



VERBATIM RECORD OF THE 16th MEETING

Chairman: Mr. Gutierrez (Vice-Chairman) (Costa Rica)
later: Mr. BAGBENI ADEITO NZENGEYA (Chairman) (Zaire)

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Mr. Emery (United States of America)
Mrs. Bertrand (Austria)
Mr. Gumucio Granier (Bolivia)
Mr. Enjo (Cameroon)

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In the absence of the Chairman, Mr. Gutierrez (Costa Rica), Vice-Chairman,
took the Chair.

The meeting was called to order at 10.15 a.m.

AGENDA ITEMS 48 TO 69 (continued)

GENERAL DEBATE ON ALL DISARMAMENT ITEMS

Mr. AL-ALAWI (Bahrain) (interpretation from Arabic): Allow me first of all, Sir, to congratulate you on behalf of my delegation on your election to the chairmanship of the First Committee. We are confident that with your guidance the Committee's work will be

I should also like to congratulate the other members of the Bureau and to wish them every success in carrying out their responsibilities.

Disarmament and arms control are two of the most important matters dealt with in the Charter, Article 11 of which assigns them to the General Assembly for consideration. That Article stipulates that the General Assembly may consider the general principles of co-operation in the maintenance of international peace and security, including the principles governing disarmament and the regulation of armaments.

Mr. Al-Alawi, Bahrain

It would be interesting to compare the list of disarmament items on the Assembly's present agenda with the list of agenda items of which the First Committee was seized at its first session. At that time there was concern over the arms race and the role of the United Nations in bringing about general and real disarmament. It is hardly surprising that today States continue to attach great importance to those items.

The main goal of the Organization is international peace and security. Achievement of that goal has always been linked with progress in disarmament. The arms race, in all its forms, is the greatest obstacle to global international security; it creates an atmosphere in which it is difficult to realize the United Nations goals.

The arms race is an enormous threat to international peace and security. The development of military technology impedes the solution of problems of disarmament and international security. Weapons grow yearly, and are in large measure devoted to weapons of mass destruction. The amount being spent on the arms race is staggering, a figure in the neighbourhood of \$1 trillion; it exceeds the indebtedness of the developing countries.

Given the frantic arms race, there can be no confidence in international peace and security. Several countries must devote resources to armament instead of development, food, shelter and health needs. Several multilateral and bilateral treaties in the disarmament field have been concluded within the United Nations, but that has not slowed the arms race.

It is regrettable to see the escalation in the arms race, which is even being extended into outer space. Nuclear weapons are the greatest threat to mankind, and it is therefore important that a halt be put to the arms race and that every effort be made to prevent a nuclear war that would destroy civilisation after its long existence on the planet. The nuclear arms race hinders peace and efforts

(Ms. Al-Alawi, Bahrain)

to reduce international tensions. The international community must urgently undertake the measures necessary to achieve disarmament.

My country warmly welcomes the agreement in principle reached by the United States and the Soviet Union concerning the elimination of intermediate and shorter-range nuclear weapons. That is a great achievement and an encouraging step towards the goal of the total elimination of nuclear weapons. We hope that the efforts to achieve that agreement will be successful and that the two super-Powers will redouble their efforts in their negotiations at Geneva on offensive and strategic weapons.

The establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones is one of the measures the United Nations has taken in the field of disarmament. Such zones are an important element in increasing regional confidence and international peace and security. My country welcomes the initiatives of the General Assembly in this connection, in particular the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East. The Assembly has adopted several resolutions to that end, and resolution 47/48, adopted last year, urged all parties directly concerned to consider seriously taking the practical and urgent steps required to implement the proposal to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East in accordance with the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly.

The resolution also invited those countries not to develop, produce, test or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons. Israel's continued development of its nuclear capacity and its refusal to place its nuclear installations under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards constitute one of the main obstacles to the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone.

Co-operation between the South African régime and Israel in the military, technological and nuclear fields, notwithstanding United Nations decisions, is another obstacle to efforts to achieve peace and security and to limit armaments in

(Ma. Al-Alawi, Bahrain)

routhern Africa and the Middle East. That co-operation in the nuclear field poses a particular threat to stability and security in the Middle East and on the African continent. We recall the Israeli attack against the Iraqi peaceful nuclear installation, which proved Israel's contempt for attempts to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.

With regard to the Indian Ocean, my delegation supports efforts to establish a zone of peace in that area. The convening of the conference called for in that regard would enable the littoral and other countries of the region to deal at the highest political level with questions essential to their own security and independence. We hope that that conference will take place in the near future.

, Our concern over the arms race is increased by its possible extension into outer space. Outer space is the common heritage of all mankind, and it should be used solely for peaceful purposes and to benefit all countries.

We would note the positive results of the International Conference on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development held recently under the auspices of the United Nations. It emphasized the close link between disarmament and development and the negative effects of the arms race on economic development. It also focused on the need to free the resources devoted to armaments and use them for economic and social development, particularly in the developing countries. The results of that Conference were positive and emphasized the responsibility of all countries to implement and realize the goals set forth in the Final Document. International co-operation in arms limitation is still the goal of the United Nations and of the international community as a whole.

(Ms. Al-Alawi, Bahrain)

Today, we live in a world that is interdependent both economically and in terms of security. This is a challenge to which all countries must respond in close co-operation. The United Nations is the only global institution for diplomacy allowing us to find solutions to common problems. There is a need for international co-operation in intensifying efforts to establish conditions of confidence and interaction with a view to reaching agreements towards the achievement of the principal goal of the United Nations, the maintenance of International peace and security.

MC. ROSE (German Democratic Republic): My delegation would like to join the delegations that have expressed sorrow at the passing away of Ambassador Cromartie, who served his country in an outstanding manner as a representative at the Geneva Conference on Disarmament.

The German Democratic Republic associates itself with the expressions of high appreciation for the agreement in principle between the Soviet Union and the United States on the issue of medium-range missiles, with the expectation that it will generally improve conditions for further steps towards disarmament and arms limitation.

We sincerely hope that the talks which started today between Foreign Minister Shevardnadze and Secretary of State Shultz in Moscow will be very successful. The General Assembly decision adopted by consensus yesterday convincingly reflects the great interest of the entire international community in positive results.

All States are called upon to do all they can to advance the disarmament process also in its regional and global dimensions by establishing a parallel with the bilateral negotiations. That focuses attention even more on the role and effectiveness of the multilateral disarmament bodies and is particularly true of the Geneva Conference on Disarmament.

(Mr. Pogg, German Democratic Republic)

The report on this year's session of the Conference points out the considerable progress that has been made in the elaboration of the convention on the complete elimination of chemical weapons. Yet, it also makes clear how much remains to be done in order to ensure that the activities live up to the tasks.

What is especially serious is the lack of efficiency in the areas of nuclear arms limitation and disarmament and also of the prevention of an arms race in outer space. There is a prevailing opinion that today declarations or discussions without concrete orientation towards the respective aims are insufficient for fulfilling the high priority tasks of the Conference.

The current situation cannot be justified, nor does it meet the growing possibilities. The maintenance of peace through disarmament is, by its very nature, a global problem, and it affects the vital interests of all States without exception. Bilateral accords between the Soviet Union and the United States, as well as regional agreements such as envisaged, inter alia, for Europe, are of utmost importance. But they will carry their full weight only when they are no longer viewed as some sort of alternative to the multilateral endeavours aimed at world-wide solutions. It is therefore with good reason that the demand is made finally to apply the principle under which the different levels of negotiations should complement and stimulate each other. In this light, a division of labour combined with a co-ordinated approach is required.

In practically all subject areas problems have already been identified whose solutions could be tackled at the Conference simultaneously with other negotiations. The major nuclear-weapon States and the other militarily significant countries should feel obliged to participate fully in the search for understanding also within the multilateral framework. That would certainly promote bilateral negotiations too. In this connection we welcome the information given regularly by

(Mr. Hose, German Democratic Republic)

the Soviet Union about **bilateral negotiations**, since this helps to bring **more openness** into the whole **disarmament process** and overcome the **exclusive** character of certain negotiating **bodies**.

The general recognition of the important role of the **Geneva Conference** on Disarmament remains the **most essential** prerequisite for its **successful work in the spirit** of relevant United Nations **resolutions**. However, **reflection is necessary** on how to modify the **structure and the method of work** of the **Conference** in order to improve conditions for **tangible progress**. That will certainly also be a **subject** at the next United Nations **special session** devoted to **disarmament**. In **this** respect, **consideration should be given**, inter alia, to the following; **first**, whether the Conference **is**, in its **present composition**, able to meet the requirement of including all States in the **disarmament process**, and here it would be **desirable** to **devise a solution** whereby global participation is combined with an **effective** functioning of **work**; **secondly**, whether it would be in accordance with the **significance** of the **tasks** facing the Conference if it were able to work throughout the year - apart from a few **breaks**; and, **thirdly**, whether the **work of the** Conference, by **simplifying procedures**, should focus even more on **substantive** questions.

In **this** connection we welcome the proposals submitted to the Conference on Disarmament by a working group under the **guidance** of the **representative** of China, Ambassador Pan. **Those proposals** deal with the setting-up of the **subsidiary organs** of the Conference and the elaboration of the report, but the **subjects** can certainly be elaborated upon.

Yet, what is required most, now **as before**, is the political will to draw **consistently** on all the Conference's **possibilities** for **dialogue**, negotiations and agreements, and to do productive practical work regarding all items on the agenda.

(Mr. Rose, German Democratic Republic)

A comprehensive nuclear-test ban has priority. It would essentially contribute to the cessation of the arms race in the nuclear field and to the prevention of its spread to outer space. We agree with the opinion of the Secretary-General, Mr. Peres de Cuellar, in his annual report to the forty-second session of the General Assembly that the continuation of testing nuclear weapons would mitigate the value of eliminating one existing type of missile and perpetuate the arms race.

What is needed is a clear political decision. The main obstacles on the road to an accord are not of a technical nature. The unilateral moratorium of the Soviet Union on all nuclear explosions has proved that the cessation of tests would be attainable in a relatively short time.

We welcome the agreement recently reached between the USSR and the United States to start comprehensive step-by-step negotiations on the problem of nuclear-weapon tests before 1 December this year, and, at the same time, we express the hope that interim agreements will be achieved rapidly on the way towards a complete test ban.

(Mr. Rose, German Democratic Republic)

The participation of all nuclear-weapon States, indeed of all countries, is needed to make the test ban complete and general. The Geneva Conference on Disarmament should rapidly agree on the necessary organizational framework so that, simultaneously with the Soviet-American negotiations, work on a comprehensive treaty can be started. Special attention could be attached to the verification system, which would be based on a combination of national means and international measures, including on-site inspections. Last June the group of socialist States submitted to the Geneva Conference on Disarmament a document entitled "Basic provisions of a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests", which contained, inter alia, detailed suggestions for verification. The socialist States are also ready to consider constructively proposals by other States.

A suitable forum for discussing and working out recommendations concerning the structure and functions of a verification system would be provided by a special group of scientific experts within the framework of the Conference on Disarmament, as proposed by Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze on 6 August 1987, and would of course have to take into account the valuable work of the Group of seismic experts.

After four years of standstill it is high time to get things moving at the Conference. We, for our part, consider a comprehensive test ban to be more than ever a most urgent measure, while others say it could come about only at the end of a long process of phased reductions. In our view, the start of negotiations on a comprehensive test ban is the shortest way to achieve concrete results. Therefore, we are very much in favour of a negotiating mandate for a committee. Others - who, incidentally, have agreed to bilateral negotiations on that subject - still wish to evade undertaking a corresponding commitment at the Conference.

(Mr. Rose, German Democratic Republic)

At present no agreement on these conceptual issues seems to be attainable. However, a goal-oriented discussion of the principal elements of an agreement would be possible, to compare positions, seek to bring them closer together and solve practical technical problems. Efforts to that end should start without delay. Proposals on the procedural aspects have been submitted by socialist, non-aligned and Western countries. Comparison of these shows that an understanding can be reached, provided that each side meets the other halfway. For example, one should not stick to every comma in the text of a mandate submitted years ago. To advance this important issue at the Conference, this session of the United Nations General Assembly should adopt, if possible by consensus, a relevant resolution.

Under the agenda item "Prevention of an arms race in outer space" the Conference discussed relevant problems and analysed existing space law with a view to preparing negotiations. Concrete tasks must be tackled now. A good basis for that is offered by the wide-ranging proposals and ideas put forward by various countries for future global accords relating to both comprehensive solutions and specific measures, including confidence-building measures, such as an international inspectorate entrusted with extensive powers, as suggested by the Soviet Union.

The prohibition of anti-satellite weapons could constitute a major partial step. Taking into account the proposals of other countries, the German Democratic Republic and the Mongolian People's Republic submitted a document entitled "Main provisions of a treaty on the prohibition of anti-satellite weapons and on ways to ensure the immunity of space objects" at this year's session of the Geneva Conference. They believe that the safe functioning of space objects - and we have in mind all kinds of such objects - can be ensured only by renunciation of the threat or use of force against space objects; prohibition of the deliberate destruction or damaging of or interference with the normal functioning of space

(Mr. Rose, German Democratic Republic)

objects and the changing of their trajectory; and prohibition of the development, testing or deployment of anti-satellite systems and the destruction, under international control, of already existing systems.

The resolution on the prevention of an arms race in outer space to be adopted at this session of the General Assembly should call for practical action to be taken at last. The close relationship between peace on earth and in outer space in a reality of the nuclear and space age. The better the prospects for radical steps towards eliminating nuclear weapons on earth, the more unceasing and dangerous will be the deployment of arms in outer space. We share the hope that the USSR and the United States will remain committed to their objective of preventing an arms race in space and terminating the arms race on the earth. It would be contrary to that stated objective if the anti-ballistic missile Treaty were interpreted and applied in a manner inconsistent with its letter and spirit. 'The prohibition of space weapons is essential to ensure that international co-operation in the peaceful exploration of outer space can develop fully, for the benefit of all peoples, and that relevant material and intellectual resources be used exclusively for that purpose.

This year we observe the twentieth anniversary of the conclusion and entry into force of the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies. The anniversary of that international instrument, which is rightly called the magna carta of space law, should prompt all States to do everything to ensure that space remains free of weapons in the future also.

Thanks to intensified efforts by many delegations and the excellent work of the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee, Ambassador Ekeus of Sweden, remarkable progress has been made in the negotiations on a comprehensive ban on chemical

(Mr. ROSE, German Democratic Republic)

weapons. We share the view that the drafting of the convention has entered the final stage. The negotiations have been accompanied by moves towards confidence-building and openness. Outstanding examples of this are the workshop at Shikhany and the very recent proposal of the Soviet Government that even before the convention is concluded important information be exchanged and its correctness checked.

The German Democratic Republic continues to regard the establishment of a chemical-weapon-free zone in central Europe as an effective step towards the global elimination of chemical weapons. By contrast, the planned start of the production of binary weapons is detrimental to the search for understanding. The forgoing of production of those weapons would, conversely, be considered everywhere a sign of goodwill.

In the interest of the early conclusion of the negotiations on chemical weapons, efforts should focus on the following: first, seeking solutions to the few open questions of a fundamental nature, and in this context we regard it as important that the Soviet Union advocates the principle of mandatory inspections on challenge without the right of refusal; and, secondly, backing up the understanding reached so far on fundamental issues by detailed provisions on such things as the destruction of chemical-weapon stockpiles and their production facilities and guaranteeing the non-production of such weapons.

The Pugwash seminar to which the German Democratic Republic served as host in March of this year, including the visit to a large chemical plant, was aimed at promoting solutions concerning verification of the non-production of chemical weapons.

(Mr. Rott, German Democratic Republic)

Exports from 17 countries had the opportunity to get acquainted with pertinent laws and regulations as well as with practical arrangements in the German Democratic Republic in the chemical industry.

Thirdly, the conditions for negotiations should be improved further. More time should be allocated to the Committee for negotiations during and outside the sessions of the Conference on Disarmament. Its challenging tasks would even justify a permanent session until the finalization of the convention.*

By chairing a working group of the Committee, the German Democratic Republic's delegation has contributed to the results recorded by the Conference. In the future, also, it will not lack readiness to play its part.

The present session of the United Nations General Assembly can provide impetus to the negotiations if, while duly commending what has been achieved, it urges the Conference on Disarmament to finalize the text of the convention.

All efforts made to reduce and to eliminate arsenals of weapons must merge with endeavours markedly to improve political relations among States, to solve conflicts and generally to advance the process of détente.

The principles set forth in the Charter must become the natural norms of inter-State relations and must include recognition of the realities that emerged in Europe after the Second World War and mutual respect for the sovereignty and independence of States.

Mr. ZIPPORI (Israel) : On this first occasion that my delegation has addressed the Committee I should like to congratulate you, Mr. Chairman, on your election to your important office and to express our appreciation of your skill and

* The Chairman took the Chair.

(Mr. Zippori, Israel)

competent direction of these deliberations. I also wish to congratulate all the members of the Bureau.

We in Israel, like States in all other parts of the world, have been greatly encouraged by the progress made in the bilateral talks between the United States and the USSR on the total elimination of long-range and short-range intermediate missiles from the European and Asian continents. As Vice-Premier and Foreign Minister Shimon Peres stated in his address to the General Assembly on

29 September 1997:

"In a world grown cynical of the super-Powers' increased arms competition and fearful of the technologies it has unleashed, the people of Israel appreciate the readiness of the United States and the Soviet Union to begin a process of nuclear disarmament. This is not just a technical accord. It is a political dictum: no longer can we find military answers to political problems. What is necessary are political answers to the military menace."

(A/42/PV. 17, p. 19-20)

Israel supports every effort and initiative that may facilitate dialogue, a reduction of tensions and a moderation of the arms race, both globally and regionally, and affirms its readiness to enter into a dialogue with all its neighbours in order to reach agreements in this sense.

However, let me touch on three areas concerning the Middle East, which have engaged the General Assembly in recent years. As has been made clear by the unanimous reports of the experts who were dispatched to the region by the Secretary-General of the United Nations, the dispositions of the 1925 Geneva Protocol have been violated time and time again by Iraq - this despite appeals from the Secretary-General and the Security Council. Recently there has been an alarming escalation when these chemical weapons have been used against civilians. There is evidence that Iran has also used similar weapons, and Syria is reported to

(Mr. Zippori, Israel)

be building up a **serious** chemical warfare capability. While we are encouraged by the progress made in the Conference on Disarmament in drafting a new comprehensive convention for the banning of chemical weapons, the continuing use of this prohibited weapon in our region is cause for **considerable** concern,

In addition, all new chemical warfare conventions must be considered not only from a global standpoint, namely the balance between the super-powers or the major military blocs, but also in a regional setting. What is of especial concern to any country is its relations with its neighbours. Any scheme for the reduction and abolition of chemical weapons must take account of the security needs of all countries.

Even as the convention is being debated in the Conference on Disarmament, a number of States have established controls over the export of chemical precursors to countries which might avail themselves of these for the production of chemical weapons. Israel has also published a list of such chemicals for which export permits are required, and the policy of the Government of Israel is not to grant such licences for exports where there is reason to fear that they would be used for the manufacture of chemical weapons.

It is manifest that urgency should inform the deliberations of the Conference on Disarmament in order that these pernicious means of warfare can be outlawed. However, the major threat which hangs over our region is in the conventional arms race. Conventional wars have been fought in the Middle East, and the General Assembly so far has seen ample and undisguised evidence that the elimination of Israel is still the principal target of many Arab countries, even at the expense of what one would assume to be more urgent requirements. Even Iraq and Iran, locked in combat, ceaselessly proclaim the destruction of Israel to be their ultimate goal. We cannot disregard authoritative declarations. Indeed, we take them seriously. Moreover, these threats are backed up by a military potential, which

(Mr. Zippori, Israel)

exceeds that of **Israel** in every category - men and **arms** - even in the case of Syria, let alone any combination of Arab **States**. I should make **special** reference here to surface-to-surface missiles, where the disproportion **is** particularly menacing, because the Arab States can oriny **their** missiles **right** to the frontiers **Of** Israel, if they were to decide on a renewed thrust, and **Iraq** is officially reported to have **successfully** tested a **missile** with a **range** in excess of **600** kilometres.

In this context, at the last session **of** the General Assembly we stated that mutual balanced force reduction in our region is an **idea** whose time has come. I am convinced that even without solving all the outstanainy problems of our area, a basis for the building of confidence could be found were the States of our region **to** enter into serious, direct and **unfettcred** negotiations on mutually balanced force reduction. There is hardly any sense in continuing the ever-increasing **spiral** Of armaments which playue the people and States of the Middle **East**. livery component of the military balance would be included **in** these negotiations.

I urge our neighbouriny States, therefore, to think about **our** proposal to enter into free and direct negotiations in **order** to examine **the** possibilities which **exist** in the concept of a Middle **Eastern** mutually balanced force reduction. Even a serious discussion of such a possibility between the States concerned could **contribute** some of the **confidence** so badly needed.

Lastly, the General Assembly has gone along for years with the request to report on Israeli nuclear armament, and the item is inscribed on the **agenda** of this session of the General Assembly as well. Israel, of **course**, objects to so exceptional a treatment, **to** which no other State of scientific and **technical** competence is subject, and equally it objects to the insinuations which have been levelled against it in past resolutions. We shall **return** to the **subject** in greater detail when it comes up for debate. For the moment, let me only remind

(Mr. Zipori, Israel)

representatives of the authoritative • statements made by Prime Minister Shamir, speaking at the General Assembly in 1985. He said:

"we believe that the most effective and credible barrier to proliferation in 10 sensitive area as the Middle East is a freely and directly negotiated convention • establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone, based on a system of obligations binding on all States concerned. Israel stands ready to begin such negotiations without delay or preconditions." (A/40/PV.18, p. 86)

We still await the response of our neighbours.

Mr. EMERY (United States of America): Before turning to the business before us, I should like to pay a special tribute to one of our colleagues who is no longer with us. I know that all who have served with him here at the United Nations, in Vienna at the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and in Geneva at the Conference on Disarmament are saddened to learn of the recent death of Ambassador Ian Cromartie. Ambassador Cromartie was a man of great intellect and charm. He approached all issues with the disciplined mind of a scientist, while at the same time always practising the subtle art of diplomacy. His contributions to arms control and disarmament and to peace were very significant. They ranged from promoting the peaceful atom to preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons and, most recently, leading the negotiations on a comprehensive ban on chemical weapons. I would ask the delegation of the United Kingdom to convey to Ambassador Cromartie's widow and family the most sincere condolences from my delegation and of course from all others here which share the thoughts just expressed.

It is an honour and a personal pleasure for me to take part once again in the First Committee's disarmament debate. The Committee has before it some of the most vital issues of the day, issues of concern to all nations and all mankind. For its part, the United States of America views the issues of arms control and disarmament as integral parts of its national security. We therefore approach the debate and the consideration of resolutions in the Committee as very serious business indeed.

If we find a formulation unacceptable or wrong, the United States delegation will not hesitate to say so. If any other delegation does not fully understand any position that we may have taken, we are always willing to discuss the matter in question and provide the reasoning behind our conclusions. We respect the fact that in some instances other countries may view certain issues from a different perspective than we do and come to different conclusions regarding that approach and what should be done. Even when we disagree with another Member State, we

(Mr. Emery, United States)

strongly defend the right of that State to express its views freely and openly. It is through the free and open exchange of views on the important issues of the day that new ideas and possible solutions can emerge.

The business before us today is not arms control in the abstract but instead how we can use arms control to enhance the security interests of all in a manner consistent with the Charter of the United Nations.

Arms tend to reflect the existence of International tension rather than to be the cause of such tension. 'Today, as throughout modern history, the policies of aggression, territorial expansion and domination are the principal sources of Conflict and tension. Without dealing with the root causes of tension and conflict, we deal only with the rules of war - an important and legitimate topic, but hardly disarmament. The purpose of arms control is surely not to make conflict more acceptable or more likely; instead, it is to enhance security and strengthen international stability.

While arms control alone cannot solve international security problems, arms control can, under the right conditions, introduce or preserve restraint, reduce the likelihood of accidental conflict, create a stable military balance and change threatening postures or behaviour. In certain circumstances, arms control and disarmament may even be able to provide for the removal of certain categories of weapons from national arsenals. However, for such disarmament measures to provide the enhancement of security intended for all parties, it is necessary that there be adequate verification to establish a high degree of confidence that all parties are in full compliance.

If the promise of greater transparency is actually implemented and maintained among some societies that have previously been closed to outside scrutiny, there will be a double benefit to arms control. First, it will be easier to obtain information on the activities of such States that may have implications for

(Mr. Emery, United States)

arms-control obligations and will, it is hoped, facilitate the resolution of compliance questions. Secondly, greater openness can lead to a more informed debate within a society on arms-control positions and military actions. The United States is convinced that free and open public debate can help to create a positive influence on the attainment of meaningful arms limitation measures and progress in disarmament.

The United States and the Soviet Union have reached agreement in principle to conclude a treaty to eliminate all United States and Soviet intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles - that is to say, ground-launched long-range INF missiles with a range of 1,000 to 5,500 kilometres and ground-launched shorter-range INF missiles with a range of 500 to 1,000 kilometres.

The United States delegation in Geneva is committed to working intensively to resolve the remaining technical issues, including details of a comprehensive and effective verification régime. The United States hopes that the remaining technical issues will be resolved promptly. In this regard, as the Committee is aware, Secretary of State Shultz is in Moscow today working with his Soviet counterpart on these very matters.

The United States is also committed to an intensive effort to reach agreement on deep reductions in strategic offensive arms. The draft treaty presented by the United States calls for roughly a 50 per cent reduction to equal levels in United States and Soviet strategic offensive arms, carried out in a phased manner over seven years from the date that the treaty comes into force. The United States draft specifies a ceiling of 1,600 on the number of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles and a ceiling of 6,000 warheads on those delivery vehicles. To ensure strategic stability and place effective limits on the most dangerous missile systems, the draft treaty establishes, within the 6,000 warhead limit, a sub-limit of 4,800 ballistic missile warheads, of which no more than 3,300 can be on

(Mr. Emery, United States)

intercontinental ballistic **missiles (ICBM)** and of which no more than 1,650 can be On **permitted ICBM** other than **silobased** light or medium **ICBM with six or fewer** warheads.

The United States **draft** treaty **bane** mobile **ICBM because of stability and** verification concerns and **eeke** limits to codify and **sustain** a 50 per cent reduction in **the** current Soviet **throw-weight level**. **Each heavy bomber is counted** **as** one **strategic** nuclear **delivery** vehicle and each heavy bomber equipped for **gravity bombs** and **short-range** attack **missiles** would count as one warhead **in** the limit of 6,000.

The draft treaty **includes a comprehensive verification régime providing for** the exchange of data **both before** and after **arms** reduction⁸ take place, **on-site inspection** to verify the data exchange and **observe** the **elimination of weapons** and an effective on-site monitoring arrangement for facilities and **remaining** forces **following** the elimination of weapons. Non-interference **with** national technical **means** of verification is, of **course, also** required.

Since the earliest **days** of his **Administration** President **Reagan** has established as his highest priority the achievement of deep, equitable, **stabilizing** and **effectively verifiable** arms reductions **in** **United States** and **Soviet strategic** offensive forces. The Soviet side has continued to insist that an agreement on strategic **arms** reductions is contingent **upon** the resolution **of issues in** the **defence** and space pact of the Geneva talks, seeking to constrain **the United States** strategic defence **initiative** beyond the provisions **of** the anti-ballistic missile Treaty. This is unacceptable to the United States.

(Mr. Emery, United States)

President Reagan has made clear that he will not agree to measures that would kill or cripple the strategic defence initiative, a programme that holds great promise for enhancing international security, ensuring strategic stability and, ultimately, moving away from the concept of mutual assured destruction.

The time is ripe for a truly historic strategic-arms agreement. An agreement along the lines proposed by the United States would not be a win for the United States or a loss for the Soviet Union. Instead, it would be a win for both sides and a win for all mankind. I would not want to suggest that such an agreement, including the essential verification régime, is a simple undertaking. It certainly is not. Today, however, there are grounds for optimism. Soviet willingness to accept on-site verification measures as a matter of principle is a very welcome new development. If that fundamental change in position can be translated into concrete measures and provisions in various arms-control negotiations, the prospects for more than one success in the year ahead will be very much enhanced.

We should also not forget the question of nuclear proliferation. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is one of the most successful agreements to date in the field of arms control. It is often said that this Treaty has prevented the spread of nuclear weapons throughout the more than 20 years of its existence. But it is not the Treaty alone that deserves credit for the achievement. Credit must also be given to the more than 130 parties and other like-minded States that are not yet part of the Treaty. However, each year the dangers of further nuclear proliferation are underscored. The United States calls upon those States that have not yet done so to undertake a binding commitment in support of the principles of nuclear non-proliferation as reflected in the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons or an equally stringent arrangement. It is simply not acceptable to have the very significant progress in reducing

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existing nuclear weapons offset by the flagrant spread of nuclear explosive capability. The potential devastation that could occur as a result of nuclear conflict is awesome. There would be no winner in a nuclear war, and the defence posture and foreign policy of the United States has been pursued in such a way to ensure that such a war is never fought.

If nuclear war is a potential nightmare, however, conventional war is a devastating reality. Since the end of the Second World War there have been many so-called conventional wars in which millions of people have died, and such wars are, unfortunately, continuing at this very time. Does the pain of conventional war become more acceptable if it occurs in smaller doses over an extended period of time? We believe that it does not.

In the area of chemical weapons the past year has seen significant activity, along with clear evidence that we still have a great deal to do in our efforts to rid the world of this particularly cruel and inhumane form of warfare.

On the positive side, I note in particular a noticeable trend towards seriously addressing security concerns underlying negotiations and converging views in some basic areas of verification. This trend has been influenced in large part by increasing Soviet acceptance of on-site verification measures. The most recent example of this trend was the acceptance in principle by the Soviet Union this summer of a mandatory challenge inspection provision. However, the views of all 40 countries involved in the chemical-warfare negotiations must be taken into account, and all must work together to develop the concrete provisions to implement the principles of a chemical-weapons convention. We still must negotiate detailed procedures that will assure reliable verification, provide undiminished security for all States during the period of stockpile destruction, monitor non-production of chemical weapons by the civil chemical industry and deal with the risk that some

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States posing a chemical-weapons threat may not become a party to the chemical-weapons convention. In addition, the structure, operation, staffing and funding of the international body that will implement and monitor the convention has yet to be agreed upon.

We hope further progress in these talks will be facilitated by the series of visits to chemical-weapon installations now taking place. The United States welcomed the opportunity for the delegations to the Conference on Disarmament to visit the Soviet chemical-weapon and testing facility at Shikhan, and we look forward to hosting the Soviet visit to our chemical-weapons destruction facility at Tooele, Utah, next month, similar to the workshop that we hosted for representatives to the Conference on Disarmament in 1983. We hope that these visits and the subsequent discussion of issues that arise from them will help define and clarify the practical questions that must be addressed in negotiating a chemical-weapons convention.

While noting the progress that has taken place, we must also note the discouraging fact that the subject of chemical weapons is not an academic issue, but one that continues to have a brutal, inhumane reality. Chemical weapons continue to be used, and the threat from proliferation of such weapons remains urgent and real. We face what amounts to an erosion of international norms of behaviour and one that must be halted. My Government condemns any and all illegal use of chemical weapons, and we believe the Committee should continue to focus attention on this use. In particular, we support investigation, under the direction of the Secretary-General, of allegations of the use of chemical and biological weapons, and we believe that further procedures and guidelines for such investigations should be developed. We also support ongoing efforts to halt the spread of chemical weapons. The United States participates in multilateral

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discussions on this problem, and we and the Soviet Union have not bilaterally to consult on it as well, most recently in Berna earlier this month. While much has been accomplished in the last year in the area of chemical-weapons arms control, much remains to be done.

The United States delegation welcomes the positive attitude on the part of several delegations that has been expressed towards the process of confidence-building as a means of facilitating arms control. The measures adopted in Stockholm a little over a year ago closely reflect the concrete, militarily significant and verifiable measures put forward by Western States, as well as by neutral and non-aligned States, at the beginning of the Conference. Such measures, and not the well-intended declaratory proposals, can lead to increased understanding and enhanced security.

Appropriate confidence-building measures can contribute to a better political and security environment by providing a clearer picture of military activities and intentions and by reducing the likelihood of misinterpretation or miscalculation. For example, the measures adopted at the Stockholm Conference on Confidence- and Security-building Measures and Disarmament in Europe provided for prior notification of certain military activities, observation of notified military activities above a certain threshold, exchange of annual forecasts of all notifiable military activities, and on-site inspection from air or ground, or both, to verify compliance with agreed measures with no right of refusal.

These measures, if faithfully observed, will reduce the danger that unintentional conflict will occur in Europe. However, they do not address the element that is most threatening to European peace and stability: the current configuration and level of Warsaw Pact forces in Europe, particularly in the central region. The number and deployment of those Warsaw Pact forces cannot be

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justified in terms of defensive needs. If there is a serious intention to reduce tensions in Europe, then why not reduce force levels between the Warsaw Pact countries and those of countries members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), particularly forward-deployed forces in the central region, down to a level that does not threaten either side?

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In **his address** to the **second special session** of the General **Assembly** devoted to disarmament in 1982, President Reagan proposed specific **steps** for the development of a common **system** for accounting and reporting military expenditures. The United States delegation **believes that a common system** for **providing detailed** information on military expenditures in a way that would permit meaningful comparison among various countries, could provide a useful **tool** in several areas of **arms** control and disarmament. **Perhaps** the greatest immediate opportunity for the **use of such** information would be **as** a confidence-building measure in support of specific arms control agreements. Such an exchange of information, together with a mechanism for **consulting** on any questions that may **arise**, and with appropriate verification provisions, **could be** particularly important in dealing with matters of conventional **arms** control.

The United **States** delegation urges that greater attention be **given** to this important question and calls on those Member **States** who have indicated a willingness to provide **more information** on their **military expenditures** for the **first time, to do so by using** the international **system** for the **standardized** reporting of military expenditures.

In **his** statement to **this Committee** on 16 October, the representative of the Soviet **Union**, Deputy Foreign Minister Petrovsky, listed recent Soviet efforts towards openness - a direction which my Government **strongly** encourages. In that connection, he noted that a group of American **congressmen** had observed the process of an on-site calibrating experiment using non-nuclear underground explosions near **Semipalastinsk**, but then stated that

"unfortunately, there **has** been **no** reciprocal invitation to observe American nuclear **explosions**". (A/C.1/42/PV.8, p.32)

That latter remark compels me to **recall** briefly the actual **facts** regarding this particular matter.

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In seeking improved verification **measures for existing nuclear test limitations**, President Reagan **has on several occasions** extended invitations to **Soviet officials and scientists to visit our test site**. In September 1984, for example, here in the General **Assembly**, he **proposed** reciprocal visits to United States and **Soviet test sites**. That invitation was broadened the following July to offer Soviet scientists the opportunity to bring any instrumentation devices that they deemed necessary for measuring **yield** - and without the requirement for a reciprocal **visit** by a United States team to a Soviet test **site**. Again, in **March** 1996, President Reagan invited a **Soviet scientific** delegation to visit **our nuclear test site** in Nevada during April of that **year** for the purpose of monitoring a planned nuclear test and examining the so-called **CORTEX** method of estimating the **yield** of such explosions. Regrettably, **these long-standing invitations, extended** officially to the Soviet **Government**, have **yet** to receive a response from the Soviet Union.

The people of the **United States** treasure peace, as do all people of **goodwill**. **Peace is more than the absence** of war. True peace can only be enjoyed in an atmosphere of **security**, with **justice and the full range of human rights and freedoms**. Totalitarian rule is not **the choice of free men and women**. **The United States will not turn its back** on those who **currently suffer under totalitarianism**, but who yearn for freedom. **As President Reagan has declared**, the peaceful **extension of human liberty is the ultimate goal of American foreign policy**. **The best chance for the survival of mankind and the massive reduction in armaments by choice is the spread of democracy and the promotion of democratic institutions throughout the world**. In **the absence of a clear and present danger**, democracies will **not** sustain substantial military **establishment beyond that needed for their own national security**. **Democracies will rise to the challenge of aggression** - be it direct or directed at our allies and friends. **Democracies do not pose a**

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military threat to other democracies. I can think of no example in this century where a democracy has initiated a war against another democracy. This does not mean that there are no disputes among democracies, for of course there are. However, democracies respect the rule of law and seek a solution to disputes through negotiation or fair arbitration. The vision of the United States is a world where there is freedom and justice for all - peaceful resolution of conflict.

Mrs. BERTRAND (Austria): Permit me to convey to you the congratulations of the Austrian delegation upon your election as Chairman of our Committee. We are confident that under your guidance the Committee will achieve substantial results. Your Competence in the fields of disarmament and United Nations matters gives rise to the expectation that this session will continue efforts to streamline its work. My delegation attaches particular importance to those endeavours. May I also congratulate the Vice-Chairman and the Rapporteur on their election. I should like to assure the Bureau of the full support and co-operation of the Austrian delegation.

A Year ago, the day after the historic Hoykjavik meeting, Austria expressed in this room

"the hope that both sides, apparently never so close to agreement on a number of issues, will pick up at Geneva or at another summit where they left off in Reykjavik". (A/C.1/41/PV.3, p.29-30)

We note with satisfaction that our expectations, shared by the entire international community, are beginning to be met by the common efforts of the two super-Powers.

The general debate on disarmament items is taking place at a particularly favourable - even auspicious - time. We have started our deliberations a few weeks after the successful September meeting in Washington between the Secretary of State of the United States and the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the USSR. For the first time in history, the United States and the USSR agreed in principle to

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eliminate all land-based intermediate-range missiles between 500 and 5,500 kilometres. And thus a genuine reduction of weapons arsenals will be achieved. The fact that, in this particular case, parity will be achieved between the United States and the Soviet Union at zero level, and that adequate verification measures are expected to be agreed upon, is of particular and special significance to my delegation.

My delegation attaches great importance to the continuation of the talks taking place in Moscow. We hope that they will soon lead to the signing of a treaty eliminating all land-based long- and short-range intermediate nuclear weapons of the two super-Powers. Due to the overriding importance of the military potential of these two States, a mutual balance between them is a precondition for a global balance. In Austria's view, such a global balance should be realized at the lowest possible level of military forces.

The efforts now under way in Moscow should soon lead to the next summit meeting, an event from which Austria expects a new impetus to endeavours leading to substantially lower levels of nuclear armaments. However, let us not overlook that the missiles in question account for only 3 per cent of global nuclear arsenals. Ninety-seven per cent of nuclear weapons, as well as 100 per cent of all the weapons coming under the heading of conventional weapons, will be left until, at least for the time being.

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Austria therefore hopes that the **Moscow** talks will also lead to an **understanding** on how to approach the question of **substantial** reductions of strategic weapons.

Austria attaches particular importance to **disarmament** matters in the **framework** of a policy devoted to **the** maintenance of international peace and security. We have noted with particular interest that the process of **the international** disarmament debate has recently gained momentum. Austria itself follows a policy of promoting **this process** by constructive co-operation.

We are deeply concerned that **so** far no progress has been achieved to conclude a **comprehensive** nuclear test-ban treaty. The need **for** such a treaty is **becoming** **ever** more evident. Since 1945 the world **has** witnessed more than 1,500 nuclear test explosions. My delegation has on several occasions welcomed the test moratorium announced by the Soviet Union on 6 August **1985**. We regret therefore that **the moratorium, which had** been extended several times, expired last **February** and that the time for which it lasted was not used for substantial progress **in** reaching a World-wide **test** ban. Comparing the **first** seven **months of this year** with the same time-frame of 1986, we learn that nuclear-test explosions have risen from 12 to 27. This considerable increase of nuclear tests should serve as a **powerful** reminder that a comprehensive **test-ban** treaty is of the highest priority on our disarmament agenda.

In this connection, let me to refer to the Austrian Government's **public appeal** of 3 February **1987** to the Government of the **USSR** and the United States of America. In its appeal the Austrian Government expressed its **confidence** that an immediate start of negotiations and the conclusion of the comprehensive **test-ban** treaty without delay would constitute a **significant** step **in** reducing the nuclear-arms race. The Austrian Government called on the Governments of the two

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super-Powers to renounce further nuclear testing, pending the conclusion of such a treaty.

We note with satisfaction that there are however some positive signs. The agreement between the Soviet Academy of Sciences and a group of United States scientists on scientific co-operation in proving the possibilities or verification of nuclear tests can be considered a first step towards gaining the necessary expertise reliably to monitor nuclear tests. In this context, let me recall the offer of the six Heads of State or Government to establish temporary monitoring stations in the United States and the Soviet Union and on their respective territories, expressed in the Mexico Declaration adopted at Ixtapa on 7 August of last year.

The exchange of views between experts of the two Governments, scheduled for next month in Washington, will, it is to be hoped, lead to the final ratification of the two partial test-ban agreements of 1974 and 1976. Although Austria welcomes the entry into force of those agreements, they should not distract our efforts from reaching a comprehensive test-ban treaty as soon as possible.

During the last several sessions we have regularly adopted three resolutions calling for a comprehensive test-ban treaty; a further resolution introduced in 1986 called for the notification of such tests. My delegation, which was a traditional sponsor of some of those resolutions, would suggest that interested delegations spare no effort in combining their texts, wherever feasible. We shall revert to this issue at a later stage of our debate.

A matter of particular concern to my delegation is the militarization of outer space. Austria supports all efforts to prevent an arms race in outer space. We hope that the bilateral Geneva talks in this context will soon result in an understanding between the super-Powers. In OUK view, such an understanding should

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discourage the development of new types of weapons with a view to maintaining outer space for peaceful purposes.

Austria strongly urges that existing treaties be implemented in their original spirit and not be subjected to reinterpretation. The implementation of new technologies outside an agreed framework would, in our view, cause immediate countermeasures that would result in a new turn in the arms race, thus extending it into outer space.

As the nuclear disarmament process is gaining momentum, and soon to result in the first agreement to destroy a whole category of nuclear weapons, questions pertaining to the balance of conventional forces between East and West are growing in importance. Nuclear disarmament efforts should not take place in a vacuum, but should be complemented by disarmament in the conventional field. In this area the early conclusion of a convention on the production, stockpiling and destruction of chemical weapons and conventional disarmament measures at the regional level are, in my delegation's view, of the utmost importance.

We therefore note with satisfaction the progress achieved in 1987 in the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons of the Conference on Disarmament. The general recognition of the necessity of on-site inspection, the editing of lists of certain lethal and supertoxic chemicals, and confidence-building measures outside the framework of the negotiations give rise to the hope that the year 1988 will finally bring about the conclusion of a chemical-weapons convention. In this regard, Austria welcomes the recent invitation of the USSR extended to international representatives and experts on chemical weapons, including those from my own country, to visit the military facility at Shikhan.

In accordance with the Final Declaration of the Second Review Conference of the Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and

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Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on **Their Destruction**, a meeting of experts was held last April in Geneva. Austria, which had the honour to preside over the **Second Review Conference**, appreciates that the experts were able to agree by **consensus** on a number of significant **measures** designed to strengthen the Convention. My delegation will **elaborate** on this agenda item at a later stage.

The **Third Follow-up Meeting** of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE), now taking place in Vienna, has entered a **decisive** stage. Many issues of importance to European security are on the negotiating table.

We expect the Conference to decide on continuation of the negotiations on confidence and security-building measures. The success of the Stockholm Conference is evidence of the great potential of this instrument of co-operative security policy. The experience gained so far with the implementation of the Stockholm confidence and security-building measures are encouraging, but much remains to be done to improve the present measures and to elaborate new, more ambitious ones.

We also hope that the consultations in Vienna between the 23 States members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Warsaw Pact will lead to a new beginning in the area of conventional arms control aimed at higher stability at substantially lower levels. Austria has great interest in the success of those negotiations. While only the 23 alliance States will participate in them, they will certainly touch on the security interests of all European States. It is therefore of particular and special importance to us that adequate arrangements are agreed upon to ensure that the neutral and non-aligned CSCE States are kept well informed of the progress of those talks and have an opportunity to make their own views known.

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Austria attaches particular importance to disarmament initiatives at a regional or subregional level and we note a growing tendency in various areas of the world not to wait for global, but rather to concentrate on regional, initiatives. One initiative deals with conventional weapons in Central Europe, a region with the highest concentration of conventional weaponry in the world. The Austrian capital, Vienna, has for the past 15 years hosted the negotiations on the mutual reduction of forces and associated measures in Central Europe between members of NATO and the Warsaw Pact. Austria, as a permanently neutral State in Central Europe, would benefit from a successful outcome of these negotiations. We note that unfortunately, and contrary to the international climate and progress reached in other disarmament forums, the negotiations on the mutual reduction of forces and associated measures in Central Europe were not able to capitalize on these propitious developments. The European States should, however, not relieve the negotiating parties of their responsibility. Finally to reach an agreement, even of limited scope.

So far my delegation has concentrated on disarmament negotiations between the Soviet Union and the United States of America and on other disarmament initiatives taking place outside the United Nations. It is timely to recall the central role of the United Nations in this field. The United Nations has over the years established impressive machinery for channelling disarmament efforts; unfortunately, the machinery available is not utilized to its full capacity.

The Conference on Disarmament is undoubtedly the most important part of this machinery. It is the only global negotiating forum on disarmament. In 1987 the Conference was able to achieve substantial progress in the negotiations on a chemical weapons convention and in preparing the world-wide seismic network, which will be put to the test in 1988 with a view to proving that compliance with a comprehensive test-ban treaty can be adequately monitored. Austria regrets,

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however, that not all committees of the Conference on Disarmament were in a position to produce tangible results. Though Austria is only an observer to the Conference, it is actively participating in its work. The Austrian Government, in keeping with its basic belief in promoting international peace and security, will continue its efforts to become a member of the Conference on Disarmament. In this regard, the Austrian Government expresses its hope that difficulties relating to the enlargement of the Conference, already decided upon at the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament in 1982, will be settled at the latest by the third special session next year.

The Disarmament Commission is the deliberative body of the United Nations disarmament machinery. During this year's session the Commission had a total of seven substantive items on the agenda. It goes without saying that an overloaded agenda creates problems for a number of small delegations such as ours. My delegation, which has always underlined the importance of verification, notes that the Commission was able to achieve substantial progress in this area, which for the first time figured on the Commission's agenda. This, unfortunately, does not hold true of conventional disarmament, the discussion of which showed different views, corresponding to a North-South division rather than an East-West division. The item "Reduction of military budgets", which we expected to be concluded at this session, did not profit from the growing tendency towards openness. My delegation is pleased to note that the Working Group on the Review of the Role of the United Nations in the Field of Disarmament was able to come up with agreed conclusions, which should soon lead to an improvement in the methods of work, especially in our Committee.

The year 1987 also saw the first meeting of the Preparatory Commission for the third special session of the General Assembly devoted to Disarmament. We regret that this body was not able to agree on the date and length of the third special

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session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament and deferred decision thereon to the First Committee. In the view of my delegation, the most important task of the third special session devoted to Disarmament is to give new impetus to the disarmament process. While building on the Final Document of the first special session devoted to disarmament, the third special session devoted to disarmament should not look back in anger, but should rather be forward-looking. In view of the importance of the third special session devoted to disarmament, Austria would like to see that third special session take place at a high political level.

One of the most important conferences held in recent years was the International Conference on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development. Although the prospects for a successful Conference did not look bright after four sessions of the Preparatory Committee had been unable to produce a consensus draft final document, the Conference succeeded at last in recognizing the concern of the international community about the discrepancy between resources spent on armaments and resources earmarked for development. The connection between those two areas via security is no longer subject to debate. It will be the task of the United Nations further to deepen the understanding of the public of problems connected with efforts to reduce armaments expenditure and to increase funds for development.

In conclusion, our description of the United Nations disarmament machinery would be incomplete if mention were not made of the Department for Disarmament Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat. Allow me to welcome our new Under-Secretary-General for Disarmament Affairs, Mr. Akasni, whose experience in the United Nations augurs well for his new position. I should like equally to extend our thanks to the staff of the Department for Disarmament Affairs for their dedicated work.

The difficulties and impediments on the way to disarmament are inordinately great. My delegation, however, is not prepared to believe that man's intelligence

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renders him capable only of constantly inventing new means of mass deatuction without likewise conferrny upon him the capacity to take the decisions necessary for his survival.

Mr. GUMUCIO JEANIER (Bolivia) (interpretation from Spanish): On behalf of the delegation of Bolivia it is my pleasure to convey to you, Mr. Chairman, and to the other officers of the Committee my most sincere congratulations and best wishes for the success of your work. I also wish to express my delegation's satisfaction at seeing Undue-Secretary-General Akasni now devoted to the important work on disarmament in the United Nations.

Diarmament is an imperative need for which all States are responsible. With respect, however, to nuclear diarmament, responsibility lies basically with the two super-Powers, which have stated their commitment to seeking agreement to dismantle the weapons included in the zero and double-zero propoeale. All delegation8 have stated in the general debate that they welcome the agreement in principle which was announced last month on that point. Today Secretary of State George Shultz arrived in Moscow to moot with the Foreign Minister of the USSK in order to develop that agreement further. My delegation joins in the repeated calls by the international community and wishes for the success of that meeting.

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Since 1945 the United Nations has been stressing the need to establish an international system based on the Charter, which lays down principles of international security which, if implemented along with machinery for confidence-building and verification, could provide the basic elements guaranteeing a system of peace and security.

The world Organization has dedicated untold effort to the search for this confidence-building machinery. It has highlighted the political and economic problems resulting from the arms race and has drawn attention to the potential threat of underdevelopment, which has led to an awareness of the need for a new international economic and political order.

My delegation therefore considers that the efforts and progress carried out by multilateral diplomacy in the Conference on Disarmament, in various specialized bodies and in other forums provide an appropriate framework for solutions providing for peaceful coexistence among men and committing States willingly to realize the lofty purpose of disarmament.

Bolivia has lent its fullest support to all initiatives strengthening disarmament and the climate of trust that permits implementation of the policies of détente. In 1963, the President of Bolivia, Mr. Victor Paz Estenssoro, joined other far-sighted Latin American statesmen in promoting the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Latin America. Their appeal led to the Treaty of Tlatelolco and its Additional Protocols. My delegation commends all States that have become parties to the Treaty and/or its Protocols, but once again we regret that France has not yet joined them. We invite that country to do so.

Consistent with its position of principle, Bolivia is a party to the nuclear non-proliferation Treaty, and takes this opportunity to appeal to States that have not yet done so to become parties to it. Moreover, we join other delegations in

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mentioning the disappointment of non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty at the absence of a strong commitment by nuclear States parties to chapter VI of the Treaty.

In the context of Bolivia's commitment to all initiatives for peace and disarmament, my delegation reaffirms its support for the creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones throughout the planet. In particular, we support the initiative of Brazil and other countries of the region which led to the adoption by the General Assembly last year of its declaration of a zone of peace and co-operation of the South Atlantic. Similarly, my delegation supports like initiatives for the Indian Ocean, the Mediterranean and the Antarctic. Moreover, since at the time of its accession to independence Bolivia exercised sovereignty over a portion of coastline on the Pacific Ocean, my delegation reaffirms the desire of the Government of Bolivia to seek the establishment of a zone of peace and security in the South Pacific, as stated during the general debate by our Minister for Foreign Affairs and Worship, Mr. Guillermo Bedregal.

My delegation wishes also to highlight the initiative of an enlightened group of personalities from our region - in the main former Heads of State, democratically and constitutionally elected - which established the South American Commission for Peace, Regional Security and Democracy last April at Buenos Aires under the auspices of the Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation of Sweden. The Government of Bolivia wishes especially to welcome that Commission's initiative on the establishment of a zone of peace in South America and the seas surrounding it. We consider that the five elements proposed as the basis for the establishment of that zone of peace constitute a serious point of departure from which the States of South America could in the near future realize that promising initiative.

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In the same order of principle, my delegation reaffirms once again that outer space must be free of the threat of nuclear weapons and that technology should be used for the development of peoples and not for the military use of outer space.

My delegation regrets the resumption of nuclear testing) on the basis of the good will expressed in its deeds by one of the super-Powers which had suspended its tests for some time, we hope such testing will be halted. We therefore repeat our support for the adoption of an international treaty prohibiting nuclear tests.

On the subject of conventional disarmament, Bolivia wishes to express its concern At the arms race, which runs counter to the legitimate aspirations of many peoples to development and which promotes regional conflict. My delegation appeals to countries that manufacture conventional weapons to reduce, if not eliminate, their sales to third-world countries, in particular to Latin America.

In the same context, my delegation reiterates the need for multilateral negotiations to prevent the development of chemical and biological weapons. We note the recent progress in the Conference on Disarmament, although much more needs to be done to conclude work on a treaty that truly improves on the 1925 Convention. My delegation maintains that it is important for the new legislation to take into account the controls necessary to limit the production and distribution of chemical weapons by private manufacturers; not only does this take place in developed countries but these manufacturers are seeking markets in developing countries, including those of South America.

From the outset Bolivia supported the convening of the International Conference on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development, as a part of its foreign-policy tradition of backing multilateral action to solve the most important international problems besetting mankind: backwardness and poverty resulting from the unbridled arms race between the great Powers.

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The adoption of a Final Document by consensus at that Conference can be regarded as the basis for a multilateral commitment to solve the problem of the arms race through the reallocation of resources to solving the problem of underdevelopment. For small countries, the outcome of the Conference was not as encouraging as had been hoped, although we cannot deny that the plan of action could have favourable results if it is correctly implemented. In any event, the view that disarmament and development are closely related and that the well-being of mankind depends on that relationship is a conceptual breakthrough that the international community cannot ignore.

Peace is indivisible; it is challenged by the nuclear and conventional arms race. This Committee and all other multilateral disarmament forums are contributing to the affirmation of the true foundations of international law and relations among peoples: international peace and security. Bolivia, while a small State, reiterates its total commitment to the principles of the Charter and the noble purposes of this Committee: to seek disarmament as the best guarantee that international peace and security will be attained.

Mr. ENGO (Cameroon): Permit me to commence with an expression of our heartfelt condolences to our friends and colleagues in the United Kingdom delegation on the untimely passing of Ambassador Ian Cromartie, a colleague who dedicated his professional life to the quest for understanding and the resolution of disarmament issues. We ask them kindly to convey those sentiments to their Government and to the bereaved family.

(Mr. Engo, Cameroon)

The traditions of our fathers - yours and ours - do not permit of inelegant public demonstration of the satisfaction we share in seeing a brother preside over the proceedings of this important Committee. We shall spare you that predicament. However, we Pledge to you, a noble son of Zaire - a nation with which Cameroon shares a great fellowship of common concerns and faith in mutual aspirations to regional and subregional economic and social development - our fullest co-operation in the difficult task ahead. We also extend our congratulations to the other officers of the Committee.

We express our special satisfaction at seeing the dynamism of the Under-Secretary-General for Disarmament Affairs, Mr. Akaahi, in the service of the important initiatives of the United Nations in the field of disarmament. We also welcome the presence of the Secretary-General of the Conference on Disarmament, a familiar figure among us.

We opened the work of the forty-first session of the General Assembly in a continuing atmosphere of doubt, interrupted by some sense of optimism. The fact of a summit meeting between the leaders of the two supreme Powers of our time, much more than the limited success at Reykjavik, kindled a new enthusiasm for reviewing the possibilities not only for further bilateral initiatives but also for strengthening multilateralism in the quest for international peace and security.

The spirit thus generated appears to have found its way into hitherto difficult deliberations in various forums engaged in the arms-control and disarmament process. We are undertaking a critical examination of issues at the forty-second session, inspired by greater pragmatism against the background of a reasonable hope of fostering a new process - a process that could eventually provide a response to our mutual aspirations to establish permanent conditions conducive to international peace and security and to the vital component of development.

(Mr. Engo, Cameroon)

The forty-second session takes place at a time of important developments. Once again, the United States and the Soviet Union have advanced the process of disarmament with an agreement in principle, announced on 17 September 1987, relating to decisive elements of a future treaty on ground-launched intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) which would eliminate INF missiles from their respective arsenals. They have demonstrated respect for the fundamental role of the United Nations by coming here to inform the States Members of the Organization not only of the terms of a definite landmark in negotiations, but also - and perhaps more significantly - of their commitment to continue the negotiating process at various levels in Geneva and elsewhere,

In this connection, we welcome the adoption by consensus here of the decision in document A/42/669. The two nuclear giants have publicly and jointly reaffirmed their belief that the impossibility of victory in a nuclear war renders the cost of such a war prohibitive. This important development may well launch a new era that could provide the necessary leadership and reassurance and set the precedent for other nations driven to embark on the dangerous quest for a nuclear capability by circumstances and, perhaps, a false idea of national regional security.

Thus, join in warmly welcoming this historic change, even if we must do so with some circumspection. We urge that future endeavours be increasingly inspired by the common good of all mankind. The world looks forward to the day when the arms race will be replaced by a race for better standards of living in greater freedom. The Soviet leader, Gorbachev, and President Reagan must be encouraged to realize that with every step they take henceforth in the field of disarmament they will be treading the path of history. They will be judged by the extent to which they keep faith with the universal ethic of peace and security enshrined in the Charter of the Organisation.

(Mr. Engo, Cameroon)

It is in the same spirit that we recognize the encouraging results of other efforts, with their varying degrees of success, in the domain of disarmament and security. The conclusions of the Stockholm Conference on Confidence and Security Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe have provided an opportunity for the practical inspection of military activities between nations, something that could not have been imagined at the beginning of this decade.

It is of particular relevance to us that both the Stockholm accord and the subsequent efforts in Vienna have demonstrated the value of exploiting every opportunity, especially the most appropriate, for working out practical and durable arrangements among States, Stockholm for the European region and Vienna for the States of Eastern and Western Europe provided the opportunity for examining and addressing specific problems as part of the global enterprise.

The hope of peace and arms restraint in recent times has taken root in regional initiatives. The Stockholm conclusions and prescriptions will continue to inspire similar efforts in other regions. There are positive signals from Central America, where the efforts of President Oscar Arias Sanchez of Costa Rica, who was recently awarded the Nobel Peace Prize, and other Latin American leaders have set the stage for the resolution of conflicts, thus enhancing mutual confidence and trust as well as promoting prospects for peace and co-operation among States in that subregion.

It is clear to us that relevant problems can be dealt with more easily within the appropriate regional and subregional context, taking into account the specific conditions existing in the region or subregion concerned. States located in the same subregion or region, often sharing common historical and fraternal bonds, are better placed to identify their concerns and interests and to formulate a plan or strategy for promoting peace and security in their area. A regional approach is

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or a component of a step-by-step effort towards the ultimate goal of general, global arms control and disarmament.

We can also look back with some satisfaction to other recent negotiating endeavours. These include the report submitted by the Presidents of the 40-member Conference on Disarmament, the constructive efforts and productivity of the United Nations Disarmament Commission and the adoption of an agenda for the third special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. All these point to a prevailing mood in favour of progress towards arms control, disarmament and security and the imperative need for increased levels of confidence among States.

Heralds of progress are always welcome but we must guard against misguided optimism. We need to take every available opportunity to maintain the current momentum. We should like to mention in passing that the current trend towards indiscriminately curtailing the duration of important conferences must be arrested. The widening of an emergency consensus at the United Nations Disarmament Commission, for instance, was hampered by dogmatic adherence to the positions of an unnecessary panic regarding the induced economic crisis of the Organization. We strongly recommend a reversal of this trend as far as critical negotiations are concerned.

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It would appear imperative that we recognize the limited nature of the U0030888 outlined here. The agreement between the United States of America and the Soviet Union may herald great times ahead. They most certainly do not pretend to represent the resolution of the complex issues which remain far away from treaties and common perspectives. The two nations have barely begun the real process of lasting East-West détente and confidence-building. Delicate negotiations lie ahead, as United States Ambassador Herbert Okun revealed to us last week. The issues are complex and very diverse in scope.

The process of eliminating nuclear weapons has yet to begin, and, without belittling their potency, we bear in mind that the present agreements relate to missiles that are becoming comparatively anachronistic.

These arguments are not likely to popularize the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) nor to induce an avalanche of favourable national reaction among other nuclear States, some of which hold onto weapons in an attempt to maintain visible capability and deterrence. Practically all must maintain credibility with their own population regarding their capacity for self-defence, national security and prestige. Others still, engaged in a profitable trade in arms, may be expected to offer continuing resistance.

Thus the present climate must be such as to reject complacency on our part and to gear us all to greater effort. A unity of purpose may well be established by these events, but we must never lose sight of the truth that human nature has never guaranteed instincts for peace. They must be induced by the knowledge of the consequences if man's finest ideals are to be realized.

Yet another product of the current atmosphere appears to be the final Document, including the action programme, adopted at the epoch-making United Nations International Conference on the Relationship between Disarmament and

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Development. Our preliminary views are reflected in document A/CONF.130/37. The Cameroon delegation welcomes the results of the Conference, notwithstanding the disappointments.

We do wish, however, to emphasize that problems of various regions are not necessarily the same. It is worse to attempt to categorize States as if development and security issues were identical in all of them. We would draw concerned attention to the truth that in the African region, at least, security is as such not at the top of the list of problems. It may be generally true that security is an imperative for development. It is more true to say that on our continent there is no security as long as the nations are plagued by conditions of underdevelopment.

It is clearly unproductive to insist on discussing peace and security without first addressing the oppressive issues of hunger, poverty, disease, environment and crippling external forces that undermine and preoccupy our internal efforts. I do not wish to speak at length on this matter because the Minister for Foreign Affairs of my country has clearly outlined this in the General Assembly.

It is in a young nation that the sense of false security most thrives. The economic lesson that seems to have eluded many leaders in the industrialized countries, namely that power must always be defined in terms of the possession of sometimes unusable weapons, continues to elude many third-world countries as well. A devastating economic crisis on a global scale comes as a teacher to demonstrate the evil effects of armaments on economic development.

For the first time, both industrialized and developing countries have solemnly declared a universal recognition of the close relationship between disarmament and development. We believe that the Final Document represents a major victory for our universal commitment to multilateralism and for the highest aspiration of the United Nations system to provide a haven for the harmonizing of the actions of

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States. The Final Document forcefully provides for and declares our joint effort and desire to enhance and strengthen the commitment of the international community to disarmament as well as to development, giving impetus to renewed efforts in both fields.

We wish to draw attention to the action programme in paragraph 35 of the Final Document, which outlines specific actions and modalities that would require States to Pursue new policy decisions. In other areas within the purview of the Secretary-General and the United Nations system it calls for measures to be implemented. In order to strengthen the capacity of our Organization to discharge our responsibilities we strongly urge that sufficient resources be made available, without prejudice to the ongoing administrative and financial reforms. Some of these programmes are far more important to the system than merely administrative changes in a major organization such as this.

We would also like to take this opportunity to put on record our appreciation of the important role played by the Department for Disarmament Affairs in the preparatory work for the Conference and at the Conference itself. We trust that the Department for Disarmament Affairs will continue to play that role in the effective implementation of the action programme, especially in the areas addressed to the United Nations system.

At its second series of meetings, the Preparatory Committee for the third special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament adopted its agenda (A/42/46). My delegation regards the Final Document of the first special session as a landmark statement. It affirmed that the United Nations can and should play a vital role in the field of arms control and disarmament. Bearing in mind that the outcome of the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament was a disappointment to most delegations, the Cameroon delegation's goal for the Preparatory Committee and the third special session would be based on

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an obtainable international climate which, we believe, must be supportive. The Preparations for it must be balanced, pragmatic and realistic. The prime objective, therefore, would be to develop an international consensus. As a deliberative body the United Nations offers a unique perspective to disarmament issues, to the extent that it can speak in harmonizing opinion. In that light the Cameroon delegation would urge that all future deliberations give due attention to the problems encountered at the second special session devoted to disarmament to ensure that we do not repeat the mistake made there.

The 1987 substantive session of the United Nations Disarmament Commission, in my delegation's view, exhibited a tendency towards consensus, compromise and accommodation.

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The continued appearance of the item dealing with South Africa's nuclear capability reflects legitimate and widespread international concern. Cameroon's consistent opposition to the racist apartheid policies of the South African régime is well known. We do not wish to restate it here. South Africa's failure to reassure the international community of its peaceful nuclear intentions by full adherence to the International Non-Proliferation Treaty continues to be cause for anxiety and must be remedied. My delegation wishes to express its appreciation to Mr. Juan Fischer of Uruguay, Chairman of Working Group I, and all participants representing the various points of view expressed in the Working Group for the prudence and pragmatism they exercised in the adopted consensus paragraphs in their report (A/42/42).

We live in dangerous times, condemned - more than at any moment in history - to coexist peacefully or perish together senselessly, unable to resist the compulsions of this century's technological age. It is perhaps too simplistic to place the blame merely on the inadequacy of political will on the part of Governments, or to diagnose the absence of a sound universal attitude towards this Organisation - an Organization established to foster what may now be regarded as an ancestral ethic for employing its international machinery to promote the economic and social development of all peoples.

It would appear that the excuses and explanations popularly postulated are mere impish manifestations of a deep-rooted crisis of the inner spirit, a crisis indeed of the subjugation of the universal conscience. Morality commonly held by the great cultures of the world appears to be contentedly flouted, eroding confidence among States in international relations.

The practice of tolerance, peaceful coexistence and good-neighbourliness were noble attributes recognized and prescribed by the founding fathers of this Organization. They are fundamental for safeguarding the great imaginations of a

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generation humbled, bullied and tamed by the horrors of global conflict and warfare. It may well be safe to conclude that without this frame of mind, the political and psychological contradictions of our contemporary world will persist, starving our endeavours of desperately needed political will, chilling the zeal to unite human strength to build and to maintain conditions of lasting international peace, nourishing a generalized misguided sense of security deriving from the notion that security can be guaranteed only by the possession of the most dangerous weaponry, inducing illusions of the ultimate gratification of ethical definitions of peace in terms of the absence of armed conflict among the powerful nations of the time.

The United Nations may, in its General Assembly, present the facade of a forum for unproductive debate to the uninspired. If it were established for that purpose, then at least it provides a means for releasing the internal tensions and frustrations of States - frustrations which, unexpressed, may explode with dangerous consequences.

The time has come when an awareness of a common destiny on this planet should lead us out of the wilderness of inconclusive debates and stimulate a new quest for concrete and practical solutions to the problems which continue to nag our so-called enlightened generation. We here can begin by demonstrating that we are clearly aware of the nature and scope of the issues we place on the deliberative list, that we recognize the ultimate major issues to which subjectivity blinds us and that we are determined to encourage our respective Governments to embrace disarmament as a desperate instrument of peace, security and development on our planet. Let us take advantage of this atmosphere to launch a new beginning.

The meeting rose at 12.25 p.m.