



VERBATIM RECORD OF THE 24th MEETING

Chairman: Mr. **ROCHE** (Vice-Chairman) (Canada)

later: Mr. **ZACHMANN** (Chairman) (German Democratic Republic)

CONTENTS

STATEMENTS ON SPECIFIC DISARMAMENT ITEMS AND CONTINUATION OF THE GENERAL DEBATE

Statements were made by:

Mr. Sagdeev (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics)
Mr. Lang (Austria)
Mr. **Mashhadi-Ghahvehchi** (Islamic Republic of Iran)
Mr. **Aguilar** (Venezuela)
Mr. Kahn (German Democratic Republic)
Mr. **Beesley** (Canada)

*This record is subject to correction. Corrections should be sent under the signature of a member of the delegation concerned within one week of the date of publication to the Chief of the Official Records Editing Section, room DC2-750, 2 United Nations Plaza, and incorporated in a copy of the record.

Corrections will be issued after the end of the session, in a separate fascicle for each Committee.

The meeting was called to order at 10.50 a.m.

AGENDA ITEMS 46 TO 65 AND 144 (continued)

STATEMENTS ON SPECIFIC DISARMAMENT ITEMS AND CONTINUATION OF THE GENERAL DEBATE

Mr. SAGDEEV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (interpretation from Russian) : Once again the meeting in Reykjavik has given rise to the urgent question of why the strategic defence initiative (SDI) is, in Comrade Gorbachev's words, "a symbol of obstruction to the whole process of nuclear disarmament". That is why the exchange of views now taking place in the First Committee reflects serious concern about the danger of the arms race spreading to outer space. In the light of the results of the Reykjavik meeting, I should like once again to adduce the fundamental arguments which demonstrate the danger of the conception of star wars.

First of all, consideration of this question should take into account the indissoluble internal link between scientific and technological aspects of this problem and the military-strategic aspects. In most cases the proponents of SDI lay stress on the scientific and technological side in an attempt to fire the imagination of taxpayers with the exciting prospects that might be opened up in this area by scientific and technological progress. It is precisely for this reason that we keep on hearing new arguments demonstrating the need to carry out a broad research programme leading to development and even large-scale testing. But very little is said about the dangerous military-strategic consequences which would inevitably be engendered by changing the existing strategic doctrine based on nuclear balance. However unpleasant the existing strategic situation of nuclear balance might be, it is a fact with which we must reckon.

(Mr. Sagdeev, USSR)

what new **aspect** could emerge as a result of an attempt to change the strategic **equation based** on deterrence by a gradual shift to the principles of global defence? The nature of nuclear weapons **has** a levelling effect on a **whole range** of military, **strategical**, geographical and technological **differences** between the opposing **camps**. In this **sense** it can be **stated** that the dynamic framework within which it would be **possible** to remain without disturbing the strategic balance is **quite** large. Of course, the problem is to move steadily **towards** a lower level of **nuclear confrontation**, without disturbing this balance, until we **reach** the point of the total elimination of nuclear weapons. The combination of deterrence and the elements of **strategic** defence sharply narrow the dynamic range for the existence of a strategic **balance**.

In this context, even the slightest nuance in the differences of a **geopolitical** nature and technological level could be **significant**, not to mention the fact that insuperable barriers would have been erected in the **process** of arms control for the purpose of lowering the level of nuclear confrontation. For example, the establishment of rules for the replacement of equivalents in the process of disarmament would **become virtually** impossible. Indeed, how would it be **possible** to **compare** differences in technology according to current **principles** of the type of defensive **arms** if **both** sides were to embrace **the SDI** concept? The levelling effect of the nuclear deterrent weapon for **defensive systems** would be entirely absent.

Let **us suppose**, for **example**, that the defensive system of one **side** had a target accuracy only half that of the system of the opposing side. For **specialists** in the field of this technology **such** a quantitative difference would seem entirely natural, but what **might** this **lead to**, from the **standpoint** of establishing **rules** of balance? To provide **equal** certainty of hitting the target, the fire **power**, in

(Mr. Sagdeev, USSR)

order to offset its lower **accuracy**, would **have** to be **geometrically** increased - **fourfold** in **this** particular case. This would create **insuperable** obstacles to any attempt to **aatahlish** a balance.

It **is** no accident that, in the many analyses of **SDI** carried out even by its proponents, even theoretical mean8 of a decisive **shift** to a new type of **strategic** balance have not been indicated. **Hence** the **question arises** of **some** kind of potential transfer of **SDI** technology to • n8ure an agreed **shift** to a balance with element8 of defence. It **seems to me** that it is hardly worth dwelling on the **question** of how real **this procedure is** in the light of the policy of the **constant** **atepping up** of an embargo even on whet **would appear** to be the **most** platonic **types** of technology being carried out by the United State8 **Administration**.

But, even if the hypothetical81 **strategic** balance of a new type were ever actually achieved, thie would certainly **not** mean **that** it would be **stable**; slight **changes, fluctuations**, could disturb **this strategic** balance. One of the **most** dangerou8 varieties of ouch inatabiltty would be the competition between offensive and defensive weapon8. It wan precisely the recognition of that fact and its **strategic significance** that led 14 year8 ago to the conclusion of the Treaty on the limitation of anti-ballistic missiles. Now **attempts** are being made to convince **us** that the miracles of technology are changing the **situation**; that moving to defensive systems in space and laying emphasis on exotic **types of arms**, such am laser beam and **accelerated** particle **weapons**, resolve the **issue** in favour of **defensive** weapons. New technological **progress** to an **equal** degree would also lead to the **increasing** sophistication of offensive weapons. Furthermore, as in shown by history, offensive types of weapon always stand to gain with every **new** spiral in the scientific **and technological** race.

(Mr. Sagdeev, USSR)

It is no accident that in answer to the discussion on the potential competition between defence and offence a criterion was formulated which has become known as the first Nitze, which requires economic effectiveness of the defence strategy in comparison with the expenses of a potential rival in building up offensive weapons. As estimates based on various premises have shown, without even having recourse to special counter-measures to combat strategic defence, the economic effect would be of a ratio of 20 to 1 - or even, let us say, 10 to 1 - in favour of offensive weapons.

If the strategic instability that I have mentioned is not conceptually new, the appearance of defensive weapons in space opens up yet one more extremely dangerous form of instability. I would call it "space-quake".

(Mr. Sagdeev, USSR)

Let us imagine a hypothetical situation. There are two symmetrical space defence shields, each of which possesses a fire power sufficient to destroy, when the time comes, 1,000 launched ballistic missiles. Now let us ask if such a defensive system, as a kind of by-product, possesses the capacity suddenly to make use of its fire power to destroy, to put out of operation, or to make a breach in, the space defensive shield of its opposite number. If so, what proportion of the ammunition would be sufficient to accomplish that goal?

We could deduce some very simple logical arguments to the effect that such a technical possibility certainly exists, and we would be talking about a much lower yield. The so-called military combat stations of the strategic defence initiative would be moving along trajectories previously known to the opponent. The number of those stations would be considerably less than the number of ballistic missiles, and it would be very difficult to make them secure against attack. Moreover, in a bilateral system of orbital combat stations it will always be possible to find numbers from the opposite camp which would be situated at a comparatively short distance. Experts estimate that such an action can be carried out with just a small percentage of the original weaponry. The side that is counting on the first-strike strategy would thus have available to it such a scenario, theoretically remaining invulnerable to a retaliatory strike of nuclear retribution.

Paul Nitze's second criterion previously for the same reason requires invulnerability for the space echelons of the strategic defence initiative as one more condition for hypothetical stability. So far we have not heard of any kind of scenario that provides for the attainment of this invulnerability that is at all convincing. Incidentally, in order to make progress in this question, you do not need millions of demonstrations and tests in outer space.

(Mr. Sagdeev, USSR)

So it is **easy** to ☐ me that both criteria **are** in **profound internal conflict**.

Indeed the **attempt** to make **stations invulnerable** - for example by creating special armour - **would** inevitably **make** them much **more** expensive. **Now**, these varieties of Strategic **instability** by no **means exhaust** all the inherent **flaws** of the Strategic defence initiative. **Much** has been said about **other components** of 'the **strategic**' triad which do not overlap with the star **war** weaponry. This would open up an **avenue for accelerating** an **arms race** in **those components**.

The historic lesson of the meeting between the General Secretary of the Central **Committee** of the **Communist** Party of the Soviet Union, Comrade Gorbachev, and President Reagan in Reykjavik has shown **that** there is a real hope of finding political **means** of eliminating the nuclear threat - that is, the **total** elimination of nuclear **weapons**. In the light of that meeting it has **become** particularly clear that a large-scale strategic-defence-initiative programme must lose its point entirely even, it would appear, **from the standpoint** of its proponent

The arguments adduced here to the effect that even in this case the **strategic** defence initiative **would** still be **necessary**, and that it can provide guarantees against possible violations and random **acts of nuclear terrorism**, are hardly likely to **convince** anyone. For **example**, X-ray **lasers** pulsed **from** nuclear explosion would become **simply** absurd **if there** were a total renunciation of nuclear ballistic **missiles**. Furthermore, this type of **strategic-defence-initiative** weapon is in profound conflict with the principle of the total elimination of strategic **ballistic** missiles, and the **possibility** of such an agreement is not challenged even in the **minimal** version of the American Interpretation. After all, X-ray **lasers** have to be installed on **special** missiles **carried** by submarines equipped with nuclear warheads for pumping radiation. I think no sensible person would agree to present **as** a guarantee of the **absence** of **strategic** nuclear missiles an arsenal of

(Mr. Sagdeev, USSR)

allegedly defensive missiles equipped with such nuclear warheads. The technical characteristics of these missiles for X-ray lasers, as we can see from the discussion, would in terms of its propulsion substantially exceed the characteristics of strategic missiles. And who would guarantee that the "defensive" missiles would not be used to carry out an initial nuclear strike?

The Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missiles has played and will continue to play an important role throughout the process of limiting the offensive arms race. In circumstances of the discussed unprecedented reduction of stockpiles of nuclear weapons and means of delivery, the natural question arises of its further consolidation and the limitation of research to laboratories and laboratory testing, along with the obligation for 10 years not to make use of the right to withdraw from the Treaty. To us this seems very important. This would make the Treaty the keystone of ensuring stability in the process of nuclear disarmament.

At the same time the level of research and laboratory testing would make it possible to ensure natural scientific and technological progress. There is a peaceful alternative to the appearance of the arms race in outer space: research and exploration of outer space in the interests of all mankind. American science and technology have made distinguished advances in this field, including international space co-operation, so I should like to express the hope that American strategic thinking will live up to the technological genius of the American people.

Mr. LANG (Austria) : The ~~statement~~ I am about to make will be devoted in the first instance to the Austrian position on chemical weapons and to a personal account of the Second Review Conference on the biological weapons Convention. In the second part of my statement I shall, on behalf of its co-sponsors, introduce draft resolution A/C.1/41/L.9 related to the aforesaid Conference.

The commitment of Austria not to use chemical weapons in as old as this century. It was in June 1900 that my country ratified the Hague Protocol on Asphyxiating Gases, a commitment Austria reconfirmed in 1937; the Geneva Protocol of 1925, as well as the Austrian State Treaty of 1955, strengthened and amplified this original obligation. Against this background of a generally applicable prohibition on the use of chemical weapons the people of Austria watched with horror the repeated use of chemical weapons in the recent past and witnessed with distress the ordeal of the victims of chemical warfare who were treated in Austrian hospitals; many of them died in spite of the great care they received. This suffering, which occurred due to a clear violation of humanitarian law, prompted the Austrian Government to support the endeavours undertaken within the framework of the United Nations to uphold the authority of the Geneva Protocol. Austria participated actively in the follow up of General Assembly resolution 37/98 D by putting an Austrian specialist at the disposal of the Secretary-General, who established a group of experts, to whom the collection of evidence concerning the use of chemical weapons was assigned.

The reappearance of this type of weapon of mass destruction must be considered as the writing on the wall; the relative inexpensiveness of these weapons might well be an element of temptation to acquire them. But from yet another direction pressure might arise that increases the potential value of chemical weapons: if the vision of the leaders of the two super-Powers - that all or almost all nuclear weapons were to be eliminated within the next 10 years - became a reality, the

(Mr. Lang, Austria)

importance of conventional weapons, including chemical weapons, right well grow. This perspective of a new and even greater role for chemical weapons is far from encouraging, in particular for countries like Austria which find themselves in a region in which a major conflict between the two military alliances right easily spill over into neutral territory.

My delegation noted in the past with interest various efforts and initiatives aimed at the establishment of a chemical-weapon-free zone in Central Europe. We continue to believe that such endeavour should be taken not in isolation but within a broader framework embracing the thinning out of conventional weapons in general. As a first step towards the total elimination of chemical-weapon or as an interim measure pending the entry into force of a chemical weapons convention a moratorium on the production of such weapons could be agreed upon either immediately or at least in conjunction with any agreement on nuclear forces.

During the proceedings of the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, chemical weapons were again by far the most active field. Serious negotiations, involving actual give-and-take, made it possible to advance in an effort to reach agreement on preliminary texts on a number of important provisions of a convention on chemical weapons. We appreciate this as a significant movement forward. But much remains to be done and some of the more intractable questions in the area of verification, scope and the monitoring structure still open. We appeal to the Conference to redouble its efforts to reach the objective of presenting a complete draft to the General Assembly at its next session.

Turning now to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction, and in particular to the Second Review Conference of that

(Mr. Lang, Austria)

Convention, I wish to stress that I considered it a particular privilege for Austria and for me personally to preside over that meeting. For my country, which found itself for the first time at the helm of a disarmament conference, this constitutes a particular challenge to engage itself even more actively in disarmament matters. The successful outcome of the Conference, which has already been hailed by several delegations, was mainly due to the high degree of flexibility displayed by most delegations and to the common willingness to restore confidence in the reliability of the Convention, a confidence which was slowly eroding in the light of a growing number of allegations as to the non-compliance by certain parties with their obligations under the Treaty. The Conference was therefore faced with a demanding task, which went far beyond that of previous review conferences. It had to strengthen an ailing treaty régime without the possibility of major surgery.

The results of the Conference, as they were reflected in the Final Declaration adopted by consensus, can be summarized as follows.

First, the comments relating to article I give a new and detailed definition of all biological agents and toxins covered by the Convention in order to take into account recent scientific developments. From a legal viewpoint this definition may be considered as an extensive interpretation of the original terms.

Second, commenting upon article III on prohibition of transfers, the Conference stated that potential recipients were not necessarily States, but could also be actors at sub-national levels. That terrorist groups should not have access to biological agents or toxins was frequently stressed in the debate at the Conference.

(Mr. Lang, Austria)

Third, referring to article IV, the Conference noted inter alia the importance of legislation regarding the physical protection of laboratories, to prevent unauthorized access to and the removal of pathogenic or toxic material.

Fourth, whereas in 1980 the final text relating to article v consisted of five paragraphs, it now covers two pages, and includes the two main agreements arrived at during the last hours of the Conference. The first such agreement was that the consultative meeting, already conceived in 1980, was now defined more clearly as regards its convening and functions¹ the original scope of article V was considerably extended and bilateral procedures were transformed into a multilateral exercise. In addition, it was agreed to implement a series of measures (data exchange related to laboratories, exchange of information on abnormal outbreaks of infectious diseases, etc.) in order to prevent or reduce the occurrence of ambiguities, doubts and suspicions; a meeting of scientific experts is supposed to finalize the modalities of this data and information exchange in the spring of 1987.

Fifth, reference to the use of chemical weapons in recent years was made in the comments related to article VIII by quoting the relevant report of the Security Council and by appealing to all States parties to the Geneva Protocol of 1925 to abide by its provisions.

Sixth, the comprehensive comments relating to article x reflect the dissatisfaction of many countries, in particular developing countries, with regard to the present state of international co-operation covering the peaceful uses of biosciences; the Conference requested the Secretary-General to initiate a process of discussion and examination to improve the existing institutional set up serving these purposes.

(Mr. Lang, Austria)

seventh, the Conference finally approved provisionally the agenda for the next review conference, to be held in 1991 at the latest. In this context the possibility of legally binding improvements to the Convention is mentioned, which could mean either the adoption of an additional protocol or a formal amendment to the Convention itself. At that time the States parties might be in a position to draw on the verification provisions laid down in a chemical weapons convention, which according to some expectations could be finalized before the end of the 1980s.

Having concluded this brief and certainly incomplete account of the results of the Second Review Conference, I shall now turn to the second and last part of my statement, the introduction of draft resolution A/C.1/41/L.9, which I present to the First Committee on behalf of the following countries: Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Bulgaria, the Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Chile, China, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Ethiopia, Finland, the German Democratic Republic, the Federal Republic of Germany, Hungary, the Islamic Republic of Iran, Japan, Kenya, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Spain, Sweden, the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and, of course, Austria. Needless to say, additional co-sponsors would be highly welcome; they are requested kindly to advise the Secretary of the Committee accordingly.

This draft resolution is mainly of a procedural nature. It takes note in a general way of the results of the Conference and appeals to those States not yet parties to the Convention to adhere to it as soon as possible. It then tries to focus the attention of the States parties on the forthcoming expert meeting, which will finalise the modalities for the exchange of information and data agreed to in the Final Declaration. No other review conference has ever decided to hold such a follow-up meeting. In order to organize it properly one has to innovate in a most

(Mr. Lang, Austria)

pragmatic manner. This is reflected in an informal understanding along the following lines. The ad hoc meeting of scientific and technical experts is considered as an appendix to the Review Conference, which implies that it will meet under the authority of the President of the Conference and that its costs will be borne by the States parties in accordance with the rules of the Conference. Further consultations will be required to identify more technical matters, such as the exact structure of the meeting. This delegation will be ready to serve as a focal point for these consultations.

Having presented to the First Committee the draft resolution on the Second Review Conference of the parties to the biological weapons Convention, I wish to express the sincere hopes that the Committee and the General Assembly will be able to adopt it by consensus. As to the ad hoc meeting of experts, we expect that it will accomplish its task appropriately and thereby facilitate the full implementation of the confidence-building measures approved by the Conference.

Mr. MASHHADI-GHAHVEHCHI (Islamic Republic of Iran): Since this is the first time I have spoken, Sir, I should like at the outset to congratulate you on your well-deserved election as Chairman of the First Committee and to wish you success in discharging your weighty responsibilities.

I also avail myself of this opportunity to express the deepest condolences of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the people of Mozambique on the tragic incident in which President Samora Machel, along with a number of his aides, was killed. We still recall the warm and hospitable welcome accorded by Mr. Machel to our President during his official visit to Mozambique last February.

The insane arms race poses a threat to the whole of mankind through its objectives of domination. It is a race pursued by the super-Powers to gain military supremacy through qualitative and quantitative arms superiority and to

(Mr. Mashhadi-Ghahvehchi,
Islamic Republic of Iran)

expand their spheres of influence. The balance of power has replaced the rule of law as the fundamental basis and practical means of safeguarding security at both the international and the regional level. Domination, violation, aggression, the threat of and recourse to force, occupation of independent countries and violation of their sovereignty are practised throughout the world as effective means of attaining illegitimate ends. Land, sea, earth, space and even outer space are contaminated by counter-productive rivalries as well as political and military conflicts. Each day the big Powers become increasingly dominant at the expense of the oppressed nations. International peace and security are more seriously imperilled more than ever before.

Quite apart from its universal dimensions, the cessation of the arms race is of paramount importance to my country owing to its location in a very sensitive and strategic region. We have witnessed the increase in the spheres of influence and military presence of foreign rival forces in the region.

Bearing in mind the significance attached to disarmament, the eighth Summit Conference of non-aligned countries, in Harare, addressed a special appeal to the leaders of the two super-Powers in which it said, inter alia, that mankind has never before been so close to self-annihilation and that the alternative is, therefore, not war or peace but rather life or death, which makes the struggle for the prevention of the arms race imperative in our time.

Unfortunately the Conference on Disarmament has recorded no sizeable progress except in the chemical field, and the arms race is on an upward spiral. The development and perfection of the weapons of mass destruction threaten the very survival of our civilization. A nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought.

The development of nuclear weapons must be stopped immediately, as the first

(Mr. Mashhadi-Ghahvehchi,
Islamic Republic of Iran)

step, but it seems that so long as the idea of deterrence prevails there will be no hope for the ending of the arms race. Deterrence is in fact a justification for gaining might, to be used for the expansion of spheres of influence. In this context, disarmament is a process that contributes to decolonisation, while the arms race is a hegemonic approach. We believe that reliance on the principle of common and equal security can guarantee international peace and security in the future. In this regard, we support the Mexico Declaration of the leaders of the five continents with regard to verification of compliance with disarmament agreements between the two blocs.

Another menace to international peace and security is the use of chemical weapons. The world has been shocked by the news that this deadly weapon has been used again and again, in flagrant violation of the Geneva Protocol of 1925. As a result, the issue of the prevention of the production, development, use and stockpiling of chemical weapons has been taken up by the Conference on Disarmament as emphatically as the question of nuclear arms. Despite agreement on those chemical substances which can be turned into weapons and their inclusion in the convention, the modalities and nature of the implementation of the provisions of the convention and the means of verification of compliance have not yet been agreed upon.

(Mr. Mashhadi-Ghahvehchi, Islamic Republic of Iran)

It is true that, if the right of verification is granted to every country, it may provide certain grounds for abuse. But, at the same time, subordinating that process to the consent of the other countries subject to verification creates practical impediments to the implementation of the treaty. My Government believes that an international committee should make the final decision on the verification of each case. Such a committee should give top priority to the verification and destruction of stockpiles and of the means of providing chemical weapons to those countries identified as users of chemical weapons.

A crucial point that has generated numerous debates and arguments is the recent proposal to expand the arms race into outer space. Outer space is the common heritage of mankind, and all nations are entitled to it for peaceful purposes. It has unfortunately been turned into a militarized zone by a few countries, which have saturated space with military and spy satellites. More than 90 per cent of today's satellites have military purposes. The notion that the world military powers have to acquire constant information in order to maintain mutual confidence in East-West military relations might be a justification for the presence of spy satellites, but the sphere of action covered by those satellites is not confined to the two blocs. Rather, it brings all countries under their intelligence reconnaissance. In this regard, we support the formation of an international satellite monitoring agency, and the obstacles in the way of its creation should be removed. We believe that the arrest of the arms race in outer space is indispensable, regardless of developments on Earth. Nations cannot wait for the super-powers to reach agreement on Earth and then talk about outer space, which will by that time have been completely and irreversibly contaminated. Safeguarding the world system of telecommunications, including the satellites and ground stations, is an international obligation.

(Mr. Mashhadi-Ghahvehchi, Islamic
Republic of Iran)

Of particular concern is the fact that, despite the efforts of the great majority of the members of the Conference on Disarmament, this year again it was not possible to start negotiations on a comprehensive nuclear test-ban. The unilateral moratorium was a positive gesture, which did not receive a positive response from the other side. If it is not possible to achieve a comprehensive agreement at present because of disagreements on the modalities of verification, a mutual moratorium can provide suitable grounds for the commencement of a constructive dialogue, while the continuation of tests will exacerbate tension. The positive evaluation of seismic methods for the verification of nuclear tests can probably lead to a breakthrough.

The commitment to non-first-use of nuclear weapons by countries possessing them is a positive step, although not a very substantial one, in the disarmament dialogue. Expansion of the same non-first-use commitment to conventional and chemical weapons would be a further contribution, particularly if it is unambiguous and straightforward.

Another point that should receive equal attention in parallel with nuclear and chemical disarmament is the reduction of conventional forces and weapons. Although the weapons of mass destruction pose a serious threat to the security, and even the survival, of mankind, we should also bear in mind that a large amount of the military budgets of countries, particularly the third-world nations, are spent on conventional weapons. According to the 11st-makers, some 150 wars involving 80 countries, with 25 million casualties, have been fought since the Second World War with conventional weapons produced by the First and Second world Wars. My delegation therefore supports zones free of conventional super-Power weapons. The territorial waters of the non-aligned countries should also be free from any military bases and manoeuvres in the context of the East-West confrontation.

(Mr. Mashhadi-Ghahvehchi, Islamic Republic of Iran)

The link between disarmament and development in a well-established reality. The Islamic Republic of Iran therefore regrets the postponement of the International Conference on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development. The Preparatory Committee had carried out extensive work and laid down solid foundations on which it would have been possible to build joint positions. The questions involved make it incumbent upon us to decide, at this session, on the date of the International Conference in 1987. We hope that this time such a decision will be adopted without further procrastination.

Mr. Chairman, my delegation is confident that, under your wise guidance, the Committee's work will bear fruit in terms of reducing tension and enhancing disarmament.

Mr. AGUILAR (Venezuela) (interpretation from Spanish): Since this is the first time my delegation has spoken in the Committee, I should like to congratulate you, Mr. Chairman, and the other officers of the Committee, on your elections to your posts and to wish you every success in the performance of your important tasks. I pledge to you our wholehearted co-operation.

This annual debate on disarmament items could be viewed as a ritual rhetorical exercise that adds little or nothing new to the consideration of those items and the attainment of the objectives sought in this area by the United Nations. There is, of course, some truth in that analysis, and the proliferation of items and draft resolutions on the subject, far from clarifying concepts and easing the way to solutions, makes it increasingly difficult to treat a field of this complexity in an orderly and coherent fashion. It requires a great deal of patience and discipline to be able to read and to study the intensive and sometimes prolix documentation available and to consider the advisability of adopting an ever-increasing number of draft resolutions on those items.

(Mr. Aguilar, Venezuela)

It can also be stated that disarmament is a subject for specialists and that very little can be brought to the solutions of these problems by countries that do not • unlike the super-Powers and other Powers • possess vast armaments of weapons of every type.

Nevertheless • and this is the other side of the coin • the participation of many delegations in these debates year after year reflects the legitimate concern of all States at the scant progress that has been recorded in this area of such vital importance for all peoples, despite all the efforts of the United Nations and of numerous institutions and personalities throughout the world. All States, large, middle-sized and small, have not only the right but also the duty to contribute to this urgent task of halting or reversing the arms race, because, as has so often been said, what is at stake is the very survival of mankind.

(Mr. Aguilar, Veneuela)

Moreover, although it is true that ~~most~~ States are virtually unarmed and that the solution of the problem therefore does not lie in disarmament for those who possess no weapons or only those conventional ~~weapons~~ strictly necessary for their security and internal and external defence, we all can and ~~must~~ help to increase the pressure applied by international public opinion for the adoption of bilateral or multilateral regional or global ~~agreements~~ with the genuine, effective effect of curbing the arms race and ~~reducing~~, qualitatively and quantitatively, the ~~weapons~~ now ~~possessed~~ by the super-Powers and by other Powers.

An ~~assessment~~ of the progress made on disarmament is especially meaningful now when we are still celebrating the International year of ~~Peace~~. In recent days we have seen encouraging signs from States ~~which~~, because they ~~possess~~ nuclear weapons, bear a great responsibility towards all mankind. Therefore, we have welcomed the contacts between the leaders of the two super-Powers. Summit ~~meetings~~ between the two super-Powers have always aroused ~~expectations~~ concerning possible agreements to improve the world climate and to ~~promote~~ tangible results in the ~~disarmament~~ field. We trust that existing opportunities to ~~make~~ progress in that area will be duly ~~seized~~ and that formulas to curb the arms race will be found.

At present, there are ~~possibilities~~ in the negotiating process that could hardly have existed a year or two ago. World attention continues to ~~focus~~ on proposals to reduce nuclear weapons on both sides, and in particular on the idea of a 50 per cent reduction in the number of ~~strategic offensive~~ nuclear warheads. Unfortunately, we are witnessing a continued intensification of massive programs to improve the quality and ~~increase the~~ number of nuclear ~~arsenals~~.

It would even seem that the priorities for nuclear disarmament ~~negotiations~~ set out in the 1978 Final Document have been changed. If the final goal is the

(Mr. Aguilar, Venezuela)

elimination of nuclear weapons, only through the suspension of testing can a limit be placed on the growing sophistication and qualitative development of nuclear weapons and hence on their spread to other environments.

In that regard, the initiative of the Group of Six is a true reflection of a legitimate aspiration of mankind, whose very survival is at stake, as has been noted. That initiative is aimed at persuading those primarily responsible for the arms race and for the vast resources it consumes of the need to engage in negotiation and dialogue in order to guarantee a safer world for all.

A nuclear test-ban treaty is a decisive element in the attempt to halt the arms race. We think therefore that the suspension of nuclear-weapon tests stands high on the list of priorities. Unfortunately, to date only one party has decided to suspend such tests and unilaterally to extend its moratorium on them.

We are convinced of the importance of the problem of verification of a moratorium. There should thus be due recognition of the attention given to that problem by the Group of Six. We trust that the Group's proposal to the super-Powers will be accepted and that an agreement on the subject will make it possible to make steady progress towards a nuclear test-ban treaty.

As the Secretary-General has rightly pointed out, this is a political rather than a technical problem. The document on verification measures issued on 7 August 1966 at the Ixtapa, Mexico, summit meeting of Heads of State or Government of the Six clearly demonstrates the readiness of those States to make a concrete contribution to achieving a negotiated moratorium, through measures to facilitate verification of the ban on nuclear tests. Those measures could include the establishment of temporary monitoring facilities at existing test sites, arrangements to use existing stations in the United States and the Soviet Union to monitor their territories outside the test sites, and inspection of large chemical explosions.

(Mr. Aguilar, Venezuela)

As a member of the Conference on Disarmament, Venezuela feels that it must refer to the most important item on the agenda of that sole multilateral United Nations negotiating body. I refer to item 2, "Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament", whose inclusion on the agenda is based on the relevant paragraphs of the Final Document of the 1978 special session.

Although it is true that nuclear-weapon States bear a special responsibility regarding the achievement of the objectives of nuclear disarmament, it is no less true that the other countries, including Venezuela, have the duty and the right to sound the alarm on a question of concern to us all: our survival. Hence the importance of recognizing the negotiating function of the Conference on Disarmament, in which nuclear-weapon Powers participate along with States representing more than 75 per cent of the world's population, which lives under the threat of a nuclear holocaust. Negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament continue to encounter grave difficulties. The fact is that thus far the Conference has been unable to discharge its principal responsibility.

Another item that should be given the same priority as nuclear disarmament is the arms race in outer space. We have repeatedly expressed our total opposition to attempts to militarise outer space, which some would claim to be a solution to the nuclear threat, but which would in fact only spur the arms race. In the Conference on Disarmament Venezuela has made observations and comments on specific questions concerning this subject, and we shall not repeat these here. We should, however, like to repeat our appeal to the two super-Powers to show the political will necessary to make it possible to achieve concrete short-term results in this area through agreement on an international instrument reiterating the basic principle that outer space is to be used for peaceful purposes only and thus preventing the spread of the arms race to that environment.

(Mr. Aguilar, Venezuela)

it seems that the only item under serious discussion and with any real prospect of agreement on a draft convention is the one on chemical weapons. We stress once again the urgency of agreeing on a convention on the total prohibition of those weapons.

In our view, United Nations disarmament studies have fulfilled a very important function, particularly as they contribute to greater public awareness of the problems of the arms race and disarmament. In 20 of the 22 studies carried out to date, a report was adopted, in the majority of cases by consensus. In cases where that is not possible, other means must be used to reflect the varying points of view. In any event, we must remember that such studies help to create an informed public opinion in matters of disarmament.

The work of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) over the past 20 years shows how important the dissemination of reliable and specialized information on disarmament and the arms race is to people and to Governments. We must acknowledge the important work of the Institute over these years and the contribution made by eminent persons involved in the cause of disarmament and connected with SIPRI.

With regard to specialization on disarmament subjects, it is important to acknowledge the role of the United Nations programme of fellowships on disarmament, which has been particularly beneficial to fellows from developing countries.

(Mr. Aguilar, Venezuela)

As will be recalled, this programme, which was established following the 1978 special session on disarmament, was designed fundamentally, as is pointed out in the Final Document, for the developing countries. Owing to the Organization's present crisis, the programme's duration has been reduced. It might be a good idea to stress the fact that it is developing countries that encounter difficulties in training personnel in such a specialized area as disarmament and that consequently they should benefit primarily from the programme. In that way we could perhaps contribute to the rationalization of the Organization's expenditures.

Venezuela is a party to the Treaty of Tlatelolco. Hence, as a country belonging to a nuclear-weapon-free zone, it welcomed the signing of the Rarotonga Treaty, which establishes a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the South Pacific. The establishment of such zones is an important disarmament measure that helps to strengthen the security of States in the region and international peace and security in general.

I should like to take this opportunity to refer to agenda item 139, 'Zone of peace and co-operation of the South Atlantic', which has been included in the agenda of this session of the General Assembly at Brazil's request, since, although not assigned to this Committee, it is very closely connected with matters relating to disarmament and international security. On other occasions we have expressed our support for the principle of creating zones of peace in various parts of the world as a collateral disarmament measure. This is a matter of a measure designed to avoid an increase of military activity in the zone to prevent its becoming involved in tensions and conflicts that would breach international peace and security. Bearing in mind that peace is indivisible and sharing the idea of common security in the nuclear era, Venezuela supports this initiative.

(Mr. Aguilar , Venezuela)

We regret that the International Conference on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development was not held as scheduled. We hope that the postponement of that Conference does not mean any questioning of this relationship or any change of attitude as to the need to deal with this subject at a high political level.

In accordance with its resolution 40/151 I, the General Assembly is to convene the third special session on disarmament, to implement the necessary preparatory committee and decide on the date during 1987 for the holding of the International Conference on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development. In view of the interest of the international community as a whole in these meetings, we trust that these decisions will be taken at the present session.

We are convinced of the important role of the plenary sessions of the General Assembly, particularly the session held in 1978, whose Final Document is a framework for the treatment of the subject. With regard to the relationship between disarmament and development, we are convinced of the beneficial effect on the social and economic development of all countries of allocating for that purpose the resources that would be freed by disarmament from the vast amounts of money spent for military purposes. No one can doubt the trilateral relationship between disarmament, security and development. We are working for those three objectives, which will make peace possible.

I cannot conclude without referring briefly to the need to streamline and simplify our procedures and working methods. The number of items allocated to the First Committee has gradually increased and more than 700 resolutions have now been adopted on disarmament. Nevertheless, the proliferation of items and resolutions has no relation to the results of negotiations on disarmament and arms control.

(Mr. Aguilar, Venezuela)

Every day we see an increase in the number of items and resolutions that are lacking in real content. It is high time to adopt measures to ensure better presentation and organization of the items to be considered by this Committee.

The Secretary-General included in his annual report the following comment on this aspect:

"The United Nations influence will be enhanced if discussions in its various disarmament forums can be organized as to minimize duplication and reduce the number of resolutions." (A/41/1, p. 10)

Mr. KAHN (German Democratic Republic): My delegation would like to speak today on agenda items 65, "Relationship between disarmament and development", and 58, "Reduction of military budgets".

During the general debate many representatives of States emphasized the great importance that attaches to the International Conference on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development. That Conference could be very helpful in identifying in all their aspects the implications of the arms race for the international economic situation. It could consider ways and means of releasing through disarmament measures additional resources for peaceful and creative purposes, in particular for overcoming economic backwardness in many parts of the world. The German Democratic Republic and the other Warsaw Treaty member States declared in the Budapest appeal, inter alia, that the funds released as a result of reductions of armed forces and conventional armaments must not be allocated to other military purposes but must be used for economic and social development.

We note with satisfaction that the Political Declaration adopted at the eighth summit of non-aligned countries, in Harare, contains substantive statements on the

(Mr. Kahn, German Democratic Republic)

interrelated questions of disarmament and development and stresses the importance of holding the International Conference.

As one of the sponsors of resolution 40/155 and by filling the post of Vice-Chairman in the Preparatory Committee, the German Democratic Republic has participated in the preparations for the Conference. The elements for a final document put forward by socialist States are geared to the elaboration of concrete measures. It is regrettable that the International Conference envisaged in the resolution did not take place in July-August 1986 although, in our view, preparations had reached a higher level than was the case with earlier comparable international conferences. Other delegations here have also commended the useful work done by the Preparatory Committee. A special word of appreciation is due to the Chairman of the Committee, Ambassador Dubey and to the Secretary-General of the Conference, Under-Secretary-General Martenson, and his staff for the great personal efforts they have made. We share the view of many other delegations that the International Conference should be held in 1987 and that the First Committee should take a decision to that effect by consensus.

The question of the reduction of military budgets will be a major topic at the International Conference. Only through such reduction can additional funds be released for development purposes. In the aforementioned Budapest appeal, the German Democratic Republic and the other Warsaw Treaty States express their firm position that disarmament measures must be followed by appropriate reductions in the military spending of States.

It is common knowledge that proposals for the reduction of military expenditures have been on the table for many years. By contrast, some States have kept increasing their military budgets every year and are not willing to enter into negotiations as suggested by socialist and non-aligned countries. In the light of

(Mr. Kahn, German Democratic Republic)

⁴¹
this situation it is worth recalling that in 1986 progress was achieved in the Working Group of the United Nations Disarmament Commission which deals with the elaboration of principles that should govern the actions of States in the field of freezing and reducing military budgets. That progress is also the result of the flexible approach demonstrated by the socialist States-

(Mr. Kahn, German Democratic Republic)

That same approach was displayed by them with regard to reasonable data exchanges on military expenditures during the negotiating process, on which they submitted draft texts. If other States would match that attitude and give up demands that data should be exchanged prior to and irrespective of substantive negotiations, and that military budgets should be made comparable, it should be possible to finalize the set of principles very soon. That would allow us to proceed to the next phase, that is, to begin substantive negotiations on freezing and subsequently reducing military expenditure.

My delegation has noted with interest and approval the proposals submitted by the Deputy Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union, Comrade Petrovski, at the tenth meeting of the Committee on 17 October. In our view, his proposals meet practical requirements - for example, that an international fund of assistance for developing countries be set up under an agreement reducing military expenditures, that disarmament agreements should stipulate the amount of resources released, and also the proportion to be allocated to assist developing countries and that negotiations be started on the principles governing such transfers and c., the establishment of an appropriate mechanism.

In conclusion, my delegation would like to recall the appeal contained in the joint communiqué of the meeting of Foreign Ministers of the Warsaw Treaty States held at Bucharest on 14 and 15 October 1986. That communiqué states, inter alia, that all countries and peoples, all peace-loving forces, are called upon,

"in the spirit of the lofty goals of the International Year of Peace, to unite their efforts and to do everything so that concrete measures are achieved directed to nuclear disarmament, the cessation of all nuclear-weapon tests and the reduction of armed forces, conventional armaments and military expenditures."

(Mr. Kahn, German Democratic Republic)

The German Democratic Republic favour the adoption by consensus of a resolution on the reduction of military budgets and its speedy implementation. which would serve the aforementioned concerns.

The CHAIRMAN: The last speaker on the list is the representative of Canada, who will make a statement in his capacity as current President of the Conference on Disarmament to introduce the report of the Conference on Disarmament, and I now call upon him.

Mr. BEESLEY (Canada), President of the Conference on Disarmament: Allow me to join preceding speakers in extending to you, Sir, my very warm personal congratulations on your election as Chairman of the First Committee. As others have so ably pointed out, the guidance you have already provided for the Committee during this session attests to the wisdom of the General Assembly in choosing you for this difficult task.

As you have explained, I have asked to speak in my capacity as President of the Conference on Disarmament before the Committee begins consideration and action on draft resolutions in order to introduce the annual report of the Conference on Disarmament to the General Assembly on its 1986 session. The report of the Conference is contained in document CD/732, issued as document A/41/27. I do so in the hope that the annual report of the Conference will assist the First Committee in its deliberations on the draft resolutions submitted to it that are relevant to the future work of the Conference.

Allow me to refer briefly to the contents of the report I am introducing today. Matters will find in paragraphs 7 and 10 the agenda for the 1986 session of the Conference, as well as the programme of work for the first and second parts of the annual session. A summary of views expressed in the Conference on Disarmament on substantive questions on its agenda appears under the relevant sections of the annual report.

(Mr. Beesley, President, Conference
on Disarmament)

In the case of the first three items on the agenda, relating to a nuclear test-ban, cessation of the nuclear-arms race and nuclear disarmament, and prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters, during 1966 the Conference continued its efforts to find an appropriate organizational arrangement for dealing with them. Although no agreement emerged on the establishment of subsidiary bodies under those agenda items, much thought and effort were devoted to achieving such agreement. It should be noted in this connection - and this is a matter of some importance - that the Conference was able to agree on the holding of a series of informal meetings on the substance of agenda item 2, "Cessation of the nuclear-arms race and nuclear disarmament," and that discussions held at those informal private meetings are also reflected in the annual report under the section dealing with that agenda item. This is a new development, which made possible an in-depth consideration of the subject and ensured that all members of the United Nations would be duly informed of those discussions.

Negotiations on a chemical-weapons ban are continuing at an increasing pace. Progress has been achieved and differences significantly reduced. Of course, there are still a number of important issues to be resolved, but there is a momentum now which should not be lost. The consultations to be held later this year in Geneva, as well as the additional work in the extended session of the Committee, scheduled for January 1987, may ensure that the momentum is maintained and should do so, as well as ensuring that further areas of agreement are developed.

Agenda item 5 was considered mainly by an Ad Hoc Committee, which held an in-depth discussion on a number of questions relevant to the prevention of an arms race in outer space. As a result of those deliberations, there was a general recognition in the Ad Hoc Committee of the importance and urgency of preventing that arms race and a readiness to contribute to that objective. It was recommended

(Mr. Beesley, President, Conference
on Disarmament)

to the Conference that the Ad Hoc Committee be re-established with an adequate mandate at the beginning of the 1987 session.

Views and positions on the question of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons continued to differ, and additional efforts are needed if the present stalemate is to be overcome.

The competent Ad Hoc Committee on Radiological Weapons conducted useful work on the basis of the mandate entrusted to it, and the Conference should consider at the beginning of the 1987 session the recommendation to re-establish it so that the subsidiary body may consider the ways and means of how best to proceed further, a subject on which some differences of views remain.

(Mr. Beasley, President, Conference
on Disarmament!)

During the 1986 session, the Ad Hoc Committee on the comprehensive programme of disarmament concentrated its work on certain outstanding questions relating to the programme, especially those concerning disarmament measures. The areas of agreement have been enlarged, but work remains to be done on some questions, such as stages of implementation and time frames. As the Conference was expected to submit to the General Assembly a complete draft of the programme at the present session, it has been agreed that work on the elaboration of the programme should be resumed at the beginning of the 1987 session with a view to completing the task of the Conference during the first part of its annual session.

The Conference also considered during its 1986 session the expansion of its membership. As noted in paragraph 16 of the annual report, the Socialist Group and the Western Group announced that their candidates for membership were Viet Nam and Norway, respectively. The Conference has agreed to further intensify its consultations with a view to taking a positive decision at its next annual session on the expansion of its membership and will inform the General Assembly at its forty-second session concerning this matter.

Before concluding, may I emphasize what is sometimes regarded as a truism: that the work of this Conference is heavily influenced by the international climate. The Conference cannot be content, however, merely to reflect that climate; it must help lead the way by improving it.

It should be recorded that all groups and all delegations collaborated in attempting to ensure that the report I referred to is as comprehensive while none the less as objective and as free from counterproductive polemics as we could possibly make it. At the same time, on basic, substantive issues, there is no doubt that there exists a widespread wish that the Conference had done more and the hope that we will do better. Yet the progress achieved in some areas, although not

(Mr. **Beesley**, President, Conference
on Disarmament)

as great as one would desire, should not be under-estimated. If on some agenda items the Conference has been unable to move beyond the pre-negotiating phase, the work done up to now can prove to have been vital when conditions are ripe to move to concrete negotiations, As the current President of the Conference on Disarmament, I express the widespread hope that next year the Conference will be able to concentrate more on substance. By so doing we could lay the foundation for **future agreements which are essential to international security, agreements which** are thus of concern not only to the **members** of the Conference but to the whole membership of the United Nations. All of us here today share with the Conference on Disarmament a heavy moral duty, not only to the Governments we represent, but to all the peoples of the world.

As President of the Conference on Disarmament I am fully prepared to engage in any consultations and pursue any endeavour which might advance the work of the Conference during the coming year.

In closing, I wish to thank the members of the Conference on Disarmament for their invariably friendly co-operation in the preparation of this report. On their behalf, I express our thanks for the invaluable assistance throughout the year extended by Mr. Komatina, the Secretary-General of the Conference, and his deputy, Mr. Berasategui and all the members of the secretariat of the Conference on Disarmament, who gave such outstanding support, advice and guidance to the Conference, more particularly in the preparation of its report.

ORGANIZATION OF WORK

The **CHAIRMAN**: I should like to remind members of the Committee that, in accordance with its decision, the deadline for submission of draft resolutions under disarmament agenda items 46 to 65 and 144 will expire at 6 p.m. on Thursday, **30** October 1986,

(The Chairman)

I should also once again like to invite the sponsors of draft resolutions to kindly introduce them even during the current phase of our work if at all possible.

Before adjourning the meeting, I should like to inform **members** that the following delegations are inscribed on the list of speakers for this **afternoon's meeting** : the **Byelorussian SSR**, Peru, the **United** Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, who will **speak on** behalf of the 12 members of the **European Economic Community (EEC)**, Sri Lanka, whose representative will speak in his capacity as Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean, and Poland.

The meeting rose at 12.15 p.m.