations of chemical-weapons use, it is entirely appropriate for the United Nations to play a role. However, *for* its cart, the United States views such actions as ad hoc and exceptional, rather than the rule. Experts from the United States will continue to participate actively and constructively in the verification

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study, but they will not support recommendations for new verification machinery in the United Nations that is independent from existing or future disarmament treaties.

The Conference on Disarmament has continued its work in the Ad Hoc Committee responsible for the consideration of outer space arms-control issues of global interest. That work has been carried out on the basis of a non-negotbting manda te. For it8 part, the United States has conducted a careful analysis of potential measures that miqht be feasible and desirable as the basis for negotiating further multilateral arms-control aqreements that apply to outer space. However, we have neither identif ied any appropriate measures to propose nor seen any proposals from others that we believe are feasible, desirable and verifiable. The United States deleqation is prepared to work for a realistic General Assembly resolution on outer-space arms control, but it cannot accept a call for multilateral negotiations when there is no agreement on the basis for such negotiations.

Similarly, my Government believes that global security interests would not be served by entering into comprehensive nuclear-test-ban neqotiatione now, in advance of other far-reaching arms-limitation and disarmament measures and while cur security and that of our allies remain dependent on nuclear weapons. My Government shares the hopes of those who yearn for a better world in which it would not be necessary to maintain such a dependence on nuclear weapons. However, we must temper our hopes with realism and r ecognize that some demands, such as demands for an early comprehens ive test-ban, in the absence of the necessary conditions, are unrealistic. Simply put, it would be irresponsible for the United States to forqo nuclear testinq as lonq as our security relies on nuclear weapons to provide deterrence.

The United States deleqation will, however, support resolutions that place the tee tinq issue in its proper context and offer encouraqement to the bilateral Un! ted

(Mr. Lehman, United States)

States-Swiet negotiations on protocols to the Treaty on Underground Nuclear Explosions for Peaceful Purposes and the Treaty on the Limitation of Underground Nuclear Weapon Tests, which will permit effective verification of those two Treaties and lead to their ratification and entry into force. I am pleased to report that my Government believes that both of those important verification protocols should be oompleted and available for signature by the time of next year's summit meeting between President Bush and President Gorbachev.

The agenda of the First Committee is full. Some might even oall it overflowinq. It is reasonable for the world community to use the First Committee to gain an overview, once a year, of all that is qoinq on in the field of arms limitation and disarmament. At the same time there is a question as to how effectively or wisely this limited amount of time is used. The United States supports the recent efforts to streamline the work of the First Committee and make it more efficient. However, further efforts are required. The resolutions that are adopted each autumn in the First Committee dc not always convey an accurate Picture of what is happening, nor do they reflect the true priorities of the in terna tional agenda. Aqain, as I mentioned at the outset, there are siqns of greater realism. Indeed, there are siqns of even further qreat progress amcnq th major nuclear Powers and their allies, How many other nations cm demonstrate comparable commitment to, and achievement of, real reductions in arms and tensions? Now la the time for each nation to move beyond easy words about peace and towards concrete ach ievements enhancinq peace with both reqional and qlobal neighbours.

The United states delegation will move ahead in this spirit, seekinq to mak innovative chanqes that are needed to make the work of the First Committee relev and productive and seek inq to enhance the secur ity of everyone.

Mr. BOURAVKIN (Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic) (interpretation from Russian): The Byelorussian deleqation associates itself with the conqratulations offered to you, Sir, on your election to the important post of Chairman of the First Committee. We hope that the work of the Committee will be constructive and fruitful, and we are ready to make our contribution, in co-operation with other deleqations.

We would like to express our condolences to the United States deleqation on the earthquake which struck California.

In its statement today, the Byelorussian SSR intends to discuss some problems of nuclear disarmament. In characterizinq the aqe we live in, we quite often call it the nuclear aqe. And this term, unfortunately, is understood to mean not only the peaceful, creative potential of nuclear enerqy, but also its traqic capacity for mass destruction, with devastatinq consequences for our civilization. That is why, of all the international security issues, we give special attention to the problems of nuclear disarmament. We are qratified that major positive chanqes have occurred and are continuinq to occur in relations amonq States. Confidence based, inter alia, on mutual verification is becominq increasingly crucial; moreover, the predictability of action is now qrowinq, and the defensive character of military doctrines is beinq strengthened in practice. In a word, relations between major political alliances are qrowinq more stable. In qeneral, it can be said that the risk of a military conflict directly involvinq the qreat Powers has lessened.

However, we cannot fail to see that the process of reducinq the existinq stockpiles of nuclear weapons is somewhat laqqinq behind the fundamentally new developments that are takinq place. In a sense, this can be explained, but it still qives rise to leqitimate concern and urqently calls for proqress in nuclear disarmament as the central element in the area of military security.

(Mr. Bouravkin, Byelorussian SSR)

As members are aware, the Soviet-United States Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles - INF Treaty - is being euooeeefully implemented. I would like to point out that missiles are also being eliminated on the territory of the Byelorussian SSR. It is clear that the hietorio breakthrough evidenced by the conolueion o:! that Treaty must be built on. The Soviet-United States talks on rtrategio *offensive* arms have a key role to play in this. The success of there talke and the achievement of 50 per cent reductions in corresponding United States and Soviet nuclear arsenals would not only further the nuolear disarmament prooeee but would also eiqnify, as it were, the transfo.mation of this new quality of politics into a reduced quantity of arms. The road which there negotia tione seem to be taking now is precisely the road that leads to an early and balanced eolution of the complex problems facing the talks.

The logic of ooneietent nuclear disarmament presupposes that it embraces all nuclear States and all categor ire of nuclear weapons without exception at appropriate etagea. Plane to modernize taotioal missiles, which in fact would put them in a qualitatively different category, and, broadly epeaking, programmes for building up and improving other type8 of nuclear weapons that are now being considered or implemented, are incompatible with that logic. At issue here are the modernization of nuclear artillery, dual-capable aircraft, development of new air-to-eur face missiles, the planned build-up *of* sea-based nuclear eye tems in European wa tere and the redeployment across the Atlantic of nuclear aircraft to Europe. Should these plans and other programmes for building up nuclear forces in Europe be implemented, a thousand new nuclear systems would appear in Europe, systems similar to those now being eliminated under the Soviet-United States INF Treaty.

(Mr. Bouravkin, Byelorussian SSR)

We are oonvinoed that there is now an urgent need for the early and unconditional commencement of negotiations on tactical nuolear systems.

As the Committee is aware, the Swiet Union has already taken unilateral steps to reduce its weapons in this category and is prepared to take further unilateral steps once negotiations begin. In full oonformity with the impera tives of our times, the USSR has also exercised political reetraint by stating that it is not moderniz ing i ts tao tioal nuolear mire iles.

We hope that expanding the process of nuolear disarmament and progress in the Soviet-United States START negotiations will create a political and strategic environment in which modernization of and a build-p in any nuclear weapons whatsoever will become senseless. The Soviet-United States summit meeting due to take place next year could play an important part in creating euoh an environment.

Another increas ingly important aspect of the nuolear problem is the cessa tion of production of weapons-grade fissionable materials. Here we must pay a tribute to the perspicacity of the General Assembly and its First Committee, whioh for years now has kept that problem within the purview of the world community, with the Canadian delegation playing a particularly active part. A truly unique and favourable situation has now developed for the reciprocal cessation *of* the production of f issionable ma ter ials. This opportunity must not be lost. The Soviet Union has defined its positive attitude to that idea and, in keeping with the new thinking, has this year launched unilateral measures to limit its own production of weapons-grade fieeionable mater ials and is ready to oall a complete halt to this kind of activity on the basis of reciprocity with the United States.

As members know, some time ago the United States also showed willingness to take such a step. We believe it to be important for the present United States Administration, as part of its in-depth foreign policy review, to reinstate that

(Mr. Bouravkin, Byelorussian SSR)

ureful element and take it favourably into account when oharting its course for praotioal action in this field.

Mutual cessation of weapons-grade nuolear materials production is another major step that is feaeible within the context of new agreements outting United State8 and Soviet nuclear arms dramatically. Moreover, it is verifiable; oomplianoe with the relevant agreementa oan be verified using national technical means and on-site inspections, drawing on the experience of the Inbrnational Atomio Energy Agency (IAEA).

(Mr. Bour avk in, Byrlor uss ian SSR)

The complete and strictly verifiable termination of the production Of fissionable materials would, by the way, be amonq the quarantees *that* nuclear weapons would not re-emerqe. Introduoinq a system of quarantees aqainst their re-emerqence in a futur e nuclear-f ree wor ld is a ser ious challenqe, and in th is connection the deleqation of the Byelorussian SSR reiterates the proposal it Put forward at the third special session ot the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, namely, that the United Nations Institute For Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) should oonduot a study of safequards aqainst the re-emerqence of nuclear arm end other weapons ot mass destruction in a nuolear-tree world.

The dialoque on nuclear problem cannot shirk the issue of nuclear deterrenoe. We continue to believe that this oonoept perpetuate8 nuolear terror and, in the final analysis, deters nuclear disarmament. None the less , s ince the concept is an active factor in today's political situation and looms wer the nuclear disarmament talk8 it might be advisable to discuss the parameters *tot the* potential minimization of nuclear deterrenoe so as to facilitate proqress towards the qoals of diearmament, This could be done at a meeting of experts from the nuclear Power8 and other States havinq nuclear weapons on their territory.

Our planet is becominq an ever more Aanqerous place in wh ich to live. Rampant druq abuse, the danqerous power and aqqressiveness of! the druq cartels, the frequent outbreak8 of international terrorism, and the danqer of nuclear and chemical weapon8 prolifera tion - all require a joint response trom all States. The realities *ot* today add a new and danqerous dimens ion: the spread Of miss iles and miss ile technoloqy . What is needed is a mul tilateral mechanism that would on the one hand rule out the proliferation of missiles and, on the other, promote peaceful co-operation in the exploitation *ot* outer space.

(Mr. Bour avkin, Byelor uss ian SSR)

We sometimes face a situation in which multilateral and bilateral approaches to disarmament measures are set aqainet one another or are even mutually exc lue ive. We believe that th is is wronq, and we are pleased to Bee siqns of chanqe for the better in attitudes to the capabilities of the United Nations not only in the field of reqional conflicts but also in the field of disarmament. We are convinced that bilateral and multilateral approaches are complementary and mutually enrichinq. The bannino of nuclear-weapon tests is an area where a combination of those approaches is urqently needed. While proqress in the talks between the Soviet Union and the United States has been made, ths continuinq inactivity on the substance of the issue at the Conferenoe on Disarmament is a qreat liability in multilateral efforts. Joint efforts are needed to break the deadlock and to consider in earnest the possibility ot tranrtorminq the 1963 Moscow Treaty banninq nuolear tests in the three environments into an instrument totally bann inq nuclear-weapon tea ts.

We recoqnize that the United Nations has a specific and indispensable role to play in many important disarmament issues oonoerninq which our community, as a unique multilateral body, has qreat practical potential. Thie inoludee the adoption of measures to prevent nuclear war. It is obvious that a integrated system of such measures will be needed in the future, and now is the time to put in place the international leqal and ma terial elements ot such a sys tern.

We believe it to be advleable to start tranelatinq into practical action the proposals - particularly those at the Secretary-General - to ret up a multilateral nuclear and war risk reduction oentre, and ultimately a system ot suoh centres, includinq reqional ones. Steps in this direction are alreadv beinq taken. I refer mainly to the establishment in the USSR and the United States, pursuant to the relevant agreement, of nuclear risk reduotion centres whose functions are likely to be expanded in the fu tur e.

(Mr. Bouravkin, Byelorussian SSR)

A new and heartening accomplishment is the Soviet-American agreement preventing dangerous military activities, which was signed during the visit of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the USSR and will enter into force in a little more than two months. During that visit, the United States military experts also visited the Byelorussian military district.

The detailed proposal put forward by the USSR in 1988 on the setting up of a European regional war risk prevention centre was another important step in the right direction.

At this session of the General Assembly, the Soviet Union has proposed that all nuclear Powers conclude an agreement on measures to reduce the risk of nuclear war, Such an agreement could provide for, inter alia, hotlines, linking the capitals of all the nuclear Powers, for the transmission of urgent messages, notifications and requests for the speedy clarification of situations, and, accordingly, for national nuclear risk reduction centres in Great Britain, France and China similar to those of the USSR and the United States. Consultations among the permanent members of the Security Council would, in our view, provide an appropriate forum for discussion of the issue of drafting an agreement on measures to reduce the risk of nuclear war.

Systematic endeavours to prevent nuclear war call for concerted efforts at all levels of intergovernmental relations. Bilateral measures combined with national, regional and multilateral centres that are to develop into a nuclear and war risk reduction system are specific illustrations of the need for an organic symbiosis of bilateral and multilateral approaches. Such a system incorporating electronic communications could in future be used for early warning and the prevention of crises, for verifying accords on disarmament, and settling conflicts.

(Mr. Bcuravkin, Byelorussian SSR)

The Byelorussian deleqation once aqain oalb on the international community to initiate practical efforts tor the settinq up ot auoh centres, to be shaped into a system that would represent an important shift trom crisis diplomacy, which reacts to circumstances, to preventive diplomacy, whioh shapes them. It is just that kind of imaqinative and inteqrated diplomacy that a secure world really needs.

Mr. KENYON (United Kinqdom) : At the outset, Mr. Chairman, allow me to conqra tula te you on your election to your post. Your lonq exper ienoe and deep knowledqe Of the subject of arms control and disarmament will be ot qreat assistance in quidinq the work in this Committee. May I also add my deleqation's expression of condolence tO the United States deleqation tot last niqht's earthquake in northern California.

(Mr. Kenyon, United Kinqdom)

In our plenary debate on all the disarmament items an our aqenda, it is usual to look back on the paet year and to pick out the prior ities tor further ef forts in the year ahead. In reviewinq 1989, I believe we can say that those opportunities tor proqress that we identified in our debate last year have been viqorously pursued, the momen turn has been maintained, *and* real proqress hae been achieved in many key bilateral, reqional and multilateral areas. Measurable proqress is manifest towards the achievement ot all thr 88 of the top-priority arms control and disarmament objectives set by the British Government and its allies in 1967. Those are the establishment ot stability and security at lower levels of conventional forces by the elimination of dispar ities in the whole *of* Europe; *a 50* per cent reduction in the aitrateqio offensive nuclear weapons of the United States and the Soviet Union; and the qlobal elimination of chemical weapons.

Our f irst ob jective r ela tes to conven tional forces in Europe. Toqether with our partner8 in the Atlantic alliance, we are playinq a tull part in the neqotiations on conventional armed *forces* (CFE) currently in their third round in vienna. The talks have qone remarkably well, better than many of us had thouqht possible, and in a serious and workmarrlike atmosphere. Thouqh the neqotiations are less than eiqht months old, a considerable measure of aqreement has already emerqed. Both sides are aqreed on the cateqories of forces to be covered, and that the conventional imbalance should be addressed throuqh equal collective ceilinqs between the two alliances in those weapons systems relevant to surprise attaok and larqe-scale offensive action, toqether with limits on the torcee of individual participants and on those stationed outside national territory.

The CFE neqotiations Provide a renewed opportunity to address the key ques tions at the heart Of European security, notably the mass ive oonven tional superiority Of the Warsaw Pact. We ar 8 encour aqed by the readiness ot the Sov iet

(Mr. Kenyon, United Kingdom)

Union and its Warsaw Pact partners unilaterally to reduce their armed forces. We welcome the cuts announced over the past year as useful first steps towards redressinq the conventional disparities in Europe, which the proposals submitted by the alliance in Vienna are desiqned to eliminate. As indicated in the North Atlantic Treaty Orqanization (NATO) Summit Declaration in May this year, it is our hope that a treaty can be concluded in the course of next year and be fully implemented by 1992 cc 1993. We accept that this is an ambitious timetable, but we see no reason why it cannot be met, qiven political will on both sides and our belief that the prospects for proqress on conventional armaments in Europe are better now than they have been for many years.

I turn next to the bilateral strateqic neqotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union. We heard yesterday and today reports from both sides on the negotiations, and we are encouraged by the proqress being made towards an early strategic arms reduction treaty (START). As outlined, a START aqreement would make a major contribution to international security and stability. We are qlad that, at the recent meeting in Wyoming between the United States and Soviet Foreiqn Ministers, proqress was reqistered on some of the problem areas that have been holdinq up an aqr eement. That applies to the defence and space neqotiations as well. The avowed United States and Soviet aim of preventinq an arms race in space is one to wh ich we all subscribe. We hope that what has been aqreed at Wyominq and durinq the neqotiations in Geneva will provide a basis for the resolution of the outs tandinq issues. While we hope for an early aqreement, we do not underestimate the importance of the issues that have not yet been resolved. Those must be worked Out with the care and attention to detail which they deserve; That may take time, but we are confident that the United States and the Soviet Union will conclude an aqreement which not only results in a substantial reduction in the size of their nuclear arsenals, but also provides for greater strateqic stability.

(Mt. Kenyon, United Kinqdom)

These security aqr eemen ts, thouqh reqional in coveraqe, will have a siqnificant effect on the security of all States. The multilateral neqotiation of arms control and disarmament measures of qlobal application is another vital component in our security policy. That, of course, is the role of the Conference on Disarmament, where intensive work is in proqress on our third objective - a qlobal, comprehensive and effectively verifiable ban on chemical weapons.

The world-wide concern and *the* shared *determination to prevent any* recourse to chemical weapons by completely eliminatinq them was shown by the participation of 149 States in the Conference of States Parties to the 1925 Geneva Protocol and Other Interested States, held in Paris in January. In its Final Declaration, adopted by consensus, the Conference called on the Conference on Disarmament to redouble its efforts to conclude a chemical weapons convention, and called on all States to contribute to the neqotiatione, As a necessary corollary, it expressed the belief that any State wishinq to contribute to the neqotiations in the Conference on Disarmament should be able to do so. The United Kinqdom was pleased that the Conference on Disarmament invited 26 non-member States that had so requested to participate as observers in the work of the Ad Hoc Committee On Chemical Weapons at the 1989 session. We hope that the number will be *even* qreater in 1990 and that the spirit at the Paris document will be fully applied. If we are to achieve a qlobal convention, no State can be excluded from par ticipatinq as an observer in the neqotiations.

In its I.989 session, the Conference on Disarmament did indeed redouble its efforts towards a chemical weapons convention, under the able and viqorous leadership of the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee, Mr. Pierre Morel of France. Some useful proqress was made on important technical issues, but some key issues, particularly around the subject of vet itication, remain to be resolved. However, the trend towards practical problem-solvinq is welcome and has elicited a clearer

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understandinq of the problems and their possible solutions. All parties to the negotiation should now approach 1990 with the necessary determinatiom to undertake the hard practical and technical work which resolving the remaininq issue3 and achieving an effective convention will entail.

One component vital to real proqress is confidence that the other parties to the neqotiations share the same ends and are holding nothing back. In that context, we welcome the continuinq series of bilateral discussions on chemical weapons between the United States and the Soviet Union. The latest fruit of those discussions, the aqreement on data exchanqe siqned in Wyominq last month, is a most important addition to that process of confidence-buildinq, and should help to clear up my Government's well-known doubts about the size of the Soviet stockpiles. Addressing the General Assembly on 27 September, my Secretary of State welcomed the proposals on chemical weapons made to the Assembly by President Bush and the positive Soviet response to them. These should provide yet further impetus to the work of the Conference on Disarmament.

In the view of my Government, the key question to be solved remains that of an adequate system of verification. That must be no more and no less riqorous than is necessary to provide effective assurances of compliance. At the same time, there should be adequate safeguards to meet leqitimate concerns about security unrelated to chemical weapons. The verification réqime must ensure that leqitimate production of chemicals, includinq some of particular concern, is rot impeded, while maintainiq confidence that they are not misused. And it must be capable of deterrinq or detectinq clandestine production, or any other failure of compliance.

(Mr. Kenyon, United Kinqdom)

This year there has been valuable debate in Geneva on the vital concept Of challenge inspection, under the quidance of the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee, in which we have discerned signs of a qreater converqenae of views. The subject rema ins an area of central concern on which much of our effort should continue to be concentrated. We in the United Kingdom believe that a useful basis for developing the design of a challenqe inspection system is hands-on experience. As we have described to the Conference on Disarmament, we have started a series of trial challenge inspections to test the proposed procedures, which have included inspections of sensitive installations such as military ammunition storaqe depots. We are continuing the series of trials and will report further to the Conference on Disarmament. Useful pointers and lessons have already emerqed. We would encouraqe other States to carry out similar trials.

A chemical-weapons convention that is soundly constructed and that gives confidence to its parties is bound to have an impact on the operations of the chemical industry. The Canberra Conference provided an important opportunity for Governments and senior chemical-industry representatives to assess the situation in the neqotiations. The joint declaration at Canberra by the world's chemical industry brought a new impetus to the dialogue between Government and industry that is SO essential to achievinq a convention.

We cannot allow any slackeninq in the pressure on the neqotiations in Geneva. Every year that we delay in the completion of the chemical-weapons convention increases the risk of the proliferation of those terrible weapons.

What of the rest of the arms-control aqenda? We are at present in the midst of a deriod when some of our attention is beinq turned to checkinq the health of past achievements, the Conventions already in force. We have just completed the Third Review Conference of the Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of

(Mr. Kenyon, United Kingdom)

Nuclear weapons and Other weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-Bed, a review that showed that that useful Treaty is in good health. We were pleased by the declaration of the parties that none of us is emplacing nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction on the sea-bed, even outside the Treaty's zone of application. And some useful provision has been made for future exchanges of technical information.

In the view of my Government, the most important of the existing arm-control treaties, and incontestably the one with the widest adherence, is the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Here, we are in the midst of the process of preparation for the Fourth Review Conference, due to be convened in the middle of August next year. That review has a particular importance as it is the last before the parties meet in 1995 to decide on the extension of the Treaty. We have been heartened by some recent developments in relation to the Treaty, including the welcome access ion a year aqo of Saudi Arab ia and, more recently, Bahrain and Qatar. The positive and constructive nature of the first two Preparatory Committee meetings indicated that the prospects for the Fourth Review Conference are good. But there is no room for complacency. The possibility of a nuclear-arms race developing in one of the so-called sensitive reqions continues to be a threat to the non-proliferation régime. I can assure the Committee that my Government will not rest in its efforts to strengthen and reinforce the réqime and to work for an outcome to the Fourth Review Conference that will help to further the qoals of the Treaty.

The other existing instrument to which attention has been turned is the Treaty Banninq Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water - the partial test-ban Treaty - of 1963. My Government, as a depositary, is actively prepar inq for the convening of the conference requested by some of the

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parties. However, in this case what is proposed is not the review of the operation Of a useful arms-control measure but a misguided attempt to force into being a measure that has proved unattainable, at present, throuqh the normal end accepted means of multilateral negotiation, That attempt oannot succeed, but it we are not careful we risk real damage to the vehicle the promoters have chosen. The partial test-ban Treaty has brouqht us to the position *where, for years* now, all nuclear explosions, whether by parties or non-parties, have been underqround. The Treaty has, of course, had important environmental benefits, but it is also an arms-control measure, placinq siqnificant cons traints on weapons-testinq . Underqround nuclear-weapons tests were further constrained by the 1974 threshold test-ban Treaty, and we look forward to the early conclusion of the bilateral neqotiations on the verification protoool, which will enable the ratification of that Treaty, and its necessary companion, the 1976 *Treaty* on Underqround Nuolear Exploeions for Peaceful Purposes.

The aqreements reached at Wyominq will, we hope, speed that process. Further steps to limit testinq will then have *to* be considered. In that context the Conference on Disarmament is considering the matter of a mandate for establishinq an *ad* hoc committee to discuss nuclear testinq. The United Kinqdom continues to support and to participate fully in the work of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events, but an immediate move to *a* comprehens ive tee t-ban would be premature end perhaps even destabilizinq. For the foreseeable future the United Kinqdom's security will depend on deterrence based, in part, on the possession of nuclear weapons. That will mean a continuing requirement to conduct underqround nuclear tests to ensure that our nuclear weapons remain effective end up to date.

(Mr. Kenyon, United Kingdom)

Since the 1950s and 1960s the compr ehens ive teat-ban has been seen by many countries as a shor t out to nuclear-arms control. But rhort cuts do not work. We support instead the s tep-by-step approach on which the super-Powers are embarked. That dou work - as can be seen from the real progress that has been made over the past few years towards actually reducing the total numbers *of* nuclear weapons. As we all know, the 1987 Trwty on the Elimination of Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles - the INF Treaty - eliminated a whole olau of theatre nuclear weapons in Europe, and in the past 10 years NATO has reduced its stockpile unilaterally by 35 per cent.

On the strategic aide we all look forward to the substantial cuts that will be made by both the United States and the Soviet Union when an aqreement is reached in the strategic arms limitation talks. Our view remains that thr best way *forward* in nuclear-arms control is not throuqh a comprehensive test-ban but throuqh real and verifiable cuts in existinq weapons. The progress of recent yearse shows that this way works.

Taken over all, 1989 has probably seen as qreat a movement in the direction of reductions of tension, improvements in reaurity and the construction of viable arms-control measures as any year in recent times. We murt maintain - nay, increase - the momen turn in 1990.

Mr. REESE (Australia): The Australian deleqation would like to add its expression of condolences to the United States deleqation *tot the* losses and suffer inq caused by the earthquake yesterday in California.

The theoretical physicis t Proteeror Stephen Hawk inq beqins his now-famous book, A Brief History of Time, with the followinq anecdote about a well-known scientist. The scientist was qiving a public lecture on astronomy and described how the Earth orbits round the Bun and how the Sun, in turn, orbits *round* the centre of our qalaxy. At the and of the leature an old lady at the back of the

(Mr. Reese, Australia)

roam got up and raid, "What you have told us is rubbish. The world is really a flat plate, supported on thr baok of a giant turtle." The scientist gave a superior smile before replying: "Indeed. And what is the turtle standing on?" "You're vuy clever, younq man, *very* clever," she retorted, "but it's turtles all the way down."

(*Mr.* Reese, Aus tralia)

Speakers before me have already commended the movement we havr seen in recent times away from what I might oall the "flat-earth" confrontational approaoh to international relation that we have experienced up until now. We have seen a shift away trom a divisive and unworkable world, We have seen in a r emarkable way a freeinq-up in East-West tensions, aharaoter ized in particular bv increased and productive dialogue on a wide ranqe of issues between Eaat and West, by qreater super-Power w-operation and by profound chanqes in the politioal climate Of Eaa torn Europe.

On the arms-limitation and disarmament front we have witnessed the conclusion of the h is tor ic Treaty on the Elimination of Intermedia te-Ranqe and Shorter-Ranqe Missiles - the INF Treaty, the remarkable proqress in the talk8 at Vienna on oonventional forces in Europe and aubatantial shifts in the neqotiatinq positions in the strateqic arms reduction talks, whioh will expedite those *very* important negotiations.

Nor are those developments limited to Em t-West aonoerna. Improvements in East-West relation6 have had their accompaniment in the achievement of, or movement towards, peace in a number of reqional conflicts. The raoent summit meeting of member8 of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries held at Belgrade olearly spelled out the desire of all members of the Movement to enhance qlobal oo-operation in the search for peace and security.

But we have a lonq way to qo. It is clear that the "flat-earth" mentality of those who favour oontronhtion and reaiat the common aearoh for peaceful solutions to mank ind's problems still has its adherenta. Clearly, one area in which qreater et tort is needed is our area, the arm of multilateral disarmament and arms-limitation neqotiations. Our neqotiations appear to be ● tuok, with few exoeptionr, in the time-warp of the oold war, althouqh in some situations North-South differences seem qreater than those of East-West.

(Mr. Reese, Australia)

Most - but not all - of the reoent progress achieved has been in bilateral negotiations or between alliances, as in the negotiations on conventional forces in Europe. Thue is an evident need ta a greater ettort to ● ■□◌□ℳ oontruotively in multilateral processes. In nuclear arts it is evident that the question of nuclear weapons is so germane to the future at us all that the issues cannot be left to the nuclear-weapon States alone, This and other questions can be resolved ● tteotively only through multilateral agreement on, ta example, nuclear non-proliferation, balliatio missiles, chemical weapons, and conventional weapons and arms tranatrra. Similarly, other threats to security need the involvement of the international community. I refer to problems pertaining to druq-trafficking, to environmental issues *and* to third-world debt, to name but a few.

It concerns my Government that in too many multilateral forums States oontinue to indulge in politioal point scoring and oontinue to adhere to positions that do not contribute to aolutiona. I aoknowledqe that there oontinue to be many problm that do not lend themselves to easy a r eady aolutiona. It would be na ive to pretend that a simple ahanqe ot attitude will solve all things.

But it is clear that in international disarmament forums we oontinue to beat the air too often. The current state of the Disarmament Commission is an untor tuna te example. That body is not aervinq the purpose for which it was established, and it was for that reason that Australia called for change in its statement to the Commission in May.

In the Conference on Disarmament, similar ly, there are areas in which we are not produoinq reaulte. One ray of light this y~r wm the decision to set aside for the time beinq our attempte to develop a comprehensive proqramme of die armament, which clear ly had become boqqed down.

We need to trea t all of those issues more r iqorously. The laok of proqress on a comprehens ive test-ban treaty con tinues to disappoint us. Indeed, as the

(Mr. Reese, bus tralia)

Australian Minister for Foreign Affairs and Trade, Senator Evans, pointed out in a statement to the Conference on Disarmament on 13 June this year, the proposal for a partial teat-ban Treaty amendment oonf erence was an indiotment of the inertia of the Conferonce on Disarmament on the issue ot the comprehensive teat-ban treaty. Australia will, however, be eupportive of the proposed amendment conference, in line with our ongoinq commitment to work towards the abolition of nuclear weapons.

I will come to the subject of chemicals weapons shortly, but in this context I should like to say that if we are to ach ieve a chemical-weapons oonvention we must show more flexibility and imagination in our approach to the negotiating process. We must not be tied down by our uneatintaotory negotiating schedule, which wee cettled on *for* reasons that have nothinq to do with the enpeditioua negotiation of a chemical-weapons oonvention,

In the area of multilateral disarmament, Australia has a number of priorities. The nuclear non-proliferation Treaty is the single most important arms-limitation aqreement. None of ue doubts that the world would have been a *far* more dangerous place if that Treaty had not been concluded and had not received the wide number of adherents that it ha8 today. The Trea ty is coming up for review in 1990 end for deoieion as to how it is to be extended in 1995. How we handle the multilateral disarmament questions in this period will play an important role in confirminq the oontinuinq validity of the Treaty.

Australia continues to believe that a comprehensive test-ban treaty is an urqent priority for the international community, We wish to see such a treaty neqotiated in the Conference on Disarmament and firmly believe that a committee should be established for that purpose at the outset *of* the 1990 aeaaion. *Now* Zealand and Australia, alonq with a number of other countries, will again sponsor a draft resolution to that effect at this session of the General Aaeembly, Laet

(Mr. Reese, Aus tr alia)

year 's resolution 43/64 was adopted by the highest vote ever recorded for any test-ban resolution, evidence that the international community is almost unanimous in its desire to see a test-ban in place.

The need to prevent an arm r ace in outer space is of incr eas ins impor tanoe as we expand our knowledqe of the technological applications that are feasible in that domain. Sinoe 1967 mankind has reooqniaed the need for international oo-operation in outc space and the need for any outer-space activities to be carried out in the interests of maintaininq international peace and security. In Australia's view the emplacement of weapons in outer space or their use *from* Earth aqainst objects in outrr space should be prohibited. The Conference on Disarmament should oontinue to pursue the neqotiation ot multilateral measures to prevent the arms race in outer space.

As views of the qlobal situation change and as conflicts are resolved it is inevitable that States should beqin to question more seriously the value of maintaining hiqh levels of military expenditure. Sovereiqn States of course have the riqht to maintain their military expenditure at levels they see as commensurate with their self-defence neede. But it is becominq apparent that such spendinq is in the long term detrimental to the over-all intrastruoture and sooial and economic interest% of the population.

Crippling debts and larqe deficits, in developed and developinq countr ies alike, increaeinqly call into question the levels of expenditure on weapons and armed forces. Conventional wars since the Second World War, and the bolster inq of those wars through arms sales or military aid, have resul ted in traqic loss Of life and, equally, have been to the detriment of economic development in the developinq world.

The transfer and development of arms should therefore both be subject to the scrutiny of the world. Australia supports the establishment of an international

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United Nations register of arm transfers. The United Nations rtudy soon to beqin will provide invaluable insights into those complex and vexinq issues. Aurtralia will be a participant in that study.

As the Minister *tor* Disarmament of New Zealand, Me. Fran Wilde, has already announoed, South Pacif lo oountriee Members of the United Nations have decided at this session of the General Assembly to ask for endorsement of the reqional treaty that has been neqotiated among them but that no less enhances security on a qlobal basis. I refer, of oouree, to the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty or Treaty of Rarotonqa, the name by which it is commonly known. The support of the States of the United Nations for the aspirations of the peoples of the South Pacific encapsulated in that Treaty will play an important role in assistinq us in our quest for unqualified adherence by relevant States.

(Mr. Reese, Aue tralia)

The achievement of a ohemioal weapons convention is one of the Australian Government's pr incipal disarmament objectives . I have alr eady spoken of the need to look anew at the negotiating schedule. Today, rather than 90 over all of the issues relating to the convention, I propose to focus on developments in whioh Aue tral ia has been par tiou lar ly involved.

What Australia seeks is a convention that is comprehensive in scope, effectively verifiable, non-dieoriminatory in impact and *one* that attracts universal support. But we also recognise the need for a convention that is workable. If we aim for provisions that are too prescriptive and riqid, the convention simply will not work and the international chemical industry a imply will not co-operate in its implementation.

A particular ohallenqe therefore is to see that a correct balance is struok between security benef its and commercial realities. Put another way, the convention must marry the strategic perspectives of Governments to the more practical and immediate concerns at industry. To help crea te the conditions for such a marriaqe, the Australian Government convened in Canberra, from 18 to 22 September this year, the Government-Industry Conference aqainst Chemical Weapons involvinq representatives of nearly 70 Governments and the world's ohemioal industry.

I am pleased to report that *the Conference* achieved its objectives and qave new momentum to a dialoque that is fundamental to the successful conclusion of the convention. On the more specific outcomes of the Conference, I would draw the attention of delegates to two particular documents that emerqed from Canberra, and which Australia has asked the Secretary-General to circulate as documents under item 62: the statement isaued by industry representative8 at the Conference, *and* . he Chairman's closinq atatement.

(Mr. Reese, Australia)

The statement by the representatives of the chemical industry is significant in that, for the first time, the world's chemical industry has recorded its unequivocal abhorrence of ohemioal warfare and has expressed its willinqness to work actively with Governments to achieve a qlobal ban on chemical weapons. In declaring its support for efforts to conolude and implement a chemical weapons convention at the earliest *date,* the chemical industry has stated its willingness to continue dialogue with, and to participate in the necessary national measures With, Governments to prepare for the effective entry into force of the convention.

The oloeinq statement of Australia's Minister tor Foreiqn Affairs and Trade is no less an encouraqinq indicator for the oomins year. The Canberra Conference was unique because it brouqht toqether for the first time on this scale Government representatives and those representatives of the chemical industry whose involvement will be so vital to the proper design and implementa tion of a chemica l weapons convention. The meetinq was not side-tracked by divisive point-sooring or poll ticiza tion. It conveyed an overwhelming sense of oommitment to conolude and implement a convention, as well as the political and praotioal will to work throuqh and resolve the remaining outstanding issues in the neqotiations in the comina year.

Accordingly, 1990 was seen to be a cr itical year for the ohemioal weapons neqotiations, and that is one of the most important messaqes from the Canberra Conference. We must not allow the momentum qenerated for the ear liest conclus ion of a convention to falter, and we must now, all of us, commit the necessary political and practical will to seeing the conclusion ot a convention in 1990.

Even as the focus now returns to Geneva, Australia believes that Government8 oan and should take further measures to support the Geneva neqotiations. In Auqus t this year, for example, Australia convened a reqional seminar in Canberra to discuss with our neiqhbours the secur ity Problem that ohrmical weapons pose to our

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region. We considered how best that ought to be avoided and in that context how to pre are for the chemical weapons convention.

We see the seminar as a first step in ensuring that the countries of our region not directly involved in the Geneva neqotiations can develop a common understanding of the implications of a chemical weapons convention. We have also asked the Secretary-General to disribute a selection of the seminar documentation, because we think that other non-members of the Conference on Disarmament in particular should find it of value. Complete sets of the Conference documentation are available at the Australian Mission for those who would like a more complete account of the proceedings. we would encourage other members of the Conference on Disarmament similarly to consider ways in which countries of their regions might be drawn into the Geneva process.

There are, of course, other ways to assist the negotiations and to ensure that when the Convention is ready for siqnature, countries are ready to siqn it. For its Part, Australia has set up a National Chemical Weapons Convention Secretariat to be responsible for preparing the way for Australia's implementation of the chemica 1 w eapons convention. The Secretariat will co-ordinate consultations between federal Government departments and between Government and industry; review existing laws and regulations cover inq the activities of the chemical industry; and look at ways of introducinq and adaptinq the prospective requirement of the chemical weapons convention to our current regulatory matrix, with a view to harmonizinq industries' obliqations.

Cur overall objective is to ensure that the appropriate structure is at hand to enable us to implemnt the convention once we have siqned and ratif ied it . We would commend that approach to others. Clearly, if we are to achieve at the earliest date a chemical weapons convention, we cannot just wait for the Geneva

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process to run its course before we consider what must be done to bring the convention into force. We must now take whatever measures are necessary and practical to ensure that signature and ratification can also be effected at the earliest date.

In my opening remarks, I drew attention to the need for perceptions to keep pace with developing realities, just as in our field - the field of disarmament and arms control - negotiations must keep pace with technological advances. In particular, I stressed the need for disarmament negotiations, a linchpin of international peace and security, to become an acknowledged part of our global co-operation and to be treated accordingly.

We need to see our way to eradicating the flat-earth mentality, to accepting the universality of our many plights upon the planet and to working together to eliminate them. Perhaps we can turn for inspiration some quarter of a century back down the track to the words of President John F. Kennedy of the United States, when he addressed the General Assembly on the same question of a changing of perceptions. He said :

> "Never before has man had such capacity to control his own environment: to end thirst and hunger; to conquer poverty and disease; to banish illiteracy and massive human misery. We have the power to make this the best generation of mankind in the history of the world - or to make it the last". (A/PV.1209, p. 6, para. 58)

The 1990s should provide an opprortunity for us to discover that best generation.

Mr. ENGO (Cameroon) : Permit us to commence by expressing our strong sense of shock at the tragic earthquake in California last night. In expressing our sincere condolences to the United States delegation, we respectfully ask them

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to convey to the Government and people of this great nation, with which Cameroon shares the warmest of friendly relations, the sense of solidar ity that our delegation, our Government and our people share wfth the bereaved in California at this time.

(Mr. Enqo, Cameroon)

The delegation of the Republic of Cameroon extends to you, Sir, the warm conqratulations of our Government and people, who share many common concerns with you. Paramount among these is the predicament of the noble ideals, purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter, whioh provide the only frontier for the successful management of peace and development everywhere. Your 0011 eaque, the Permanent Representative of Venezuela, Ambassador Andres Aquilar, *and* I shared the privilege of responsibility in the monumental endeavour8 that oulminated in the 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea at Montego Bay, At the commemorative twenty-fifth anniversary of the United Nations, we were fortunate enough to preside *over the* First and Birth Commi tteee, respectively. On these two occas ions, we came to recoqnize the profoundness of the interest links that Venezuela and Cameroon had as so-called third world nations and as witnesses to the imperatives of the multilateral process in a teahnoloqioal aqe.

In the oontemporary world, the dividinq line between war and peace is so thin that both phenomena have lost their traditional definitions. It has become more obvious than ever before that the impulse for peace, secur ity and development knows no borders: rich or poor, powerful or weak, all share a stake in it. Your presence in the Chair underlines another truth, Mr. Chairman: that the quality of experience which your backqround and knowledqe brinq to the leadership of this Committee does not confine its influence to qeoqraphy. What is relevant is the maqnetism of the multilateral process, which increasinqly attracts universal participation in discourse on qlobal issues. We pledqe to you the fullest oo-opera tion of the Cameroon ian deleqa tion.

Ambassador Douqlae Roche of Canada made a tremendous oontr ibution to our work. We have come to take his dedication for qranted, *and* we are qratified that he lived up to that reputation.

(Mr. Engo, Cameroon)

The First Committee of the General Assembly meets onue aqain, seeminqly responding *to* an annual ritual. This institution was created for a purpose that has been the viotim of threats and violations. In the final analysis, it will always remain mainly what we, the human element, make of it. Our attitudes and responses to the preoccupations or concerns of others continue to dictate the nature Of our concourse here, as well as the role we ascribe, consciously or unconsciously, to it.

The international public entertained hopes in our endeavours, but was tormented, teased and incensed by what some journalists and sections of the media had overplayed, and sometimes rearranqed, oonoerninq our pronounoements here. Indeed, symphonies of disoord have been extracted *from* our unendinq rendition of repetitive political lyrioe at the General Assembly.

We approach the year 2000 better informed about both the horrors of warfare and the benefits of the alternatives. Perhaps what we should be addressinq at this time is not so much where the United Nations has failed or succeeded , but what ahanqe should be introduced into our attitudes towards it. The miraqe of a tide in the affairs of this generation has not *produced* a flood that lea& to fortune: the fortune of rejection of armed oonfliot and belliqerenay, of conetruotinq the sustainins rudiments of peace, of coneolidatinq international strenqth to maintain qlobal peace and secur ity.

What the world needs today are the fruits of euoh chanqe in attitudes; ohanqe also in the will to pursue our universal visions of the future, a future that will increasinqly mock all tendencies towards both individual isolationism and eectionaliam qeared to defyinq the collective will of the peoples of these United Nations. We need to demonstrate our commitment to the United Nations Charter, makinq productive use of the periodic meetinqs of the General Assembly and the

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Organization's Other forums, ensuring that we are seen to be more than a mere debating society.

Multilateraliem has procured for mankind perhaps the only realistic vehicle to international underetanding, an understanding that enhances confidence-building measures and paves the way to oonoord devoid of mistrust, an understanding that permits of knowledge of the nature of our common exposure to dangers, of natural forces, Of our own forces, and of the scope of our interdependence. The multilateral process provides opportunities to hear and to be heard on the definition8 of national policies, the concerns, aspirations and expectations of peoples everywhere, opportunities also for an exchange or views an the human oondi tion - all these with a view to harmonizing the aotione of Statee.

Most problems in contemporary life derive from oraoke and breakdowns in the international rye tom. Each nation was to be tuned to respond effectively to the uncertainties and transformations of the interna tional scheme. It would be amiss to administer local medicine to a malaise needing qlobal solutions.

We attaoh great importance to this phenomenon, because it translates the reality of life in a technological aqe. Frustration0 with the consequences of adopting old attitudes in order to resist new realities may well be at the foundation of inter-State wars, of the war that modern man seems to be waqing against himself, of a crisis in both conscience and perception.

At the commemorative fortieth anniversary of thie Orqaniaation, we undertook some oritioal stock-taking of the tedious march from the San Francisco of the 1940s to the New York of the 1980s. The dialoque qave the impression that the United Natiom was on trial. Criticisms were made about its valua and place in modern international r elations. There were indictments of its oredibility and worth. The decision was reached to set UP a qroup of high-level intergovernmental experts to

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review the efficiency of the administrative and financial functions of the United Nations. It was as if the Organization was separate from ourselves, the Member States that constitute it. The juridical personality presented a convenient scapegoat for our misgivings.

Yet from the barrage of sentiments came some ideas upon which the fruits of today were nourished. It soon became crystal clear that States, no matter how rich or powerful, could no longer shield themselves with the outdated panoply of excuses as to why the Organization had been largely sidelined or even ignored in serious issues of international dimension.

Serious disarmament effort had been considered a matter within the privileged domain of the strong. The Organization was too cumbersome and too plagued with reactionaries for the sort of in-depth discussions on complex technical issues that disarmament negotiations entailed. Others had chosen resignation to the fact that there was no political will for disarmament on the part of the major military powers.

We approach the beginning of the last decade of this century with reformed attitudes in Washington, Moscow and other major capitals of military strength. It is reassuring that the disarmament issue has left the exclusive universe of discourse for experts. Politicians and the civil decision-making machinery of States have now sought and obtained the necessary knowledge. They have begun to join with the populace to recognize that a real stake in peace and security anywhere is the well-being of the individual, the family, the nucleus of society everywhere. The nuclear threat does not discriminate; it concerns mankind as a whole. This in *itself* demonstrates the need for involvement in disarmament efforts by all sectors of the international community that desire such involvement.

(Mr. Engo, Cameroon)

These things are important for two praotioal reasons. First, the new attitudes in Washinqton and Moscow may be taken - hopefully - as part of the realization that primary responsibility for ration in the field of disarmament, constitutionally as well as de faoto, rests with these nuclear-weapon Powers. Secondly, the n-found friendly relations among them have encouraqed the rest of the world to entertain a sense of revived hope in qreater endeavours towards better standards of life for all.

Last January the Frenoh capital was host to a renewed international effort to ourb and finally to eliminate chemical weapons. Even so-called third world nations, which often look on this category of weapons as the poor man's nuclear force, responded favourably to President Mitterand's echo of the universal oall made at the General Assembly. The enthusiasm of the disarmament world was later to freeze somewhat as the Conf erence on Disarmament in Geneva strolled its rocky path, completely out of tune with the spirit of Par is.

President Bush and President Gorbachev were too inspired to permit the demise of a lofty ideal. The unilateral decisions to destroy existinq weapons cannot but help build confidence amonq those States that feared a power and defense vaouum in the oall for a mere ban on proliferation. It oan only be hoped that the trend will visit the non-proliferation Treaty as well as the elaboration and implementation Of other accords qeared at riddinq the world of military and non-military instruments of destruction and war.

Our preparation6 for a new world order of peace, secur ity and development in the year 2000 must now address the prooedurr and machinery for implementinq the aspirations of a qeneration recently qraduated from illusions of thr role of power and of the mirage of benefits deriving from conquest, oonfliqt and conflaqration in international relations.

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A happy consensus seems to have emerqed after all concerninq the ever-present potential of the United Nation8 in the maintenanoe of peace and eeourity. There was universal applause for the deserved award of the Nobel peace prize to the Secretary-General and to the United Nations peace-keepinq foraea. It was as if we all jointly smiled at the realization that the Orqanization was ours, that we were proud of our baby.

In order to avoid a relapse into the confusion and misqivinqs of the past, it would appear imperative that we strengthen the Orqaniaation and its capacity to play the roles prescribed by the Charter. This is more urqsnt now than ever before. The 1980s have bequn to witness a remarkable chanqe in the brute use of force involved in r eqional conflicts. The Secretary-General has demonstrated what a man of vision and dedication can do. Cessa tion of open warfare may be expected to extend to ar eas beyond Namibia: Central Africa, Asia and other reqions of the qlobe may follow.

Peace-makinq must be followed by peace-keepinq. Peace-keepinq can assume a permanent form only if it is accompanied by settled measures of confidence-buildinq amonq parties, to replace the elements of discord. Ver ification is a subject to which the Cameroonian deleqation and *Government* attach equal importance because Of the strenqth and reassurance it provides to parties as part of confidence-buildinq.

Five years aqo the Cameroonian Minister of Foreiqn Affairs, Mr. William Eteki Mboumoua, addr ess inq the thirty-ninth sess ion of the General Assembly on behalf of our nation, proposed a review of the role of the United Nations in the field of disarmament. We were enoour aqed by subsequent discuss ions and decisions on the subject to present to the Disarmament Commission a formal document outlininq our views on the subject. Our pr imary concern continues to be the efficiency of the ins titutions set up by th is qenera tion for the cons truotive maintenance of international peace, as designed by the universal political edifice

(Mr. Enqo, Cameroon)

that we all choose to call the United Nations Charter. We cannot be above owninq that the contradictions of contemporary international society exist in spite of the Charter, not because of its prescriptions. States do not seem to echo in their policies the determination of the peoples of the United Nations represented in San Francisco to establish productive conditions of peace, to practise tolerance and to promote such harmonious proqress universally as would make conflict both repuqnant and undesirable.

Faced with disputes or even suspicion? about the motivations of others, nations resorted to war and belliqerency instead of seekinq understandinq or recourse to peaceful settlement, The first half of the twentieth century saw a qraduation from Europe's Middle Aqes in which States were created bv force of arms. Tochnoloqy had chanqed the scene, and the ambitions of individual tyrants had to be met with the collective force of new qroupinqe across the qlobe. The frustrations of the vile quest for military victory and foreiqn occupation persisted well beyond the immediate ravaqes of war. The cancer of conflict was to find its way into lonq-term economic and social consequences. The lesson beqan to dawn on those who revelled in the illusions of power, and restructurinq responded very quickly to rethinkinq on the blessinqs rather than the curse of it.

We can only hope that recent events justify our impression that the chanqinq times do, in fact, herald a revival of faith in the universal conscience that establisher3 the qrcat visions of the United Nations Charter. If this is so, it would be danqerous and premature to presume that the human instincts for conflict and war have been eliminated from in tarnational relations. The pressures that provoked chanqe descend from deteriorating economic and social advancement, the cause of which may be traced to mismanaqement and wronq priori ties set. History has shown that once the pressures and other nightmares of conflict recede into what is seen as irrelevant memory, man takes on vaqrancy, lured by illusions and

(Mr. Enqo, Cameroon)

It is our view, during the happy moments of revival, that sustainable institutions must be set up and strenqthened to ensure that the individual is always preoccupied with forms, procedures and other activities which actively promote the nature of better alternatives to conflict - the alternatives of co-operation, of understandinq throuqh dialoque, of the inevitability of joint actions. The United Nations can hardly be seen not to be a precedent because it has no precedent: it indeed creates one.

We live in danqerous times and need to r ecoqnize that fact. It would appear to this deleqation that history is once aqain presentinq our qeneration with the facet of a détente which may be said to exist amonq some of the military powers and amonq the economic qiants of the aqe.

(Mr. Enqo, Cameroon)

If anythinq is becominq clear, it would appear to be the diverqency Of views an the scope and beneficiaries of the proclaimed détente. It is not even clear whether the predicament of othcro was particularly relevant as thu two super-Powers undertook a critical rapprochement in the process of easinq tensions between them. The rest of the world took hope and may have presumed too much about its effect On international relations elsewhere. The world no lonqer operates merely on the wishes, interests and dictates of the major Powers alone. Yet, we must understand that their predicament colours the pliqht of others; they share economic crises and the epidemic spreads; yet, they make peace amonq themselves and this does not necessarily qive comfort and relief to others. The blame is too often placed entirely where it does not belonq: there is a tendency to iqnore the ever-present truths of the human condition. There are permanent interests which each State seems to seek in security, peace and development.

What is heartenino is that in time of adversity, man seeks his kind for survival. That quest qave birth to this Orqanization. At least for the time beinq, we have with us a renewal of faith in the United Nations. We must strenqthen this Orqanization in order to consolidate recognition of it as the only true, universal centre for the harmonisation of the actions of States.

Most critical, perhaps, at this period in time is the role it must play in the delicate areas of disarmament, of peace-makinq and of peace-keepinq. The cessation of open-armed conflict does not always come with assurances of a sustainable peace. Peace-keepinq is probably the most urqent amonq the important responsibilities of this Orqanization. It is upon the Secretary-General and the efficiency of the institutional structures that parties to conflicts, as well as the international public, place their hopes for the maintenance of peace and security.

(Mr. Engo, Cameroon)

In a fast-moving world, the Secretary-General's responsibility is both complex and heavy. The holder of the office cannot afford to operate on an ad hoc basis, permitting crises situations to drag dangerously on because of indolence or bureaucratic idiosyncracies. He is called upon to maintain a tremendous reservoir of knowledge of the nature of each case and to respond with dispatch as well as expertise regarding any issues arising from the special dictates of the Security Council and the General Assembly in relation to the promotion and maintenance of international peace and security.

Considering the multifaceted nature of his overall duties and the need to enhance the effectiveness of his exercise of his prerogatives, it is the opinion of this delegation that the hand of the Secretary-General should be strengthened. The tremendous bureaucracy over which he presides must be so structured as to reinforce his capacity to respond efficiently in the performance of the delicate functions demanded of him.

We are inclined to conclude, in the light of ever-increasing events relating to regional and other conflicts, that the time has come to review the role of the various organs and institutions which deal with international peace and security. That review must lay prominent emphasis on the efficiency of the system, especially the effectiveness of co-ordination and the elimination of duplication of effort, The Secretary-General must be seen to he the master of crisis management, not a technocratic pater familias Preoccupied with co-ordinating a large, diverse bureacracy of equals, each laying claim to unsettled jurisdictions.

The process of evaluation for the Secretary-General-, especially when he has to consult Member States on delicate political decisions, must be streamlined. His professional and technical support must come to him with reasoned alternatives, not conclusions and recommendations from diverse sources. Following consultations with

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many deleqa tions and experts, we have come to the conclusion that a step should be taken, similar to the decision of the General Assembly to establish a principal co-ordinator for international economic development, a hiqh-level official at the level of Director-General, The formal proposal by Cameroon's Minister of External Rela tions, Dr, Jacques-Roqer Booh-Booh, at the 11th plenary meetinq of the General Assembly on 28 September 1989, was inspired by that conclusion. He too endeavoured to reflect our Government% concern for, and commitment to, such reforms in the United Nations sys tern as truly make for efficiency both of cos t and of actions.

In order to address the full implications of this proposal, we would respectfully request that the Secretary of the Committee or the Secretariat of the United Nations should provide a purely technical analysis of the distribution of labour amonq the various orqans, services and other institutions dealinq with all aspects and activities of international peace and security within the syutem. I would stress that we are requestinq a purely technical analysis.

In closinq, we cannot help but draw attention to the stronq case for peace that has been made by the fadinq twentieth century, the end of an eventful millennium postulatinq a cataloque of the evident consequences of human conduct in conf 1 ict amonq States, in conflict both with nature and the environment. The conflict, any conflict, is destructive. War is definitely not an instrument of well-beinq, either to the victor or to the vanquished. Peace, to be attained, must be fouqht for resolutely aqainst conditions of war and belliqerency. Once obtained, peace must be orqanized. It can only be maintained by conscious and concrete construction, not only of the rudiments that inhibit war and conflict but also by the entrenchment of procedures and mechanisms which lend efficiency to its overall manaqement.

(Mr. Engo, Cameroon)

We sincerely hope that the sentiments which we express today will further enhance the recommendations for rational change made by the Group of High-level Intergovernmental Experts to Review the Efficiency of the Administrative and Financial Functioning of the United Rations.

The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from Spanish): I am certain that the Under-Secretary-General for Disarmament Affairs has taken note of the request by Ambassador Engo, and that he will be contacting him about the request in due course

The meeting rose at 12.30 p.m.