



VERBATIM RECORD OF THE 27th MEETING

Chairman; Mr. ZACHMANN (German Democratic Republic)

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ORGANIZATION OF WORK

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The meeting was called to order at 3.20 p.m.

AGENDA ITEMS 46 to 65 AND 144 (continued)

STATEMENTS ON SPECIFIC DISARMAMENT ITEMS AND CONTINUATION OF THE GENERAL DEBATE

Mr. CROMARTIE (United Kingdom) : I am speaking this afternoon on behalf of the 12 members of the European Community to comment on two items on our agenda, item 60 (j), "Review of the role of the United Nations in the field of disarmament", and on item 62 (m), "Review and appraisal of the implementation of the Declaration of the 1980s as the Second Disarmament Decade". On the former subject, the Twelve are gratified that at the initiative of a group of African countries led by Cameroon, a review is being carried out of the role of the United Nations in the field of disarmament. The member States of the European Community submitted their detailed views on the issues raised, as set out in document A/CN.10/69/Add.1. The subject has been under consideration in the Disarmament Commission for two years now, and we hope that the Commission will be allowed to complete its work so that a report and recommendations can be submitted to the next session of the General Assembly, and as necessary to the next special session devoted to disarmament.

(Mr. Cromartie, United Kingdom)

The Twelve agree fundamentally that the United Nations **must play a central role** in the ● phase of **disarmament**. This **is** wniatant with **tha** purpoaaa and **principles** of the Charter, **full obaervance** of which would definitely **enhance** the **contribution made** by the United Nations.

It aould, **however**, not be **overlooked** that United Nations bodies have ● **lresdy made major contributions** to the **cause** of **disarmament** and **arma** wntrol. A number of agreements, **some of great importance**, have **been concluded** under **the auspices** of the General Aasenbly and other United Nations **bodies**.

**It is** true that in recent years there have been **few new** agreement8 **concluded** but *in* the Twelve's **view this** la not the **fault of** the United Nations; rather, **this situation reflects** a period of **erosion** of **international** confidence. **Apart from** **avoiding actions which** are wntrary to the Charter, **Members of** the United Nations can make a contribution to **avoiding** much a **position** in future by **striving for** greater **understanding** on the part of Member States generally of the **security** wncepta and **principles** which guide each **others** approachem.

**Happily**, in the part **few year8** the international climate ham **improved**, **negotiations of var ious** aorta have **re-commenced** or been reinaugurated, and **we look forward to** the **fruits of this whether** outalde or **within** the United Nations system - for example, the chemical **weapons** negotiations **in** the Conference on **Disarmament**.

As I indicated at tha outset, the Twelve **w lcome** periodic **reviews** of United Net ions machinery. It ha been **some** years now mince **this machinery** in the field of diaarmamant **was** laat ra-examined and restructured.

We **believe** that the **role of the General Assembly**, in particular that of its **First Committee**, is **essential** given the **commitment** of the United Nation8 to **peace**, ● **\*lhrity** end a safer world for all. It **is** the **main** deliberative **organ** of the United Nations in the **field of disarmament** where **all States, inc:uding** those not

(Mr. Cromartie, United Kingdom)

participating **directly in** specific negotiations, can **make** their **views** felt. Here **States can** bring to bear their particular geographical, regional, maturity, moral and **economic** perception\*.

However, **my Minister of State, Mr. Renton**, pointed out on **behalf** of the **Twelve** in *the* **general debate** on 14 October, **there has** been a **proliferation** of **resolutions** and a **decline** in **consensus**. In our view, the **process** of **deliberation** and **review** in the **First Committee** would gain significantly if **resolutions were** **directed** to the achievement of concrete action. The need for greater efficiency and **effectiveness** is made **the more urgent** as a result of the **budgetary crisis** which the United Nations **faces**.

The **Twelve** consider that the **Disarmament Commission** has a significant contribution to make as a **deliberative body**; its **existence** permits in-depth examination of **specific issues**, which cannot be undertaken elsewhere. In order for this to **be done** **effectively**, it might be useful to have **periodic rotation** of the **issues under consideration**.

The **Twelve** attach great **importance** to the **work** of the Conference on **Disarmament** as the **permanent** multilateral negotiating body. Clearly, **negotiations can take place** only on **subjects where common** ground exists. In the present **circumstances**, we believe that **one of the most urgent priorities** in the **Conference on Disarmament** is the conclusion of an agreement  **banning chemical weapons**. **It should** **be possible** to see the agreed **enlargement** of the Conference **take place** as soon as **possible**.

**Turning from forums of discussion** and negotiation to other areas of United Nations activity, the **Twelve** hold that the **best possible use** of resources should be **made** and **unnecessary duplication** avoided. The Department for Disarmament Affairs **has** a **primary** co-ordinating role in this respect. We would wish to **emphasize** at this point that we **much appreciate** the value of the work done by that Department.

(Mr. Cromartie, United Kingdom)

We also believe that studies conducted under United Nations auspices should be related clearly to specific practical objectives.

We believe that the First Committee should show restraint in commissioning new studies, which in any case should be the subject of proper consultation. The Secretary-General's Advisory Board also has an important role to play as a co-ordinating clearing-house for studies of a more independent and academic nature and to avoid overlapping with one another and with studies carried out by experts appointed by the Secretary-General. We welcome the initiative launched in resolution 40/152 K on the subject of studies.

We believe that pragmatic measures on the line8 indicated would do much to improve the United Nations handling of disarmament issues.

I turn now to agenda item 62 (m). The 12 members of the European Community share the purpose and objectives of the Second Disarmament Decade proclaimed by the United Nations General Assembly in resolution 45/46 of 1980. They attach the highest priority to progress on arms control and disarmament, which they believe is essential if the goals of enhanced security at the lowest possible levels of armaments and increased confidence and trust are to be achieved. Six years after its adoption the Declaration remains a basis for action by Member States.

sadly, the beginning of the Decade was marked for a variety of reasons by a decrease in international trust and a corresponding increase in suspicion, which naturally had repercussions for arms control and disarmament. More recently the international atmosphere, and thus the prospects for agreements, has improved. In our view, the demonstration of compliance with existing agreements as well as greater openness about military matters will hasten this process.

undoubtedly the area of primary interest is the one where the two Powers with the overwhelming preponderance of nuclear weapons as well as the leading military

(Mr. Cromartie, United Kingdom;

capability in space bear special responsibility. The Twelve welcome the heightened activity in this area in the past year and have been encouraged by the meetings between President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev which have taken place. Though no agreements have been concluded, we have noted with great interest the common ground reached between the participants in the recent discussions at Reykjavik. In this respect the Twelve support the draft resolution submitted in document A/C.1/41/L.3.

The Twelve also welcome the considerable progress made this year in the Conference on Disarmament towards the important objective of concluding a complete ban on the production, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons. Members of the Twelve have played a full part in this process.

We were also pleased by the positive outcome of the Second Review Conference of the biological weapons Convention which took place in Geneva in September.

In the Twelve's own region, the successful outcome of the Stockholm Conference on Confidence and Security Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe was of great importance. The confidence and security-building measures agreed are a step in the right direction towards strengthening and enhancing security and trust between States. Those members of the Twelve which take part in the Vienna negotiations on mutual and balanced force reductions in Central Europe maintain their determination to continue to seek mutually acceptable solutions and have accordingly made major efforts to move those negotiations forward.

The Twelve have continued to play an active part in United Nations bodies devoted to disarmament, including this Committee, where they have brought forward a number of resolutions; and also in the Disarmament Commission, whose Chairman this year was a State member of the European Community.

(Hr. Cromartie, United Kingdom)

The Twelve have been **pleased to note** that the Disarmament Commission **was able** to reach **agreement** on **a report** on the **implementation** of the **Second** Disarmament Decade A its 1985 session, which in turn **reflected resolution 40/152 L** adopted by the First Committee by **consensus** last year. In **our view** this **pragmatic** and realistic approach reflects well on the **sponsors** of the **resolution**.

Mr. KEISALO (Finland) : Today I shall address some aspects of the item entitled "Naval armaments and disarmament". This matter has been gaining increased attention in recent years, as can be seen from the reports before the Committee and the discussions that have taken place in both the General Assembly and the Disarmament Commission in following up the United Nations comprehensive study on the naval arms race.

It is easy to show that a significant naval arms build-up has been going on for some time in both quantitative and qualitative terms. This development is not only a matter of accumulating capabilities and thus acquiring new options for the use of naval forces. Such forces are also being deployed more intensively.

Taking my own region as an example, there have been many reports about growing naval activities in the North Atlantic and in other sea areas close to Northern Europe. Those activities include patrolling at sea and large-scale naval manoeuvres. If these trends continue the result may eventually come to look like a semi-permanent deployment of strong naval forces in certain sea areas. It should be noted that submarine incidents in the Baltic Sea have caused concern, especially in Sweden.

We all know that such phenomena can be interpreted differently. They can be seen in the context of a search for security and stability on the global level. It can be argued that the easily observable fact of the naval arms race is not a valid starting-point for negotiating any arrangements that would deal separately with naval matters, in spite of some remarkable historical precedents.

It is not my intention to enter into those arguments at the present time. On the other hand I wish to argue that it is feasible to identify and agree on certain types of measures affecting the use of naval forces. I have in mind particularly confidence-building measures in the naval environment.



(Hr. Keisalo, Finland)

The 35 States that participated in the Conference on Confidence and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe reached an important agreement in Stockholm last month, leading to the implementation of much more far-reaching measures on the European continent than were previously thought possible. As we have heard from many speakers here in the Committee, this result has been widely regarded as an important achievement in the broad field of arms regulation. We hope that the Conference will deal with the matter of maritime confidence and security-building measures when it resumes its work.

Here at the United Nations the Disarmament Commission has begun its deliberations relating to the study on the naval arms race but the Commission has not yet been able to come up with any specific recommendations. Confidence-building measures concerning sea areas and naval operations have played a prominent part in its work until now. We note that guidelines for such measures have been regarded as a priority item, on which a consensus should emerge or be well in sight before other aspects of naval arms regulation can be tackled.

Earlier this month, in a public speech, the President of Finland drew attention to the importance of naval confidence-building measures. He had in mind particularly measures that would be applicable to sea areas adjacent to northern Europe. Intensified naval activities in those areas I have already mentioned have sometimes been regarded as evidence of growing tension even in northern Europe itself. In our view such a conclusion does not necessarily follow, but Finland and the other Nordic countries can certainly be expected to take a strong interest in developments affecting their naval environment.

I may mention in this connection that the idea of confirming the well established and traditional nuclear-weapon-free status of northern Europe through a zonal treaty arrangement has been more and more prominently studied and discussed in the Nordic countries. We would regard the establishment of a Nordic

(Mr. Keisalo, Finland)

nuclear-weapon-free zone as having a strong confidence-building dimension, and one could easily envisage related extension measures concerning the Baltic Sea or even other adjacent sea areas being arrived at in agreement with the **reactive** nuclear-weapon States that are active on the high seas.

Many other possible confidence-building measures, applicable also to the waters surrounding northern Europe have been referred to both in the documents before us and in previous statements in this Committee. The measures could deal with pre-notification of naval exercises, with the multilateralization of existing bilateral arrangements regarding incidents on and over the high seas, with restraints on deployments, naval patrols and exercises, including amphibious exercises, and many other questions which, taken together, could result in disengagement measures and become the basis for a whole new code of conduct regarding the use of naval forces.

We believe that this is one of the areas where common security interests can be identified and where it should therefore be possible to work out mutually satisfactory arrangements on a voluntary basis for the benefit of all.

The delegation of Finland will be ready to co-operate with other delegations both in the General Assembly and later in the Disarmament Commission in order to advance in such a direction.

Mr. PENAZKA (Czechoslovakia) (interpretation from Russian): The Czechoslovak delegation wishes to expound in more detail its views on the question of the prevention of an arms race in outer space, an item which, without any doubt, is one of the main topics of our debate and indeed of political discourse in general in the world.

We have already touched on a number of important and topical military and political aspects of this problem, in summing up our assessment of the results of the Reykjavik meeting and those of the Conference on Disarmament. In the present

(Mr. Penazka, Czechoslovakia)

**statement** we intend to ● **nphamix**e the urgent need for a **solution** au regards the practical **activity** of **States** in **space** and the need to **strengthen** the treaty **basis** for that activity.

I **wish** to pint out that **guaranteeing** a peaceful statue for **space** is, **as** we **see** it, a practical **task** which ham a direct bearing on our national security and the **development** of our ● **oonomies**. We are **fu'ly** aware of the **threat** emanating from the **implementation** of the program for the **development and deployment** of space-atr ike **weapons**. We believe that the **militariz** tion of space will lead to the emergence of a qualitatively new **military** and **strategic** situation characterized by a particularly high level of instability end uncertainty. **Programmee** for the development of **space armamaments** are already the principal obstacle to the limitation and elimination of nuclear **weapons** and even to a nuclear test ban.

(Mr. Penazka, Czechoslovakia)

One discerns in the **thinking** behind the **strategic defence** initiative (SDI) a policy of adopting nuclear space weapons • ymtmas which involve8 the **rapid improvement** of • xinting systems of **nuclear weapons** and their combination with **space-based** weapons. This is fully confirmed by the development and ongoing **implementation** of the **SDI programme**. The argument that **SDI** could make **nuclear weapons obsolete** is thum **revealed** to be **wholly meaningless**. This theory is refuted by practice. We are **even 1088 persuaded** by **arguments** to the effect that so-called **strategic defence is necessary** as a kind of **barrier** or **guarantees** in the case of **deception** by the **other side** in the **process** of the **implementation** of **agreed** cuts in and the elimination of **strategic** nuclear weapons. Without any doubt such guarantee8 can be provided by **strict** and effective **verification measures**, including all **the** procedure8 **necessary** to **establish complete** confidence in their **reliability**. And it is well known that there are no **obstacles** to **agreement** on such verification. The **dangerous** and **destabilizing** nature of **SDI** is revealed **most** clearly by **the consequences** its **implementation** would have in respect of existing treaties **designed** to curb the arm8 race.

We have **already** pointed out that the 1972 Soviet-United States Treaty on the **Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems**, no matter how freely interpreted, doe8 not allow the development and **testing of such weapons** in space. When the **implementation** of **SDI** reaches the **testing stage** other important international **agreements** will immediately be called into **question** - one of them being the 1965 partial test-ban Treaty banning **nuclear-weaprn** tests in the atmosphere, in space and under **water**.

It is admittedly very difficult to draw the line between conventional nuclear testing in space and the testing of high-capacity **nuclear-powered** laser devices. The agreements which are thus threatened include the crucial 1967 Treaty on

(Mr. Penazka, Czechoslovak in)

Principles **Governing** the **Activities** of States in Outer Space, which **imposes** on States parties the obligation not to place in orbit **around** the Earth any **space** devices with nuclear weapons or any other types of weapons **of** mass destruction on board, and not to deploy such weapons in outer **space** by any other means.

Since the space weapons envisaged have a **largely** nuclear **basis** and **possess** **immense** destructive power which can at any time be turned against purely **terrestrial** targets, it is **obvious** that such weapons can properly be included in the **category** of weapons of mass destruction. Nor can one overlook certain statements **made** by the United States this year in connection with the SALT I and SALT II Treaties. **Thus** a clear picture is emerging of the disruptive **consequences** of SDI for existing disarmament treaties and their future prospects. If, in **spite** of the efforts and clearly expressed will of the **overwhelming** majority of States, it proves **impossible** to prevent an arms race in space, this will directly or indirectly undermine all substantive results in the field of **arms** limitation that have been achieved in the **past**, and will erect obstacles which will be **very** difficult to overcome for future agreements.

That **is** why we emphasize once again the need for the **United** Nations to concentrate **on** ensuring that, at this crucial moment - when time **is** running out for action and the need for action is increasing rapidly - practical negotiations are initiated **to** prevent an arms race in space in all **its** aspects. Such negotiations should become the main objective of the Conference on Disarmament.

In **this** way we would be making a substantial contribution to the **attainment** of an agreement on **this** crucial problem of our **age** in the bilateral **negotiations**

(Mr. Yenarka, Czechoslovakia)

between the United States and the Soviet Union. It is essential that all States, and especially those with a major space potential, should comply strictly with existing legal restrictions on space weapons, including those contained in the 1967 space Treaty and the 1972 ABM Treaty, and that they should refrain from taking any measures to develop, test and deploy weapons, including new types of weapons systems, in space. Furthermore, it is essential to strengthen the political and organizational basis for the broadest possible international co-operation in the prevention of an arms race in space and in the peaceful exploration of space.

Czechoslovakia, like many other countries with relatively limited resources, can carry out programs for the exploration of space only within the framework of broad international co-operation, that makes it possible to combine the financial, material, scientific and technological resources needed to proceed with joint projects on a mutually advantageous basis. We have accordingly been taking an active part in the international Inter-Cosmos programme and firmly support the development of comprehensive space co-operation among all States of the world.

Although at first sight these questions did not have a direct bearing on the work of the Committee, they nevertheless illustrate even more clearly why the preservation of the peaceful status of space is very much in the vital interest of the entire international community. First of all, the conversion of space into a zone of military preparations and confrontation of the leading space nuclear Powers could not fail to have the effect of undermining international efforts for the peaceful exploration of space and the utilization of its wealth on the basis of equal access for all States, since it would materially restrict the scope for such co-operation. For example, a number of States have already expressed their concern at the fact that space, and in particular the geostationary orbit, is already crammed with space devices. The total number of such devices is under 3,000, and

(Mr. Penazka, Czechoslovakia)

yet it is known that, under the United States SDI programme alone, up to 3,200 military space devices, deployed in several tiers, are to be placed in space. In other words, the number of the space strike weapons would exceed that of all existing space devices. And of course we are talking only about the initial phase and about a single State.

It is not difficult to arrive at the conclusion that in this context of a military occupation of space - which is what it really amounts to - peaceful space devices, including international devices, would find it very difficult to find a place for themselves in space orbit.

(Mr. Penazka, Czechoslovakia)

Secondly, the projects for the militarization of outer space obviously entail serious financial consequences, not only for the States implementing such projects, but on a broad, international level. If an arms race starts up in outer space, it will, in an ever-widening spiral, suck up vast economic, industrial, scientific and technological capabilities of many States. The first dangerous step in that direction have already been taken as a result of the internationalization of the strategic defence initiative (SDI) and the begetting of its European offshoot. It is already evident that the net outflow of resources to such programs can, even by conservative estimates, be calculated in trillions of dollars, and that, even in the initial stage of their deployment, their cost will exceed the total of the current indebtedness of all the developing countries together. It is obvious that such expenditure cannot fail to have an impact on the world economy and will serve as a factor of serious destabilization in international economic relations.

In fact, the anticipated profits of the transnational corporations and other contractors under the strategic defence initiative will be gained, directly or indirectly, at the expense of a larger number of States than those actively participating in it - by means, inter alia, of taking resources away from the developing countries. Thus, the SDI programme is in clear contradiction with the purposes of the United Nations and its attempts to bridge the economic gap between developed and developing countries, as well as threatening the well-being and economic security of States. Moreover, as a result of the diversion of the vast scientific and technological potential of States to the development of space weapons there will be an inevitable reduction in the possibilities for technological co-operation in the realm of the peaceful use of outer space and a proportionate reduction in opportunities for non-discriminatory and equal access to the benefits derived from the peaceful exploration of outer space.



(Mr. Penazka, Czechoslovakia)

Thirdly, the **spread** of the **arms** race into outer **space**, in addition to its **serious** military, strategic and economic **consequences**, will lead to a **sharp** **increase** in **distrust** and the **possible** outbreak of unpredictable conflict **situations** with regard to **space** activities. From a practical **standpoint**, the task of harmonizing concrete **international** programmes for the peaceful exploration of Outer space will be greatly **complicated** when it is **thought** that their **results** could be used by either **side** to accelerate the pace of **space** programmes for military **purposes**. Looking at **this** objectively, **we** believe that this would give a greater **impetus** to **isolationist** tendencies and to even greater limitations being placed on the exchange of scientific and **technological** data and the **openness** of research. Such information, as we all know, has an **important** role to play in **maintaining** the necessary level of **trust**.

In such **circumstances**, given a high concentration of **military** **space** platforms in orbit, any accidents connected with **such** **armed** facilities would be exceedingly dangerous. Everyone will recall the **consternation** created not long ago by an accident to one of the **relatively** **small** artificial earth **satellites** intended for peaceful **purposes**. Technical breakdowns, computer malfunction and incorrect **assessments** of such situations in control centres and the **like** could, in the case of **military** **space** **platforms**, have far more **serious** consequences.

All this cannot be swept **aside** by **assurances** about the peaceful purposes of the strategic **defence** initiative. On the contrary, it **serves** only as further proof of the need to elaborate a broad program of joint **practical** actions by states for the peaceful exploration of outer **space**. We feel that the proposals put forward by the Soviet **Union** in this regard, including the proposed **establishment** of a **world** **space** organization, deserve the most careful **consideration**. We believe that the elaboration of such a comprehensive **programme** for peace in space and the

(Mr. Penazka, Czechoslovakia)

establishment of the machinery needed for its full implementation are indeed possible, if an arms race in outer space can be avoided. On the other hand, progress in that direction would also help in confidence-building and be an important factor in support of efforts to prevent the militarization of outer space.

The multifaceted nature of the problem of preventing an arms race in outer space and its particularly urgent nature require that all States adopt a responsible, active and constructive approach in all forums involved in its solution, and primarily at the United Nations. We are hopeful that this year the First Committee will adopt decisions consonant with the gravity of that task, and we are prepared to participate in their preparation.

Mr. MEISZTER (Hungary) : In my statement today I would like to make a few general remarks about the Geneva Conference on Disarmament and to deal at some length with the item on its agenda concerning the prohibition of chemical weapons.

The Geneva Conference on Disarmament is commonly referred to as the only multilateral disarmament negotiating body within the United Nations system. It is also regarded as such by the Hungarian People's Republic, which therefore follows its activities with particular attention.

The activities of the Conference on Disarmament are extremely labour- and time-consuming. The number of meetings - formal and informal plenary sessions, ad hoc committee meetings, expert meetings, technical workshops and so on - may be put at 300 to 400 every year. I do not mean that as a complaint; I merely want to highlight the fact because it forms an element of our assessment and because, in our view, the results achieved are far from commensurate with the input of energy and time, particularly with regard to the urgency of solving the questions on the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament. An objective look at that output reveals the following.

(Mr. Meiszer, Hungary)

**First**, during **this year's** session it **was** not **possible** to **carry** out negotiating **activities** in the preparation of an agreement on any of the priority **subjects** - by which I mean **questions** of nuclear disarmament - although the overwhelming **majority** of delegations were strongly **in** favour of doing so.

(Mr. Meisster, Hungary)

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Secondly, on **the second** priority subject, the **Prevention** of the extension of **the arms race to** outer space, **some** negotiating activity **may be said to have been** going on in the preparation of a treaty, but regrettably such **activity can be** regarded **as** having produced no tangible effect on the real processes under way outside the conference room. Besides, what is more **disquieting, one** of the participants, while engaged in the negotiations, is pursuing or introducing a practice that is contrary to the search **for** an agreement for which we are striving-

Finally, in some areas, like negative **assurances**, we do not see even formal **progress, while in some** other fields, such as the prohibition of radiological weapons, we can only speak of moving backward<sup>6</sup> rather than forwards.

In expressing such a degree of **dissatisfaction** in **connection** with the Conference on Disarmament, **I** hasten **to** preclude a **misunderstanding**. **As we** look at it, the cause of unsatisfactory activity is in no way in the structure of the Conference **on Disarmament or its** working methods. We are **aware that some** are inclined to think that the reasons **for** the unsatisfactory activity of **the Conference on** Disarmament lies **in** its structure or **inadequate** working methods. It has **become** rather fashionable to **call for improving** the efficiency of **the Conference on** Disarmament in this respect, **Even if I** admit that **there is** also room and **need** for such improvement, the change<sup>6</sup> **that** representatives familiar **with** the **Conference on Disarmament are** referring to, will not and **cannot** lead to any radical change in the essential activity of the Conference on Disarmament because in **our** opinion what lies behind the lack **of** results is the attitude of **delegations** or the **position** of the States they represent; **As long as** a new approach to disarmament **is** not adopted by all **participating** States, a veritable **negotiating process** directed to the conclusion of disarmament agreements cannot **be expected** to gain **momentum** in the Conference on Disarmament.

(Mr. Meiszer, Hungary)

This brings me to the **negotiations** on **the prohibition of chemical weapons**, of which I **should like to** make a **special** point. If we stick to the **original** meaning of words, it is only in this area where the Conference on Disarmament can be **said** to be **engaged** in an activity that can be called a negotiating process aimed at the **conclusion** of an agreement. Since nothing less is at **issue** than a weapon that is indisputably one of mass destruction, whose **use** the world is not free from **despite** the existence of the Geneva Convention of 1925, the very fact of **serious** negotiations going on is welcome and salutary - if it is **necessary** to **use** the word 'serious' at all, for when speaking of disarmament no negotiations are **supposed** to be conducted that are other than **serious**. It is not accidental that almost all speakers have **dealt with** the **negotiations** on chemical weapons, and many of my colleagues have been rather optimistic about their **possible** speedy success, using **such phrases as** "considerable progress", "**significant progress**", "**encouraging prospects**", "conclusion of a convention is within reach", and so forth..

However, a closer look at the relevant part of the report of the Conference on Disarmament and at its 1986 **session** compels us to point out that while great interest was shown in the topic - as is indicated indirectly by the fact that 11 **States not** members of the Conference on Disarmament **also** took an active part in the work of the **Ad hoc** Committee, and indicated directly by the fact that during the 1966 session 42 **official documents** were presented by **delegation** - the working **groups** nevertheless **have succeeded** in discussing only **small portions** of the chapters assigned to them. Certain **questions covered** by the report are not based on **consensus**, with various delegations expressing reservations regarding them. Several **notions** are **used** without special **clarification**. Even in the chapters discussed there are many remarks like "to be elaborated", **signalling** that the **given aspects** cannot yet be clarified in the context of the convention as a whole.

(Mr. Meiszter, Hungary)

In the light of the foregoing, I feel that Mr. Morel, the French representative, has given a noteworthy assessment in stating that:

(spoke in French)

"However, my delegation is very much aware of the efforts to be made and the difficulties to be overcome in order to achieve the result that we desire. We do not agree with the optimism of those who think the negotiations can be concluded next year or that the objective is within our reach."

(co: in English)

My delegation is inclined to treat with similar caution the optimistic assessments of the probable development of the situation. We do not, of course, question the sincerity of the aforementioned optimistic assessments or the willingness of delegations to participate in such a spirit in the future activity of the Conference on Disarmament. We, too, are ready to do so. At the same time, my delegation wants to draw attention to its opinion that, though the area of common ground has been enlarged somewhat during the last session of the Conference on Disarmament, serious divergences will have to be overcome in the future, that a large amount of work remains to be done and that all delegations will have to do their utmost in order to make further progress possible. All this can be done, of course, but it will need time, energy, political will and, above all, a commitment by all participating States not to pursue or start activities that might shatter the foundations of a future treaty.

In this context, efforts to embark on the production of a new type of chemical weapon, signalled as a possibility by one of the Member States, would make any agreement technically senseless, once and for all. And I do not see any good in pressing for the early drafting of an agreement by means of a threat to produce a

(Mr. Meiszter, Hungary)

new chemical weapon and incorporate it into the existing arsenals. If we are perforce "playing for time", I find it better to defer the production of the new weapon in the hope of reaching a treaty, however long it would take, than to postpone indefinitely the conclusion of a treaty because of a premature implementation of a hastily adopted decision, which I venture to say is not called for by the real security interests of the country concerned.

Mrs. URIBE de LOZANO (Colombia) (interpretation from Spanish):

Mr. Chairman, since my delegation is speaking for the first time in this Committee at this session, I should like to congratulate you on the effective manner in which you have been presiding over our debates and to convey to you and the other officers of the Committee our full confidence in your abilities.

A person living in the third world who hears that billions of dollars are being spent on weapons must feel perplexed at seeing that war is a priority and not social development. He must think that devoting such enormous resources to military purposes, and devoting so many other technical and human resources to the work of destruction should certainly weigh on the conscience of those who are aware of the dimensions of the tragic problem of underdevelopment.

Many of those resources are spent on the conventional arms race, with the consequences which that entails for the developing countries. The emphasis which my delegation wishes to place on conventional disarmament is not an arbitrary choice. It is due to a tangible and dramatic reality, to the experience of many countries which are bleeding as a result of those weapons. Accordingly it is this subject on which I shall speak today.

Colombia has welcomed the study on the various aspects of the conventional arms race prepared by the Secretary-General. After many years of discussing this item, for the first time in the United Nations there has been a far-ranging

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review of the characteristics, the causes and the effects of the conventional arms race, and there has been a study of principles approaches and measures for a limitation of conventional weapons and for disarmament.

In our view, this study is an excellent contribution, one which could also serve the purpose of involving the countries represented here in a clinical analysis of the general situation and in the adoption of remedial measures.



(Mrs. Uribe de Lozano, Colombia)

There can be no doubt that the adoption of effective measures towards conventional disarmament is of vital importance in the effort to reduce the danger of war. The study reminds us that since 1945 more than 100 armed conflicts have occurred in the world, resulting in the loss of millions of human lives. The developing world has been the stage, and of course the victim, of almost all those armed conflicts, many of which could have expanded to create situations dangerous to world security. Today, when we read the newspapers or listen to the news it seems obvious that armed conflicts are of an international nature, many of them either the result of foreign intervention or encouraged from outside. In them we see also an expression of the classic theory that it is more advantageous and less dangerous to wage a war on somebody else's territory and with others as the main protagonist. Thus this is not a problem that can be consigned to the pages of history; it is a tragedy that increasingly keeps pace with the world's political development. The study goes to the heart of the matter when it says that the current conventional arms race is closely related to political tension and differences between East and West. It also relates it to tensions, conflicts and confrontations elsewhere in the world.

It is thus shown that the greatest danger for mankind stems from the extreme rivalry between the super-Powers. The undeniable intrusion of the East-West confrontation in various regions of the world and the resulting involvement of other countries in the arms race, far from guaranteeing peace, increases conflict and endangers the security of all States.

The study states that

"If current trends continue it is inevitable that there will not only be more and continued human suffering but also a continual rise in the world's military expenditure, to the further detriment of social and economic development in the world." (A/39/348, para. 57)

(Mrs. Uribe de Lozano, Colombia)

In moral terms there is no **difference between** a man who **dies** in a war and one who is **condemned** to die from hunger. The major moral problems caused by the **slow** growth of the world economy vis-A-vie the **spiralling** arms build-up and the justifiable **disquiet** of the peoples at their **poor** living conditions call for an **immediate** response.

We are therefore faced with a **flagrant** and **shameful** injustice in which the developing world serves as the **scapegoat** in the feuds of others. That **situation** could **persist** unless we have **the** sense to understand our place and time in the **world**. **When** we refer to **the** international context it is not in an attempt to **shirk** our own responsibility but in order **the** better to understand past and present reality. Being aware of **its** nature, we must **diagnose** and **act** accordingly.

Everything that we have read and experienced about our **path** to development **confirms** that we cannot **speak** of **peace** while there **is** hunger. We have also **learned** to take a **less** optimistic view of **development** than that which **is** apparently **professed** by those who **imagine** that **development**, once **it** has started, will bring about a **gradual** reduction in social tension and a gradual increase in the confidence and satisfaction of the population. That **is** a **hope** which could lead to **crushing**, disappointment, **because** by **its** very nature **economic development** cannot bring about a **considerable** increase in the **standard of living** in most backward areas in a **short** space of time. On the contrary, the **advent** of development can very well be characterized by a **growing** gap between hopes and achievements - that **is** to **say**, by a greater awareness of what people lack and **less** tolerance of poverty and privilege. For the oppressed **masses** the path to **development** can be a time of nascent hostility, persistent feelings of frustration and growing unrest and **dissatisfaction**.

The **process** of **development** also **extorts** a price from those in the more educated and cultured circles in these conglomerates. Unavoidable **social**

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readjustment, the dissolution of the old systems of values, the **resentment** caused by the emergence of new political, **social** and economic classes are all factors in the evolutionary **process**. It **is** therefore a mistake to **imagine** that the advent of development **is** a period of growing social **harmony**; it is **more** likely to be a period of **division** and discontent.

Those that attempt to interfere with the peaceful process of **development** of the backward countries, which in **itself** is disruptive, are well aware of their vulnerability. Ideologies and weapons, terrorism and subversion, prophecies and propaganda, all are brought across the oceans and continents and adjusted to the most diverse and heterogeneous characteristics and idiosyncrasies in order, by those means, to achieve world domination, which today it is extremely risky to pursue by means of war. It is therefore not difficult to see expressions of violence as part of a global scheme, in which there is an interplay of situations which are dangerous to world security.

In addition to all those destructive factors, the illicit trafficking in arms has an impact on the international scene. We are aware of the seriousness for countries such as Colombia of the manipulations of weapons producers and dealers in trying to establish **his** illicit traffic. Members of the Committee can understand better than most the scope of this **crime** and explain how it relates to the political **turmoil** in many countries and its effects on their possibility of peace and **development**. Those that **commit** this crime succumb to the temptation of money. They incite to violence and in most **cases** infringe the fundamental values on which our democracies are based. Their success would be small indeed, however, if it were not for groups that wish to legitimize this behaviour because it is lucrative business.

We recognize that the greatest obstacle in **the** fight against this **evurge** in many countries **is** that the traffic is clandestine in nature. We believe, however,

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that vigorous and fruitful understanding, encouraged by vehement rejection of anything that could impede good relations between countries would be the best contribution towards solving the problem of the illicit traffic in weapons, which increases international friction and brings with it the risk of the escalation to conflict of already tense situations.

Sometimes the traffic in arms goes hand in hand with the big business of drugs and terrorism. Unfortunately, these epidemics hit at the same time and with unlimited cruelty, in a kind of diabolical synchronization, in various parts of the world.

Terrorism has become the great endemic plague of our time. It is present everywhere, waiting to strike at a ruler, a leader, a group of soldiers or - even more cruelly - to attack anyone of any age who happens to be in the place where the criminals want to commit an act of violence, demonstrating not so much their ideals as their ferocity.

It is not easy to know why this type of crime, which results only in the indiscriminate assassination of fellow human beings, should suddenly have become virulent, but the way in which these actions are co-ordinated gives ground for suspicion that there is some hidden force which is organizing this fatal chain reaction, which is generally turned against democracies, in particular the democracies in the developing world.

When we speak of democracy we are speaking of freedom, not the romantic freedom which has been expressed in sonnets or in commissioned works of art, but a freedom forged in blood, sweat and persistence. It is the freedom which has been forged of human clay, which makes man aware of himself, which means that he is no longer just a number but a decisive factor with an influence on his own existence. That is the freedom which cannot be enslaved by means of weapons.

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In **Colombia** we have conquered freedom, but we know that it is a treasure we must not lock in a chest but must reconquer every single day and in this difficult stage of our **existence**, make a new effort to keep it **alive**.

In Colombia we are well aware of the dangers to our **freedom**, as well as of the obstacles to our development. Thus we feel compelled to refer to another sore point, and that is the indiscriminate weapons market which fills the coffers of a few manufacturing countries, as well as the pockets of disreputable **individuals**, who exploit human misery. While Colombia has not had nor has any military pretensions, we cannot disregard the considerable increase in weapon expenditure throughout the world or the slowing down of the development process which that implies. Nor can we disregard the consequent world insecurity and worsening of international tension that the arms trade encourages. We are not going to dwell on an analysis of a phenomenon which can be seen in many countries. we know that the consequences, especially for developing countries, are extremely serious.

The United Nations experts have analysed the question and have arrived at several sad conclusions

"Imports of weapons can place receiving countries in a vulnerable situation on the political and economic levels, in addition to consuming a valuable share of their foreign exchange resources which could otherwise be made available for development."

Numerical data and cold percentages, however, cannot truly reflect the cruel reality. The fact is that behind every figure, every number, there could be thousands of lives cut down by weapons, and as many others destroyed by hunger. There is a great deal which is wrong in a world which stockpiles more weapons than food, which is more concerned with military superiority than with hunger and malnutrition. Where does the evil lie? The only evil, this is taught to us by the Saint of Assisi, seems to be the absence of love, since the supreme value is love

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itself. Lack of love for God or man. There is where the evil lies, represented by hatred, force and **war**. Evil is **therefore** represented by **hatred, force and war**, an arid soul and an empty heart. In his Ode to the Sun, Saint **Francis** says, "Blessed are those who persevere in peace". Peace is good.

In conclusion, we wish to refer **to** the letter addressed to you by Mr. Dubey, Chairman **of the Preparatory Committee** for the International Conference on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development. **My** delegation wishes to join in the **consensus** which seems to **be** emerging from this debate as to the decision this Assembly should take that the **Conference** should be held, as recommended by the Preparatory **Committee**, during the scheduled dates in 1987. Together with other **delegations** in this **chamber**, we are firmly convinced that the holding of the Conference on the **Relationship** between **Disarmament** and Development cannot be postponed.

Mr. AHMED (Bangladesh): Mr. Chairman, quite in line with the policy of **my** delegation, I should like to be very brief in the statement I am going to make on item 63, that is, the **Implementation** of the **Declaration** of the Indian **Ocean** as a Zone of **Peace**: report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean.

I should like to draw your attention, first to the **bas'ic** elements of my country's **foreign** policy which dictates our position on this question. Bangladesh, **as** the Committee knows, is a small country with one of the largest populations in the world. **Our** problems **are** many and varied. We should, therefore, like to devote all our energies **to** ensure for our **people** an acceptable **quality** of **life**. In part pursuit of that **aim**, we have **developed** a foreign policy based **on** principles and not on expediency that would enable us to **carry** out our development endeavours in an environment **of** peace and stability. It is also because of this that we have been instrumental in the forging of regional **co-operation** in South Asia on a **structural basis**.

(Hr. Ahmed, Bangladesh)

In view of this, it is obvious that we are not in a position to approve of the existence of a situation in our region which contains the seeds of **potentia**<sup>1</sup> conflict. As a littoral State of the Indian Ocean, we are deeply interested in contributing our utmost to ensure a peaceful environment in that area. We are of the firm opinion **that** the implementation of the Declaration of the Indian ocean as a Zone of Peace **would ensure** that.

I should, therefore, like to reiterate unequivocally the support of my delegation to all the resolutions adopted in the past on this item by the General Assembly. I should particularly like to recall the decisions of the General Assembly at its thirty-fourth session, contained in resolutions 34/80 B to convene a conference on the Indian Ocean and the subsequent decision of the General Assembly at its fortieth session, contained in resolution 40/153 urging the convening of the Conference at a date not later than 1988. We should like the Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean to continue all efforts to that end. All measures in that connection should be taken forthwith, including the establishment of a secretariat for the conference.

We are aware that the Indian Ocean is a crucial region to many users. The **success** of our aim would involve and **require** the co-operation and **assistance** of **not just** the littoral States, but also **the major maritime Powers**, the hinterland States and the permanent members of the Security council.

It is our **fond hope** that this positive attitude will be **forthcoming**. We have a vision of a world where one day this zone of peace would expand to cover the entire planet. This might at this **stage** appear a remote ideal, but certainly, it is one for which any meaningful efforts are highly desirable. We expect it.

Mr. von STULPNAGEL (Federal Republic of Germany): Let me, in introducing our draft **resolution** on the topic of confidence-building measures (agenda item 61 (a), draft resolution A/C.1/41/L. 26) , recall the important step the

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Republic of Germany)

international community made when the representatives of the States Members of the United Nations debated the "Draft guidelines for appropriate types of confidence-building measures and for the implementation of such measures on a global or regional level" during the meeting of the United Nations Disarmament Commission in May 1986. Due to a great degree of positive judgements and flexibility displayed by all parties involved, it was possible to narrow down considerably the divergencies in views on the subject matter, so that finally consensus on all but two issues could be reached.

There was a second most important event this year, which merits mentioning in this connection.

By agreeing on a Final Document at the Stockholm Conference on Confidence and Security Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe on 22 September 1986, a great step forward has been made in proving that a process of confidence-building among the States involved in a region can successfully be sustained over a long period of time, leading from modest introductory steps to meaningful, observable and verifiable measures apt to gradually reduce distrust and fear in a region with a marked concentration of armament, both nuclear and conventional. By agreeing on a set of concrete and militarily significant measures in Stockholm the participating States demonstrated their intent to establish more transparency in military matters and to help avoid miscalculation of military activities.



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Republic of Germany)

If strictly applied, the **measures** contained in the Final Document of the Stockholm Conference will help to promote a better **assessment** of the military activities of individual participating States by others in a region **encompassing** the **whole** of Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals. They would also diminish the fear of existing or perceived threats. Thus observance of these **measures** will **smooth** the path to **more** far-reaching negotiations on conventional stability in the whole of Europe.

The **most important** breakthrough in the Stockholm negotiations, in our opinion, consisted of the agreement on mandatory on-site inspections to be carried out on the face of the earth and from the air. This is of principal importance for the entire process of **arms** control.

These two events - the results of this year's deliberations in the United Nations **Disarmament Commission** and at Stockholm - in my view clearly demonstrate that, both on a regional and on a global scale, concrete, effective and verifiable confidence-building measures can **serve**, in the view of a vast majority of States, **significantly** to enhance **compliance** with those provisions of the United Nations Charter that demand that States refrain from the **use** or threat of use of force. Having given the background of these positive experiences, I revert to our draft resolution.

During the **debates** of the **Disarmament Commission** in Hay it was uncontroversial that confidence-building constituted a dynamic process **over** time. While the set of guidelines discussed at that time was designed to contribute to greater usefulness and to a wider application of confidence-building **measures**, the accumulation of relevant experience in applying the measures described in the guidelines may lead to a further development of the text at a later **time**.

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Republic of Germany)

Experience can only be gained by trying out ~~some~~ or all of the ~~measures~~ described in the guidelines) so nothing should stand in the way of implementing them ~~and then~~ coming back to the relevant United Nations forums and reporting on the ~~insights gained~~ in the process. This is exactly what our draft ~~resolution~~ is all about: to ~~recommend~~ that all ~~Member States~~ of the United Nations ~~make good use~~ of the findings of the United Nations ~~Disarmament Commission~~ by ~~implementing~~ these ~~recommendations~~.

Three critical ~~arguments~~ have been brought forward. One ~~argument~~ focuses on the ~~fact~~ that during the deliberations in ~~May~~ it ~~was~~ not ~~possible~~ to eliminate two areas of divergency and ~~thus~~ the General Assembly could not approve ~~those~~ draft guidelines. This argument does not seem to be of major relevance, as ~~the~~ two areas of that divergency are clearly marked in the guidelines, which exactly for that ~~reason~~ have been entitled "Draft ~~guidelines~~ for appropriate types of confidence-building measures and for the ~~implementation~~ of such measures on a global or regional level". ~~As for~~ the substance ~~of the~~ remaining divergencies, the progress achieved meanwhile in Stockholm has left me very ~~optimistic~~ about an eventual further elaboration of the ~~guidelines~~. A group that in May thought it ~~was~~ not yet ~~possible~~ to accept ~~consensus~~ showed remarkable ~~flexibility~~ in September and ~~made~~ such consensus ~~possible~~. This development should ~~indicate~~ that, concerning the draft guidelines, we might not have to undergo the ~~most undesirable~~ experience of ~~untying~~ again the whole ~~parcel~~ and ~~discussing~~ the topic from the ~~start~~ - forgoing ~~all~~ the laudable efforts put into the ~~work~~ of drafting those guidelines.

A second critical argument to be heard ~~centres~~ on the verification demands embodied in the draft ~~guidelines~~. Some States ~~seem~~ to consider them excessive. The answer to this argument ~~is~~: confidence-building, in our view, ~~is~~ a truly reciprocal and step-by-step process; one may ~~start~~ with ~~small steps~~ and spare ~~some~~

(Mr. van Stulpnagel, Federal  
Republic of Germany)

of the **benefits** for later, but one **has** eventually to get there. What **is** the source of **mistrust**, if not lack of transparency and misinterpretation of the military activities of the **potential** adversary, because one **actually** knows too little about them? Thus a confidence-building process that does not comprise **concrete measures** is a contradiction in terms.

A third critical **argument** revolves around a **line** of thought that blames States interested in promoting **confidence-building** for trying to divert the interest of the **international** community from the more urgent and pressing tasks of **disarmament**. This argument **is** easy to **dispe**l. The need for confidence-building was already clearly recognized at the first **special** session of the General Assembly devoted to **disarmament**, which in its **Final Document** stated:

“Collateral **measures** in both the nuclear and **convention**<sup>61</sup> fields, together with **other** measures specifically designed to **build** confidence, should be undertaken in order to contribute to the creation of favourable conditions for the **adoption** of additional disarmament measures and to **further** relaxation of international tension.” (resolution S-10/2, para. 24)

The General Assembly, in a series of consensus resolutions, has expressed **its** belief that confidence-building measures, where appropriate conditions **exist**, will significantly contribute to facilitating the **process** of **disarmament** and **has** recommended **considering** the introduction of such measures with a view to enhancing **security** between States and facilitating **progress** in arms limitation and **disarmament**. In Stockholm 35 European **countries** have done exactly that, underlining thereby the **affirmation** that confidence-building measures and verification **actually** to **further** the process of **disarmament** and do enhance **security** between States.

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Republic of Germany)

My delegation sincerely hopes that our draft resolution (A/C.1/41/L.26) will be carried by an **many** votes **as** possible.

The CHAIRMAN: I shall now call on those **representatives** wishing to speak in exercise of the right of reply. I should like to remind members that, with **respect** to the exercise of the right of reply, the **Committee** will follow the **same** procedure as that to **which** I referred earlier.

Mr. MAHMOUD (Ire-9 (intarprotation from Arabic) : At the end of this **morning's** meeting we had an example of the **keenness** of the **representative** of the Zionist entity not to **comply** with international **rules**, norm and instruments. He spoke **amply** and **sensationally**, preventing us with the perceptions of the terrorist criminal **Shamir** with regard to sound solutions to rid the **Middle East** of its current **crises** and **catastrophes**.

One of the **most important factors** leading to the continuation of the catastrophes in this sensitive area of the **world** is the presence of Shamir and his **henchmen** in authority in the Zionist entity. The record of this entity, fraught as it is with criminal **acts**, terrorism, **□** c'rdor and devastation, **is** well known. It is **testimony** to the desire of Shamir and his representatives for **peace** and **stability** in the Middle East, a desire that **is reflected** in attenptn at liquidation of the Palestinian people and at its **forced depopulation** and **expulsion** by all possible **means**. We wish to **ask the representative** of the Zionist entity about the entity's acts of **agg, ession** against Lebanon and the **Lebanese** people. What kind of **weapons**, such as cluster bombs and **others**, were used in that, dirty onslaught against Lebanon?

(Mr. Mahasul, Iraq)

we understand that his involving my country in his statement this morning was the result of his ineptitude, yesterday morning during the consideration of the time on the Israeli aggression against the Iraqi nuclear installations, which are under the international control of the IAEA. If that representative is indeed keen on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, why does his entity not sign the NPT? Why does it not agree to subject all its nuclear installations to the international control system of the IAEA?

(Mr Mahmoud, Iraq)

The representative of the Zionist entity did not tell us this morning about the nuclear arsenal or the underground bomb plant in Dimona; rather, he spoke about the Stockholm Conference, the Geneva Conference and the Vienna Conference. The existence of this arsenal and the underground nuclear bomb plant has been revealed irrefutably by a technician named Mordecai Vanunu. Where is Vanunu now? Will the representative of Israel inform us of the method used to kidnap him and smuggle him to Israel? If the Israeli representative really wants the war between my country and Iran to cease, why does he not desist from supplying Iran with weapons and stop stoking the fire? He spoke of the presence of conventional weapon arsenals in the countries of the area. However, it is well known that Israel possesses the largest arsenal of such weapons in the area, in addition to the nuclear arsenal to which he did not refer this morning. In this respect, we wish once more to recall that the Middle East can become a nuclear-weapon-free zone only if the Zionist entity abandons its nuclear arsenal in the area, subjects all its installations to international control and accedes to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. This is due to our conviction that there are no nuclear weapons in the area other than those possessed by the Zionist entity. Lastly, I wish to state that he did not mention the relations of his country with South Africa. I have before me document A/41/22/Add.1 of 2 October 1986, from which I will quote paragraphs 8 and 10 on page 5, which is headed, "Military and nuclear collaboration":

"Although the collaboration between Israel and the racist régime of Pretoria in the military and nuclear field is kept secret, there have been many reports confirming that, such collaboration is expanding and covers various fields, ranging from scientific exchange in military matters to the production and procurement of arms." (A/41/22/Add.1, para. 8)

(Mr. Mahmoud, Iraq)

• In a paper submitted to the Seminar on the arms embargo Signe Landgren of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute stated that Israel is of course the closest contact for South Africa in the Middle East. South Africa has, as mentioned in part I (of the book) supplied large amounts of hardware, and also military volunteers during Israel's wars with its Arab neighbours after 1946. In 1967, for example, South Africa was the chief supplier of spare parts of the Mirage fighters of the Israeli Air Force. It seems reasonable to assume that technological co-operation in military R and D (research and development) has taken the place instead of direct arms exports since the Israeli arms industry is more advanced than the South African. In 1982, P. G. Marais of ARMSCOR confirmed in an interview that both Israel and Taiwan played a role as intermediaries for South African arms exports."

(Ibid., para. 10)

Mr. ZIPPORI (Israel): We have just heard another perfect example of the attempt made by the representative of Iraq to divert the attention of the Committee from the criminal actions of his Government in waging war using inhuman methods against a neighbouring country. He did not mention anything about the use of gas, which has been condemned by the Security Council. He did not mention anything about the bombing of shipping in the Straits of Hormuz by his aircraft. He did not mention anything about the attacks on open cities in Iran - although I must say the Iranians are not much better than the Iraqis in that respect. He did not mention anything about the tremendous loss of life which has gone on in this bloody war for six years now, in which over one million people have died or been wounded. That he did not mention.

He talked about the Government of Israel as an impediment to peace in the Middle East. I should like to remind the representative of Iraq - and members will

(Mr. Zippori, Israel)

note that I call the **representative** by the name of his country. I do **not use** titles as he **does**, not **mentioning** the name of my country. **This is an example of** the real intention of **Iraq and other States**. What they really want **is** the extermination of **Israel**, and let the Organization keep that wall in **mind**. But he does not mention the fact that the only peace that has been found in the **Middle East** was the peace which the **Government of Israel made** with the **Government of Egypt** to the great credit of the leader of **Egypt** at that time, **President Sadat**, and of the **Government** that **made** that peace. The Government that **signed** that peace agreement, **was** the **Government** of the **present** Prime Minister, who **was** a member of that Government. And I think we should **remember that** the only **contribution** of the Government of Iraq to peace in the **Middle East** was to denounce that peace agreement, and to attack it.

With regard to the South African allegations, I mentioned **earlier** in **exercise** of my right of reply, the proven connection between many **Arab States** including Iraq and South Africa in the field of oil. There **is** no nuclear **collaboration** between Israel and South Africa. Nobody has **been** able to prove it. **Nobody** has been able to show that there is any **such collaboration because it does not exist**.

With regard to **Israel's so-called might**, we have had to **arm ourselves because** we have been attacked six **times** by our **neighbouring States, including** Iraq. Iraq refused to sign an **armistice** agreement with Israel after the **1948-1949** war. Iraq has **refused** to recognize Israel in any way **whatsoever**. What would be the **sense of signing** the Non-Proliferation Treaty when there **is** a state of war **proclaimed**, not by us, but by countries like Iraq, between them and **Israel**. I think we all remember that former Secretary of State Dean **Rusk**, shortly after the **Non-Proliferation Treaty was signed**, was asked whether it would have any validity in the **case** of war, and he answered, "no". I think that **the** Non-Proliferation



(Hr. Zippori, Israel)

Treaty will have a role in the Middle East - and we will elaborate on this later when we discuss the relevant item on the agenda - only if we achieve a nuclear-weapon-free zone, which would give us the necessary guarantees which are lacking in the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

#### ORGANIZATION OF WORK

The CHAIRMAN: As there are no further speakers at the end of this afternoon's meeting, permit me to say a few words. We have had a rather long and arduous week so especially in view of the 6 p.m. deadline today for the submission of draft resolutions on disarmament agenda items. Of course, a lot of hard work is still ahead of us and consultations are being held on the draft resolutions which have been submitted and as we continue to seek areas of agreement and consensus wherever possible. Accordingly, I thought that it would be useful if I were to set aside tomorrow morning to allow delegations to engage in the necessary consultations. Hence, it is my intention to schedule only one meeting tomorrow at 3 p.m. This will also enable us to contribute to the conservation of the resources made available for conference services by consolidating the list of speakers and thereby eliminating one meeting.

Before adjourning the meeting, I should like to inform members that the following delegations are inscribed on the list of speakers for tomorrow afternoon's meeting: the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Argentina, Mongolia, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Togo, the German Democratic Republic, Ireland, Afghanistan, Albania, Poland and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, speaking on behalf of the 12 member States of the European Community.

The next meeting of the Committee will be held tomorrow afternoon at 3 p.m.

The meeting rose at 4.50 p.m.