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**SUMMARY RECORD OF THE 28th MEETING**

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later: Mr. AOKI (Japan)

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The meeting was called to order at 3.25 p.m.

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STATEMENTS ON SPECIFIC DISARMAMENT ITEMS AND CONTINUATION OF THE GENERAL DEBATE

The CHAIRMAN : Before calling on the first speaker in the debate this afternoon, I invite the Under-Secretary-General for Disarmament Affairs, Mr. Jan Martenson, to make a statement.

Mr. MARTENSON (Under-Secretary-General for Disarmament Affairs) : On 29 October 1986 the representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, speaking on behalf of the 12 States members of the European Community, stated that it would be valuable if the Secretary-General could inform the First Committee of the efforts that have been made concerning Mr. Liviu Bota, Director of the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR), and of the present situation.

I have been authorised by the Secretary-General to present the following summary in response to that request, in addition to the information contained in document A/C.5/41/12, which is before the Fifth Committee:

Since January the matter has been continuously pursued with the Romanian authorities. Those efforts have included communications from the Secretary-General to the Romanian Government at the highest levels and also through the medium of personal consultations with the Permanent Representative of Romania to the United Nations. Early in 1986 the Secretary-General designated a special envoy to visit Bucharest to resolve the difficulties, but, despite repeated efforts, the visit did not take place.

In recent weeks the Secretary-General discussed the matter personally with His Excellency Mr. Ioan Totu, Foreign Minister of Romania, during Mr. Totu's visit to New York to attend the current session of the General Assembly.

(Mr. Martenson)

On 12 March, the Permanent Representative of Romania informed the Secretary-General that Mr. Bota had **resigned his** post at the United Nations. on 13 March the Secretary-General **sent** a cable to the Foreign Minister of Romania, **asking** that Mr. Bota submit **his** resignation in **person**, in accordance with staff rule 109.2 (c), which reads as follows

“The Secretary-General may **require** the resignation to be submitted in person in order to be acceptable”.

On 18 March, Mr. **Bota's** letter of resignation **was** received in New York through the United Nations Development Programme (UNDO) **resident** representative in Bucharest. On 26 March, the Secretary-General received a note **verbale** from the Permanent Representative of Romania stating again that Mr. **Bota** had submitted his resignation and that Mr. Bota had just been named a Director in the Ministry of External Affairs, in charge of co-ordinating general international questions. In mid-April, the Secretary-General **emphasized** in a note **verbale** to the **Romanian** Mission that the presence of the Director of UNIDIR was needed at the session of the Board of Trustees to be held in **May**, and that that session would also provide an occasion for Mr. **Bota** to submit his resignation in **person**.

Mr. Bota was not present at the Board of Trustees **session** in early May, although he sent a cable expressing his regret at his inability to attend for reasons which could be explained by the **Romanian** authorities. The cable was signed “**Liviu Bota, Director, UNIDIR**”. On 9 May, the Chairman of the Board of Trustees of UNIDIR sent a letter to the Secretary-General in which it **was** stated that the absence of the Director for **over four months** had placed great strain on the Institute's viability, on the Deputy Director and on **its** very small staff. The Chairman noted that the wish had been voiced **within** the Board for greater

(Mr. Martenson)

clarification of the circumstances surrounding the absence of Mr. Bota and that deep concern had been expressed at the resulting impairment of the Institute's functioning. The Chairman urged the Secretary-General to bring the Board's views to the attention of the Romanian Government authorities at the highest level, with a view to resolving the difficult situation. The Secretary-General took prompt action on the Chairman's request by immediately passing the content of the Chairman's letter to the Romanian authorities.

On 25 June, the Secretary-General addressed a further note verbale to the Permanent Representative of Romania to the United Nations, drawing attention to the fact that there had been no official response to earlier cables, and expressing his conviction that the case could be resolved satisfactorily in conformity with the staff rules, which covered the conditions of Mr. Bota's service with the Organization.

The Board of Trustees of UNIDIR met again in late September and again discussed the continued absence of the Director of UNIDIR and its effects on the functioning of the Institute. During the discussion, a cable from MK. Bota, sent on 23 September, was read out to the Board. In that cable, Mr. Bota stated that he was being prevented by the Romanian authorities from travelling to Geneva to exercise his functions as Director of UNIDIR and also was not allowed to travel to New York to attend the meeting of the Board, of which he was a member.

On 26 September, the Chairman of the Board of Trustees sent a further letter to the Secretary-General, in which he emphasized that the primary charge of the Board was that of ensuring the effective functioning and financial health of the Institute in order that it might achieve the purposes assigned to it by the General Assembly. He observed that the physical absence of the Director had had grave

(Mr. Martenson)

effects on the work and functioning of the Institute. Noting that the Secretary-General intended to raise the matter personally with His Excellency MK. Ioan Totu, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Romania, on behalf of the Board the Chairman requested that the Board's deep concern be brought to the attention of Mr. Totu, together with an appeal for a solution to be found that would enable the Institute to function effectively in response to its mandate from the General Assembly while at the same time protecting the interests of all concerned.

(Mr. Martenson)

The Secretary-General discussed the matter personally with Mr. Ioan Totu on 30 September. It was agreed to keep the question under discussion.

On 28 October, in another note ~~verbale~~ to the Permanent Representative of Romania, the Secretary-General urged that the appropriate authorities be requested to provide him with an early reply that would permit a positive solution to the present difficulties.

At the meeting with the Secretary-General requested by the Permanent Representative, which was held today, the matter was further discussed. The Secretary-General is at present waiting to hear from the Romanian Government authorities and continues to hope for a prompt solution to these regrettable difficulties.

Mr. MARINESCU (Romania) (interpretation from French) : In listening to the response just given by the representative of the Secretary-General, which was largely a repetition of what delegations have already had an opportunity to read in the two reports which have been available to them for some weeks now - I refer to the Secretary-General's report on the matter we are at present discussing, and his report on the problem, entitled "Respect for the privileges and immunities of the officials of the United Nations and the specialised agencies and related organizations". In this connection, I most respectfully ask the representative of the Secretary-General to be kind enough to give us some supplementary information.

Would he please tell us, first, whether, from the point of view of the Secretariat, the proper place for consideration of such administrative and personnel questions is, in fact, the First Committee. I should like to hear the Under-Secretary-General's view, bearing in mind the specific agenda which has been established for some time now for the First Committee, which should devote all its

(Mr. Marinescu, Romania)

attention to the serious present-day **problems** of disarmament and international security, because of a long-established tradition and the urgent need, **recognized** by all, for disarmament **bodies**, in particular the First Committee, to make their contribution towards a solution to these important matters of **concern** to everybody. Thus, my first question is, what is the appropriate place for administrative and personnel question6 of this nature to be discussed?

My second question, **which** is closely linked to the first and to everything that Mr. Martenon has said here, is **this**: is it possible, from the Secretariat's point of view, for one and the **same** question to be discussed in two different Committees of the General Assembly?

The first report I have referred (A/41/666) was distributed on 6 October 1986, and the **second** document (A/C.5/41/12), dated 10 October, deal, apart from **some** minor, insignificant details, with one and **the same** question, **sometimes with** identical wording. My question is, therefore, is it really possible, from the Point of view of the Secretariat, **for** one and the same matter to be discussed in two different Committees at the same time? Perhaps there is even a third document. with which I am not **familiar**; I do not exclude the possibility that there may be a third, or **perhaps** even a fourth document. Perhaps the Committees of the General Aesembly, lacking sufficient items to deal with and have to be fed additional items and have resorted to this particular formula in order to discuss **certain** matters in which they are interested, but which have nothing to **do** with the items on their agenda, or the **organization** of work established at the beginning of each session.

Mr. MARTENSON (Under-Secretary-General for Disarmament **Affairs**): The Representative of Romania, Mr. Marinescu, has asked whether these issues should be discussed in this Committee. I should like to simplify my response in the sense that I am speaking, **as** authorized by the Secretary-General of the Organisation, in

(Mr. Martenson)

direct response to a question put to him by 12 Member States of the United Nations. I think, with all due respect, that it would be inappropriate for the Secretary-General not to reply to such a question. That is the reason for my statement. I understood also that the question arose from the points on the agenda of this Committee covering the Advisory Board and the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research.

Mr. BUTLER (Australia) : The subject that has been raised this afternoon is an important one. The Under-Secretary-General has just referred to the obligations of the Secretariat. My delegation is aware of the terms of rule 112 of the rules of procedure of the General Assembly, which allow, and indeed require, the Secretary-General or his representative to respond to questions put to him by representatives of Member States.

The Under-Secretary-General has given us a response this afternoon to a question put to him two days ago. To be quite direct about it, had he not done so, or been permitted to do so, this afternoon, that would have been a matter of grave concern to my delegation. The response he has given is valuable, because it represents a factual account of a situation that is of serious concern to a number of Member States.

Our concern rests fundamentally upon our interest in the work of the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR), which is a subject on the agenda of this Committee and on which a draft resolution has been submitted. In that sense, I cannot share the view of, or the sense of the question that has been put by, the representative of Romania, who has sought to pass this off as merely a matter of personnel or administration. The works, affairs and activities of UNIDIR do register on the agenda of this Committee and are a matter of interest and concern to a number of us that sit in this Committee.



(Hr. Butler, Australia)

In those circumstances it is entirely appropriate that where it has been made clear that the affairs of the Institute are being conducted now in the absence of its Director and where it has been made clear that that has harmed the affairs of that Institute, it is clearly a question of concern to this Committee and one which cannot and should not be passed off as merely a matter of so-called personnel and administration. One indeed may well ask the question to whose personnel administration is reference being made?

The report that was given by the Under-Secretary-General constituted the first full public account of events that have taken place in a period of almost one year now. It was objective, clear and valuable. In those circumstances I ask that it be made available to this Committee in full at the earliest possible moment.

I know that there are some difficulties with regard to documentation these days, for the good reason that our Organisation has financial problems and that this statement would, in the normal course of events, appear in the verbatim record of the Committee. Normally, those records take some time to appear. Given that there is, inter alia, a draft resolution submitted to the Committee on this subject, it seems to me that it would be quite wrong if this report were to be slow in its appearance in full, and certainly if it were not to be available prior to action on that draft resolution.

In these circumstances I feel bound to ask that the Secretariat find a solution to this problem either by making this report available as a document or circulating it to the Committee in an informal way without delay, or by arranging that the verbatim record in which it will appear be advanced in its production and brought forward to the Committee at the earliest possible date.

Mr. LUNDBO (Norway): I would fully endorse the points -

The CHAIRMAN: I call on the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on a point of order.

Mr. ISSRAELIAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (interpretation from Russian): Mr. Chairman, I should like to ask what we are discussing today. Yesterday it was stated that we would be continuing statements on specific items on the agenda of the First Committee and the general debate. Furthermore a list of speakers was read out, which included the Soviet delegation. Now, unexpectedly, for reasons which we do not understand, there has been a statement by Mr. Martenson, which could have been made later. There was nothing urgent or extraordinary in his statement. Out of simple respect for the Under-Secretary-General we did not protest against that extraordinary statement. But now I see that a whole discussion is ensuing on matters which are not in today's agenda. Therefore, I wish to make now the statement which I have prepared in accordance with the programme announced yesterday. Please permit me to make my statement.

The CHAIRMAN: I fully share the concern expressed by the representative of the Soviet Union in his point of order, because the Committee has to listen to 11 speakers at this afternoon's meeting. Therefore it is my intention not to prolong the discussion on this matter. I just want to call on the representative of Norway, who is inscribed on the list of speakers, and after his statement the representative of Romania has asked to speak. I will permit him to speak on this subject, and then I intend to call immediately on the representative of the Soviet Union.

I call on the representative of Poland on a point of order.

Mr. PAWLAK (Poland) : I should like to propose that the statement of the representative of Norway and others on the subject arising from the information given to us by the Under-Secretary-General be postponed until after the discussion of the item on our agenda.

The CHAIRMAN: I should like to inform the committee that the representative of Norway ~~is not insisting on speaking~~ at this time. I would ask the representative of Romania if he insists on speaking at this time. If not, then we can hear him after we hear the ~~statements~~ to be made in the Committee. I should like to request all delegations to concentrate on substantive ~~questions~~ which concern all mankind and are to be dealt with as agenda items. In this connection I would point out ~~that~~ the content of this question is considered ~~in~~ another Main Committee of the forty-first ~~session~~ of the General Assembly.

If there are no objections we shall now ~~continue~~ the general debate and consideration of specific disarmament items.

Mr. ISSRAELYAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (interpretation from Russian): Mr. Chairman -

The CHAIRMAN: The representative of Australia wishes to ~~speak~~ on a point of order. I hope it is a point of order on this substantive matter which is ~~before~~ the First Committee.

Mr. BUTLER (Australia): My point of order is that in the statement I made a few moments ago I posed a ~~question~~ to the Secretariat about the early distribution of the ~~statement~~ that was made by the representative of the Secretary-General. No answer ~~was~~ given. It is a valid point of order to ask that an answer be given to the ~~quest~~ ion I posed, which, may I say was in fact on a substantive matter.

The CHAIRMAN: I call on the Secretary of the Committee.

Mr. KHERADI (Secretary of the Committee): I wish to point out that the ~~statement~~ made by the representative of Australia, Ambassador Butler, ~~was~~ noted by the Secretariat. He proposed various alternatives, and, as he very correctly said, there are verbatim records of these meetings which are available in the normal course of our proceedings. As regards this particular meeting I can assure him

(Mr. Khsradi)

that I will do everything possible to expedite the production of the record. This was my intention and since he made a statement, as I understood it, rather than a query, I simply took note of it. I once again assure him that everything possible will be done to issue the verbatim record as expeditiously as possible.

In addition, of course, if an informal paper containing what was read out by the Under-Secretary-General, Mr. Martenson is required after the meeting, there will be no problem. I assure it can be made available, but informally only.

The CHAIRMAN: We shall hear the statement devoted to specific agenda items and continuation of the general debate.

Mr. ISSRAELIAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (interpretation from Russian) : YOU called on me, Mr. Chairman, and I was interrupted for no reason by the representative of Australia. I shall continue from the point at which I was interrupted, in the hope that the representative of Australia will not interrupt me again, although it is certainly to be expected of him.

The problem of ending and banning nuclear-weapon tests has for many years been one of the most important subjects of debate in the First Committee during the sessions of the General Assembly. This year's debate proves convincingly that solving the problem is becoming a matter of particular urgency.

The Soviet Union has always strongly advocated, and it continues to advocate, the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests and the opening of full-scale talks on the issue.

In Mikhail Gorbachev's reply to the letter from the leaders of six countries he stated:

"There is today no task more immediate and important than ending all nuclear testing. We associate this step with the beginning of movement down the road leading to a nuclear-weapon-free world".

The prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests is an important, self-contained disarmament measure. We believe that the nuclear States could address the issue now, without waiting for the outcome of the talks under way on other aspects of the arms race. Thus the way would be cleared for creating a nuclear-free world in the shortest possible time. A ban on nuclear-weapon tests would become a prelude to other, no less weighty and specific actions aimed at eliminating the threat of nuclear war.

Furthermore, it is becoming increasingly clear that a breakthrough along these lines would help undo the already tight knot, which is being further tightened, at the Soviet-United States talks in Geneva, for ending the tests would be a very

(Mr. Israelyan, USSR)

effective step towards ending and curtailing the nuclear arms race on Earth and, to a significant extent, preventing an arms race in outer space.

Banning nuclear testing is also particularly urgent because, as a result of the unilateral moratorium on all nuclear explosions declared by the Soviet Union from 6 August 1985, there has emerged an entirely new situation favourable to an early solution of this problem.

Why is the world community giving so much attention today to the moratorium on nuclear explosions? There are many reasons. But the main one is that if the United States joined in the Soviet moratorium - and the latest extension of the moratorium gives the United States one more chance, it could even be said a unique chance - a serious and responsible step would be taken towards stopping the improvement and stockpiling of these most destructive weapons. To miss the opportunity that has opened up would be not simply a manifestation of indifference for the future of mankind, but criminal, as the representative of Austria rightly pointed out.

Each session of the General Assembly begins with a minute of silence or prayer. That symbolic act has a profound meaning. It enables us to concentrate on what has yet to be done, on what has yet to be accomplished, to concentrate in silence, not amidst the roar and thunder of nuclear blasts.

The declaration of a moratorium by all the nuclear powers - to be followed by a treaty on the general and complete prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests - would have just about the same significance for further progress. In a situation of world-wide silence at all nuclear-test sites, it would be possible to concentrate on charting the shortest possible routes on the road map of ways to a safe world, a world without nuclear weapons.

(Mr. Israelyan, USSR)

Ending the test~~s~~ and declaring a moratorium is also a legal problem, **first**, in the sense that the ~~Soviet Union~~, the United States and Great Britain have treaty obligation~~s~~ to work to ~~ban~~ experimental ~~explosions~~ and to curtail the ~~spiral~~ of nuclear rivalry. ~~These obligations~~ are embodied, in particular, in the 1963 Moscow Treaty banning nuclear ~~tests~~ in the three environment~~s~~ and in the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

It ~~is~~ particularly **important** to note that the moratorium would put a cap on the proliferation of nuclear ~~weapons~~. The call for the ~~non-proliferation~~ of nuclear-suicide technology would receive moral ~~support~~. For it ~~is~~ impossible - without ~~becoming~~ hypocritical - to ~~persuade~~ other~~s~~ not to obtain or ~~deve~~lop nuclear ~~weapons~~ while stubbornly refusing to ~~agree~~ to end the ~~testing~~ of such weapon~~s~~ and then to eliminate them ~~altogether~~.

Finally, the ~~declaration~~ of a moratorium by all the nuclear ~~Powers~~ would contribute **significantly** to making headway in the humanitarian field, too. Ending and banning nuclear-weapon ~~tests~~ ~~is~~ inseparable from the right to life, the right to live in an ecologically clean world and the right to have confidence in tomorrow, confidence which ~~is~~ **poisoned** by ~~awareness~~ of the deadly threat looming over all of ~~us~~. This ~~is~~ mentioned, **for** example, in the Mexico Declaration adopted by the Head~~s~~ of State or Government of **Argentina**, Greece, India, Mexico, Sweden and the United R~~epu~~blic of Tanzania, which reaffirms the right of the world community to **peace** and contain~~s~~ a **commitment**

"to protecting this right so that the human race may endure." (A/41/518, p. 3)

Many delegation~~s~~ have pointed out during the debate that the Soviet moratorium has made it **significantly** easier to ~~put~~ the problem of banning nuclear ~~weapons~~, ~~tests~~ on a practical **track** - that of negotiations. **We** fully agree.

(Mr. Israelyan, USSR)

Our position is clear. We continue to be prepared for any form of talks on this matter - bilateral, trilateral or multilateral - and for any type of agreement, provided there are full-fledged negotiations on the complete and definitive prohibition of nuclear explosions.

The Conference on Disarmament must serve as an important forum for multilateral talks on the cessation and prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests. There are now on the table several draft treaties on the general and complete prohibition of nuclear tests, including the one presented by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, separate provisions and ready-made formulas which cover practically all aspects of the ban on test explosions. It is indicative that such proposals should have been introduced by representatives of all groups of countries - socialist, non-aligned, neutral and Western. Suffice it to recall the Swedish draft treaty and the supplement to it, as well as the documents submitted by the delegations of the German Democratic Republic, Argentina, India, Mexico and of many other countries. Some of those documents have been on the negotiating table for more than a year now, without any movement whatsoever, although they could help to resolve the most complicated problems with regard to the prohibition of nuclear tests.

In this context, I should like to address in particular the problem of verification, the absence of a solution to which allegedly constitutes the main obstacle to reaching agreement.



(Mr. Israelyan, USSR)

In introducing its proposal8 for banning nuclear tests, the Soviet Union stated that it was interested in enforcing the most stringent verification of such a ban, including international verification. The Soviet Government's consent to the installation of American monitoring equipment in the area of Semipalatinsk clearly proves that. The USSR has more than once expressed its readiness to use the offer by the six countries of five continents to provide assistance in verifying the cessation of nuclear tests, including on-site inspection - if the other side, too, accepts the offer. The Soviet Union has also expressed its positive view of the proposal to organise a meeting of experts of the aforementioned six countries, together with Soviet and American specialists, in order to seek mutually acceptable solutions to the problem of verifying the cessation of nuclear tests. Recently, the Conference on Disarmament endorsed the fourth report of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events; that report was highly praised. The USSR proposed that the Group begin to develop a system of operative transmission of Level-11 data to serve as a basis for international seismic verification of a nuclear-test ban.

All that attests to the fact that there is no problem with the Soviet Union as regards the verification of a ban on nuclear tests. In essence, we agree with any form of verification.

So all the conditions have now been created to resolve positively the question of banning nuclear tests. However, the United States position blocks concrete negotiations on this problem, which has long been ripe for solution. The reasons for that position, which declare the test ban to be a 'very-long-term goal', are well known. It is becoming increasingly clear that Washington is motivated by the desire to retain for the United States the possibility of qualitatively upgrading

(Mr. Israelyan, USSR)

old types of nuclear weapons and developing new ones and thus carrying on the nuclear-arms race. The true reason for the United States Administration's reluctance to renounce nuclear explosions is the desire to upset the existing balance of forces to its own advantage. However, the world demands something else - namely, that good will be demonstrated, as has been done by the Soviet Union, in order to ensure that our planet no longer will be shaken by underground nuclear explosions.

A weighty contribution can and must be made by the United Nations to achieving progress toward the conclusion of a treaty on the general and complete prohibition of nuclear tests. The United Nations efforts in this major area should be redoubled and made more dynamic and purposeful.

In a few days the First Committee will begin taking decisions on various disarmament issues. A most important place among them will be held by decisions concerning a nuclear-test ban. We express our hope that those decisions will provide a new and important stimulus to the long-awaited beginning of negotiations aimed at ending nuclear explosions.

Mr. CAMPORA (Argentina) (interpretation from Spanish) : In this statement the Argentine delegation will address itself to various agenda items that are of particular interest to it.

First, we shall refer to the item on the naval arms race and disarmament and to the link between that item and the declaration of the South Atlantic as a zone of peace and co-operation. We shall turn next to chemical weapons, then to the role of the United Nations in the field of disarmament, and, finally, to confidence-building measures.

The consideration of the item on the naval arms race and disarmament has gone through a series of stages, and we therefore feel justified in going into some detail on this matter.

(Mr. Campora, Argentina)

It will be recalled that, in the first place, a Group of Experts was convened, under the chairmanship of Ambassador Alatas, and that that Group prepared a report which was broadly supported. The report was the basis for a first round of consideration, in the Disarmament Commission at its last session, this year, of the item on the naval arms race.


The report that the Disarmament Commission has, in turn, submitted to the General Assembly (A/41/42) contains a summary of the statement by its Chairman of the Commission on the conclusions reached. Unfortunately, the most important part of that statement by the Chairman of the Disarmament Commission was not included in the Disarmament Commission's report, for reasons that are well known. Hence, we should like to refer to document A/CN.10/83, dated 29 March 1966, which reflects the substantive consideration that the Disarmament Commission gave to the question of the naval arms race and disarmament.

That document - and we take the liberty of recommending that members study it - gives an account that highlights the great importance of the item and of the concepts and points of view voiced by many delegations. The importance of the item and the interest it has aroused are very well reflected in the document to which I am referring. In particular, it clearly shows that the naval arms race has generated an unprecedented military presence in various maritime areas. It also indicates that there has been an increasing nuclearization of the oceans and seas of the world, with regard both to armaments and to propulsion systems; and that this situation, when considered in conjunction with the great mobility of naval forces, explains why the naval arms race has another special characteristic - that is, the geographical spread of nuclear weapons.

Another comment in the foregoing report is that certain naval activities that are carried out in regions or zones far removed from the territory of the State or States involved have given rise to regional and sub-regional tensions.

(Mt. Campora, Argent in )

We would repeat that document A/CN.10/83 - which, unfortunately, is not included in the report of the Disarmament Commission to the General Assembly - in our view has great importance in duly assessing the need for the United Nations to deal in depth with this item on the naval arms race.

In particular, the concepts to which I have referred in regard to the unprecedented military presence in various maritime •  as well as the geographical spread of nuclear weapons that has been generated by the great mobility of naval forces, fully apply also to the • situation prevailing in the South Atlantic. For that reason, those concepts are at the very basis of the initiative to declare the South Atlantic a zone of peace and co-operation.

(Hr. Campora, Argentina)

Indeed, the General Assembly only a few days ago - to be precise on 27 October last - adopted resolution 41/11 by 124 votes in favour, 1 against and 8 abstentions. That resolution:

"Solemnly declares the Atlantic Ocean, in the region situated between Africa and South America, a 'Zone of Peace and Co-operation of the South Atlantic'.

This brand new resolution of the forty-first session of the General Assembly also:

'Calls upon all States . . . in particular the militarily significant States, scrupulously to respect the region of the South Atlantic as a zone of peace and co-operation, especially through the reduction and eventual elimination of their military presence there, the non-introduction of nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction and the non-extension into the region of rivalries and conflicts that are foreign to it'.

Hence we support the Disarmament Commission continuing to deal with this item, that is, the naval arms race and disarmament, in its 1987 session, with a view to appropriate recommendations being submitted to the forty-second session of the General Assembly.

The relative progress achieved in the negotiations being carried out in the Conference on Disarmament aimed at drawing up a convention banning the use and very existence of chemical weapons gives us some cause for satisfaction, since it is on one of the few items on disarmament where results are slowly coming in.

It is hoped that in 1987 the Conference on Disarmament will make sufficient progress to conclude the convention which, because of its overall approach encompassing all related issues deserves our fullest support.

(Mr. Campora, Argentina)

We should like to believe that the international community is gradually moving closer to a universal, total and lasting ban on chemical weapons.

Therefore we are not able to support any initiative involving a discriminatory or partial approach. The drawbacks and ineffectiveness of any partial approach have indeed been recognized in the negotiations.

We continue to hope that the convention will be universal, in the sense that all States will take part in it. Not only should it be universal, but it should also be a global convention: it should encompass all types of chemical weapons and remain in force for all time.

Above all, we believe that the convention must not be discriminatory; it should not create a particular status for any specific country. No country individually, or no group of countries, should be authorized to carry out international control over the movement of chemical substances. This should be done by international and national verification systems created under the convention itself in order to monitor compliance with the obligations entered into by the States parties.

The drafting of the convention has, in our view, made sufficient progress, and we do not believe at this stage that it is necessary to adopt new and specific systems from those which are already receiving very careful study in the ongoing negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament.

In the course of the discussions this year and in previous years, it has become obvious that there is a deep-rooted concern with regard to the role of the United Nations in the sphere of disarmament. That concern does not stem from a lack of guidelines, since the Charter as well as the 1978 Final Document are very clear cut in this respect. The main reason for that concern is the arms race itself, which is continuing at a dizzying pace, despite the ceaseless work being carried out by all United Nations bodies dealing with disarmament.

(Mr. Campora, Argentina)

The role of the United Nations in disarmament has been taken up in the Disarmament Commission at its 1985 and 1986 sessions. Both sessions have allowed for a broad exchange of views and have also given rise to many proposals. This is an item which has been followed up with great interest by the delegation of Cameroon, whose contribution to its analysis must be recognized.

In our opinion, the final assessment and the adoption of substantive measures and recommendations to enhance in so far as possible the work of the United Nations with regard to disarmament is a task for the third special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, which we hope will be held in 1988.

The Disarmament Commission has virtually concluded the drawing up of confidence-building measures at both the world and the regional levels. The Argentine delegation believes that it is essential to maintain an awareness of the obligation to build up mutual confidence in order to consolidate the possibilities of lasting peace. The Minister for Foreign Affairs of my country, Mr. Dante Caputo, devoted special attention to this particular aspect in his address to the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva on 6 February 1986.

The report of the Disarmament Commission to the General Assembly contains a body of guidelines for confidence building, with regard to both multilateral and bilateral relations. We wish to take this opportunity to emphasise various guidelines we believe are of particular importance.

It is interesting to note that the report states that confidence is based on a body of interrelated factors, both military and non-military.

The report adds that confidence is related to a broad range of activities in the sphere of interaction between States, and that confidence must be promoted in the political, military, economic, social, humanitarian and cultural spheres.

(Mr. Campora, Argentina)

It also affirms that the appropriate combination of different types of specific measures for each region must be identified in keeping with the security perception of the countries in the region and the nature and intensity of the threats to which they are subjected.

Finally, the report points out - and we believe this to be acceptable - that the Conference on Disarmament should be able to identify and draw up for confidence-building measures that are in keeping with the type of agreements on disarmament and arms limitation at present being negotiated.



Hr. BAYART (Mongolia) (interpretation from French) : I should like to introduce the draft resolution on Disarmament Week, A/C.1/41/L.14, which is sponsored by Afghanistan, Angola, Bulgaria, the Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, the Lao People's Democratic Republic, the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Viet Nam and my own country, Mongolia.

The question with which the draft resolution deals needs no comment from me. For the past 10 years Disarmament Week has been an integral part of world action designed to make world public opinion aware of the need to halt and reverse the nuclear-arms race, and to eliminate the threat of a nuclear war.

Disarmament Week is observed throughout the world. It furnishes an occasion for a number of ceremonies and manifestations of various types in many countries, as well as in the United Nations itself. The Secretary-General's reports in documents A/41/491 and A/41/492 and the statements made here in the First Committee by the President of the General Assembly, by the Secretary-General and by the representatives of the various regional groups at the recent meeting held in observance of Disarmament Week are eloquent evidence of this.

In his statement on that occasion, the Secretary-General,  
Mr. Javier Perez de Cuellar, stated

(spoke in English)

"We must devote our efforts to the gradual reduction of armaments, both nuclear and conventional. The difficulty and complexity of negotiations must not be allowed to turn nations from this objective, which is shared by all the peoples of the world. In this Week we give special emphasis to disarmament, but it must remain a major, universal concern every day of the year."

(A/C.1/41/PV.23, p. 13)

(Mr. Bayart, Mongolia)

(continued in French)

Speaking on behalf of the Group of Asian States, the representative of Japan stated:

(spoke in English)

"Disarmament Week provides the Member States with an excellent opportunity to rededicate themselves to United Nations efforts to enhance international peace and security through the achievement of general and complete disarmament."

(A/C.1/41/PV.23, p. 18)

(continued in French)

During that meeting, we heard some very interesting proposals for the diversification of the various organizational aspects of Disarmament Week. I refer in particular to the proposals by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, which reflected our common aspiration to make more effective use of the opportunities offered by Disarmament Week as part of efforts to put an end to the arms race and the danger of war.

My delegation noted with satisfaction the reports submitted by various specialized agencies, as well as the report of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), on their activities to promote the objectives of Disarmament Week.

We noted with particular interest the report by IAEA, which reads, inter alia:

"The IAEA contributes actively to the cause of arms limitations and disarmament within its area of competence." (A/31/491, para. 10)

In this connection, I should like to note that the General Assembly, in resolution 34/75 of 11 December 1979, invited relevant specialized agencies to express their views and suggestions on possible elements for the declaration of the 1980s as the Second Disarmament Decade. We regard that as recognition of the role that organizations in the United Nations systems can play in promoting the disarmament process.

(Mr. Bayart, Mongolia)

Turning now to draft resolution L.14, in essence it repeats last year's resolution, as well as those adopted in prior years, while expressing its grave concern over the escalating arms race, especially the nuclear-arms race. The draft resolution stresses the vital importance of eliminating the threat of a nuclear war, ending the nuclear-arms race and bringing about disarmament for the maintenance of world peace. The draft resolution recognizes the important role of the mass media in acquainting the world public with the aims of Disarmament Week and measures undertaken within its framework, and invites the Secretary-General to use the United Nations mass media as widely as possible to promote better understanding among the world public of disarmament problems and the objectives of Disarmament Week.

The draft resolution also expresses appreciation to all States and international and national governmental and non-governmental organizations for their energetic support of and active participation in Disarmament Week in 1986, the International Year of Peace. It invites all States, international non-governmental organizations, the relevant specialized agencies and the IAEA to participate actively in Disarmament Week to intensify activities within their areas of competence with regard to disarmament and to inform the Secretary-General accordingly.

Lastly, the draft resolution requests the Secretary-General to submit to the General Assembly at its forty-second session a report on the implementation of its provisions.

The preamble to the draft resolution refers to the creation of a comprehensive system of international peace and security. The creation of such a system would serve to strengthen the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations relating to a system of collective security. It aims at the implementation of such provisions in the light of the nuclear and outer space realities of our era.

In conclusion, I would express the hope that the draft resolution will, as in the past, be broadly supported by members of the First Committee.

Hr. CROMARTIE (United Kingdom) : I am now speaking in my national capacity as representative of the United Kingdom to introduce briefly two draft resolutions, A/C.1/41/L.10 and L.11.

First, on behalf of the delegations of Australia, Belgium, Botswana, Canada, Denmark, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Iceland, Italy, New Zealand, Norway, Samoa, Turkey and my own delegation, I have the honour to introduce to the Committee draft resolution A/C.1/41/L.10 on objective information on military matters.

This draft resolution builds further on that adopted last year, as General Assembly resolution 40/94 K, with widespread support. The additional element of draft resolution L.10 in response to comments received is the emphasis laid on the value of much objective information on both regional and subregional levels.

(Mr. Cromartie, United Kingdom)

The sponsors of the draft firmly believe that the provision by States of objective information on military matters will have a beneficial effect in helping to establish an atmosphere of greater confidence, a climate in which the likelihood of an outbreak of conflict is correspondingly reduced. They accord a high priority to the fostering of such a climate. Equally valuable is the contribution which the availability of relevant information could make to avoiding the sort of erroneous assessments of the capabilities and intentions of potential adversaries which could provoke unnecessary military build-ups on the part of States.

In this context, the sponsors keenly appreciate the value of the existence of a standardised reporting instrument on military expenditure which is being used by an increasing number of states.

The recommendations made in the draft do nothing to impinge on the vital security interests of States. Rather, the draft urges the reporting of information which many States routinely make publicly available, by way, for instance, of reporting to national parliaments.

The draft contains a request to the Secretary-General to report further to the General Assembly at its next session on the implementation of the provisions of this resolution.

We would welcome the comments of other delegations on the draft resolution, which the co-sponsors are very ready to take into account. We attach importance to extending still further the area of consensus on these ideas, which already have the support of the great majority of the countries represented in this Committee. In this connection, I am confident that support for the approach enshrined in this draft resolution will command even broader adherence than last year in view of the greater readiness to give information recently displayed by one super-Power. The co-sponsors of this draft resolution would, of course, welcome further co-sponsors.

(Mr. Cromartie, United Kingdom)

Secondly, turning to another draft resolution, I have the honour to introduce, on behalf of the delegations of Cameroon, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, France, Norway and my own delegation, the United Kingdom, the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/41/L.11, entitled "United Nations disarmament studies".

Last year I had the honour of introducing a similar draft resolution, which was subsequently adopted by the General Assembly without a vote as resolution 40/152 K. This resolution invited Member States to submit their views and proposals on how the work of the United Nations in the field of disarmament studies can be improved. It also invited the Secretary-General's Advisory Board on Disarmament Studies to submit a report on the subject to the General Assembly at its forty-second session. We are gratified that a number of Governments have already responded to that request and that the Advisory Board continued to discuss the matter during the course of its sessions in 1986.

My delegation is firmly of the view that studies can and do make an important contribution to a balanced and comprehensive examination of issues in the field of arms limitation and disarmament. Clearly, a thorough appraisal of the subject of United Nations disarmament studies will greatly benefit from the widest possible cross-section of views of Member States as to how such studies might be made even more effective.

The purpose of the draft resolution in document L.11 is, therefore, to encourage those states which have not yet done so to submit their comments and ideas. This would facilitate the preparation of the Advisory Board's report and would ensure that all views are taken fully into account when the subject is taken up by the General Assembly at its next session.

The co-sponsors of draft resolution L.11 are confident, that, like its predecessor, it will again be adopted without a vote.

Mr. KOUASSI (Togo) (interpretation from French) : Since I am speaking for the first time before this Committee, permit me, Mr. Chairman, to express to you and to the other officers of the Committee my delegation's earnest and warm congratulations on the occasion of your unanimous election. Working side by side with you in the General Committee, I was able to appreciate your effectiveness and your great capacity for work and your wisdom and, with your permission, I should like to pay this tribute to you here publicly.

In laying the foundations of our Organization in 1945, the major Powers at the outcome of the most bloody war in the history of humanity, forgetting for a moment their reciprocal mistrust, had dreamed of the advent of an era of peace, harmony and fraternity, if not of total confidence, among men.

That was why they devoted their very first resolution to the objectives of Peace, disarmament, the elimination of atomic weapons and the peaceful use of atomic energy.

After four decades of negotiation, we are still very far from a process of gradual and balanced disarmament. Can we say that that initial objective seems to be close today as the result of the Reykjavik Summit Conference? Are we authorized to think that the Governments will successfully take the initiative of stopping the armaments race and effectively undertake nuclear disarmament when confronted with a massive and continuous growth in the number, power and variety of nuclear weapons?

The arms race is today out of all control. And if the founding fathers of the United Nations could come back to witness the level and the power which today's world has reached, they would undoubtedly conclude bitterly that the lack of understanding of their dream of peace and security for mankind had produced one of the most tragic and terrifying paradoxes of our era, because how can we understand that, after the horrors of war, our world should have committed itself to an arms

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race brought about by the incessant perfecting of the human species' capacity for destruction.

How can we **justify** the fact that, despite the **impressive** efforts made by the United Nations to promote disarmament, \$1,000 billion should be spent every year on arms and that 150 local conflicts should **have** caused more than 20 million deaths since the creation of our **Organization**?

In intervening in the debate on agenda item 61 of the **First** Committee, entitled 'Review and **implementation** of the Concluding Document of the Twelfth Special Session of the General **Assembly**', my delegation is guided by a desire to make **its** contribution to reflection on **specific** measures which might facilitate the progressive achievement of general and complete disarmament.

**Far** from showing the impotence of our Organisation in the face of the excess Of arms in the world, the paucity of results obtained in respect of disarmament rather indicates the great complexity of **this question**, which **is** of such crucial importance and which presupposes a very long-term process.

That means that any human effort **inspired** by objectives as noble as **international** peace and security **requires** the **deployment of sustained efforts** despite **gropings**, failures and **all** sorts of **obstacles** related to the difficulty Of combining the requirements of the security of States **Members** of the United Nations **with** the imperatives of a global equilibrium.

**Thus** it **is** important, in the search for disarmament, not to lose sight of the realities of today's world. We must recognise that every country, large or small, has vital national security interests. To disregard that would be to totally lack realism in a world made up of sovereign States.



(Mr. Kouassi, Togo)

It must be noted that national security cannot be assured by increasing levels of armaments. Thus we must start reducing the levels of weapons and of armed forces in an equitable and balanced way, while guaranteeing the right of every State to undiminished security.

One event of historic significance was the commemoration last year of our Organization's fortieth anniversary which provided an exceptional occasion for States Members to reaffirm their profound commitment to the noble principles, ideals and objectives which presided at the creation of the United Nations, specifically international peace and security. That was an incontestably tangible manifestation of the commitment of the international community to work to strengthen the United Nations as an essential and irreplaceable instrument for the preservation of balance in international relations.

However, the advent of a world forever rid of the spectre of war cannot result from simple and ritual proclamations of peaceful intentions. Quite the contrary, our common will for peace must lead to concrete and persevering actions aimed at harmonising our national interests with the search for collective security. The multidimensional and evolving character of disarmament demands that any effort at promoting it be undertaken at the regional, national and international levels.

While it is precisely the nuclear Powers which bear primary responsibility for the promotion of general and complete disarmament, it is also true that the disappearance of the spectre of war would be greatly assisted by other countries' contribution to the creation of collective security in their respective regions. In view of the complexity of today's international context, progress in disarmament and related security problems takes ever more into account existing situations and conditions in specific countries and regions. The process of the development of

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a global consensus for general and complete disarmament will thus emerge gradually, first at the national level, then at the regional level, and finally at the world level.

In that regard initiatives taken here and there in the world to strengthen regional security are very significant. After long and laborious negotiations over the Helsinki Agreement, the recent Stockholm Agreement itself constitutes a message of peace addressed to the international community. That message indicates that the permanent concretization of the attachment of the countries of East and West to détente and peaceful coexistence is an inestimable contribution to reinforcing international peace and security.

In this constant search for regional security the developing countries, concerned as they are with creating the indispensable conditions for their economic and social progress, play individually and collectively within the framework of their respective regional organizations a role that should be emphasized and encouraged.

The conclusion of the Treaty of Tlatelolco was tangible evidence of the attachment of the Latin American States to the total and definitive denuclearization of their region.

The Organization of African Unity (OAU), the League of Arab States, the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN), the Pacific Forum and the Movement of the Non-Aligned Countries have worked since their creation in support of the denuclearization of Africa, the Middle East, the Indian Ocean, South-East Asia and the South Pacific.

As concerns Africa in particular, we must recognize that its vocation in support of peace in the world is based on the unshakeable will of the African

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le as to introduce political, economic, social and cultural conditions that will lead to the achievement of African unity and protect that continent from the threat of aggression inherent in the covetousness, geo-political calculations and foreign interference of which that continent has been the object.

Since their accession to independence, the African States have always devoted special attention to the objectives of peace and security which, to them, are essential for the achievement of their aspirations for development, unity and genuine freedom. It is no accident that the charter of the Organization of African Unity clearly emphasizes in its preamble the conviction of its founders that peace and security must be created and maintained to permit those aspirations to become a dynamic force in behalf of human progress.

In the same spirit the founders of the OAU established a Defence Committee which is entrusted with, inter alia, creating the necessary conditions and mechanisms to make it possible not only to help African territories still under colonial domination to achieve their national sovereignty but also to guarantee and Preserve their dearly achieved independence.

Years have elapsed since United Nations experts and others have stressed the close link between security, disarmament and development, which today is subscribed to by the whole international community.

The Organization of African Unity, in its efforts to seek peace and progress in Africa, has always pronounced itself firmly in support of general and complete disarmament that will make it possible for all to have peace and security and improve the prospects and opportunities that will facilitate the development of relations of constructive co-operation among States. That is why at its first regular session in Cairo in July 1964 the Heads of State or Government of the African continent adopted the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa by

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which they want to remove Africa from all the dangers of nuclear war. That Declaration represents not only the concrete manifestation of Africa's support for the objective of non-proliferation and non-dissemination of nuclear weapons but also its determination to maintain and consolidate international peace and security.

Africa favours peace and feels an urgent need for it. The exchanges of view that have taken place at recent OAU ministerial meetings have shown the international community's serious concerns caused by the arms race, in particular the nuclear arms race which threatens mankind's survival.

We believe that for disarmament to be effective and lasting it must guarantee the security of all States, assure them equal security and create mechanisms to maintain peace and settle conflicts among States, in conformity with the principles contained in the United Nations Charter.

Our region must face the challenge of trying to maintain peace and security without thereby weakening our economies by the dissipation of our limited resources for defence purposes and military expenditures to meet threats that confront us. The creation of the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa by General Assembly resolution 40/151 G of 16 December 1985 is an excellent step to meet this concern. Also, the OAU Conference of Heads of State or Government held in Addis Ababa from 28 to 30 July 1986 welcomed the creation of that Centre one of whose objectives is to promote the world campaign for peace and disarmament in the region.

In connection with that campaign, the Centre is an indispensable instrument for educating, informing and mobilizing African public opinion in behalf of peace, the limitation of armaments, and general and complete disarmament. In functioning as a

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source of information, research and advice, the organisation of seminars and conferences, the Regional Centre in Africa must combine the objectives of disarmament, security and development.

The inestimable value of peace has undoubtedly been well perceived by Szilard, Bohr, Einstein and Rotblat, eminent scientists who, immediately after making their contribution to the design of the first atomic bomb, expressed their regret and waged a vigorous campaign against nuclear weapons. In continuing their action, 11 famous scientists - nine of whom have been awarded the Nobel Peace Prize - as early as 1955 signed a manifesto calling upon the scientists of the whole world to work for peace.

Today, as yesterday, the struggle for peace and disarmament has no chance of success unless it is waged unceasingly on all fronts.

(Mr. Kouassi, Togo)

The absolute necessity of nuclear disarmament should not make us lose sight of the fact that, because of the increasingly interlinked nature of international relations and the interdependence of States, the tiniest spark could flare up into a general conflagration. Even if for four decades there has been no generalised war, local conflicts in the third world have caused great ravages and untold suffering, delaying economic and social progress in these countries.

That is why Africa consistently supports all initiatives to ensure peace, security and co-operation among nations, for true peace is the firmer condition for its stability and development. Africa therefore follows with great interest changes affecting relations between the super-Powers in the context of their repercussions on the prospects and possibilities for peace in the world. We hope that the Heads of State of those Powers will continue the dialogue begun in November 1985 and continued at Reykjavik, and we hope that in future meetings that dialogue will provide an opportunity to take constructive measures leading to the signing of effective treaties on general and complete disarmament. The super-powers have the responsibility and duty to take the initiative and to set an example, particularly in the field of nuclear disarmament.

In conclusion, we reaffirm that there is a close relationship among disarmament, détente, respect for the right to self-determination and independence, the peaceful settlement of disputes and the strengthening of international peace and security.

Mr. ROSE (German Democratic Republic): On behalf of the sponsors, I have the honour of introducing the following draft resolutions: draft resolution A/C.1/41/L.6, on nuclear weapons in all aspects; and draft resolution A/C.1/41/L.5, on non-use of nuclear weapons and prevention of nuclear war.

(Mr. Rose, German Democratic Republic)

I shall be brief, because the texts of those draft resolutions are based respectively on resolutions 40/152 C and 40/152 A, which were adopted by a large majority at the last session of the General Assembly.

Both draft resolutions address the main issue of our time: averting the threat of the nuclear self-annihilation of mankind. They contain concrete and realistic ideas on ways to halt the nuclear-arms race and proceed to the reduction, and ultimately the complete elimination, of nuclear weapons. Thus, they are in line with the priorities set out in the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, which was adopted by consensus.

The draft resolution on nuclear weapons in all aspects (A/C.1/41/L.6) calls upon the Geneva Conference on Disarmament to proceed without delay to multilateral negotiations on the cessation of the nuclear-arms race and nuclear disarmament, including the elaboration of nuclear disarmament programme, and to establish for this purpose an ad hoc committee. This concern, we believe, is today more topical and more urgent than ever before, in the light, inter alia, of the recent meeting at Reykjavik. Although these issues met with growing interest during the 1986 session of the Conference on Disarmament, no agreement was reached, owing to the position taken by a few States. The preambular part of the draft resolution reiterates the need for and urgency of multilateral negotiations.

Draft resolution A/C.1/41/L.6 welcomes the conviction expressed in the joint Soviet-United States statement of 21 November 1985 that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought. It also notes with satisfaction that the two sides agreed to accelerate the negotiations aimed at preventing an arms race in outer space and terminating the arms race on Earth. The draft resolution reflects the awareness that bilateral and multilateral negotiations on the cessation of the nuclear-arms race and on nuclear disarmament must complement and stimulate each other.

(Mr. Rose, German Democratic Republic)

The second draft resolution (A/C.1/41/L.5) expresses the hope that all nuclear-weapon States that have not yet done so will follow the example of the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China and undertake not to be the first to use nuclear weapons. Such an obligation, if assumed by all nuclear-weapon States, would constitute an important first step and a significant confidence-building measure aimed at lessening the danger of nuclear war. In that context, the Geneva Conference on Disarmament is requested in the draft resolution to consider the elaboration of an international instrument of a legally binding character.

We hope that the two draft resolutions, in the light of their subject-matter and their general importance for the process of arms limitation and disarmament and for international security, will receive broad support.

Mr. McDONAGH (Ireland): As this is the first occasion this session on which I am speaking in this Committee, I should like at the outset to extend to you, Sir, my delegation's warm congratulations on your unanimous election as Chairman of the First Committee. In closing, I should like to assure you of my delegation's full support and co-operation as you guide the Committee's deliberations. Your keen grasp of arms control and disarmament questions, together with your wide-ranging experience and skill, hold out the promise of a fruitful and successful session.

I take this opportunity also to congratulate the other officers of the Committee and to wish them too every success in carrying out their important tasks.

My delegation, like so many others, was heartened by the decision of the two Super-Powers to proceed to a summit meeting in Iceland earlier this month. We were impressed by the seriousness of purpose and evident commitment which they brought with them to the vital task of trying to reach common agreement on the reduction



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and possibly even the ultimate elimination of their arsenals of mass destruction. As we know, the meeting at Reykjavik ended without agreement. But our shared regret need not - indeed must not - induce my sense of despondency. We should be encouraged by the evidence that two Powers seem to have come closer than ever before to reaching crucial agreements on major arms control and disarmament issues. While a historic breakthrough was not achieved, the summit meeting succeeded in demonstrating that developments of major significance were and remain in prospect and, furthermore, that the super-Power relationship is susceptible to reasonable and constructive management. The outcome at Reykjavik need not, therefore, be viewed only as a lost opportunity.

The degree to which the two Powers were able to develop the fluency of their dialogue in the arms control arena offers encouraging grounds for believing that wide-ranging progress may still be achieved. From the perspective of this Committee, we may record that, perhaps for the very first time in the aftermath of a SC per-Power summit, both the United States and the USSR rendered a valuable service by coming here and outlining in considerable detail their respective positions in the bilateral exchanges in Iceland. This they did in terms which can fairly be described as conciliatory and for the coming.

(Mr. McDonagh, Ireland)

In itself, this is a cause for satisfaction and could be interpreted as a vote of confidence in the role of the Committee as a central component in the multilateral disarmament process. The First Committee is a finely-tuned barometer of the international political climate, whose effective functioning can be improved on - or impaired - by the state of sensitivities in the super-Power relationship at any given moment. The contributions by the representatives of the two Powers have helped set the tone for this session which, my delegation hopes, will be a productive and successful one. Moreover, the wealth of information now available to us as a result of the Reykjavik meeting should not only intensify our awareness of what is at stake in the super-Power relationship, but should also enable us to form more soundly based judgements on the complex and difficult issues which preoccupy the Committee.

I suggest that what is now called for from the Committee in return is the patient and sustained support of all delegations for the bilateral super-Power negotiations, which are still under way in Geneva. Those negotiations, and the overall conduct of the super-Power relationship, bear directly on the future and security of the whole of mankind. It is for this reason also that my delegation believes that the Committee should again demonstrate, in measured and reasoned terms, by the draft resolutions delegations decide to adopt, its collective belief that the super-Powers bear a profound responsibility for international peace and security. We have every right to remind them constantly of that responsibility and, in urging and supporting them to persevere in their endeavours, we feel entitled to seek from them the full discharge of their obligations to the international community at large in the disarmament field.

If I have focused my statement until now on the bilateral super-power relationship, it is not because my delegation considers the multilateral disarmament

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process to be any the less significant. As we know, the super-Powers are not the sole ~~possessors~~ of weapons of ~~indiscriminate~~ destruction, even if it is they who maintain the preponderance of the world's destructive military capacity. The value and importance of the multilateral ~~process~~ cannot be gainsaid, and my delegation comes to this session of the Committee with renewed grounds for moderate optimism in the resilience and worth of that process. In several key areas we have witnessed in the past year substantial steps forward on which this ~~Committee~~ can justifiably record a note of ~~satisfacti~~ n.

The successful ~~outcome~~ of the Second Review Conference on the Biological Weapons Convention, held last month in Geneva, gives considerable grounds for satisfaction. The adoption by consensus of the Final Document of the Review Conference marks a significant *advance* in terms of ~~reinforcing~~ the authority of this important Convention, which is a cornerstone of the chemical weapons control régime. We can now look forward with confidence to the Third Review Conference, due to take place not later than 1991.

Of particular interest among the decisions reached at Geneva, to all of which Ireland fully subscribes, were the ~~commitments~~ undertaken by the States parties to the Convention to increase exchanges of information. Such exchanges constitute practical means for ~~improving~~ confidence, and it is my delegation's hope that the planned meeting of scientific technical ~~experts~~ in Geneva in 1987 will succeed in ~~elaborating~~ effective measures designed to translate into concrete terms the commitments already ~~assumed~~ by the states parties.

We are ~~also~~ pleased to note that a specific item in the important area of verification will be included on the agenda of the Third Review Conference. This decision clearly reflects the widespread view that there is much scope for improvement in this area. As every delegation here is aware, rapid technological developments increase the potential for the development of new biological and toxin

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weapons. For that reason, my delegation supports the view that the Third Review Conference should be convened at the earliest possible date. And we trust that all States parties will, in the meantime, observe strictly their obligations under the Convention, which the Final Document of the second Review Conference expressly links to the wider negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons.

On the subject of chemical weapons, my delegation welcomes the degree of progress which has been made this year at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva. Ireland remains firmly committed to the earliest possible conclusion of a multilateral convention on the total prohibition of the development, production, and stockpiling of chemical weapons, and on their complete destruction.

The adoption by the Conference of the report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons was indeed a most encouraging development. The report succeeds in grafting onto the agreed framework of a chemical weapons convention further elements which would prevent the misuse of commercial chemicals and which deal with the elimination of existing stockpiles and of production facilities. These developments raise our expectation that next year this Committee may at last be in a position to welcome the conclusion of an internationally binding and verifiable ban on chemical weapons.

These positive developments should not however lull us into a false sense of complacency. Any country prepared to commit resources to the fabrication of chemical weapons could probably succeed in doing so. This is not mere conjecture. The continued use of chemical weapons in battlefield conditions, in violation of the 1925 Geneva Protocol, is a sobering reminder of the acute dangers involved. By the same token, we are deeply concerned at any steps designed to modernize existing chemical-weapon stocks. Neither are partial or interim steps acceptable as an alternative to a global ban. Despite these unhelpful factors, we remain optimistic

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that a chemical-weapons convention is **now**, finally, within reach. No State should act in any way which would hinder the momentum towards this end.

The multilateral process also demonstrated this year its worth at the regional level. Only last month, a development of considerable political significance took place, which we hope will have a beneficial impact on the security environment of immediate concern to my delegation. I refer to the successful outcome of the Stockholm Conference on Confidence and Security Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe and to the adoption by *consensus* of the Stockholm Document.

The series of concrete measures to increase confidence and enhance security in Europe, set out in the Stockholm Document, represent a major advance on the steps agreed upon at Helsinki in 1975. For my delegation, the success of the Conference on Confidence and Security Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe marks a high watermark in the process of multilateral negotiations on the regional plane. The Stockholm Conference was mandated to devise measures to reduce the risk of conflict that could arise from miscalculation of military intentions or through misinterpretation of military activities. The resulting agreement, which will come into effect on 1 January 1987, elaborates concrete measures on prior notification and observation of certain military activities, on the exchange of annual calendars relating to military activities and on measures of constraint and procedures for verification and compliance. The enhanced degree of openness and predictability which the implementation of these measures implies should contribute in no small way to the creation of an improved climate of security in Europe. In addition to the confidence-building measures agreed at Stockholm, the 35 participating countries stated their firm determination to continue to build confidence, to lessen military confrontation and to enhance security for all. They also declared

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their determination to achieve progress in disarmament. We believe that the politically binding agreements reached at Stockholm last month should also help to pave the way for progress towards disarmament in all the relevant negotiating forums.

(Mr. McDonagh, Ireland)

The three areas I have singled out indicate how the multilateral approach to arms control and disarmament issues can be successfully applied. And while we may record with appreciation the extent to which progress has been made in those separate but interlinked areas, it is with a sense of regret that I must acknowledge, too, those areas of which the same cannot be said. Perhaps nowhere is that failure more evident than in the continued reluctance of the nuclear-weapon States to negotiate on the conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty, the one disarmament measure which is singled out in the nuclear non-proliferation Treaty of 1968. Only last year this Committee was able to welcome the satisfactory outcome of the Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference. At that Conference, the participants expressly called upon the nuclear-weapon States to conclude a comprehensive test-ban treaty. That call still fails to evoke an appropriate and positive response from the nuclear-weapon States and nothing in the past year has occurred to suggest that worthwhile movement on the question of comprehensive test ban is in the offing. On the contrary, 1986 has again marked a failure at the Conference on Disarmament to reach agreement on the establishment of an ad hoc committee which would proceed to multilateral negotiations on a comprehensive test ban, which is the first item on the agenda of the Conference. The consequences of the continued failure in Geneva are both perplexing and unsettling for the international community in general. One can only conclude that the continued absence of a comprehensive test ban leaves open the door to the further refinement, and increase in the volume of, the existing nuclear arsenals. Not for the first time my delegation appeals to the nuclear-weapon States to give a firm commitment to halt the testing of nuclear weapons and to take urgent steps to achieve a negotiated comprehensive test ban. We reject the notion that the world can

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continue to maintain its present degree of stability against the background of an upwardly-spiralling increase in the quality and number of armaments, which in itself must add to the dangers inherent in nuclear deterrence. There can be no logical basis for the assumption that the uncertain and, on occasion, precarious peace the world has enjoyed since the Second World War can be sustained indefinitely into the future, while the nuclear-arms race is permitted to run its course without effective international constraint. The super-Power leaders are agreed that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought. Should not that obvious and shared perception induce the super-Powers, and the other nuclear-weapon States, to proceed to the early negotiation and conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty;

In underlining the importance my delegation attaches to this issue I am not unmindful of the concerns that continue to preoccupy the nuclear-weapon States. We recognize that there persists a lack of adequate mutual trust and confidence, and we understand the perception that extraneous events, such as the outbreak or intensification of regional disputes, can easily undermine such fragile belief as may be common to the nuclear-weapon States in the efficacy of a comprehensive test ban. We also acknowledge that serious, but by no means insurmountable, problems remain to be tackled, especially those of scope, verification and compliance. But let the nuclear-weapon States take courage from the positive atmosphere generated both at Reykjavik and by the sentiment in international public opinion and let them return to Geneva, there to make a sustained effort to open the way to the early conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty. For the nuclear-weapon States should be in no doubt that the international community is bound to draw its own conclusions from their readiness or reluctance to face this task squarely. Failure to conclude a comprehensive test-ban treaty can only reinforce the widespread



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belief that the contest for military supremacy, unfettered by affective, internationally binding measures of control, remains at the core of the strategies to which they subscribe.

I must also record at this point my delegation's regret that circumstances have not so far permitted the holding of the International Conference on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development, which was scheduled to take place in Paris in 1986. This time last year my delegation was pleased to support the decision, endorsed by the overwhelming majority of Member States, that the Conference should be convened in 1986. We did so out of a deeply-felt concern at the ever-increasing diversion of scarce material resources to the further accumulation and modernization of armaments. The scale of expenditure being channelled into the world-wide armaments industry continues on its upward, inexorable climb. Reliable statistics demonstrate that world military spending in 1985 was running at a figure in excess of a staggering \$850 billion. When viewed against the sombre backdrop of widespread misery, poverty and human suffering, this level of expenditure is truly deplorable. It constitutes an obvious and intolerable strain on less-developed countries just as much as it reflects ill on some of the policies pursued by those States which are more fortunate. It is the fervent hope of my delegation that, despite the setback this year, the appropriate decision will be taken at this session of the Assembly, that the Conference will take place as soon as possible thereafter, and that it will command the universal participation of this Organization.

The evolution and accelerating pace of new technologies has brought to the forefront of our debates the question of outer space, and it is appropriate that this Committee should continue to provide the forum for a substantive and detailed exchange of views on the growing concern at any prospect that outer space could

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become the next arena for a dangerous and probably irreversible competition in weaponry. Outer space must be confined exclusively to peaceful uses only, for the scientific, economic and social betterment of all States. The implications and feasibility of new space-related technologies cannot yet be accurately assessed, but we do know that their applications can be beneficial to the peaceful exploitation of this dimension of the common heritage of mankind. We know too that technology relating to outer space has made a positive contribution in many ways germane to the work of this Committee, most notably in the field of communication satellites, which have strengthened the means of verifying arms control agreements.

But these technologies, both advanced and emerging, constitute a double-edged sword. Satellite systems which can predict weather conditions with greater accuracy are adaptable to predict with enhanced precision the flight of deadly weapons to designated targets. If the civilian applications of these technologies can contribute to better understanding of outer space they can also, in time, facilitate the guidance systems of new weapons of mass destruction. That is the dilemma before us: how can the international community protect itself from the grim spectre of outer space becoming the next theatre for the development, testing, production and, conceivably, the deployment of new weapon systems? If we fail to agree upon effective means of ensuring against this ominous possibility, each and every advance in the development of space weapons will lead inevitably to the progressive undermining of international peace and security. Already, adherence to one of the pillars of the existing arms control régime - the 1972 Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems - has become the subject of speculation. In our view, that Treaty continues to require strict observance, in the letter and in the spirit, by the parties concerned.

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We are none the less disposed to take a cautiously positive view of the bilateral and multilateral negotiations that are taking place on this issue. My delegation fully endorses the commitment of the super-Powers to pursue their bilateral negotiations and we support their purpose, namely, to prevent an arms race in space and to terminate it on earth. This Committee has also been able to make a worthwhile contribution to preventing the militarization of outer space. Again, last year, one of the Committee's more impressive achievements was a compromise resolution, which accommodated the concerns of almost every delegation. That resolution facilitated the work of the Ad hoc Committee of the Conference on Disarmament the 1986 report of which contains many constructive and important elements, inter alia, it recognizes that the legal régime relating to outer space must be reinforced, and it underlines the necessity for strict compliance with existing agreements, both bilateral and multilateral. My delegation fully shares that assessment and considers that no effort should be spared to ensure that substantive work on this issue will continue at the 1987 session of the Conference on Disarmament. To that end we look forward to the re-establishment of the Ad hoc Committee with an adequate and effective mandate. I also express the hope that this Committee will succeed in the current session in adopting a resolution to which every delegation can subscribe.

(Mr. McDonagh, Ireland)

In our statement in the Committee's general debate last year we felt it necessary to draw attention to the fact that many of the resolutions tabled here would be adopted irrespective of the views of significant groups of states, or of important individual States. We regret to have to return to this topic once more. In doing so on this occasion we should make it clear which categories of resolutions we have in mind. We all know that consensus resolutions are, by definition, those which command the voting support of all delegations. Also by definition, those resolutions which are put to the vote are divisive. Put my delegation would distinguish between those resolutions which can command the clear and widespread support of the great majority of delegations, support which far transcends the extent of approval given them by a particular regional or other grouping, and those which plainly cannot.

In this context, we are conscious as well of the practice of repeating on an annual basis resolutions which are intended to focus on areas of contention between delegations and which, in our view, are not conducive to enhancing the Committee's authority. This practice demonstrates a weakness in what should be our commitment to work constructively towards maximizing the areas in which the broadest possible accommodation can be reached. Frequently, too, we have seen competing resolutions - some with the very same title - being pressed to a vote when it is quite evident that the minimum necessary degree of political support for them is not forthcoming. These observations, I may add, are made while the Committee has to deal with a continuing upward trend in the number of draft resolutions tabled. In appealing to delegations to reflect on this situation, we do not intend to imply that they should feel in any way constrained in bringing before the Committee serious issues of national, regional or global concern. Their right to do so is, of course, unquestioned.

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One other unsatisfactory aspect of our activities concerns the manner in which we organize our work. The representative of Indonesia, Ambassador Alatae, who so skilfully chaired the Committee last year, made a valuable proposal when he suggested the establishment of an informal group which would try to identify improved methods of realizing our complex and demanding work. We fully share his objective, and we hope, Mr. Chairman, that under your wise guidance some early movement can be achieved in this area.

However many draft resolutions we may present to the Committee, the objective criterion by which we should measure their worth ought to be to what extent are they likely to contribute to the achievement of practical, realizable goals in the field of disarmament? Proposals which fall short of that standard - and there are likely to be a number - should be seriously reconsidered. Those proposals, on the other hand, which meet that criterion and offer the prospect of enlarging the area of common ground between delegations, even where substantive elements of divergence remain, should warrant the intensified scrutiny of all delegations. In that way we may not only succeed in improving our work methods, but may also enhance the quality and worth of our collective contribution to the clearly defined, ultimate goal that we share in common - the eventual creation of a state of general and complete disarmament, in which the security of all peoples can be effectively guaranteed.

Mr. NENGRAHARY (Afghanistan) (interpretation from French): I wish today to speak on item 54, entitled "Prevention of an arms race in outer space", to which the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan attaches particular importance because of its sensitive nature and its possible political, military and economic implications for all countries, including the developing countries.

Our concern over the efforts of certain imperialist circles which, wishing to achieve military superiority, have chosen to extend the arms race into outer space,

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lies in the fact that nuclear war once unleashed will know no geographical or ideological frontiers and will affect all nations, directly or indirectly.

It is more than ever clear that the deployment of a sophisticated space-weapons system will not only threaten the security of nuclear-weapon States but will put all mankind in fear of annihilation. That intolerable situation demands strict compliance with agreements already concluded aimed at curbing and halting the arms race on Earth and eliminating the possibility of its extension to space.

Furthermore, it is urgently necessary for the international community - particularly those countries with tremendous space potential and other economically developed countries - to take concrete measures to preserve space exclusively for peaceful purposes. In this context, the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan is convinced that the constructive proposals of the Soviet Union, in the form of a detailed programme for the total elimination of nuclear weapons by the year 2000, submitted on 15 January this year by Mr. Gorbachev, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, are vitally important.

Of course, it will be possible to attain these goals only if favourable conditions are created, with the participation of the other nuclear-weapon States, and above all the United States of America. We share the view that the renunciation of the development, testing and deployment of space-strike weapons would help to remove the nuclear threat hanging over mankind. It is with that sense of responsibility that the nuclear Powers must act in order to guarantee the security of their own people as well as that of mankind as a whole. To act in any other way, as by opening up other fields for the nuclear-arms race, would accelerate the military escalation to the most dangerous degree and increase the possibility of nuclear war. The Eighth Summit Conference of the Heads of State or

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Government of the Non-Aligned Countries rightfully came to the conclusion that the new technology used to prepare for the development of new weapons systems would add a most dangerous new dimension to the arms race.

The Conference also stressed that measures to develop, test and deploy new weapons systems in outer space would lead to an escalation of the arms race in both offensive and defensive weapons. On the basis of specific, precise conclusions, the Conference appealed to the leaders of the two countries with the greatest military potential to continue their dialogue and co-operate fully with a view to concluding important disarmament agreements, including an agreement on the prevention of an arms race in outer space. We believe that they must respond in a positive manner to the appeal by the large majority of the international community if they are truly in favour of disarmament and the maintenance of peace and stability, thus guaranteeing the equal security of all peoples.

The Mexico Declaration, adopted on 7 August 1986 by the Heads of State or Government of six States from five continents, appealed to the leaders of the Soviet Union and the United States

"to continue and to reinvigorate the dialogue which they started last year; to set a firm date for a new meeting between them; and by an approach of mutual compromise and conciliation to ensure that such dialogue leads to practical results in the field of disarmament." (A/41/518, p. 5)

Let us see what has happened since the unambiguous expression both in Harare and in Mexico of the desire of the absolute majority of the international community.

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The Soviet Union took the initiative of extending to the United States an invitation to a meeting between Mr. Gorbachev, the General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, and President Reagan, and it put forward a series of constructive proposals to reduce and then eliminate all nuclear weapons in a relatively short time. The concessions made by that country considerably increased the possibility of reaching historic agreements. But the other side, the United States - although it is trying to give the impression that its proposals made possible the attainment of agreements acceptable to the parties - went to Reykjavik not only with empty hands but, indeed, to defend the selfish interests of the military-industrial complex, thus erecting the main obstacle on the path to disarmament.

The obstinacy of the United States with regard to its right to test and continue research on all aspects of the star wars programme, not only in laboratories but also in outer space, made Reykjavik another missed opportunity. Many delegations have referred to the aggressive nature of that famous programme and to its objective of political blackmail and intimidation of other peoples. Hence, I shall not discuss them in detail. Nevertheless, I would ask this question: why is there any need for this programme if it is possible to eliminate all the weapons against which the programme has supposedly been drawn up?

The United Nations plays an important role in the field of disarmament. It is therefore essential that, through the collective efforts of all its Members, it adopt the appropriate measures to eliminate all the barriers - wherever they may be found - in order to ensure that mankind is saved from the scourge of war. We must redouble our efforts to build a world of peace, dignity, development and progress for all.



Mr. PAWLAK (Poland) : In my statement I shall concentrate on agenda

*Item 54: "Prevention of an arms race in outer space".*

It is almost 30 years since, in October 1957, the first artificial satellite, the Soviet "Sputnik", began to circle our planet. Rapid progress in space exploration has opened new horizons for communication, navigation, meteorology and research in different fields. Space activities have broadened human knowledge and the understanding of the universe and have created a new valuable tool for the solution of many of the Earth's problems.

One of the features of the first period of the space age that evoked the most optimism was that the principle of the exploration and use of outer Space exclusively for peaceful purposes was established as the main guideline of human activity in this new domain. As long ago as 1958 the international community recognized that "outer Space should be used for peaceful purposes only" (resolution 1348 (XIII), first preambular paragraph), and expressed the wish "to avoid the extension of present national rivalries into this new field" (ibid., third preambular paragraph). And that declaration was repeated by the General Assembly in the following years.

Now that principle is being threatened. We are approaching the threshold beyond which stories of star wars, so far merely a subject for movie-script-writers, can turn into reality. Technologies are being developed for the production of space weapons to be used against space- and ground-based targets. To justify these efforts the idea of "strategic defence" has been put forward.

The verdict of scientists on these plans is becoming more and more clear: the capability of the "space protection" of populations against nuclear attack remains completely out of reach. In the statement of the Pugwash Council on the thirty-sixth Pugwash Conference, held in Budapest on 6 September 1986, we read the following:

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• Nuclear weapons are so powerful, the ways to deliver them are so diverse, people are so vulnerable, and the performance of complicated defence is so unpredictable and failure-prone that no amount of technological 'progress' in strategic defences can transform the dream of population defence into reality. Even the more limited aim of defending nuclear missiles and other military targets cannot succeed unless co-operative arms limitation prevents compensating build-up of offensive forces'.

Equally enlightening is the information published in today's New York Times concerning a survey conducted by the Cornell Institute for social and Economic Research. According to The New York Times, members of the United States National Academy of Science think that

'President Reagan's 'Star Wars' programme cannot produce an effective defence against... nuclear attack'. (The New York Times, 31 October 1986, p. A36)

'The production and deployment of space weapons will only extend the arm race to a new dimension, undermine stability and confidence among nations and jeopardize further disarmament negotiations.

So far there are no such weapons in the Earth orbit. The world community still has an opportunity - perhaps a unique opportunity - to prevent military rivalry in outer space. That is one of the greatest challenges of this generation and of this Organization, and one of the most urgent tasks in building a comprehensive system of international security. In trying to make the present situation safer, we should first of all refrain from making it worse. We badly need "preventive arms control". It has already provided the world community with a number of treaties that have prevented military competition in some areas - such as the Treaties concerning Antarctica and the prohibition of nuclear weapons in Latin America, the sea-bed Treaty, and the ban on the hostile use of environmental

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modification techniques. This common-sense logic should be urgently applied to outer space. As the Secretary-General rightly states in his last report on the work of the Organization:

'Outer space and the deep *sea-bed* have until now been kept free from nuclear deployment. This is a major achievement of multilateral diplomacy and, I would add, of human wisdom. It should under no circumstances be jeopardized'. (A/41/L, p. 8)

The consequences of the beginning of the "weaponization" of outer space should be assessed in terms not only of its immediate negative impact on international security, but also in the longer term. It must be realized that the introduction of the space weapons of today will not be the end but the beginning of the process. They are just the top of an iceberg which will gradually emerge if we embark on this path.

It must be reasonably assumed, however, that if we do proceed along this path, in a quite foreseeable future not one or two but more States can have at their disposal space-strike weapons. The lesson of 40 years of "vertical" and "horizontal" accelerated proliferation of nuclear weapons is a good illustration of the dangers which we would face.

Endeavours to prevent an arms race in outer space are not carried on in a legal vacuum. There are important bilateral and multilateral agreements in this field. They define how outer space can be explored and used. I should like to mention only some of them.

The 1972 Treaty between the Soviet Union and the United States on the limitation of anti-ballistic missile (ABM) systems prohibits deployment of any ABM systems except those which are explicitly allowed by this agreement. It contains a clear obligation

"not to develop, test, or deploy ABM systems or components which are sea-based, air-based, space-based or mobile land-based".

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The Treaty was founded on a sound premise that limitation of anti-ballistic missile systems is a substantial factor in curbing the race in strategic offensive arms and in decreasing the risk of nuclear war. Unfortunately this sound logic is rejected today by the authors of the Strategic Defence Initiative.

The partial test-ban Treaty of 1963 prohibits any nuclear explosion "in the atmosphere; beyond its limits, including outer space". (ENDC/100/Rev.1, art. I)

The multilateral 1967 Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities Of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space has established important guidelines which include, inter alia: the common interest of all mankind in the exploration and use of outer space for peaceful purposes; that the exploration and use of outer space should be carried out for the benefit and in the interests of all countries; that States should carry on activities in outer space in the interest of maintaining international peace and security and promoting international co-operation and understanding.

Any analysis of these principles must lead to the conclusion that: first, deployment of anti-satellite weapons and anti-missile defence having such a negative impact on international security can hardly be reconciled with the Treaty requirements; secondly, all parties to the Treaty have a legitimate right to express their concern at the possible deployment of those weapons and their views and opinions cannot be disregarded by any State; thirdly, the world community's legitimate demands and recommendations in this field contained in numerous United Nations General Assembly resolutions, stressing the need to prevent an arms race in outer space, should be taken into account most seriously and implemented.

The prime task today is to ensure that the concrete legal obligations contained in the 1972 bilateral agreement on anti-ballistic missiles as well as the general principles governing the activities of States in outer space following from

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1967 outer space Treaty and other international agreements, including the Charter of the United Nations, are strictly observed and enforced.

What is especially needed is a bona fide interpretation of those obligations, restraint in outer space activities, and respect for the interests of all States.

Any action which could lead to erosion of those obligations must be avoided. This body of law constitutes a valuable foundation on which further efforts to prevent an arms race in outer space should be based. Such efforts are urgently needed and should aim at supplementing the existing law with other legal instruments which would close any possible channels leading to the weaponization of outer space.

The best way to solve the problem is the prohibition of all space-strike weapons. A good example of such an approach is the Soviet draft treaty of August 1983 on the prohibition of the use of force in outer space and from outer space against the Earth. It provides for a total ban on testing and deployment of all space-strike weapons, including any anti-satellite or ballistic missile defence weapons systems. Poland strongly favours this radical approach. It would overcome the difficult problem of overlapping technologies for anti-satellite and ballistic missile defence systems and the close relationship existing between those two systems, which makes it difficult to constrain either one adequately without constraining both.

The Reykjavik meeting between General Secretary Gorbachev and President Reagan has demonstrated that in order to achieve elimination of nuclear weapons from our globe it is necessary at the same time to prevent an arms race in outer space. This concern also motivated the Foreign Ministers of the Warsaw Treaty member States at their recent meeting in Bucharest.

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Poland attaches particular importance to preventing an arms race in outer space. In the opinion of the Polish delegation, the international community cannot fall victim to the arms policy of certain States which in their pursuit of the elusive goal of military superiority are determined to deploy space-based strike weapons. Epitomized by the Strategic Defence Initiative, such a policy - if carried through - would turn outer space into the fourth dimension of confrontation and, in the process, deal a blow to strategic stability. As the Polish delegation stressed in this Committee earlier, Poland is keenly interested in the early completion of a study on the diverse consequences of the militarization of outer space being prepared by the United Nations Institute on Disarmament and Research. The need for such a study was underlined by Wojciech Jaruzelski, President of the Council of State of the Polish People's Republic, in his address to the General Assembly during its fortieth session. We hope that such a study will be of great help in further efforts aiming at prevention of an arms race in outer space, especially in the work of the Conference on Disarmament. It can also play a most useful role in making public opinion aware of all the dangers involved in weaponization of outer space.

We are following with great interest the work of the Conference on Disarmament in this field. We welcomed with appreciation the decision of the Conference to establish an Ad Hoc Committee on the prevention of an arms race in outer space. Poland noted with satisfaction and took an active part in the Committee's substantive discussion both on the existing legal régime of outer space as well as on the definition of basic terms and ideas used in this field of disarmament negotiations. The work of the Conference, however, cannot but give rise to a certain concern. The Conference has a very special place in the system of disarmament efforts as the multilateral disarmament negotiating body. Moreover,

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in the field of outer space problems it has received from the United Nations General Assembly a clear indication as to the way it should proceed.

It has been stressed in numerous General Assembly resolutions that the spread of an arms race to outer space should be prevented by concluding an appropriate international agreement or agreements and the Geneva forum has been repeatedly requested to embark on negotiations with a view to achieving such a treaty or treaties. Unfortunately, so far no negotiating effort has been undertaken. What is more, there is a clear tendency for some Western members of the Conference to avoid such an effort and to limit the work of the Conference to repeated consideration of different aspects of this problem. It should be stated again that the General Assembly has established a clear aim for the Conference in this field, which is to arrive at a verifiable international agreement or agreements preventing an arms race in outer space in all its aspects and guaranteeing that outer space is used exclusively for peaceful purposes.

The General Assembly has on many occasions asked the Conference on Disarmament to intensify the consideration of the question of the prevention of an arms race in outer space, has recommended that this question should be 'treated as a matter of priority', has urged the Conference "to undertake appropriate work without delay" and called upon States "to undertake immediate measures, to prevent an arms race in outer space". These are quotations from relevant resolutions of the General Assembly

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We would like to believe that those recommendations will be taken into account by all members of the Conference on Disarmament so that the much-needed concrete negotiations may at last be undertaken and pursued. All States, especially States with major space capabilities, should contribute actively to their success and refrain from any action which could frustrate the achievement of the recommended goal of such negotiations.

Poland notes with satisfaction, and is encouraged by, the fact that two great Powers, the USSR and the United States, are involved in bilateral negotiations which relate in part to preventing the militarization of outer space. We understand their importance and follow them with hope, but we are strongly convinced that those negotiations do not preclude multilateral action.

Outer space should be not only an area of exclusively peaceful activities but also a domain of constructive international co-operation. Such co-operation, leading to a rational co-ordination and pooling of efforts, can achieve tangible scientific and economic benefits and extend them to all nations.

Poland welcomes the ambitious Soviet programme of joint actions in the peaceful exploration and use of outer space presented by the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, Nikolai Ryzkhov, in his message to the United Nations Secretary-General. We are of the opinion that that important initiative should be advocated, not only on ethical, scientific and economic grounds, but also as a significant part of endeavours aimed at the prevention of an arms race in outer space.

Among the many efforts of the United Nations aimed at the prevention of an arms race in outer space, it is worth mentioning the work of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space. That Committee has been involved in the efforts directed against the militarization of outer space since the thirty-sixth session of the General Assembly, whose resolution 40/162 requested it to continue to



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consider, as a matter of priority, ways and means of maintaining outer space for peaceful purposes. In compliance with that mandate, the socialist countries, including Poland, submitted to the recent session of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space concrete proposals designed to keep outer space free of weapons and to unify the efforts of States in its peaceful exploration. Those proposals aim, in particular, at the strengthening and developing of the rule of law in outer space and at establishing a world space organization. That approach is based on a conviction that that Committee may usefully supplement the efforts of the relevant disarmament forums and make its own contribution to the establishment of a comprehensive system of international peace and security in the world.

Finally, while developing the rule of law in outer space, we should also have in mind the recent studies and opinions of leading scholars in the field. I would quote only one of them, a man who was a long-time member of the International Court of Justice and its former President, Mr. Manfred Lachs, who spoke at the International Astronautical Congress. He stated:

"The old principle that everything not prohibited is permitted is not valid today. Freedom of action is determined by the possibility of infringing upon the rights of others. Hence the limitation of rights and the need for co-operation and consultations in all cases where a State may, by its activity, affect the rights of others. This is of particular importance with regard to outer space."

Mr. CROMARTIE (United Kingdom) : I should like to speak on behalf of the twelve States members of the European Community to comment on two agenda items, namely, 61 (a), "Consideration of guidelines for confidence-building measures," and 58, "Reduction of military budgets".

In the view of the Twelve, the concept of confidence building is particularly important in a world regrettably fraught with examples of the use or threat of use

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of force. We believe the concept is relevant in the regional as well as the global context.

Confidence-building measures are not, of course, a substitute for disarmament, but they can promote an atmosphere which is more conducive to progress in arms control and disarmament.

The most fundamental approach to confidence building is respect for the principles enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations. If all Member States respected those vital principles, that would in itself transform the world's political climate.

In addition to this, practical confidence-building measures should be considered in order to diminish the roots of mutual misunderstanding, mistrust, fear and miscalculation. To be of value, such measures must be concrete and binding and appropriately verifiable. Mere declarations of intent or of generalized principles are of little use.

Confidence-building measures should embrace greater openness about military activities, including the provision of objective information on military matters. The implementation of confidence-building measures, step by step, can promote the atmosphere necessary for nations to contemplate real arms-control measures. It is heartening that the Disarmament Commission, when it continued its consideration of confidence-building measures this year, reached a large measure of agreement. Under the chairmanship of a member of the Twelve, draft guidelines were agreed except on two issues, on which the Commission presented alternative formulations. We support draft resolution A/C.1/41/L.26, which is co-sponsored by member States of the Twelve.

Turning now to a concrete example of confidence-building measures, a process on the lines I have referred to has been under way in the Twelve's own region in Europe. I refer to the outcome of the Stockholm Conference on Confidence and

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Security Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe, which concluded last month by reaching agreement on a set of confidence and security-building measures. Along with others, the Twelve made a substantial contribution to that result. The agreement known as the Stockholm Document is designed to bring about a greater degree of openness and predictability about military activities in Europe, thus reducing tension, mistrust and the risk of military confrontation.

There are six main elements in the agreement. First, 42 days' notice will be given of military activities - exercises, concentrations and movements - involving more than 13,000 troops or 300 tanks. Secondly, observers must be invited to all such activities involving more than 17,000 troops. Thirdly, the annual forecasts of notifiable activities will be exchanged for the coming year by 15 November of the preceding year. Fourthly, the Stockholm accord will be verified by means of on-site inspection, by ground or air or both. Participants will be obliged to accept, on request, up to three such inspections on their territory per year. Fifthly, military activities in the field involving more than 40,000 troops are to be notified in the annual forecast one year before they would normally be forecast. Activities involving more than 75,000 troops cannot take place unless so forecast. Sixthly, the participating States reaffirmed their commitment to the principle of the non-use of force, a reaffirmation drawn from the Helsinki Final Act and from the United Nations Charter.

(Mr. Cromartie, United Kingdom)

The Stockholm Accord represents a significant and qualitative step forward from the modest confidence-building measures contained in the Helsinki Final Act of 1975. It sets out a set of concrete, politically binding confidence-building measures and gives practical effect to the zone of application (from the Atlantic to the Urals) laid down in the Madrid mandate for the Conference on Confidence and Security Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe. It introduces a greater degree of openness and predictability in European security arrangements, which should thereby help to reduce mistrust and the risk of miscalculation in times of tension. Thus, its achievement comes as a welcome impetus for the process initiated by the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe.

The Accord is the first major multilateral agreement in the military and security field which includes nations from the East and West to have been reached since 1979. It is significant in being the first agreement to provide for verification through on-site inspection by land, air, or both. These provisions for on-site inspection will no doubt form an important precedent for future arms control and disarmament negotiations.

Equally, the Twelve support effort<sup>6</sup> in other regions - in Latin America, in Africa, and in Asia - which can contribute to a favourable atmosphere for regional disarmament measures. We hope that these efforts will prosper.

On the global scale also, the past year has seen developments on confidence-building measures. Last month in Geneva, the Review Conference of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction adopted a number of measures designed to increase compliance with the Convention. A meeting of experts next April will follow up this process.

(Mr. Cromartie, United Kingdom)

It is to be hoped that these important steps in the area of confidence-building measures will inspire further measures.

Turning now to the reduction of military budgets, the 12 members of the European Community, on behalf of whom I am speaking, have retained a consistent and active interest in the subject.

It has been estimated that, by 1985, global military spending was running at the staggering rate of \$US 900 billion per year. Although it is difficult to be certain, on the basis of available information, how accurate that figure might be, no one would dispute that military budgets are absorbing far too great a proportion of the world's human, financial, natural and technological resources. This places a heavy burden on the economies of all countries - big and small, industrialized and developing. There is thus a mutual interest in finding ways of reducing these expenditures.

If the shortcomings of high military spending and the advantages of reductions are obvious to us here in the First Committee, it is reasonable to assume that Governments charged with determining the levels of defence expenditure are equally well aware of them. It is also reasonable to assume that they take these factors fully into account when considering priorities in allocating resources. The balancing act is not an easy one. Governments have a duty to protect their national interests, including the right of States to undiminished security. Defence is not, therefore, an "optional extra".

Nevertheless, as I pointed out, the international community has a common interest in looking for mutually acceptable ways to reduce military budgets. Agreements on balanced disarmament measures could themselves make a major contribution to that objective. Accordingly, the 12 member States of the European Community continue to attach priority to making progress in disarmament

(Mr. Cromartie, United Kingdom)

negotiations that are currently under way. In addition they have taken an active part over the years in work at the United Nations related to the reduction of military budgets, including at the United Nations Disarmament Commission.

We are pleased to note that some progress was made during the 1986 session of the Commission on the drafting of principles covering the actions of States in the field of freezing and reducing military budgets. In developing the draft principles, the 12 members contributed to various compromise formulations and noted that there was wide acceptance in the Commission of the need for a prior understanding about the exchange of relevant data and about the comparability of military budgets. Notwithstanding the progress achieved, much work remains to be done and we believe that the Disarmament Commission should continue to work on this subject with a view to finalising the draft principles at its session in 1987.

While a set of general principles in this area would no doubt be useful, compliance with and implementation of concrete measures in the field of arms control and disarmament remain of priority importance.

The United Nations reporting matrix, established through General Assembly resolution 35/142 B provides a universal framework whereby States can supply information about their military expenditures in a standardised form - that is to say, in a comparable and non-prejudicial form. It is clear from the range of countries which have participated in the exercise already that differences in social and economic systems are not an obstacle to completing the reporting instrument. We therefore hope that more countries, in particular from Eastern Europe, will do so in the future. For while the provision of facts and figures does not solve all of the difficult problems associated with the reduction of military budgets, there is no doubt that a freer, more open flow of information as well as the political goodwill of all States concerned are essential prerequisites for the conclusion of worthwhile and reliable agreements in this field.

## ORGANIZATION OF WORK

The CHAIRMAN: At this stage of our work, permit me to make a few remarks. As you will recall, the deadline for the submission of draft resolutions on disarmament agenda item 8 expired yesterday. Despite effort made in good faith by all the delegations concerned, the Committee has once again ended up with a large volume of draft resolutions under the relevant agenda items. Quite a large number of drafts namely, 45, have been circulated as official documents today. The balance of the draft resolutions will become available as official documents by Monday, 3 November.

With respect to the action to be taken on these drafts, members will recall that, at the organizational meeting on 8 October, I stated my intention to follow the useful device of clustering draft resolutions - a device which has evolved in the course of the past several years. In the next few days, the Bureau of the Committee will address itself to the draft resolutions with a view to grouping them into appropriate clusters, and I think I shall be in a position to provide the Committee with suggestions and further information on the matter during the early part of the next phase of our work.

At this stage, I also have to bring to the attention of the Committee the situation concerning the item on disarmament and development. You will recall that a note by the Chairman was circulated on 29 October setting forth the recommendations of the Bureau of the Preparatory Committee for the International Conference on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development, which was conveyed to me in a letter dated 24 October 1966 (A/C.1/41/7) from Ambassador Muchkund Dubey, the Chairman of the Preparatory Committee.

(The Chairman)

In view of the atmosphere prevailing at the time, following the adjournment of our meeting yesterday afternoon, I, in my capacity as Chairman of the First Committee, invited the members of the Bureau of the Preparatory Committee and other interested parties to sit down with me for informal consultations in order to explore thoroughly the possibility of reaching an agreement on a single text which would constitute the proposal under this agenda item.



**(The Chairman)**

In the course of those intensive consultations, however, it became apparent that perhaps more time would be needed if a satisfactory solution was to emerge. Nevertheless, since we were faced with a deadline, the interested parties submitted to me personally two proposals, thereby technically adhering to the deadline set by the Committee.

Subsequently, with the concurrence of the parties concerned, I requested the Secretariat to withhold issuance for the time being of those two proposals to afford me further opportunity to hold the necessary consultations to determine whether the Committee might be in a position to produce a single text on this issue that would be acceptable to all.

I am confident that representatives understand the delicate nature of the consultations that I intend to undertake and, accordingly, I would appreciate it if the subject-matter could be held in abeyance in the course of our formal discussions at this juncture so as to facilitate the process of my further consultations.

I understand, following the necessary consultations, that the procedure that I have just outlined will be acceptable to the Committee. Since I hear no objection, it will be so decided.

It was so decided.

**The CHAIRMAN:** I shall now call on representatives who wish to speak in exercise of the right of reply, I would advise them that the Committee will follow the procedure outlined by me at a previous meeting.

**Mr. MASHHADI-GHAHVEHCHI** (Islamic Republic of Iran) : There are concrete, well-defined and exact subjects and items on the First Committee's crowded agenda. I do not know why a few delegations prefer to use this forum to seek to justify their groundless and baseless accusations.

(Mr. Maashhadi-Ghahvehchi, Islamic  
Republic of Iran)

One day when the subject of nuclear-free zones in the Middle East and Africa - two very important items on the Committee's agenda - were being considered suddenly representativea heard some irrelevant and, more important, baseless accusations about oil trade between the Pretoria régime, the Arab States and the Islamic Republic of Iran. Another day when the issue of the use of chemical weapons - also an agenda item - was being discussed, another voice, that of Iraq, repeated the old, obsolete and fabricated accusation about Iran's arms purchases.

To show representativea the realities, I should like to draw their attention to some news items reported in the Western press.

On 21 March 1986, Jerusalem Post reported as follows:

"reports, based on Washington sources, have confirmed earlier statements that Iraq has requested . . . arms and military advice from Israel".

It added the following regarding relations between the United States and Iraq in furtherance of these matters:

"Diplomatic ties were resumed in 1983" - that is, between Iraq and the United States - "and Saddam Hussein's boycott of Egypt for signing the Camp David accords has been dropped. Subsequently, Iraq received \$1.5 billion of American credits to purchase wheat, rice and barley."

The Daily Telegraph of 24 March 1986 reported:

"Iraq wants to buy the Israeli 'Drone', an unmanned reconnaissance aircraft equipped with sophisticated monitoring equipment which could be used to pinpoint Iranian field positions.

"America wants Israel to sell this and other arms to Iraq because of growing fears that the Iraqi Government will not be able to resist long-term military pressure from Iran."

(Mr. Mashhadi-Ghahvehchi, Islamic Republic of Iran)

The same paper **added**:

“Apart from selling Iraq the '**Drone**' there is also the possibility that Israel [will] **5011** its collection of Soviet weapons captured during **past wars** with its Arab neighbours.”

Those articles show the realities and therefore these are known to all and sundry.

Mr. MAHMOUD (Iraq) (interpretation from Arabic) : I do not believe that there is anyone present in this room who has forgotten the reports about collaboration in arms **supplies** between Iran and the Zionist entity.

We categorically deny what **was** said a moment ago by the representative of **Iran** about an arms link between Iraq and the Zionist entity. On the contrary, there is a close and significant arms link between Israel and Iran, which was specifically defended by the **spokesman** of the so-called Iranian Parliament, **Hashemi Rafsanjani**, who stated: “These are Israel’s previous debts and we have to collect them.”

**Moreover**, the Argentine aircraft crash two years ago on Soviet territory - an aircraft that **was** engaged in the transport of weapons from Israel to Iran - irrefutably revealed the existence of an **arms link between the two régimes**.

Finally, **about** a month before that **Danish** sailors said that their **ships** went to Iran carrying Israeli weapons,

The CHAIRMAN : I have to inform members that the following delegations **are** inscribed on the list of speakers for the meeting on Monday morning: **Sri Lanka**, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the German **Democratic** Republic, the United Arab Emirates, Hungary, Australia, Iraq, Botswana, Romania, Poland, **Brazil** and **Austria**.

The meeting rose at 6.20 p.m.