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VERBATIM RECORD OF THE 32nd MEETING

Chairman : Mr. Roche (Canada)

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The meeting was called to order at 3.20 p.m.

AGENDA ITEMS 51 TO 69, 139, 141 AND 145 (continued)

CONSIDERATION OF AND ACTION ON DRAFT RESOLUTIONS ON DISARMAMENT ITEMS

Mr. FUNUNGWE (Zimbabwe): The Zimbabwe **delegation is** pleased to **introduce**, on behalf of the States members of the Movement of **Non-Aligned Countries**, the draft resolutions contained in documents **A/C.1/43/L.7** and **L.8**, on bilateral **nuclear-arms** negotiations and the relationship between disarmament and development **respectively**. I should like to discuss first draft resolution **A/C.1/43/L.7**, and then to go on to draft resolution **L.8**.

In the post-1945 era the question of the prevention of nuclear war and nuclear disarmament has emerged as the most **important** issue **fact in hand**. It has become patently obvious that the Clausewitzian dictum that war **is** a continuation of political dialogue by other **means** no longer holds in the nuclear age. To seek the ends of policy by engaging in a conflict that denies or defeats all possible rational **goals** is a contradiction in terms. That is why the non-aligned **countries** have stated that nuclear weapons are not weapons **of war** but a means of **mass** destruction, a means of genocides.

It was also with that in mind that the international community was able to **agree** in 1978, in the Final Document **of the** first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, that

"**Removing** the threat of a world war - a nuclear war - is the most acute and urgent task of the present day. Mankind is threatened with a choice: **we** must halt the **arms race** and proceed to disarmament **or** face annihilation".

(resolution S-10/2, pars, 18)

It **is** evidence of our continuing **rationality** that faced with this **choice** we have chosen the former, not the latter. As we approach this vital subject, which has **as** its **agenda** the very survival of every **child**, woman and man on Earth, **it is**

(Mr. Punungwe, Zimbabwe)

clear that all States - and indeed non-governmental organisations and other private organisations - have a right to be heard, and to hear and influence all the views and decisions that may affect them, no matter the forum in which those views are expressed or those decisions taken. That is not a subversive viewpoint. There is a universal consensus on it. In the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, the international community agreed by consensus that

“All the peoples of the world have a vital interest in the success of disarmament negotiations. Consequently, all States have the duty to contribute to efforts in the field of disarmament. All States have the right to participate in disarmament negotiations. They have the right to participate on an equal footing in those multilateral disarmament negotiations which have a direct bearing on their national security”. (para. 28)

Clearly, whether or not nuclear war is prevented and whether or not there is nuclear disarmament has a direct bearing on the security of every country. I do not regret the circumscription of some forums that discuss the issue. If such limitation of membership makes for greater progress in negotiations it is well and good. As the Final Document itself recognises, not all States are equally guilty in the nuclear-arms race. As stated in the Final Document,

“While disarmament is the responsibility of all States, the nuclear-weapon States have the primary responsibility for nuclear disarmament and, together with other militarily significant States, for halting and reversing the arms race”. (para. 28)

But let us not confuse that responsibility with the stakes at issue or with interest in the subject. A shared log cabin is not necessarily the property only of the man who possesses the matches. That he can destroy the house does not make the house his alone, and its fate of no consequence to his cohabitants.

(Mr. Punungwe, Zimbabwe)

It is in the light of the foregoing that the non-aligned countries have approached the subject of draft resolution A/C.1/43/L.7. The spirit guiding the draft resolution clearly emanates from the consensual positions of the Final Document of 1978 and should thus command consensus here. In the preambular part, we set out the philosophical basis for the operative paragraphs that follow. The issues raised in the preamble closely follow the Final Document.

We recall the Harare Appeal. What is that Appeal? It is actually the text of a letter sent in 1986 to President Reagan of the United States and General-Secretary Gorbachev of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics by the leaders of the non-aligned countries. It was not an order. It was not a demand. It was an appeal, a request, to which we have now received replies. The Harare Appeal is a physical fact of which we are all aware, not a figment of the imagination. What can be wrong in recalling that Appeal? Is there something objectionable in it? We do not believe so.

The Appeal mentions the profound concern and anxiety of the non-aligned leaders about the continuing arms race. So does the Final Document of 1978. It states that the struggle for peace and for the prevention of nuclear war is the principal task of our times. The 1978 Final Document calls the struggle for peace the most urgent task of the present day. The Harare Appeal states that the arms race, if allowed to continue, would heighten the risk of nuclear holocaust and the real Possibility of the destruction of civilization. The 1978 Final Document states that we must halt the arms race and proceed to disarmament or face annihilation.

What does the Appeal ask of the two super-Powers? It urges the two leaders to use their

(Mt. Punungwe, Zimbabwe)

**"best efforts to reduce the prevailing tension and to promote a climate of confidence in the world, in order to facilitate the settlement of major international issues by peaceful means". (A/41/697, annex, p. 158)**

Whether in response to the Appeal or not, it appears that the **two super-Powers** are already in compliance with that request.

The Appeal urges

**"the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, as well as all other nuclear-weapon States, to take immediate steps to prevent the outbreak of nuclear war". (p. 158)**

It would appear that on this too, whether or not because of the Appeal, the **two super-Powers** are working hard and may soon be rewarded with more success after the obvious success of the Treaty on intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles, the INF Treaty.

The Appeal goes on to mention the belief of the non-aligned leaders that it is within the grasp of President Reagan and General-Secretary Gorbachev, as the leaders of the **two most powerful nations on Earth, to arrest the trend towards confrontation and conflict, and it urges them to cooperate in the**

**"dialogue which has been initiated to put an end to the arms race with a view to reaching substantive agreements in the field of disarmament, including an early agreement on the prevention of an arms race in outer space". (p. 158)**

We note again that, whether because or in spite of the Harare Appeal, the **two countries** are largely in compliance with that request as of this moment.

The Appeal then goes on to express the hope - it does not demand or even urge; it just expresses the hope - that at their next summit meeting both parties would

**"agree on a moratorium as a first step towards a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty"**

(Mr. Punungwe, Zimbabwe)

and states that

"Such a step would be greatly welcomed by the peoples of the world and would make a major contribution to halting the nuclear-arms race and encourage progress in other areas of disarmament." (pp. 158-159)

(Mr. Pununqwe, 2 Zimbabwe)

These are all the substantive issues raised by the Harare Appeal. We cannot fault them why any delegation should find difficulty with them. Nevertheless, the basic philosophy underpinning them is the hallmark of our approach to the subject under consideration and we feel compelled to cite the Harare Appeal, as well as the Havana Appeal and the Nicosia Communiqué in the second preambular paragraph. We believe that the spirit of those documents not only characterise the non-aligned movement but also correctly reflects international sentiment as reflected in the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, of 1978.

The third preambular paragraph is self-explanatory. Yes, we have had some successes, such as the Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles - the INF Treaty, but the arms race continues to escalate and the quantity of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction remains unconscionable. The escalation of the arms race clearly increases the risk of nuclear war and threatens the survival of humanity.

In paragraph 11 the Final Document states that

“Mankind today is confronted with an unprecedented threat of self-extinction arising from the massive and competitive accumulation of the most destructive weapons ever produced. Existing arsenals of nuclear weapons alone are more than sufficient to destroy all life on earth.” (resolution S-10/2, para. 11)

From this it is clear where we got the fourth preambular paragraph. This ties in with the other observations made in the Final Document that the prevention of a world war, a nuclear war, is the most acute and urgent task of the present day. Far from using war to attain the ends of policy, in the nuclear age the avoidance

(Mr. Pununqwe, Zimbabwe)

of a world war has itself become the most vital goal of policy. The question clearly is no longer one of war and peace but of life and death.

The fifth and sixth preambular paragraphs are also self-explanatory and in fact closely follow the consensus of the international community as expressed in the Final Document adopted at the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament.

It will easily be seen that the first to sixth preambular paragraphs come from the resolution on the same subject that was adopted by our Committee last year. The seventh preambular paragraph is not really new either, since it is merely an update of the first preambular paragraph of last year's resolution. Last year we welcomed the agreement in principle between the United States and the USSR to sign the INF Treaty and to make intensive efforts to achieve a treaty on 50 per cent reductions in strategic offensive arms. Since the INF Treaty has now been signed and ratified by both parties, we have used this paragraph to welcome the commencement of implementation of that Treaty.

The really new paragraph is the last one in the preamble. Yet although new in this draft, the idea involved is not new either in the thinking of the non-aligned countries or in that of the international community. In paragraph 121 of the Final Document, for example, it is stated that

“Bilateral and regional disarmament negotiations may also play an important role and could facilitate negotiations of multilateral agreements in the field of disarmament”. (resolution S-10/2, para. 121)

Also, in the Final Documents of Harare, adopted by the Heads of State and Government Of the Non-Aligned Countries in 1986, the leaders of the non-aligned stated that bilateral and multilateral negotiations on disarmament should mutually facilitate and complement, and not hinder or preclude, each other. We believe

(Mr. Pununqwe, Zimbabwe)

this is a sentiment that is universally shared in this forum and that it should be included here, especially in the light of the limited results of the third special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, although it was held against the backdrop of truly admirable progress at the bilateral level.

The operative paragraphs are really either updates of last year's resolution or reproductions thereof and should not cause controversy.

I should like to note that our resolution was adopted by this Committee last Year by a vote of 145 to none, with 13 absentees. We believe this is an important issue and that it is important for us to send an unequivocal message to the world on this matter. We would thus hope that it will be possible for all delegations to support this draft resolution. It would be a pity if we should be put in a position where we must choose between sending an equivocal message or sending a wrong message.

I would like to turn now to draft resolution A/C.1/43/L.8, entitled "Relationship between disarmament and development". The draft is practically merely a procedural resolution the sole purpose of which is to include the item on the agenda of the forty-fourth session. In the draft we recall the provisions of the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament which relate to the relationship between disarmament and development. We further recall the adoption by the International Conference on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development of a Final Document on the subject. We request the Secretary-General to take action through the appropriate bodies, within available resources, for the implementation of the action programme adopted at the International Conference and to present a report to the forty-fourth session, and we decide to include the item on the agenda of the forty-fourth session.

(Mr. Punungwe, Zimbabwe)

The importance attached to this subject can be seen from the way practically every delegation stated its regret at the squandering of scarce resources on the arms race in juxtaposition to the extreme need in which the majority of the world's population finds itself. These have been expressed both in this Committee and in the Assembly. In paragraph 16 of the Final Document of 1979 the international consensus was recorded that

"In a world of finite resources there is a close relationship between expenditure on armaments and economic and social development. Military expenditures are reaching ever higher levels, the highest percentage of which can be attributed to the nuclear-weapon States and most of the latter, with prospects of further expansion and the danger of further increases in the expenditures of other countries. The hundreds of billions of dollars spent annually on the manufacture or improvement of weapons are in sombre and dramatic contrast to the want and poverty in which two thirds of the world's population live. This colossal waste of resources is even more serious in that it diverts to military purposes not only material but also technical and human resources which are urgently needed for development in all countries, particularly in the developing countries. Thus, the economic and social consequences of the arms race are so detrimental that its continuation is obviously incompatible with the implementation of the new international economic order based on justice, equity and co-operation. Consequently, resources released as a result of the implementation of disarmament measures should be used in a manner which will help to promote the well-being of all peoples and to improve the economic conditions of the developing countries."

(resolution S-10/2, para. 16)

(Mr. Punungwe, Zimbabwe)

The preceding paragraph, quoted from the 1978 consensual document, so eloquently states its case that further elaboration is not necessary. On an issue of such importance it is our sincere hope that the Committee will be able to adopt this draft resolution without a vote.

Before I conclude I would like also to draw the attention of the Committee to operative paragraph 1 of draft resolution A/C. 1/43/L. 9. That paragraph has now been amended by an addition. Nothing that is now there is deleted, but we add, after the last word "Conference", the phrase "and to present a report to the forty-fourth session".

(Mr. Punungwe, Zimbabwe)

We would recall that, at the forty-second session of the General Assembly, the Secretary-General had already been asked to undertake certain tasks in connection with the implementation of the Programme of Action of the International Conference on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development. We believe he has been doing so, and it is only logical that we should request him to give us a progress report. That is why we thought it necessary to insert the addition to operative paragraph 1. I hope the Secretariat will take this into consideration and let us have a draft amended to that effect.

Mr. TANASIE (Romania) (interpretation from French): I have the honour to introduce draft resolution A/C. 1/43/L.57 of 31 October 1988, entitled "Economic and social consequences of the armaments race and its extremely harmful effects on world peace and security" of which the following delegations are co-sponsors: Bangladesh, Czechoslovakia, Ecuador, Indonesia, Mali, Mexico, Nigeria, Romania, Sweden, Tunisia, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Uruguay, Yugoslavia and Zaire.

In pursuance of resolutions 40/150 and 41/86 I of the General Assembly, the Secretary-General assisted by a group of qualified consultant experts, presented to the forty-third session an updated version of the report on the economic and social consequences of the arms race and military expenditures, taking into account the important developments which had occurred since the drafting of that report.

The report examines the arms race and military expenditures in global terms from the point of view of their economic and social impact.

One of the main conclusions of the report is that

"During the 1980s the arms race has continued, in particular in its qualitative aspect, unabated, in fact expanding in scale and accelerating in pace." (A/43/368, para. 171)

On account of its depth of analysis, this report will become an important reference document in the extensive information activities directed to Governments

(Mr. Tanar ~~to~~, Roman ~~ia~~)

and international public opinion on this subject within the framework of the World Disarmament Campaign.

Draft resolution A/C.1/43/L.57 which refers to the ~~concern~~ expressed in its preamble at the scale of the arms race, especially the nuclear arms race, and military expenditures, and stresses the negative consequences for the economic and social development of States of the use of substantial material and human resources for military purposes. The preambular part of the draft resolution also stresses the need for all Governments and peoples to be informed about the situation prevailing in the field of the arms race and disarmament.

In the operative part of the draft resolution, which is similar to that of resolutions previously adopted by the General Assembly on the basis of other reports and studies dealing with various aspects of disarmament, the General Assembly welcomes with satisfaction the updated report of the Secretary-General on the economic and social consequences of the arms race and military expenditures, and expresses its thanks to him and to the consultant experts as well as to the Governments and international organizations that have rendered assistance in the updating of the report.

Another paragraph recommends that the updated report be brought to the attention of public opinion and taken into account in future actions by the United Nations in the field of disarmament.

An important paragraph of the draft resolution requests the Secretary-General to make the necessary arrangements for the reproduction of the report as a United Nations publication and to give it broad publicity in the framework of the World Disarmament Campaign.

There is also a recommendation that all Governments should ensure the widest possible distribution of the report, including its translation into their respective national languages.

**(Mr. Tanaa ia, Roman ia)**

Yet another paragraph in the operative part of the draft resolution invites the specialized agencies, as well as intergovernmental, national and non-governmental organizations, to use their facilities to make the report widely known.

In the last operative paragraph, the General Assembly reaffirms its decision to keep the item entitled "Economic and social consequences of the arms race and its extremely harmful effects on world peace and security" under constant review, and decides to include it in the provisional agenda of its forty-sixth session. That last paragraph actually gives effect to paragraph 93 (c) of the Final Document of the First Special Session of the General Assembly Devoted to Disarmament, which stipulates that the Secretary-General shall periodically - and I stress, periodically - report to the General Assembly on the economic and social consequences of the arms race and its extremely harmful effects on world peace and security. Draft resolution A/C.1/43/L.57 theretofore flows logically from that paragraph approved by the General Assembly.

The draft resolution which I have just introduced is the outcome of extensive consultations. Indeed, the co-sponsors are anxious for the draft resolution to be generally acceptable and adopted by consensus. We are convinced that the report of the Secretary-General on the economic and social consequences of the arms race and of military expenditures, as well as the adoption and implementation of this draft resolution, would be important contributions by the United Nations to the general effort to halt the arms race and the intensification of efforts aimed at earnest negotiations on disarmament.

**Mr. STEPHANOU** (Greece): I have the honour to speak on behalf of the twelve member States of the European Community on item 62 of the agenda entitled "Reduction of military budgets".

(Mt. Stephanou, Greece)

The **Twelve have** retained a **consis** tent and **active** in **terest** in **this** **subject**. **As I stated, inter alia,** in the **general debate, speaking** on behalf of the Twelve, **greater transparency and openness** in **military matters,** including **defence budgets, is a fundamental requirement.** They welcome the **fact that confidence building is** now a widely accepted notion. **Moreover, in a pressing thrust confidence building has** played and will continue to play an important role in **multilateral disarmament affairs,** the Twelve further **emphasize** that the **United Nations standardized reporting System is an important means for** making **military expenditures comparable** world wide *and* **more transparent.** The **Twelve** call on member **States to take Part in** it in the near future.

**Military budgets are absorbing a high** Proportion of the **world's** human, **financial, natural and technological resources, and** have thereby **increasingly** become a **serious economic strain** on a large number of **countries.**

(Mr. Stephanou, Greece)

Th is applies to Governmen ts both in indus tr ialized and in developinq ooun tr ies. All support the view that Government8 have a duty to proteot their national interes's, inoluding the right of States to undiminished security. However, there ahould be a rtrong mutual interest in aohievinq thie at lower levels of armaments, thus reduoinq the present high military rpendinq in order to increase the allocation of national financial resources for a number of urgent humanitarian needs.

The Twelve have for many years emphasized the necessity of eestablishinq agreed methos of measur inq and compar inq military expenditures. An important s tep was the recommendation in General Assembly resolution 35/142 B, which provides a universal framework for States to report to the Secretary-General about their military expenditures in a etandardiaed form. All member s of the Twelve comply regularly with that resolu tion. We oall on all Sta tes to take part in the etandardiaed reportinq as soon as poeeible. We welcome the fact that more Sta tee have found it possible to oanple te the ins trument, whereas other a have indicated that they will do so in the near future. ,.

Given the role of the United Nations in the field of disarmament, we believe that the United Nations ehould play a central part in encouraqinq neqotiations on acme control and disarmament measures that could Lead to the reduction of military expenditures. By supply inq the Seore tary-General wi th relevant inform tion, Member States would support the Orqaniaation in carrying out its role in this field, through the collection and dissemination of information.

Since 1980 the Disarmament Commission has considered the pr inciples which should govern fur ther actions of Sta tea in the field of freez inq and reduc ing military budgets. The Twelve have taken an active part in the deliberations and

(Mr. Stephanou, Greece)

have **contributed to various compromise** formula tione. We welcome the fact that there is wide aooeptanoee of exohanqing relevant **data and aohievins comparability of military budgets.**

The Twelve hope **that,** with **the** growing awareness and **impor tance attached to** oonfidenoe-building, the Diarmament Commission **at its 1989 session** will be able to **rinalize the** draft **principles** and solve the outstanding **issues** with **requard** to **transpar enoy** and oompar abili ty .

I wish **now,** on behalf of the **Twelve member Sta tee** of the European **Community,** to **speak** on agenda item 62 (b), **ooncerning** the **relationship** between disarmament and development.

The Twelve share the concern **of** the international **community repeatedly expressed** by many **speakers** in **this Committee** at the high level of military expenditures **in the** world. In **particular,** the **expendi tur e** on conventional armaments and **forces absorbe** an **overwhelming** proportion of all military budgets in the world and thereby **has incr eas ingly** become a **ser ious** economic **str A** in on a **large** number of **countr ies,** whether developed or less **developed.**

On the other hand, the question **of security emerges** as a oentral feature. Decision8 to increase or reduce mill **tary** expenditure remain tied to **issues** of international and regional **secur ity,** a point which **applies** equally to **indus tr ial ized** and develop tng **coun tr ies.**

Tha problem **of** the relationship **between** diarmament and **development, taking** into account the need for security of **States, has a!ways** been a complex one. None the leas, the tranfer of **any resources** released through **arms** control and disarmament **measures** and the growing awareness of **the impor tance** of the **potent ia l** **reallocation** of **resources** for the benefit of mankind **has been a matter of** **consistent** concern in this forum. This concern **led** to the **dec is ion** to hold in 1987

(Mr. Stephanou, Greece)

the International Conference on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development, on the basis of the French initiative. It was a significant event and proved an additional successful manifestation of international co-operation.

The Twelve participated actively in the International Conference on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development and played their part in ensuring the successful adoption of its Final Document by consensus. The Conference contributed to a more substantial and balanced understanding of the matter. In particular, the Final Document underlined that:

“Disarmament and development are two of the most urgent challenges facing the world today. They constitute priority concerns of the international community in which all nations - developed and developing, big and small, nuclear and non-nuclear - have a common and equal stake. Disarmament and development are two pillars on which enduring international peace and security can be built.” (A/CONF. 130/39, p. 14)

Furthermore, the Final Document reaffirmed the crucial importance of the question of security in any detailed analysis of the relationship between disarmament and development - security understood as a concept encompassing social, humanitarian, environmental and developmental, as well as military aspects.

The Twelve subscribed to the need to implement the Final Document of the Conference .

The reference in the Final Document to the importance of greater openness, transparency and confidence among nations to facilitate progress in both disarmament and development is very significant. This reflects a fundamental requirement. These notions are now widely accepted as indispensable elements for strengthening international peace and security. The adoption of such measures helps to prevent misperceptions and miscalculations in intentions and military

(Mr. Stephanou, Greece)

**capabilities, thus dispelling mistrust. Moreover, it is important lies in the fact that, if we seriously wish to reach the goal of reallocation of resources for development, we have to pursue it vigorously, taking into account all its aspects.**

**However, the question of International financial reallocation is only one aspect of the problem. We believe that it is an oversimplification. Disarmament measures may not automatically lead to savings, particularly in the short run. The Twelve are convinced that the world community faces a great challenge to create conditions enabling the present negative relationship of arms build-up to be turned into a positive interaction between security, disarmament and development. In showing the complexity of the relationship and the attempt to give a more comprehensive description of its dimensions, the Conference on Disarmament and Development has accomplished a valuable achievement.**

Let us hope that the progress achieved this year in the field of arms control and disarmament, and the growing awareness that **international peace and security cannot be achieved in an atmosphere that fosters an accumulation of weapons, will assist us in our task on this item.** In particular, It will enable us to focus on solving the complexity of the issues involved for the benefit of the international community and its **social and economic progress.**

The **Twelve** would be happy to see draft resolution **A/C.1/43/L.8**, submitted by Zimbabwe on behalf of the **Non-Aligned Movement**, adopted by **consensus.**

Mr. MOULTRIE (Bahamas) : I wish to introduce draft resolution A/C.1/43/L. 3, on the report of the Disarmament Commission. I do so on behalf of the following sponsors : Australia, Austria, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cameroon, Canada, China, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Federal Republic of Germany, Hungary, Jordan, Romania, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Togo and Uruguay , as well as my own country, the Bahamas.

With the exception of the first, fourth and fifth paragraphs, the preamble reflects the standard phraseology that the Commission has used over the years. In fact, the first, fourth and fifth preambular paragraphs merely incorporate developments issuing from the fifteenth special session of the General Assembly, the third special session devoted to disarmament.

In this same vein, operative paragraph 1 takes into account the fact that the Commission presented two reports: the annual report and the special report.

Operative paragraph 2 highlights the achievements made at the last session of the Commission and rightfully commends rather than notes these accomplishments.

In operative paragraph 4 the sponsors recall the role of the Commission and recognize its interdependence with the Conference on Disarmament. However , consultations are continuing on this paragraph. I am optimistic that the consultations will achieve the desired goal before the end of today.

Operative paragraphs 5 to 10 incorporate cosmetic changes updating the facts; otherwise the text remains the same as in previous years.

On behalf of the sponsors, my delegation is pleased to state that in previous years the resolutions on the report of the Disarmament Commission have always been adopted by consensus. I trust that my brief introduction will enable delegations to follow the same pattern this year.

Mr. KOTEVSKI (Yugoslavia) I have the honour, on behalf of Algeria, Bangladesh, Colombia, Cuba, Ecuador, Egypt, Ethiopia, Ghana, Indonesia, Madagascar, Morocco, Pakistan, Romania, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Tunisia, Viet Nam and Yugoslavia as well as Djibouti, the German Democratic Republic and Malaysia, which joined the group of sponsors later, to introduce draft resolution A/C.1/43/L.65 on the third special session of the General Assembly devoted to Disarmament.

At this session of the General Assembly we are in a position to consider the issue of disarmament in conditions that are quite different from those of only a year ago. They are characterized by a favourable atmosphere in overall international relations and by the progress achieved in some important fields of disarmament, particularly at the bilateral level with the signing of the Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles - the INF Treaty. That agreement is yet another proof that it is possible to achieve progress towards a solution of key issues of disarmament if there is good will and mutual trust.

At the same time the sponsors of the draft resolution are convinced, as pointed out in the preamble, that multilateral action has an increasingly important role to play in the quest for ways and means to bring about lasting security. This is all the more so since, despite the progress achieved, the general situation in the field of disarmament still falls short of the expectations of the international community and of the needs and requirements of contemporary international relations. In the opinion of the sponsors of the draft resolution it is necessary to achieve complementarity of bilateral, regional and multilateral actions, primarily through the United Nations since the Organization is the sole democratic forum within which the political orientation of world public opinion can best be expressed and which provides a unique opportunity for all members of the international community to participate in the consideration and solution of questions of disarmament that have a bearing on their security.

(Mr. Kotevek i, Yuqoalavia)

At the same time we must note with regret and concern that the third special session of the General Assembly of the United Nations devoted to disarmament failed to meet the widespread expectation of the international community that multilateral activity would continue and would be given new impetus. That is not the achievement of the sponsors only but rather the prevailing appraisal of the situation in this field as evidenced in the general debate in plenary meetings of the General Assembly, in the First Committee, and in the overall work of the General Assembly thus far.

The sponsors also considered it necessary to point out that the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament indeed reflected a historic consensus on the part of the international community that the halting and reversing of the arms race, in particular the nuclear arms race, and the achievement of genuine disarmament are tasks of primary importance and urgency.

The operative paragraphs of the draft resolution are intended to pinpoint otherwise unquestionably positive aspects and effects of the three special sessions of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament held so far; We are of the opinion that despite the fact that consensus on a final document was not achieved this year the third special session devoted to disarmament served the purpose of increasing awareness of the areas where future efforts should be concentrated and that States should work resolutely for the common cause of curbing the arms race and achieving disarmament.

We also propose that the General Assembly take note with appreciation of the numerous constructive proposals submitted by Member States at the special session aimed at advancing disarmament and increasing security. At the same time the sponsors consider that it is necessary further to strengthen the role of the United Nations and in this context they consider the special sessions of the General

(Mr. Kotevek 1, Yuqoelavia)

Assembly *very* useful and one *of* the **best ways** to **ensure** the **un** iveraal **character** of the present **process**.

In aonclueion let me point **out** that thia **draft** resolution **is the result** of broad consul **ta** tione. On behalf of the aponsor **s** I should like to **recommnd** that the First **Committae** adopt the draft resolution on the third special session **of the General** Aeaombly **devoted** to disarmament by oonseneus, **as** has been done in the **past** with all the resolution8 **concerning** the special **sessions** devoted to disarmament.

Mr. von STULPNAGEL (Federal Republic of Germany) : This afternoon **I** should like to **speak** on agenda item 67 (a), "Repot t of the Disarmament **Commission**", with **specif ic reference to guidelines** for confidence-building **measures**. **As** I can **be confident** that the concept of confidence-building **is** meeting with **growing acceptance** within the **United Nations** I will be **as brief as possible**.

Fir at, it **gives** me grea t satisfaction that this year the Disarmament Commission found itself in a position **immediately** to fulf **il** the request made **by the** General Assembly last year in its **resolution 42/39 F**, that **is** to say,

"to consider, at **i ts** 1988 **session**, the ' Draft **quidel ines for appropriate types** **Of conf idence-building measures** and for the implementation of **such** measures on a global or regional level', with a view to **f inal iz ing them in the most expeditious manner . . .**",

**as** the **operative** paraqraph of that resolution **put it**. It was in no small part **due** to the skilful mediation of this year's Chairman **of** the United **Na** tiona Disarmament **Commis** ion, Ambassador Hepburn from the Bahamas, that we were finally able to over come the **rema in ing** d ivergencies that had pets is ted in the text of the **draft qu idel Inca** since 19 86,

(Mr. von Stülpnagel, Federal  
Republic of Germany)

Although the manner in which the Disarmament Commission disposed of the task conferred upon it by last year's resolution was indeed a most expeditious one, the project of guidelines for confidence-building measures has had quite a history - and a respectable one - in the United Nations system. It was in paragraphs 24 and 93 of the Final Document of the tenth special session - the first special session devoted to disarmament - that the concept of confidence building was first recognized as an important measure in the context of arms limitation and disarmament measures. On the initiative of the Federal Republic of Germany, a study on the subject of confidence-building measures was undertaken and submitted to the General Assembly in 1981 as document A/36/474. In the following year, 1982, the General Assembly found that on the basis of this extensive information it could request the Disarmament Commission to draft a set of guidelines on confidence-building measures to be applicable on a regional and on a global scale. The drafting largely took its inspiration from the assembled body of expertise contained in the aforementioned consensus study on confidence-building measures.

Let me explain the rationale behind the consensus text of the Guidelines contained in the report of the Disarmament Commission in document A/43/42, which we ask the General Assembly to endorse by draft resolution A/C.1/43/L.49, which we introduce on behalf of the delegations of Australia, Austria, the Bahamas, Belgium, the Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cameroon, Canada, Costa Rica, Denmark, Finland, the German Democratic Republic, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom and my own delegation.

In those Guidelines, the Member States of the United Nations reaffirm the ultimate importance for measures to build confidence among States, as was recognized in the relevant paragraphs of the Final Document of the first special

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session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. Confidence-building measures are needed to strengthen international peace and security and to contribute to the development of confidence, better understanding and more stable relations between nations. They create and improve the conditions for fruitful international co-operation, thus leading to increased security through a process of disarmament measures. Their immediate objective is to reduce and, to the extent possible, to eliminate - the causes of mistrust, fear, tensions and hostilities, all of which are significant factors in the continuation of the international arms build-up in various regions, and ultimately also on a world-wide scale.

The establishment of a basis for confidence and the broadening of that basis can only be realized in a dynamic process of concrete measures taken step by step within the framework of appropriate policies and international commitments. States must at each stage be able to measure and to assess the results achieved. One of the main characteristics of confidence-building measures is that they translate universally recognized principles, such as the renunciation of the use or threat of use of force in accordance with the United Nations Charter, into reality by the application of concrete, specific and verifiable measures. The effectiveness of a concrete measure in creating confidence will increase the more it is adjusted to the specific perception of threat or the confidence-building requirements of a given situation.

Since the adoption of the Final Document, significant improvements towards more confidence building among nations have been realized. The concept of confidence building as an important instrument for the strengthening of international peace and security meets with growing acceptance among States. However, further steps towards establishing a firm confidence-building-measures network are still needed. Both the United Nations and its Member States have a

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particular responsibility in that field. The sponsors that in conjunction with my delegation submitted draft resolution A/C.1/43/L.49 therefore ask the General Assembly to endorse the Guidelines as adopted by the Disarmament Commission by consensus at its 1988 substantive session and to recommend them to all States for implementation, fully taking into account the specific political, military and other conditions prevailing in a particular region. We suggest that, on the basis of national reports, accumulating relevant experience with the implementation of the Guidelines, the Secretary-General submit a report to the General Assembly at its forty-fifth session so as to give Member States the opportunity to ponder concrete confidence-building measures suitable for their region or to assemble reports on the experience they have already gathered with the confidence-building process. As the text of the Guidelines has been agreed to by consensus, we suggest that draft resolution A/C.1/43/L.49 be adopted without a vote.

Confidence building is not a concept of measures designed merely to embellish genuine disarmament. Rather, it must precede and accompany disarmament, among other things.

Mr. JONES (Canada) : I am pleased to introduce the resolution contained in document A/C.1/43/L.32 dated 31 October 1988 and entitled "Prohibition of the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes". It is sponsored by Australia, Austria, the Bahamas, Bangladesh, Botswana, Cameroon, Denmark, Finland, Greece, Indonesia, Ireland, Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, the Philippines, Romania, Samoa, Sweden, Uruguay and Canada.

This draft resolution, which is introduced in the company of sponsors from every continent and every group of countries, makes an important statement. It is a reminder that the ban on the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes remains an important element in any progress towards nuclear disarmament.

(Mr. Jones, Canada)

We believe it to be a realistic draft resolution because it takes the position that progress towards the achievement of such a ban is related to progress towards the realization of a comprehensive test ban.

We have witnessed encouraging developments in the nuclear-testing area in recent months, developments which give new meaning to the draft resolution before us. The commencement of full-scale, stage-by-stage negotiations on nuclear testing between the United States and the USSR one year ago was an important milestone. More recently, the holding of the United States-USSR joint nuclear tests constituted a landmark for the enhancement of verification capabilities. The anticipated result is the ratification of the threshold-test-ban Treaty and the peaceful-nuclear-explosion Treaty, leading to further limitations in the size and number of tests.

I therefore urge all delegations to give their support to this draft resolution. The sponsors hope that it will continue to attract strong and broad support.

Mr. NGOUBEYOU (Cameroon) (interpretation from French) : Now that the Committee has taken up the various draft resolutions before it, we should like first to congratulate you, Sir, on behalf of the delegation of Cameroon on the wise manner in which you have conducted proceedings in this Committee and on your constant efforts since you were elected to the Chairmanship of this Committee to rationalize our work and lead it to a successful conclusion, taking into account specifically the primary role that our Organization should play in the maintenance of international peace and security. As is said in the Preamble to the Charter of the United Nations was created, inter alia, "... to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war ...". Prominent among the goals of the Organization appearing in Article 1 is the maintenance of international peace and security. To facilitate the attainment of this goal, the Charter gives the General Assembly and the Security Council specific responsibilities in the area of disarmament and arms control, particularly in Article 26 which calls for:

"... the establishment and maintenance of international peace and security with the least diversion for armaments of the world's human and economic resources ..."

It is appropriate to reconsider the role of our Organization in the area of disarmament in order to strengthen its effectiveness in that area and enhance its capacity to maintain international peace and security.

Draft resolution A/C.1/43/L.69/Rev.1, which it is my honour to introduce to the Committee on behalf of the co-sponsors for consideration and adoption, meets the concerns that I have mentioned. The draft resolution is entitled "Review of the role of the United Nations in the field of disarmament" and its co-sponsors are Australia, Bahamas, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Canada, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, Côte d'Ivoire, Ethiopia, France, Gabon, the Federal Republic

(Mr. Ngoubeyou, Cameroon)

of Germany, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Hungary, Italy, Japan, Liberia, Madagascar, Mali, Morocco, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, Peru, Senegal, Singapore, Thailand, Togo, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, and those countries which have informed the Secretary of the Committee of their co-sponsorship directly.

Draft resolution A/C.1/43/L.69/Rev.1, which my delegation has co-sponsored this year, basically repeats the ideas which appeared in the similar resolution last year which was adopted by consensus. First of all, it reaffirms that, on the one hand, a genuine and lasting peace can be established only if we ensure effective compliance with the system of collective security as set forth in the United Nations Charter and only if we speedily and substantially reduce weapons and armed forces by means of international and bilateral agreements which are reciprocal and verifiable. Secondly, under its Charter the United Nations is entrusted with the primary responsibility of maintaining international peace and security. It has primary responsibility in the area of disarmament and it should be more active in this area. Thirdly, this draft notes the part of the report of the Disarmament Commission dealing with the role of the United Nations in the area of disarmament and it takes note of the progress made at the fifteenth special session of the General Assembly on this question. Finally, the Disarmament Commission is called upon to pursue as a matter of priority at its 1989 session consideration of the role of the United Nations in the area of disarmament and to prepare and adopt if possible recommendations and firm proposals. Briefly, this is the essence of draft resolution A/C.1/43/L.69/Rev.1 which I submit to the Committee for consideration.

(Mr. Ngoubeyou, Cameroon)

I should like to thank all delegations who have supported this item in United Nations forums dealing with disarmament and who have spared no effort during the 1988 substantive session of the Disarmament Commission and the third special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. They have all contributed to our very considerable progress. I should also like to thank all delegations who have helped to improve draft: resolution A/C.1/43/L.69/Rev.1. I earnestly hope that it will be adopted by consensus in this Committee, as indeed have been all earlier drafts submitted by my delegation on this question for a number of years.

Mr. AZIKIWE (Nigeria): In my intervention this afternoon I wish to introduce, on behalf of the delegations of Argentina, Brazil, Indonesia, Nigeria, Pakistan, Romania, Sierra Leone, Sri Lanka and Syria, draft resolution A/C.1/43/L.62 on the Prohibition of the dumping of radioactive wastes for hostile purposes, which relates to agenda item 64 (k) of our agenda.

Let me make it absolutely clear that this resolution is addressed strictly to the question of disarmament and merely complements other measures being undertaken by the international community in other appropriate forums on the dumping of dangerous wastes. It is against this background that we commend resolution GC(XXXII)/Res. 490 adopted by consensus at the last General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency on the dumping of nuclear wastes. We particularly welcome the decision of the Agency to establish a Working Group of Experts with the objective of establishing an internationally agreed code of practice for international transactions involving nuclear waste.

The sponsors of the draft resolution have focused attention on the hostile use of such wastes in recognition of the fact that the Conference on Disarmament deals specifically with instruments of hostility or war, since the resolution is intended solely for action by the Conference on Disarmament in the continuing negotiations for a convention on the prohibition of radiological weapons.

(Mr. Az ik iwe, Niger ia)

I cannot but emphasize our perception, indeed our conviction, that all of us are gravely concerned over the possible hostile use of radioactive wastes. Our concern arises from the growing awareness of the harmful effects of radioactive wastes. We believe that the prohibition of the dumping of nuclear wastes for hostile purposes will be a step forward towards the achievement of a convention on radiological weapons under effective international control. Indeed, it will further strengthen confidence-building measures in view of the legitimate apprehension aroused by nuclear-waste dumping, particularly in the developing countries. Such confidence is essential to the achievement of general and complete disarmament.

The call for the prohibition of the dumping of radioactive wastes for hostile purposes is timely and consistent with the provisions of the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly on disarmament, which states, inter alia, that

“Specific agreements could be concluded on particular types of new weapons of mass destruction which may be identified“. (resolution S-10/2, para. 77)

A little over four months ago, at the third special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, a consensus was reached on paragraph 38 of the draft concluding document of that session, which urged Member States to take appropriate steps to prohibit such practices, in view of the concern expressed on the “clandestine and hostile dumping of radioactive wastes”.

The need to protect mankind from the horrors and devastation that would result from the use of such lethal wastes for hostile purposes is a compelling reason for the international community to search for means to prevent such a catastrophe in the future.

The draft resolution before the Committee addresses the legitimate concerns of all of us over the unsettling consequences of illegal dumping of nuclear wastes and

(Mr. Asikiwe, Nigeria)

expresses the resolve of all Member States to prevent such dumping. We are convinced that it is a balanced draft resolution and therefore urge that it be adopted by consensus.

Mr. CHACON (Costa Rica) (interpretation from Spanish) : At the outset I would remind the Committee of the following truism: Weapons are human inventions whose sole purpose is to kill. Hence, there are no good weapons; all weapons - absolutely all - are bad,

We wished to begin our statement today by repeating that truth. It might seem obvious, but in the dispassionate discussions and negotiations on disarmament there is a tendency to overlook this fundamental ethical aspect; there is a clear propensity to justify the existence of these deadly weapons, even by invoking the purest values of the human spirit.

We wish also to make some conceptual clarifications, in order to place in its proper context in the international arena this problem of international arms transfers. When we speak about arms transfers, we are referring to those exchanges where, in addition to trade in or the buying and selling of weapons, there is something else. These transactions often take the form of subsidies or are part of other agreements - For example, agreements that are known as "counter-trades", which very often are just ways of concealing under another name the real commercial trade in weapons. Thus, when we use this term, we are referring not only to transfers of conventional weapons but also to transfers that have to do with nuclear weapons, with new military technology and with other non-conventional arms.

Moreover, our basic assumption, which the facts increasingly bear out, is that the limits between the build-up of conventional weapons and the build-up of non-conventional weapons have practically disappeared. For a long time now it has been recognized, for example, that the proliferation of technology in the area of nuclear weapons is a serious risk to international security. In keeping with that

(Mr. Chacon, Costa Rica)

view, at least some steps have been taken to inhibit the traffic in that technological know-how. Unfortunately, the same importance has not been ascribed to the proliferation of the technology used to produce conventional weapons. Little, if anything, has been done to stop that kind of exporting. This lack of concern could, in the long run, be fatal.

The proliferation of conventional weapons poses many of the dangers posed by nuclear proliferation: a substantial increase in the collective capacity that the world has acquired to wage war and, at the same time, a reduction in the ability of the international community to restrict the use of that capacity to wage war.

We believe that, although the exporting of the technology of conventional weapons is not yet as direct a threat as the exporting of nuclear technology, it does increase the intensity of regional conflicts and helps create an environment in which a nuclear war is more feasible. For that reason alone, the proliferation of conventional weapons should be of as much concern as the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

The draft resolution that was originally sponsored by Colombia and Costa Rica and is now co-sponsored by Australia, Canada, Cameroon, Peru and Sweden, refers solely to transfers of conventional weapons because we believe that this question has not been stressed enough in international debates and decisions on disarmament. Hence, this does not mean that we have overlooked these other areas that undoubtedly have to be placed under the general heading of international arms transfers - areas that have made possible the arms build-up in that disgraceful country that we know as South Africa.

We believe that there will be time in the immediate future to consider transfers of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, as well as the technology that has made possible the production of weapons that are increasingly dangerous to mankind's future. At this time we thought it appropriate to deal

(Mr. Chacon, Costa Rica)

fully with a question in which the major responsibility is borne by the third-world countries, but we do not mean to imply by this that the great Powers have no responsibility in the matter.

Each day we become increasingly convinced that control of international arms transfer is slipping from our grasp. The number of arms suppliers has increased dangerously. Trade has to a very large extent moved to the underdeveloped countries. Wars that have broken out so frequently in the post-war world and that have taken place basically in the countries of the third world, are nurtured by weapons from countries that have all kinds of ideologies and various economic conditions and that are manipulated by many dealers acting behind the scenes.

(Mr. Chacon, Costa Rica)

Terrorism and drug trafficking have increased because of the links established with unsavory dealers in certain countries who take part with impunity in an unlawful and illegal trade in arms.

Arms transfers consume a growing proportion of the meagre resources of the poor countries and substantial amounts of money that those countries should devote to servicing an external debt that threatens to throttle their development.

If those facts, and others that I could mention, are not enough to convince everyone of the need to take decisive action on a problem that affects the international community in a particularly alarming way, there is no other way of doing so. As I said at the beginning, weapons are deadly instruments, and their destructive power dramatically heightens the political, social and economic problems related to the traffic in them.

According to reliable sources, the value of weapons imported by a number of countries in 1984 was about \$50 billion - about the same amount as the value of world exports of weapons. The figures seem to have fallen in recent years, but the total continues to be excessive. The recent fall can be explained above all by the problem of external debt and the recession in the economies of the importing countries, most of which are third-world countries, which, as is known, account for more than 75 per cent of purchases of weapons world-wide.

The volume of the international weapons trade, accounted for by 35 selling countries and 150 purchasing countries, tripled in real terms between 1963 and 1984. At the same time, in the past 25 years there has been a big change in the type of purchasers. Between 1963 and 1967 approximately 58 per cent of the volume of weapons traded went to the developing world. That trend became more pronounced in the period 1978-1982, the proportion rising to more than 80 per cent,

**(Mr. Chaoon, Costa Rica)**

Those figures should make us reflect carefully on the situation, for the following reasons. First, although they are frightening in themselves they cover only the more or less open arms transfers and do not include the trade in non-conventional weapons, sophisticated weapons technologies or the illegal, behind-the-scenes traffic. Secondly, they show how the poor countries have had to use scarce resources to finance the purchase of weapons. Here it is worth repeating what the President of the Republic of Costa Rica said in June during the special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, as follows:

"We all know that the principal problem in the arms race lies with the consumers of arms and their most faithful allies, who are generally to be found at the political extremes. But there is also a very serious problem with those who produce and finance arms. Who does not know that it is much easier to obtain credit for weapons than for the development of our country? Who in the third world does not know that when credit lines for producing or buying foodstuffs are closed, credit lines for arms purchases remain open?"

"In the history of international organizations that have tried to balance the budget and correct the balance of payments of our nations, can anyone remember a single recommendation that would reduce the importation of arms or reduce military spending? The recommendations have always been to lower expenditures on social programmes . . . , to reduce subsidies to farmers, or to fire some public employees." (A/S-15/PV. 12, pp. 26-27)

Thirdly, the figures I have given should prompt us to consider the need to establish effective controls, multinational and multilateral, at both the regional and national levels, and to seek greater transparency in international arms transfers. It is desirable to think of control over international flows of

(Mr. Chacon, Costa Rica)

weapons, because restricting that trade could reduce the danger of an escalation in third-world conflicts, which could lead at any time to military confrontation between the major Powers and in turn to nuclear confrontation.

For example, the almost unrestricted and at times completely unrestricted flow of weapons from the main military alliances to the parties involved in conflict in the Middle East have sometimes brought the super-Powers almost to military confrontation. Arms transfers have often led sellers to involve themselves in the disputes of third-world countries and consequent military intervention. Similarly, arms transfers to the third world have often involved rivalry between the super-Powers and have therefore contributed to heightening tension between them, thus worsening the international situation.

Furthermore, there is no doubt that restrictions on international arms transfers could reduce the seriousness of conflicts and help prevent outside interference in them. The potential for that is clear to us when we see what has happened in Central America, where international arms transfers have played a very negative role. We do not want to pass judgement in that case or to evaluate the sources of such transfers, but there is no doubt that wherever the transfers originate they have exacerbated conflicts which are already serious enough in some fraternal countries.

Central America would today be an area of complete peace and security if the major Powers and some lesser Powers so ready to help parties to a conflict by giving them weapons instead gave financial assistance to the whole region to promote its economic and social development.

Finally, there is no doubt that arms transfers do irreparable harm to the development processes of the underdeveloped countries. There is almost always direct harm, particularly because of the costs involved for the trade of those countries. But at the same time there is also indirect harm because of the need

(Mr. Chaaon, Costa Rica)

to build an **infrastructure** and to **train** the **troops**. **More** than 5 per cent of total third-world **imports** and about 20 per cent of all the third **world's** imports of machinery and means of transportation **consist** of weapons or materials to **produce** them. More than 20 per cent of the external debt of the **countries** of the third world originates in the **acquisition** of equipment for military **use**.

I could **advance** many more **arguments** for **regulating** and **controlling** arms **transfers**. However, **Mr. Chairman**, I do not wish further to tax your **patience** or the **patience** of the other **members** of the **Committee**. I believe that the **ideas** I have set forth **are sufficient** as a **basis** for **serious** thought about the problem of international **arms** transfers.

Mr. OGRYZKO (Ukrainian Soviet **Socialist** Republic) (interpretation from **Russian**) : I **have** the honour, on behalf of the **delegation** of Cameroon, Czechoslovakia and the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, to introduce draft **resolution** A/C.1/43/L.20, "Implementation of General Assembly resolutions in the field of **disarmament**".

It is **obvious** that real **results** in the field of **disarmament** can be achieved through the collective efforts of all States.

(Mr. Огггггг, Ukrainian SSR)

It would be **difficult** to overstate the importance of the United Nations in that field.

In the view of the **sponsors** of the draft **resolution** the role of the United Nations in the field of disarmament could be **further enhanced** if one were to **stimulate** the efforts of Member States to implement **conscientiously** the provisions of General Assembly resolutions. The main objective of this draft resolution is to draw the attention of States to the need, in their practical activities, to adhere to the stipulations of these resolutions. Only in that way can our work - the entire process of drafting, adopting and implementing resolutions - be completed. It is the sponsors' view that we should all strive to complete the full cycle because the absence of action, even on the best and most correct resolution, means that the aspirations of international society will remain unrealized.

That is why the draft resolution appeals to all Member States to treat United Nations recommendations in the field of disarmament with the respect consonant with the obligations assumed by Member States under the Charter. Operative paragraph 1 reads; "Deems it important that all Member States make every effort to facilitate the consistent implementation of General Assembly resolutions in the field of disarmament, and thus show their resolve to arrive at mutually acceptable, comprehensively verifiable and effective disarmament measures". This clause is based on paragraph 115 of the Final Document of the tenth special session of the General Assembly.

We also think it is important that Member States inform the Secretary-General, and through him each other, of the measures they have taken to implement resolutions in the field of disarmament, and of their views and proposals about ways and means to improve the state of Affairs with regard to implementing General Assembly resolutions in the field of disarmament.

(Mr. Ogryzko, Ukrainian SSR)

That is why operative paragraph 4 reads:

"Requests the Secretary-General to submit to the General Assembly at its forty-fourth session, in accordance with resolution 42/38 J, a report".

We should also like to draw attention to another point which flows logically from paragraph 4 of the operative part, and that is, that the basic purpose of this draft is to facilitate a constructive dialogue to ensure effective implementation of General Assembly resolutions in the field of disarmament. This draft is fully in keeping with clauses of the United Nations Charter concerning the recommendatory nature of United Nations resolutions. It does not change and cannot change the status of the decisions adopted.

Generally speaking, draft resolution A/C.1/43/L. 20 derives in structure and essence from resolution 42/38 J. As before, we are ready to co-operate with all delegations in working out the text of a resolution which would enjoy the maximum possible support of delegations.

Mr. van SCHAIK (Netherlands): I should like to introduce draft resolution A/C. 1/43/L.50 on the report of the Conference on Disarmament, and later in my intervention I should also like to say a few words on verification resolutions and on arms transfers resolutions.

On behalf of the sponsors of draft resolution A/C.1/43/L.50, Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Iceland, Italy, Japan, Norway and Spain, as well as my own country, I wish to introduce our draft resolution on the report of the Conference on Disarmament. The delegations that have sponsored this draft are inspired by the wish to seek consensus on this resolution. In our view it is of great importance to reach consensus, because in this way the work undertaken by the Conference can best be granted recognition. Moreover, we are of the opinion that it would be inappropriate, in a resolution on

(Mr. van Schaik, Netherlands)

the report of the Conference on Disarmament, to introduce controversial elements that have already been the subject of negotiations and on which delegations subsequently achieved consensus in Geneva, as reflected in the report.

The draft resolution that we submit is therefore of a general nature and, we hope, non-controversial and basically procedural. In response to those delegations that, as in previous years, have indicated that the General Assembly should not only endorse the report but also give a political signal, encouraging the members of the Conference to proceed with their work and, in fact, to intensify the work, we have inserted language in the draft resolution that reflects those ideas. In fact, we trust that our draft resolution contains a message that will inspire the 40 member countries of the Conference on Disarmament and, where appropriate, countries that are observers to it to continue and intensify their efforts there. In also underlining the pivotal role of the Conference in the field of disarmament for the world community, we have made a serious effort to seek common ground with delegations that in the past were reluctant to endorse a resolution of a purely procedural or stocktaking nature. However, we note that all the specific items on the agenda of the Conference are addressed in other resolutions. There is no good reason to deal with these issues in this resolution as well. Certainly, we feel it would not be correct to address issues that are clearly controversial on this occasion.

This year again another resolution on the report of the Conference on Disarmament has been introduced by the delegation of Yugoslavia, A/C.1/43/L.66, which contains controversial political signals on which agreement cannot be reached. We regret, therefore, that this year again - in contrast with, for instance, with the report on the Disarmament Commission - it is on the report of the Conference on Disarmament in particular that we run the risk that the consensus

(Mr. van Schaik, Netherlands)

reached elsewhere - in this case in Geneva - will not have its role in the General Assembly. This is contrary to the high status of the Conference on Disarmament, the single multilateral negotiating forum for global disarmament questions. We wish to urge all countries seriously to consider their position on this matter. We are open to any suggestions for the improvement of our text in so far as they might lead to the consensus we seek.

(Mr. Jan Schaik, Nether lands)

The **Nether lands** delegation has together with a number of other delegation@ eubmitted draft resolution **A/C.1/43/L. 1**, entitled "**Ver ification in all its aspects**", which was introduced by **Canada** on 3 November. In fact, toge thee with **Canada and Franoe**, the **Ne** ther lande delegation paved the way for that draft rerolu tion in the wake of a **work ing** dourment that **Canada and the Nether lands** eubmitted, in June thie year, at the begininq of the third **special session of the General Aeeembly** devoted to **disarmament**.

My Government attaohea great **importance** to the subject *of verification as such*, inaeuoh **as adequa te verif ioa tion provisions** have to be part of any armr-control and disarmament agrrement. We are **enouaged** by the **fact** that for the **past few years** there **has seemed to exist** international **consensus** that **arms-control** and diarmament agreemente should be verified effectively **so as to ensure** **suff iolent** oonf idence in oompl lance.

Draft **resolution A/C.1/43/L.1** deals in particular with a **request to the** **Secre tary-General** to under take, with the **assistance** of a group of **qualif ied governmental experts**, an in-depth **study** of the role of the United Nations in **this** field. In the formulation of **this** draft **resolution** we have tried to build on the **consensus** that in the late hour s of the **las t day of the th it d specia l session on** diaarmament **was** emerq ing on the subject. We have chosen language from a text that **was** considered then, in order to increase the chance that at its current **session** the Assembly may be able to endorse the draft **resolu tion** by **consensus**. It is up to the governmental **exper ts** to **give** their **assessments** of the **appropri ate** role of the **Uni ted Nations**. Subsequently the **Secretary-General** is asked to **submit** a **comprehensive** report to the **General Assembly**, and it is only at that moment that on the **basis** of that report Governments should **q ive** their **v iews** on the subject.

(Mr. van Sohaik, Netherlands)

Even now, we wish at this moment to draw attention to two important aspects of verification. A first aspect we must take into account is that it is up to the parties to an arms-control or disarmament agreement to determine whether and, if so, to what extent elements of the necessary verification provisions under the agreement can better be served by United Nations organs. This would apply in the first place to multilateral agreements, and also to regional or even bilateral agreements if the parties so desire. In that respect, I would also refer to what the delegation of Canada has stated on this same point.

The second aspect concerns the specificity of verification problems and techniques, depending on the types of arms to be controlled and reduced. For instance, the verification régime that is being worked out for chemical weapons under the draft convention being considered in Geneva is, apart perhaps from some general principles and underlying concepts, entirely different from the régime established under the Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles - the INF Treaty - or, for example, the Treaty of Tlatelolco. In other words, we should not lapse into hasty generalizations.

On the subject of verification another draft resolution has been introduced, as document A/C.1/43/L.2, by the six countries of the Six-Nation Initiative. We welcome the interest those countries have demonstrated, also on a high level, in the question of verification and the role the United Nations could play in this field. The draft resolution is in some respects similar to, if not identical with, our draft resolution A/C.1/43/L.1. However, in some respects we feel there is a fundamental difference between the two draft resolutions. In particular, the proponents of draft resolution A/C.1/43/L.2 have, as we see it, wished to prejudge the outcome of the study to be undertaken, by endorsing in advance the principle of a multilateral verification system within the United Nations. As is clear from my

(Mr. van Schaik, No other lands)

previous observations, we in the Netherlands are of the opinion that these matters should be addressed on a pragmatic, case-by-case basis, and not on the basis of an a priori principle that a multilateral verification system should, at any price, be the outcome of the study. We wish to underline that in our view this is not the basic idea underlying draft resolution A/C.1/43/L.1, which in fact leaves open all options to be studied.

We therefore wish to suggest that all countries make an effort to reach consensus on the basis of draft resolution A/C.1/43/L.1, thus ensuring that on that basis the expert study can be put on track. We, of course, do not wish to contest the right of countries to draw attention to their special views on the way in which verification activities should take shape within the United Nations. But we would wish to urge those countries not to put their ideas into a draft resolution that should have as its main objective the initiation of an objective, unbiased study on the subject.

I turn next to the subject of arms transfers, an issue covered in draft resolutions A/C.1/43/L.22 and L.28. The delegation of Greece, speaking on behalf of the 12 members of the European Community, made an important statement on this matter last Friday. In that statement it was indicated that the Twelve were willing to enter into a constructive discussion on the matter of arms transfers. My delegation, in fact, sees a unique chance now to make some progress for the first time in this complicated field. We even see possibilities for consensus if modest goals are set for this first step in addressing the arms-transfer issue. Any over-ambitious concept is bound to fail, and would be in nobody's interest.

We therefore sincerely hope for agreement on modest steps we can take now, preparing the ground for further measures at a later stage, when we will have reflected on the consequences of restrictions on arms transfers.

Mr. TOTH (Hungary) : I should like to make some comments on draft resolutions A/C.1/43/L.13, L.23 and L.51, relating to the question of a comprehensive nuclear-test ban.

It is the position of my Government that the elaboration of a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests is a nuclear-disarmament measure of the utmost urgency and significance. In our view, such a measure would constitute an indispensable element for the success of efforts to halt and reverse the nuclear-arms race and to prevent the expansion of existing nuclear arsenals and the spread of nuclear weapons to additional countries.

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Our conviction that the elaboration of such a treaty is a task of high priority has been repeatedly expressed, not only in our statements here and in other disarmament bodies, but in traditionally sponsoring with other socialist countries a draft resolution on the immediate cessation and prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests.

Last year, in the hope that the Committee would be able to express the general wish of the world community on that score in a single resolution, to be adopted, possibly, by consensus, my delegation, along with other sponsors, decided not to submit a separate draft, thus trying to pave the way for some much-needed progress on that matter. Notwithstanding the persistent effort undertaken by other delegations as well, a real breakthrough eluded our Committee last year. As there is no substantial evidence that progress is within easy reach even this year, it would now be only natural and legitimate to initiate again the adoption of an additional draft resolution expressing in detail the approach of yet another group of countries to the banning of nuclear-weapon tests. But we have decided not to choose that way, not to pre-empt by the proliferation of resolutions the only plausible option - that is, to narrow the differences between the different positions.

There is hardly another disarmament item on which the approaches of States and groups of States have been so elaborately voiced and the prevailing deadlock has been so unmistakably evident. A decade with no results has now elapsed since the Committee on Disarmament took up the question of a nuclear-test ban as the very first item on the agenda of its annual sessions. Those 10 years have provided ample opportunity for it to be understood that an unbridgeable gap exists between one position, that of unyielding reluctance to live up to the treaty obligation to continue negotiations on the cessation of all nuclear-test explosions, and the other position of not settling for anything less than a clear-cut commitment to the multilateral negotiation of a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty. Nearly 1,000

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plenary and informal meetings of the Conference on Disarmament have been held during those 10 years, and at least 200 of those meetings have been devoted, in one way or another, to the question of the feasibility of negotiations on a nuclear-test ban. During the last five years alone, eight official proposals on a mandate for a subsidiary body have been submitted to the Conference on Disarmament by different delegations and groups of delegations. Only the short-lived existence of a subsidiary body brought some rays of hope to this very gloomy picture. Thus, apart from the two dozen meetings held in 1982 and 1983 by the nuclear-test-ban Working Group, there have been no multilateral efforts to address in substance and depth the question of a nuclear-test ban and to search for mutually acceptable solutions to the inherent political and technical questions related to such a ban.

It is a deplorable and undeniable fact of our times that nuclear-weapon testing continues unabated. Another deplorable, yet undeniable, fact of our times is that, while nuclear-test sites are frequently noisy with underground testing, there is no real hope that disarmament experts will soon be in a position to break the long silence surrounding the negotiating table and explore through common, substantive work the possibilities of negotiating and reaching an agreement on that question. It is becoming more and more difficult to explain this dichotomy, especially if one does not ignore the fact that in the Soviet-Eastern European context even the most complicated disarmament problems have by now been addressed in substance and some seemingly insoluble problems have already been settled. To achieve that, of course, each side had to re-evaluate its earlier positions and go an extra mile in search of a mutually advantageous compromise solution; that is, sit down at the negotiating table with neither pre-conditions nor taboos.

This is the philosophy behind the approach of my delegation to the draft resolutions on the question of a comprehensive nuclear-test ban. My delegation is

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ready and will **ing** to approve the ideas contained in draft resolutions

A/C.1/43/L.13, L.23 and L.51.

We are ready to vote **positively** on draft resolution A/C.1/43/L.13 because **my** delegation considers the mandate proposal in **its** operative paragraph 5 to be a **good** basis for starting practical **work** on the item. *At* the same time, as **we** stated in the Conference on Disarmament, we naturally lend our *support* to the mandate proposal made informally by Ambassador Vejvoda of Czechoslovakia and submitted formally as document CD/863.

We are ready to vote **positively** on A/C.1/43/L.51 because my delegation can **go** along with the ideas contained therein. That **of** course **does not** affect the validity of our support for the mandate proposal in document CD/863. It goes without saying that we still advocate the setting up by the Conference on Disarmament of a special **group** of scientific experts to elaborate recommendations on the structure and functions of a system of verification and the **establishment** of an international system of global radiation safety monitoring.

We are ready to vote **positively** also on draft resolution A/C.1/43/L.23, on the amendment of the Treaty Banning Nuclear-Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water. **We** are firmly of the view that States **that** have **assumed** treaty obligations should fulfil them in **good** faith. No State and no treaty should be an exception to this basic principle of international law. States parties to the 1963 partial test-ban Treaty have a legitimate right to **initiate**, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Treaty, a conference of its **parties**. Such a conference might consider, in our view, the question of compliance with **obligations** assumed under the Treaty and **possible** measures to ensure their fulfilment. **Any** proposal **concerning** further measures, including possible amendments to the Treaty, should be in accordance with the provisions of the Treaty and should be judged on

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its own merit. In our opinion, the acceptance of any such measures or possible amendments should be based on the agreement of the States parties concerned, in order to preserve the integrity and viability of the Treaty in question.

Although there is a good chance that all three draft resolutions on a comprehensive nuclear-test ban will be adopted by a majority, the question still lingers beneath the surface whether those resolutions will bring positions closer together so as to make the ♦♦♦♦ of substantive work or negotiations on a comprehensive nuclear-test ban a not-too-distant possibility. My delegation's answer to that is that it is not certain. What is certain is that on the one hand that variation of the fulfilment of treaty obligations might in forthcoming years totally erode the delicate balance of mutual obligations and responsibilities which constitute the basis of the legal régime in the field of nuclear disarmament; and on the other hand an attitude that, a priori, puts greater emphasis on the form of the work or negotiations than on their substance might doom multilateral disarmament to total impotence for another lengthy period of time, with nuclear testing continuing unabated,

We hope that these considerations that we have put forward may contribute towards generating renewed efforts to create common ground for formulating a mandate for talks on a comprehensive test-ban treaty.

Mr. GRUNDMANN (German Democratic Republic): The delegation of the German Democratic Republic would like to put forward some ideas on confidence-building measures, under rub-item (a) of agenda item 67.

At its 129th meeting, on 19 May 1988, the Disarmament Commission adopted by consensus a set of guidelines for appropriate types of confidence-building measures and for the implementation of such measures on a global or regional level. The guidelines were recommended to the General Assembly for consideration, and can be found in the special report of the Disarmament Commission to the General Assembly at its third special session devoted to disarmament.

Like other Member States, the German Democratic Republic appreciates the work of the Disarmament Commission in finalizing the text of those guidelines, and works actively for their implementation. The agreed guidelines are of universal significance. Naturally, confidence- and security-building measures in Europe are of special value for the German Democratic Republic. It shares the view that the implementation of the measures adopted in Stockholm in 1986 has proved satisfactory and thus contributes to confidence-building in Europe.

A few days ago a meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the Warsaw Treaty States was held in Budapest, the most important result of the meeting being the presentation of a document defining out conceptual framework for the continuation of negotiations on confidence- and security-building measures in Europe.

Such measures, in our view, are a significant means of, and a stimulating factor in, promoting the reduction of the military threat and the achievement of total disarmament, as well as the strengthening of peace and stability in State-to-State relations. We consider the earliest possible conclusion of the Vienna follow-up meeting to the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) to be a matter of great urgency, because in that way a fresh impetus could

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be given to effort to invigorate positive trends in Europe and the world • large. The adoption of a balanced and substantive final document would create decisive prerequisites for the commencement of negotiations on more comprehensive confidence- and security-building measures and on ways of reducing armed forces and conventional armaments from the Atlantic to the Urals.

I am saying this because what has been achieved so far must be made irreversible through political dialogue, more confidence building and continuation of further disarmament measures. The German Democratic Republic is therefore in favour of carrying on the negotiations on confidence-building measures during the rest of this year and without delay.

What the Warsaw Treaty States have in mind is not merely to touch up the Stockholm Document but to pursue genuine steps to enhance confidence and predictability, which would facilitate the achievement of results in conventional disarmament. That is what is behind the idea of making confidence- and security-building measures substantial, militarily effective and politically binding.

Essentially, what is involved here is the search for a new generation of concrete confidence- and security-building measures, such as: the limitation of military expenditure; the reduction of independent military forces; the reduction of air and naval forces; the establishment of a centre for the reduction of the risk of war and the prevention of a surprise attack in Europe; the creation of zones of confidence and security in Europe and adjoining sea areas; and greater openness and predictability in military activities. These are the kinds of steps the German Democratic Republic would like to see.

(Mr. Grundmann, German Democratic Republic)

As regards the Stockholm Document, the German Democratic Republic is consistently complying with all obligations arising from it for my country. Experience with the Stockholm Document has shown that confidence-building measures can be implemented within short periods of time. Their politically stabilising effects may become palpable even before an agreement on the reduction of armed forces is concluded.

As is well known, we are contributing our own share to the implementation of the Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles - INF Treaty. In Vienna the German Democratic Republic is co-operating with all its might, both in the framework of the CSCE process and on a bilateral basis, in the construction of a European home where East and West do not train their weapons on each other but where peoples can live together peacefully, in good-neighbourliness and an atmosphere of trust.

We believe that there is still much scope for future efforts to build greater confidence. The German Democratic Republic feels that confidence would stand to gain in particular if, among other things, the following could be agreed upon: first, the further limitation of series of military exercises, combat-ready-alert military exercises and other military activities, in particular in the vicinity of the line of contact between the two military-political alliances; second, the establishment of strips or zones of a reduced level of armaments along the line of contact between the two military-political alliances, including the setting up of observation posts at strategically important points) third, creation of a zone of confidence and security in central Europe, including the establishment of permanent confidence-building centres; fourth, discussion and comparison of different aspects

(Mr. Grundmann, German Democratic Republic)

of the military doctrines and concepts of both military alliances and their members; fifth, dismantling of enemy images on a reciprocal basis; sixth, regular exchange of data on armed forces and their activities; seventh, exchange of information on the structure and substance of military budgets and a freeze on and reduction of military expenditure; eighth, refraining from building up armed forces and renouncing the establishment of new military bases on the territory of foreign States; ninth, development of relations between political and military representatives, including visits by defence ministers, and extension of exchange of military-diplomatic representatives and military delegations; and, tenth, creation of special operative communications links between the countries, including radio links, or hot lines, between Prague, Berlin and Bonn, inter alia, for the prevention of military incidents in central Europe.

Everybody will understand that those issues are of relevance not just to Europe; as has been stressed repeatedly in the debate we have had so far, they have a global dimension in that they have a bearing on other regions, whose specific conditions must, of course, be taken into account. My delegation believes that the entire complex of confidence- and security-building measures offers wide scope for action, at both the regional and the global level, to the United Nations disarmament bodies concerned.

Is it not time that we started thinking about what, specifically, could be done in terms of preventive diplomacy? In our view we should be seriously to consider the idea of creating a multilateral centre for the reduction of the risk of war within the United Nations framework. Of equal urgency, in our opinion, are

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practical steps leading to the implementation of the Secretary-General's proposal in his report to the forty-first session of the General Assembly for the establishment of

"a multilateral nuclear alert centre to reduce the risk of fatal misinterpretation of unintentional nuclear launchings or, in the future, the chilling possibility of isolated launchings by those who may clandestinely gain access to nuclear devices." (A/41/1, p. 10)

(Mr. Gtundmann, German  
Democratic Republic)

In this context attention should also be drawn to the USSR's idea that "thought should be given to the desirability of organizing a direct line of communication between United Nations Headquarters and the capitals of the States which are Permanent members of the Security Council, with a line to the Chairman of the Non-Aligned Movement as well." (A/42/574, p. 6)

We also support the concept that

"for the purposes of strengthening confidence and mutual understanding under United Nations auspices, a mechanism could be established for broad international monitoring of compliance with agreements on reducing international tension and limiting weapons, and of the military situation in conflict zones." (ibid.)

The United Nations can make a crucial contribution where the establishment of regional and global early-warning mechanisms is concerned, thus making its contribution to greater confidence, security and stability in the world.

The CHAIRMAN: I call on the representative of Iraq, who has asked to speak in exercise of the right of reply. I remind members that in this respect the Committee will follow the procedure that I outlined at a previous meeting.

Mr. MOHAMMAD (Iraq) (interpretation from Arabic): This morning the representative of the Federal Republic of Germany reiterated certain allegations, but neither he nor any of the few speakers who have associated themselves with such allegations could be convinced of their validity. I would remind members of the statement made by the delegation of Iraq in this Committee on 26 October 1988, in which we referred to reports from reputable international bodies which refuted such allegations.

For this reason, we believe that the position of the Federal Republic of Germany is purely political and has nothing to do with disarmament. There is a

(Mr. Mohammad, Iraq)

definite political purpose behind the allegations, and this does not help the search for consensus in the Committee. Nor does it encourage a positive atmosphere in which to deal with the problem of chemical weapons in an objective manner, unaffected by the political stance of certain States.

The CHAIRMAN: I call on the Secretary of the Committee, who wishes to make an announcement.

Mr. KHERADI (Secretary of the Committee) : I have to inform members of the Committee of the following additional sponsors of draft resolutions: A/C.1/43/L.4, Mongolia; A/C.1/43/L.22, Samoa; A/C.1/43/L.38, Democratic Yemen; A/C.1/43/L.42 and L.43, Mongolia; A/C.1/43/L.45, Malaysia; A/C.1/43/L.46, Hungary and Samoa; A/C.1/43/L.57, Malaysia; A/C.1/43/L.62, the Syrian Arab Republic and Thailand; A/C.1/43/L.63, Thailand; A/C.1/43/L.66, Malaysia; A/C.1/43/L.69/Rev.1, Hungary and Thailand.

The CHAIRMAN: In accordance with the Committee's decision taken at its 25th meeting, on 2 November, we shall begin taking decisions on the draft resolutions concerning the disarmament agenda items tomorrow, Thursday, 10 November. It is my intention to take up the various clusters one after the other. As soon as we finish taking decisions on one cluster of draft resolutions, we shall pass on to the next cluster. I shall not always be in a position to say in advance which clusters will be considered by the Committee. However, as far as possible, I shall do my utmost to inform members of the Committee as to which clusters will be considered at the following meeting.

To recapitulate, therefore, tomorrow we shall begin action on the draft resolutions in cluster 1 and, time permitting, attempt to conclude action up to cluster 3.

(The Chairman)

Subsequently, on Friday, 11 November, depending on the    completed tomorrow, it is my intention to move on to the draft resolutions in clusters 4 and 5 and to conclude rations on those clusters by the end of Friday, if possible.

The meeting rose at 5.40 P.m.