



**VERBATIM RECORD OF THE 10th MEETING**

Chairman: Mr. ZACHMANN (German Democratic Republic)

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The meeting was called to order at 10.35 a.m.

AGENDA ITEMS 46 TO 65 AND 144 (continued)

GENERAL DEBATE ON ALL DISARMAMENT ITEMS

Mr. VALDERRAMA (Philippines) : My delegation wishes to pay a tribute to the memory of Mr. Samora ~~Moises~~ Machel, President of the People's Republic of Mozambique, and to say how saddened we are by his tragic and untimely death. Mr. Machel led his country in its struggle for independence, and espoused the cause of the anti-apartheid movement, as well as that of the self-determination of colonial countries and peoples in southern Africa. Mr. Machel was a symbol of the modern African freedom fighter. The people and the Government of the Philippines join the people and the Government of the People's Republic of Mozambique and the bereaved families in their moment of national sorrow.

I congratulate you, Sir, on your election to the chairmanship of the First Committee. I congratulate also the other officers of the Committee. Having worked with you and the Rapporteur in the Special Committee against Apartheid, I have confidence in your ability to lead the Committee, whose assigned tasks lie at the very heart of the United Nations goal of the maintenance of international peace and security.

Modern history is replete with examples of efforts to achieve disarmament through establishing levels of the means and instruments of war. We all know that in some instances agreement was reached, but that because of a lack of either political will or good Faith disarmament was short-lived, with war the inevitable result.

(Mr. Valderama, Philippines)

This need of our time is for Member States - in particular the major Powers - to exercise political will and good faith. In our time, the stakes are higher than before, for they involve the very survival of civilisation and of the human race itself.

Last year we commemorated the fortieth anniversary of the United Nations, and the General Assembly proclaimed 1986 the International Year of Peace. This year, as the Secretary-General prepares to begin his second term of office, may thus be regarded as a new beginning in man's eternal quest for universal peace. We should be able to put our 40 years of experience to good use in order to solve the major problems of our age, foremost among which are the lack of international peace and security and endemic poverty in the third world. All mankind is hostage to the threat of nuclear war; flash-points of conflict exist all around the globe, making it a veritable tinder-box. The proliferation of both conventional and nuclear arms imperils us all, strong and weak, rich and poor alike.

Perhaps Governments cannot be faulted if they have set security as their paramount objective: it is their primary responsibility to protect and defend their citizens. But in their zeal to do this they have instead created, with their fearful machines of war, insecurity for themselves and for the whole world.

The super-Powers are building mountains of weaponry, and the United Nations is piling high mountains of resolutions. We in the third world, who have many millions to feed, clothe and house, would rather opt for mountains of resolutions leading to victory over mankind's ancient enemies - hunger, poverty and oppression - than for mountains of weaponry threatening our world.

How ironic it is that in this age of instant communication we should still be straitjacketed by obsolete modes of thinking. Nevertheless, there has been a concern for the need to integrate services and industries and to manage global

(Mr. Valderrama, Philippines)

resources. . . On the regional level, the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN), the Organization of African Unity and the European Community are good examples of beneficial co-operation. On the international level, we have all benefited from the services of the International Committee of the Red Cross, the World Health Organization, the Universal Postal Union, the United Nations Children's Fund, the United Nations Industrial Development Organization, the United Nations Fund for Population Activities, the United Nations Development Programme, the International Telecommunication Union and the International Atomic Energy Agency, among others. The attitude of international co-operation and mutual aid was evidenced in the recent tragic crises which struck Chernobyl and San Salvador, where people worked together without regard to ideology or nationality.

Yet, alas, problems of international peace and security still remain unsolved. The structures which could be utilized to solve those problems exist within the United Nations. They include the Security Council, the General Assembly, the Conference on Disarmament, the Disarmament Commission and the good offices of the Secretary-General. If we were to employ all those instruments of peace and security we should indeed be one step closer to our elusive goals. Sadly, it is a fact that those instruments have virtually been bypassed.

Why is that so? My delegation submits that there is both irony and cynicism in our tolerance of that situation. Nations spend some \$900 billion a year on military programmes, when one adult in three can neither read nor write and when one person in four is hungry. In a world of only 5 billion people, the megatonnage of the world's stockpile of nuclear weapons is sufficient to kill 50 billion people. There is one soldier per 43 persons in the world, but only one medical doctor per 1,030. It costs \$590,000 a day to operate an aircraft carrier, but every day, in Africa alone, 14,000 children die of hunger and hunger-related causes.

(Mr. Valderama, Philippines)

We have so often heard those statistics repeated in one form or another that they have lost their shock value. None the less, rape ti tion &es not make them any less true or less frightening. AS recently as 19 October 1986, James Res ton wrote in his New York Times column that

"each day Moscow and Washington together produce six new atomic weapons to add to the near 50,000 they already have". (The New York Times, 19 October 1986, p. E23)

What can we do about this situation? We can either throw up our hands in frustration and blame those who spearheaded the nuclear-arms race and the spread of Conventional arms, or keep on encouraging the super-Powers to do something about it before all of us are incinerated.

The problem of disarmament is too great to allow defeatism. The price of defeatism is too much to pay. something has indeed to be done. All nations, working together in concerted action, should put pressure on those few among us who hold the future of the world in their hands. They hold an awesome responsibility indeed. They should be constantly reminded of this and should be held accountable for the consequences. But then, whom would they be accountable to when all of us on this Earth have perished?

There was widespread disappointment over the failure of the recent summit talks at Reykjavik. But did anyone really expect the two super-Powers to reach extensive agreements on disarmament in the Icelandic capital? On the other hand, Reykjavik may not have set back the peace process at all, because both sides seem to be determined to resume their dialogue, as evidenced by their "post-mortem" statements. There seems to be an indication also that the United States and the Soviet Union will in the coming weeks try to conclude two of the tentative agreements they achieved in Iceland, regarding curbing nuclear testing and limiting each side's arsenal of medium-range missiles. We can take consolation from this,

(Mr. Valderama, Philippines)

and can encourage agreement in every possible area of disarmament and on every possible level. We, the numerous majority, dare not be pessimistic, for without hope there can only be despair.

One encouraging area of agreement is the Final Document of the Conference on Confidence and Security Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe. That document touches on such issues as prior notification, verification and other confidence-building measures. Europe, where two world wars began, understandably does not wish to be the battleground for yet another war. Asia too, where I come from, has been the scene of wars in modern times.

Within the South-East Asian region, ASEAN has worked unstintingly to bring about a just and lasting peace. Its long-range goal is the establishment in South-East Asia of a zone of peace, freedom and neutrality. The peoples of that region have experienced war and invasions in the past. After centuries of mending strife they deserve to enjoy peace and progress in larger freedom.

(Mr. Valderrama, Philippines)

All this should be put within the broader framework of the United Nations, in which the great majority of countries are represented. The Philippines believes that this is still the best possible forum, where Member States can express their position on the important topics of disarmament and international peace and security.

The Philippines reiterates its support for the following among the many measures that have been proposed in the First Committee. First among them is the need for a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty. The Philippines believes that the conclusion of a treaty through the United Nations on the prohibition of all nuclear tests by all States in all environments for all time could constitute a vital element for halting and reversing the nuclear-arms race. Hence, it supports the efforts of the Conference on Disarmament towards negotiations on a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty. The Philippines will therefore support draft resolutions which in its view would lead to a cessation of all nuclear tests.

Second is the conclusion of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. As a non-nuclear-weapon State, the Philippines is in favour of international arrangements that would lead to security for all States. It believes that it is necessary to all States, especially the nuclear-weapon States, to demonstrate the political will to reach agreement on a common approach and formula which could be included in a legally binding international instrument.

The third is the prevention of an arms race in outer space. As the last frontier of mankind, outer space must be maintained and used for peaceful purposes. An arms race there would run counter to the United Nations objective of general and complete disarmament under effective international control, and to international co-operation in the peaceful exploration and use of outer space.

(Mr. Valderrama, Philippines)

The fourth involves the observance of existing international obligations regarding prohibitions on chemical and biological weapons. My delegation notes that significant progress has been made in the Conference on Disarmament on the definition and listing of chemicals and provisions for the destruction of chemical weapons and production facilities. The Philippines welcomes the progress made in this area by the Conference on Disarmament, which will help ensure the implementation of a ban on chemical and biological weapons. It urges all States, pending the conclusion of a comprehensive ban on chemical and biological weapons, to co-operate in efforts to prevent the use of such weapons.

The fifth measure is the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones. The Philippines has long supported the concept of nuclear-weapon-free zones and takes this opportunity to reiterate that support. Following the laudable example of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America - the Treaty of Tlatelolco - other regions such as the Middle East, South Asia, Africa and the South Pacific have similarly determined to be free of nuclear weapons. The United Nations should make every effort to persuade nuclear-weapon States to curb the proliferation of sites where nuclear weapons can be stored and developed. That would be one way to avert the catastrophe of nuclear war.

The sixth is the convening of the International Conference on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development. Studies on security, in which the Philippines has itself participated, have shown that the arms race is both wasteful and counter-productive. It is illusory to think that more arms buy us more security; the truth is quite the opposite. In addition, the arms race channels to sterile ends funds which could be used for development. The Philippines therefore urges that the Conference on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development be convened at the earliest feasible date.



(Mr. Valderrama, Philippines)

The United Nations has been accused time and again of being nothing more than a debating club. The First Committee, which last year produced 66 draft resolutions, could perhaps be included in that sweeping yet telling indictment. Last year, however, the First Committee showed itself capable of both reform and innovation. For instance, the Committee was able to trim down 11 draft resolutions on preventing the militarization of outer space to a single coherent text. In addition, 20 draft resolutions, about a third of the total, were adopted by consensus. That indicates that a more effective line of action would be for us to work towards fewer yet far more effective consensus texts. By avoiding the proliferation of draft resolutions on a single issue, we should be doing our share towards helping the United Nations out of the financial crisis in which it finds itself.

The First Committee, it seems to my delegation, has the mandate to lead the way. My delegation therefore supports the establishment of a working group, as proposed last year by the Chairman of the First Committee, which would recommend ways to make the Committee more effective and more efficient.

The goal of universal peace and security has thus far eluded us these past 40 years. Indeed, a new generation has matured to adulthood since the foundation of the Organisation, a generation that has lived uneasily under the threat of total destruction. It is also a generation which, depending on what the super-Powers do, has the right to inherit the Earth with its bountiful largesse. The novel is that Herman Wouk said in his memorable novel about the Second World War battle of Leyte Gulf in the Philippines, "Either war is finished or we are".

While we cannot turn back the hands of time, we can envision 1986, the International Year of Peace, as a year in which we can begin to rid ourselves of our old and present follies. We must overcome or do away with

(Mr. Valderama, Philippines)

obsolete ways of thinking and behaving. We belong, after all, to one planet with a shared destiny. Before it is too late, let us determine to seize the opportunity and turn from a destiny of potential destruction to one of creativity.

Let it not be said that our generation, when it had the choice, opted for strife rather than reason. Let it rather be said that our generation had the vision to carve the structures of a just peace, and that on the eve of the twenty-first century we learned to live with one another in a new régime of co-operation among all mankind.

Mr. NGO (Zambia): My delegation learned with utter disbelief and great sorrow of the untimely and tragic death of His Excellency President Samora Machel of the People's Republic of Mozambique. President Machel was a selfless leader who spent his entire life in search of peace, freedom and justice for his people and for all mankind. Indeed, his last mission was in search of that peace. We have lost a Leader who will be remembered by all peace-loving people. Zambia had the greatest respect for President Machel, and my delegation wishes to convey through you, Mr. Chairman, its heartfelt condolences to the brother people of Mozambique. As we mourn that great son of Africa, let us be reminded of the fact that this Committee was discussing matters that were of great concern to him.

(Mr. Ngo, Zambia)

The question of disarmament has been one of the major preoccupations of the United Nations since its inception. In spite of this, however, mankind today continues to live under the shadow and threat of a nuclear holocaust. The dangerous arms race between the two power blocs now threatens the very existence of mankind. The new nuclear and conventional weapons, by their quality and destructive power, are not only capable of annihilating all that mankind has developed and constructed through thousands of years of effort and sacrifice, but even mankind itself. The world's power blocs continue to develop new weapons and to maintain stockpiles at levels of destructive power far greater than could be justified by any rational military purpose. Some of the nuclear-weapon States even seem to pretend to be unaware of the fact that nuclear arms pose a most serious and immediate threat to the survival of mankind today.

We have always hoped that a day would come when the two super-Powers would recognize the need for a disarmament agreement in order to save mankind from total destruction. We were therefore disappointed at the failure of the super-Power summit in Iceland. Once again, a God-given opportunity has been lost.

While we deeply regret this development, we should like to express the hope that the two countries will continue to explore areas of agreement. We should also like to remind the international community that the question of disarmament is so central to existence that it cannot be left in the hands of a few countries. All of us must be actively involved. We must accept the fact that the acquisition of nuclear weapons does not reduce the risk of war but, rather, enhances that risk. We cannot accept the contention that the massive production of nuclear and conventional weapons contributes to international peace and security.

(Hr. Ngo, Zambia)

A new dimension has been added to the arms race: this is the militarization of outer space. This development is of great concern to us, because we strongly feel that outer space, being the common heritage of mankind, should be free of military weapons and should be used exclusively for peaceful purposes. We fear that if the militarisation of outer space continues, we are likely to witness an expansion of the arms race and an increased threat to international peace and security. We therefore urge the United States and the Soviet Union to move speedily in their negotiations so they can work out an agreement that will permanently keep outer space free of military weapons. No argument will convince us that the militarization of outer space can contribute to international peace and security.

All of us seem to agree that there is an urgent need for nuclear disarmament. In order to achieve our objective, we should work towards a comprehensive test-ban treaty. We should have in mind a comprehensive test ban that would prohibit further testing of nuclear weapons in all environments, including underground. My delegation is in this regard unhappy to note that, once again, no consensus could be reached on the creation of an ad hoc committee on the nuclear-test ban. The Soviet unilateral moratorium on nuclear tests is a step in the right direction. We believe that, if all nuclear States took similar action, an atmosphere of trust could be created which would lead to a comprehensive test-ban treaty.

Zambia has always stood firm in its commitment to complete disarmament and to the denuclearization of Africa. Unfortunately, the aspiration to denuclearize Africa has been undermined by South Africa's acquisition of a nuclear capability. The acquisition by South Africa of a nuclear capability seriously jeopardizes the realization of the objective of a denuclearized Africa and poses a grave danger not only to independent African States but also to world peace and security.

(Mr. Ngo, Zambia)

In addition to **being committed** to the **denuclearization** of Africa, we fully support the idea of the establishment of nuclear-free zones. It is our belief that such zones would constitute important collateral disarmament **measures**. It is therefore regrettable that efforts to hold a conference in Colombo aimed at designating the **Indian** Ocean as a zone of peace have not materialized. My delegation **wishes** to reiterate its belief in the imperative **necessity** of the Colombo conference. We are convinced that it would be an invaluable step **towards** the implementation of the international community's desire to designate the Indian Ocean **as** a zone of peace.

While paying attention to **halting** the nuclear-arms race, the United Nations should not overlook or minimize the danger inherent in conventional warfare. This danger is real. Its close relation to the ongoing arms race between the two super-Powers should be **recognized**. It **is** a fact that as the power **blocs** continue to develop new weapons, older conventional weapons find their way to third world countries. It is those weapons that have, since the Second world War, accounted **for** the deaths of millions of people and for incalculable destruction of property.

The developing countries continue to face **immense** economic problems, partly because they are forced to spend their meagre resources on arms, which they would not **need to do if** they were sure of a secure and peaceful future. The diversion of those resources **han** on the **one** hand had an adverse effect on those countries' **development** ef for ta. On the other hand, developed **corntr** Lee continue to waste considerable **sums** of money, which could be channelled to other important projects designed to assist the disadvantaged in both developed and developing countries. While **developed countries** by and large . ve in **extreme** affluence, the countries of the third world live in **absolute** poverty. It **is** immoral in the circumstances **for**

(Mr. Ngo, Zambia)

any nation to continue to squander billions of dollars while people all over the world are dying of hunger and disease.

The current turbulent international situation demands that we, the Members of the United Nations, rededicate ourselves to the cause of complete disarmament if we are to avert mankind's destruction.

Hr. ZARIF (Afghanistan) : My delegation joins previous speakers in expressing our deep sense of sorrow and grief over the sad and most unfortunate tragedy that has befallen the fraternal people of Mozambique. The people of Mozambique, the people of Africa and, indeed, the people of the world have lost, in the person of Samora Moises Machel, an outstanding freedom fighter, a distinguished statesman and a fighter against apartheid. We share in the sorrow of the people of Mozambique and we express our deepest sympathy to them.

(Mr. Zarif, Afghanistan)

I wish to express to you, Sir, the heartfelt congratulations of the delegation of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan on your unanimous election as Chairman of this very important Committee. Since your distinguished human and professional qualities are well known to us all, I shall refrain from duelling on them, and thus also comply with your own instructions to that effect.

This Committee, dealing with political and security matters, has begun considering its agenda items at a time when an extremely complicated and dangerous international situation prevails, but when rays of hope are emerging on the horizon of great-Power relations. In this statement I shall first focus on those two opposing features of the current situation.

The international community is now faced with the gravest threat to the existence of man's civilization, a threat characterized by an ever-increasing build-up of the most horrendous means of war with greater sophistication and destructive capability, higher targeting and retargeting accuracy, vastly expended flight range and disproportionately enormous yield. The lust to acquire ever-new systems of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery illustrates the astounding probability that deliberate and well-organized material preparations for a nuclear war may well be under way in the warmongering, imperialist circles.

To complete their scenario for such a war, those forces have now unleashed a new spiral of the arms race, this time into outer space. A gigantic programme aimed at the creation of a so-called impenetrable shield, described as America's insurance policy, is being implemented at full speed through research into and development, testing and production of new anti-ballistic-weapon systems. Together with such material preparations for a surprise nuclear attack, based on the

(Mr. Zarif, Afghanistan)

illusion of possible defence in the event of retaliation, a monstrous psychological and propaganda war has also been unleashed. That warfare has at its core the infamous doctrines of the admissibility of pre-emptive or countervailing first nuclear strike and limited or protracted nuclear war. Such an irresponsible, mad drive towards the unprecedented escalation of the arms race has brought the world ever closer to the verge of complete annihilation. The danger of the outbreak of an all-out nuclear confrontation now haunts all mankind, whose very survival is put in question.

At a time when the most conservative estimates rule out the possibility of civilization surviving a nuclear holocaust, and when many biological, geophysical and atmospheric interactions and contractions resulting from a nuclear war are not yet known, the unabated drive towards plunging our planet into the abyss of a nuclear catastrophe should be sufficient reason for all peace-loving humanity to continue and expand its struggle to curb the arms race and take urgent steps towards nuclear disarmament. That is the supreme task of all mankind, if we are to secure any future for this and forthcoming generations.

The Reykjavik meeting between Mikhail Gorbachev, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, and Ronald Reagan, President of the United States, was undoubtedly a very important event in the recent history of International relations. The significance of the meeting is attested to by the agreements that were about to be reached there. The great Powers were only steps away from reaching final political agreement on the most important aspects of disarmament.

The sweeping concessions offered by the Soviet Union made it possible to reach that stage. But, to the great regret and disappointment of every peace-loving human being, of all those with a conscience on our planet, the United States



(Mr. Zarif, Afghanistan)

Administration, which seems to be eternally wedded to the illusion of world military superiority, stubbornly refused to take the last and most important step, thus preventing the achievement of any concrete results on any of the topics that were discussed.

The logic on which the Americans based their rigid positions seems totally incomprehensible. On the one hand, they finally agreed to the Soviet Union's far-reaching and concrete proposals to reduce and finally eliminate all strategic weapons, to rid Europe of 811 United States and Soviet medium-range nuclear weapons, to limit to 100 the number of warheads on such weapons in the Asian part of the Soviet Union and on the territory of the United States and to phase out 811 nuclear tests.

On the other hand, however, the United States wishes to cross the boundaries of the anti-ballistic-missile Treaty and continue research into and testing of new and more sophisticated types of weapons of mass destruction outside the laboratory in the context of the "star wars" project.

NOW that all the facts about the Reykjavik meeting are known to the international community, we can determine categorically how sincere the positions of the Soviet Union and the United States are on questions that deal with the very existence of mankind. It is evident that the Soviet Union, for the sake of the peace and security of all humanity, went so far as to accept virtually all previous American conditions on disarmament measures. In striking contrast with the Soviet stance was the United States position, which manifested, beyond any shadow of doubt, its total dependence on the greedy interests of the military-industrial super-monopolies in the United States.

(Mr. Zarif, Afghanistan)

Although no agreement could be reached at Reykjavik, we wish to believe that the meeting was not in vain. For one thing, it proved that, given the political will, foresight and a serious sense of responsibility, wisdom, courage and statesmanship on the part of the negotiating parties, it is possible to reach agreement on the most acute problems of our time which have been on our agenda for several decades.

Together with the rest of peace-loving humanity, the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan expresses the hope that the American side, taking account of the expressed wishes of the international community and the supreme interests of mankind, including the people of the United States, will come to grips with the realities of the nuclear and space age and recognize the abiding need to eliminate all the material causes behind the threat of nuclear annihilation.

Approximately \$4 trillion have been squandered on the arms race since the Second world War. The world's annual expenditure on arms is rapidly reaching the astronomical figure of \$1 trillion. The megatonnage of destructive potential accumulated in the world's nuclear arsenal is enough to kill 58 billion people, every person 12 times over. The sum of \$1 billion is spent for military purposes every eight to nine hours, while 20 per cent of the world's population lives in hunger and 35 per cent of the adult population is deprived of the right to read and write.

(Mr. Zia ul-Haq, Afghanistan)

There is one soldier for every 43 persons in the world, while there is only one physician for every 1,030 persons. For every dollar given as development assistance \$20 are spent for arm production.

Those are some of the frightening realities that must be pondered by those who sincerely care for the present and future of human beings. Those bitter realities represent hard-core evidence of guilt against the worn-out logic of "security through force". The time has long run out on that primitive mentality. It must now be replaced inevitably and eternally by a new way of thinking based on a common search for security through disarmament. Halting the nuclear-arms race and implementing drastic disarmament measures, particularly in their nuclear aspect, are a sine qua non for achieving that goal.

It is our considered opinion that, first of all, an end must be put immediately to all nuclear-test explosions, by all States, in all environments, and for all time.

More than one year has elapsed since the Soviet Union unilaterally terminated all its nuclear tests and extended its moratorium a number of times in response to the urgings of the non-aligned and other peace-loving countries. While expressing the sincere appreciation of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan for the responsible and bold decision of the Soviet Union, we cannot but register our deep regret that the Government of the United States has turned a deaf ear to the repeated calls of the international community and conducted 22 nuclear explosions since the declaration of the moratorium by the Soviet Union.

The pretext of reliable verification has lost all its justification in the light of the Soviet Union's readiness to accept the strictest control and monitoring mechanisms. Added to the availability of sufficient technological verification means is the assistance offered by the Group of Six that would ensure

(Mr. Zar if, Afghanistan)

complete impartiality of such an exercise. The positive results of the Stockholm Conference on security and confidence-building measures in Europe also should serve as a very encouraging factor in the search for appropriate verification mechanisms for other disarmament and security agreements.

We wish to reiterate our call to the United States to cease forthwith all its nuclear tests and to embark on serious negotiations with the Soviet Union on the drafting of a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty. We also call on the Conference on Disarmament to redouble its efforts in this direction which, so far, have been less than satisfactory.

I should like now to turn to the question of space weapons which proved to be the main stumbling-block at Reykjavik. The opening up of space to mankind a quarter century ago which brought about great hopes for the future of all mankind is now becoming the source of a serious threat to the existence of our planet. To some militaristic and adventurist circles, the planet Earth seems not to be large enough and they have decided to introduce highly sophisticated military systems into outer space.

By establishing a Special space Command and a Joint Control Centre of Military Operations in Space, the United States has concentrated enormous attention on the research, development, testing, production and deployment of such weapons which could be used from the Earth against targets in outer space, stationed in outer space for use against space and earth targets, and launched by high-flying P-15 fighter bombers aimed at both earth and space targets. The first generation of nuclear weapons has already been tested within the strategic defence initiative (SDI) and anti-satellite (ASAT) programmes.

Much is being made of the so-called defensive nature of the nuclear-generated laser and particle-beam weapon systems to be stationed in space. Given their

(Mr. Zia ul-Haq, Afghanistan)

sophistication, undeterminable stations and targets, those weapons have a highly destabilizing impact. According to plans developed by the Pentagon and the National Aeronautic and Space Administration (NASA), those weapons will play the key role of rendering blind the means of observation and monitoring military movements and satellite tracking of the other side. That would enhance the dangerous temptation to launch a surprise nuclear attack by reducing the warning time for the other side and feed the illusion that a retaliatory strike could be launched before or after launch.

The enormous efforts being made to develop such weapons can be measured by the fact that the United States has allocated hundreds of billions of dollars for the purpose of military space research, development and testing alone. According to preliminary conservative estimates, the cost of a space-based defence system may go as high as over \$1 trillion - an unprecedented figure for any previous weapons system.

Those developments are all taking place at a time when there exists, in Pull force, a treaty signed and ratified by the United States and the Soviet Union limiting anti-ballistic missiles and banning their development. The violation of such a legally binding instrument as the anti-ballistic missile Treaty calls into question the reliability of the negotiating parties and the validity of many other documents which are also the outcome of many years' tireless negotiating efforts.

Last year the General Assembly adopted, by 151 votes, resolution 40/87 in which it requested

"... the Conference on Disarmament to re-establish an ad hoc committee ... with a view to undertaking negotiations for the conclusion of an agreement or agreements, as appropriate, on the prevention of an arms race in outer space in all its aspects".

(Mr. Zar if, Afghanistan)

we regret that the Ad Hoc Committee was prevented last year from making any tangible progress in the fulfilment of its mandate.

It is our earnest hope that such an important issue as the prevention of an arms race in outer space will be given the utmost priority that it deserves during the next session of the Conference on Disarmament and that the ad hoc committee be re-established to continue and intensify its work on the drafting of appropriate instruments.

Before concluding, I wish to say that the struggle for peace and international security constitutes the cornerstone of the foreign policy of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan. Comrade Najib, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan, said the following in this connection:

"The success of our efforts towards revolutionary reconstruction and the implementation of our creative plans can be effectively achieved only if lasting peace and security prevails in our region and throughout the world."

Mr. BELONOGOV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (interpretation from Russian): Today the Soviet delegation is speaking in order to share some of its thinking about one important aspect of the entire range of arms control and disarmament issues that we are discussing, namely, control and verification. In so doing we are convinced that without control there is no confidence - and confidence is a most essential factor when it comes to arms limitation agreements. The strictest possible comprehensive verification is a major element in the disarmament process.

(Mr. Belonogov, USSR)

The importance of this issue is now greater perhaps than ever before, because of the pressing need to achieve a breakthrough for the better in the international situation not as to overcome the negative confrontational trends, which have been growing in recent years, and to clear the way for winding down the arms race on earth and averting an arms race in outer space as well as securing an overall reduction of the risk of war and building trust as an integral component of relations between States.

What is needed to accomplish this is new political thinking imbued with an awareness that, in the present situation, no one can any longer act as he did in the past. This is fully applicable to the problem of verification too.

That was reaffirmed at the Reykjavik meeting, during which, as is well known, the problem of verification was discussed. Having expressed its willingness to go ahead with deep cuts in nuclear weapons, the Soviet side came out in favour not only of the strictest possible verification in any form but also of making the requirements for it more stringent. In a post-nuclear situation verification must necessarily be all-embracing and of a kind that would provide full assurance of reliable compliance with the agreements during every stage of arms reduction.

As a result this issue also was settled, and it became part of the agreements that were almost achieved and remain only to be finalized. The lack of any new political thinking in the attitude of the United States, however, thwarted the success of the meeting, and as a consequence the historic opportunity to negotiate a whole package of agreements that were reliably verifiable was missed.

One of the principal lessons of Reykjavik is that new political thinking in line with the realities of the nuclear age is a sine qua non for finding a way out of the critical situation in which mankind finds itself at the end of the twentieth century. Profound changes are required in the thinking of the entire human community.

(Mr. Belonogov, USSR)

In giving material form to the new political thinking, the Soviet Union attaches particular importance to the problem of verification. We have stated more than once that the USSR is open to verification and is interested in it no less than others.

The attempts that are being made to use references to verification issues in order to avoid agreements on arms limitation and disarmament are immoral and disingenuous as well as fundamentally destructive. Broadly speaking, the problem of verification is no longer on the agenda as some kind of obstacle to agreements. What is needed now is to deal constructively with that problem, and it is precisely here that we can frequently observe the absence of real willingness to strengthen verification measures and confidence. A similar lack of willingness on the part of one or two delegations of Western States had to be overcome when the Convention on the Prohibition of Bacteriological Weapons was reviewed and when the convention on the notification of accidents at nuclear installations was worked out and concluded in Vienna, as well as in a number of other cases.

The fruitfulness of new approaches and the need for their implementation were tellingly demonstrated by the results of the Stockholm Conference on Confidence and Security Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe. These results have proved that even in a complex situation understandings can be reached on problems of security provided there is a political will and desire to do so.

The practical significance of the Stockholm accords lies in the fact that a set of political and military-technological measures has been agreed upon to reduce the risk of war in Europe and to strengthen security and confidence among the participants in the agreements that have been reached.

In fact what is involved here is the first major agreement in the political-military field since the signing of the Soviet-United States SALT-II Treaty. A foundation has been laid for new agreements, including those for a



(Mr. Belonogov, USSR)

substantial reduction of **armed forces** and **armaments** in Europe as proposed by the Warsaw Treaty **member countries**.

For its part the Soviet Union has done everything in **its power** to contribute to a **successful outcome** for the Stockholm Conference. In accordance with **the statement** of 15 January by the General Secretary of the Central **Committee** of the **Communist Party of the Soviet Union**, **Mikhail S. Gorbachev**, the Soviet side **has made** new and vigorous **efforts** to find **solutions** to the important **problems** that were discussed there. **As** a result of the Soviet initiative, the question of the **non-use** of force was further **explored**. On our **proposal**, solutions were found as regards the **exchange of plans for** military activities, the notifiable level of **such** activities and the carrying out of on-site **inspections**.

In Stockholm the **Soviet Union demonstrated** in practical terms **its new approach** to verification **issues**, **thereby** confirming that today the **problem of verification** as such does not exist **provided** there **is** in fact a serious desire to **seek mutually advantageous** solutions that would lead to the **reduction** and eventual elimination of military danger.

The new political **philosophy** also underlies our initiative for a **sizeable reduction of conventional** armaments and **armed forces** in **Europe**. The USSR and its Warsaw Treaty allies **advocate** reliable verification at all **stages** of that **process**. This might involve both **national technological** means and **international forms** of verification, including, where necessary, **on-site** inspections.

The Soviet Union also took a **similar approach** to verifying the **implementation** of the **programme**, which they put forward on 15 January of this year, for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons everywhere in the world by the **end of this** century. The verification of **armaments** being destroyed and limited would be

(Mr. Belonogov, USSR)

carried out both by national technological means and international procedures, up to and including on-site inspections. The USSR is ready to negotiate any other additional measures of verification.

We have also proposed that, in the process of implementing the nuclear disarmament measures provided for in the programme, special procedures should be worked out for destroying nuclear warheads as well as for dismantling, converting or destroying delivery vehicles. At all stages of the elimination of nuclear weapons, the amounts of weapons to be destroyed as well as the sites where they are to be destroyed would have to be agreed upon. Of course there should be reliable verification, including international control, of the destruction or conversion process.

(Mr. Belonogov, USSR)

The USSR is **totally** in favour of **effective and** adequate verification, up to and including the establishment of general international control in **conditions** marked by the **total** elimination of nuclear weapons **everywhere**, with the final stage being the signing of a **universal agreement** to ensure that **such** weapons are **never** reactivated.

**Now** that the unilateral Soviet moratorium on nuclear explosions has been effect for more than a year, no one - even including those who have **made** assertions to the contrary - can fail to see that the issue of verification is far from being the **main** impediment to concluding a **treaty on the total** prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests; and **one** need not mention the Soviet position on this issue.

**United States** equipment located near the Soviet test site and **foreign** reporters who have been there **have** both **recorded** the **same thing**, namely, the absence of Soviet nuclear **explosions**. That is **additional** clear **confirmation** of the **fact** that the pretext of the **problem of verification** and **openness** used by **opponents** of disarmament in the **past** is now invalid owing to the **problem's** lending itself to **effective** solution.

The Soviet **Union** is **prepared** at any time and in any place to **sign** a treaty **prohibiting** nuclear-weapon tests. **We** favour strict verification in that **area**, and in **this connection** we **are prepared** to draw upon the valuable **recommendations** made by the summit Conference of the **Non-Aligned Movement** at **Harare** and **to support** the **proposals** put forward by the countries of five continents on **monitoring** compliance with the **obligation** not to **conduct** nuclear **explosions**, just as we are ready to accept the **recommendations** worked out under the **auspices** of the United Nations.

The Soviet **Union** has **put** forward concrete proposals on seismic verification and **has come** out in favour of **conducting** more thorough research in the field of the international exchange of seismic **data**, with a **view to enhancing** the effectiveness

(Mr. Br lonogov, USSR)

we have proposed that a system be worked out for the expeditious transfer of second-level economic data and that an international experiment in that area be conducted.

In our view, an effective solution can also be found to the problem of verification of the prevention of the spread of the arms race to outer space. If an agreement is reached prohibiting the introduction of weapons into outer space, the Soviet Union will be prepared, on a reciprocal basis, to open its laboratories for verification of such an agreement.

We feel bound to note that, as far as verification is concerned, the so-called star wars programme, were it to be implemented, would create virtually insurmountable difficulties. A number of questions inevitably arise. For example, what criteria should be used in differentiating between offensive and defensive space weapons? How can assurance be provided that a space platform with missiles, lasers or other technical devices installed on it will not be used for a first strike? How would the problems of inspection be solved? Thus, the strategic defence initiative programme, if implemented, would negate the very concept of verification, including verification of compliance with existing agreements.

The constructive potential of the Soviet position on the issue of verification is also manifest in the negotiations on the banning of chemical weapons. The Soviet Union favours the speedy and complete elimination of chemical weapons in the shortest possible time, as well as of the industrial infrastructure for the manufacture of such weapons. That elimination should be carried out under strict control, including international on-site inspections. Our country favours continuous or systematic international inspections of the destruction of stockpiles of chemical weapons and the manufacture of highly toxic and lethal chemicals for permitted purposes.

(Mr. Belonogov, USSR)

In April 1986 the USSR introduced at the Geneva Conference on Disarmament additional far-reaching proposals designed to ensure effective verification of the destruction or dismantling of chemical-weapons production facilities and also proposed that provision be made for carrying out systematic on-site inspection of such facilities as well. In this context, the cessation of the functioning of each chemical-weapons production facility would be ensured by means of strict verification, including systematic international inspections. Thus, we operate on the assumption that systematic international on-site inspections will become the major form of international verification of compliance with the key provisions of any future convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons.

Those and other proposals by the USSR in the area of verification serve as clear proof of its willingness to deal constructively and without delay with the urgent problems of limiting the arms race in all areas, lessening in every way the risk of a possible outbreak of nuclear war and strengthening security throughout the world. The Soviet Union's approach to question of verification is based on its willingness to adopt any reasonable measures that promote arms limitation. That approach is in striking contrast to attempts to use the verification argument to bolster an entirely different policy.

Experience in arms-control negotiations, including those between the Soviet Union and the United States, has shown that when there is a genuine willingness to reach agreement verification presents no obstacle. The Soviet Union has demonstrated such willingness in practice. There are no weapons our country would not be prepared to limit or to ban on a mutual basis and subject to the most effective verification. That approach will continue to guide our attitude towards the working out in the First Committee of draft decisions on verification issues.

(Mr. Belonogov, USSR)

The USSR delegation fully supports the **draft** resolution on verification submitted by the delegations of Bulgaria and **Czechoslovakia** in document A/C.1/41/L.1.

The question of verification is closely related to the problem of compliance with agreements on arms limitation and reduction. It is aptly stated in the United States Government's reply in document A/41/422/Add.2 with respect to General Assembly resolution 40/1520 that **such** agreements are designed to promote security and international stability. Those are **words**, but in actual deed it is precisely the United States that is undermining the **régime** of existing agreements, above all SALT I, SALT II and the 1972 Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems (ABM), which constitute the foundation of **strategic stability**. In that **same** document, it is asserted that "**compliance** can be determined only by verification".

Without **minimizing** the **importance** of verification of compliance with agreements, it should nevertheless be stated that **compliance** or non-compliance is sometimes obvious without any verification - for instance, when there is a unilateral renunciation of an agreement, as is the case with the SALT-II treaty, or when the 1972 ABM Treaty is interpreted in such broad terms that the meaning of the agreements reached is actually nullified. Resolution 40/94 L, which was **adopted** at the initiative of the **United** States, **stresses** that:

**"any** weakening of confidence in such agreements diminishes their contribution to global **or** regional stability and to further disarmament **and** arms limitation efforts". (resolution 40/94 L, fifth preambular paragraph)

(Mr. Bclonogov, USSR)

But the renunciation of existing international legal instrument<sup>6</sup> and the circumvention of treaties weaken such confidence most directly. It is regrettable that it is precisely the country that was the sponsor of the resolution to which we have referred that is acting in this way.

The Soviet Union believes that the question of compliance with agreements on arms limitation and reduction is of fundamental importance, especially when it involves such basic agreements as the two strategic arms limitation talks (SALT) treaties and the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. We stand for strict compliance with the obligations contained in the agreements concluded and for the preservation of everything positive that has been achieved so far in the field of arms limitation under effective control.

The main purpose of verification is to promote the implementation of arms limitation measure\*, to strengthen the parties' confidence in each other - confidence that is inherent in the very fact of their entering into an arms limitation agreement in the first place - and to provide objective information on the real situation with respect to compliance with the agreement. For that reason, the principal requirement that we lay down as far as verification is concerned is that it be effective.

We are convinced that verification should be used to ensure the viability of disarmament agreements. Therefore, in addition to effectiveness, another requirement that we set in regard to verification is that it be adequate. The principle of the adequacy of the verification measures applied to arms limitation measures - which has been confirmed by the experience of compliance with international agreements in the field of disarmament - is enshrined in a number of universally recognized international instruments, including the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament.

(Mr. Belonogov, USSR)

We are ~~in~~ favour of effective and ~~adequate ver~~ 'fication. We are in favour of conaidcring and resolving all disarmament and verification problems in a businesslike and concrete manner, taking a dynamic approach to find mutually acceptable aolut ions. The ~~Sov~~ let Union is ready for such solutiona and will continue to work ~~consistently~~ for such solutions.

The USSR calls upon other States to respond constructively to our new approach to dealing with ver ification issues and with the entire range of arms I imitation and disarmament problems.

Mr. OKUN (United States of America) : I am pleased to be here again this year in the First ~~Committee~~, an I was last year during the fortieth session of the General Assembly, to present the views of the United States on a number of the arms control issues before this body.

Just two days ago, the Director of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Mr. Kenneth Adelman, spoke before thie Cormnittee on the outcome of the meeting in Reykjavik between President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev. That meeting was concerned primarily with ~~questions~~ being addressed in the bilateral nuclear and apace talks in Geneva. Mr. Adelman spoke of a mosaic of arms control efforts - a mosaic in which the nuclear and space talks occupy a large space. But there are other parts of the picture, and my remarks today are directed principally to those important ~~multilateral~~ aspects of our work.

It is clear that the past year has been a modestly productive one in advancing our shared objectives in the field of ~~arms~~ control and disarmament. In addition to the progress on bilateral issues made at the highest level in Reykjavik, I believe that this ~~Committee~~ can take a measure of satisfaction - but certainly not be complacent - with the concrete progress achieved in a number of areas.



(Mr. Okun, United States)

First, at the Stockholm Conference on Security and Confidence Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe, the participants - 35 Eastern, Western and neutral and non-aligned States - adopted a document designed to help reduce the risk of the outbreak of war in Europe, provided of course that the agreement is implemented faithfully.

The United States welcomes this agreement, which can contribute to greater security in Europe - where there is a great concentration of military forces - and to improved relations, particularly between East and West. My Government believes that the Stockholm Accord demonstrates that with seriousness of purpose and hard work, common ground can be established on which to build a more secure future.

The militarily significant and verifiable measures adopted by the Stockholm Conference constitute a substantial advance over those contained in the 1975 Helsinki Final Act. Those measures, by advancing the principle of openness in the area of military activities, will make such activities more predictable, and opportunities for political intimidation will be inhibited.

The 35 nations have committed themselves to notify each other of certain military activities above agreed-upon levels, to forecast such activities at least one year in advance, to invite observers to certain military activities and to allow inspectors to verify compliance with those commitments. It is noteworthy that this is the first accord in which the Soviet Union has agreed to permit inspection, without a right of refusal, of military activities on its territory.

It is obvious that the type of provisions necessary for effective verification of agreements limiting or reducing forces would necessarily be very different from those contained in the Stockholm document. Nevertheless, the Stockholm verification measures could set a useful precedent for other, more far-reaching

(Mr. Okun, United States)

agreements and could provide an opportunity to gain experience in conducting inspections.

The agreement reached in Stockholm can also serve as a source of encouragement for the broader spectrum of issues related to the Helsinki Final Act, which resulted from the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE). These issues will be examined at the Vienna follow-up meeting, which is opening quite soon. At that meeting, the United States will press for fulfilment of all the commitments made in the Helsinki Final Act and for balanced progress across the full agenda of CSCE issues.

The Stockholm Accord itself must not remain merely promises set down on paper. Sadly, previous Helsinki commitments have been honoured more in the breach than in the observance. The proof of success will be in the implementation of the agreement. The United States will do its part.

At the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, Mr. Cromartie of the United Kingdom, Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, has overseen a useful year of multilateral negotiations on a complete and effective ban on the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and on their destruction.

The United States has taken note of the movement that has been recorded in the draft "rolling text" of the chemical weapons convention. But it is perhaps of greater importance to realize that a very considerable amount of work remains to be accomplished on issues of fundamental importance to the successful outcome of the negotiations.

(Mr. Okun, United States) :

Foremost among these issues is that of measures for the verification of compliance with the provisions of the convention, and in particular the issue of challenge verification. Several proposals have been put forward in attempting to deal with this vital matter. The United States believes that a challenge inspection provision that is as effective as that provided for in article X of the United States draft convention, introduced at the Conference in 1984 by Vice-President Bush, is essential for a successful outcome to the negotiations. Article X, by providing a deterrent against violations, constitutes a safety net to ensure compliance with the convention.

The United States remains deeply concerned about the continuing instances of violation of the Geneva Protocol of 1925 prohibiting the use of chemical weapons. My Government has also expressed its grave concern over the spread of chemical weapons capabilities, and has increased its efforts to develop measures to restrict and to regulate the export of chemicals useful in the production of chemical weapons. The United States and its allies have consulted closely on this question, and the United States and the Soviet Union have recently concluded a second meeting, in Bern, at which the question of the proliferation of chemical weapons was discussed.

In the First Committee, as a follow-up action to the resolution which the United States, together with 25 co-sponsors, introduced, at the fortieth session, and which the General Assembly approved with 112 votes in favour, the United States delegation intends again this year to introduce a draft resolution on chemical weapons.

On the closely related matter of biological and toxin weapons, the parties to the biological and toxin weapons Convention successfully completed the second review of that Convention some four weeks ago. The United States delegation made it clear at the Review Conference that it continued to adhere to the Convention,

(Mr. Okun, United States)

and to support the international norm against biological and toxin weapons that it establishes. My delegation made it **equally** clear, however, that the continuing violation of the terms of the Convention by the Soviet Union posed **serious problems**. It also made clear the increased difficulties that advances in the field of biotechnology pose for verification of the **terms** of the Convention.

At the Review Conference, the United States delegation noted that a number of countries had joined, in the Final **Declaration**, in expressing grave **doubts** about compliance with the **most basic provisions** of the Convention, and that all participants in the Conference had **stressed** the need to deal **seriously** with compliance **issues**. The United States welcomes this recognition of the importance of taking seriously compliance with existing agreements.

The United States put forward, or joined in endorsing, a number of measures at the Second Review Conference **designed** to strengthen the norm established by the Convention. In particular, it supported **measures** to improve openness in the conduct of Permitted **activities that might** otherwise prompt **suspensions** of Prohibited actions. My Government also looks forward to the meeting of technical experts of States **Parties**, scheduled from 21 March to 15 April, 1987, to develop the modalities for the exchange of information and data agreed to in the Final Declaration of the Review Conference.

With regard to the question of a nuclear-test ban, I would recall that the question was discussed by the United States and the Soviet Union at the meeting in Reykjavik. As Ambassador Adelman noted in his statement on 20 October, the United States put forward a plan for ratification of the existing bilateral **treaties**, the 1974 threshold test ban treaty and the 1976 Treaty on peaceful nuclear **explosions**, provided adequate verification could be achieved. That would be followed by further negotiations on **testing** limitations in conjunction with **reductions** in nuclear **arsenals**. The United States remains prepared to go forward with that plan.

(Mr. Okun, United States)

At the Conference on Disarmament the United States welcomed the submission of the report of the Group of Scientific Experts which describes the results of its global test of procedure for the international exchange of seismic data useful in the monitoring of a nuclear-test ban. The United States also welcomes the Group's plans to continue its work by carrying out investigations into the most modern means of recording, transmitting and processing seismological data, including the so-called level II, or full-waveform, data.

With regard to the establishment of a committee to deal with the nuclear-test ban agenda item, the Conference on Disarmament should agree without further delay to a mandate for the Committee's work on the basis of the Western proposal.

While discussing issues on the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament, I should like to add a few words about the agenda item dealing with the prevention of an arms race in outer space. The United States has supported the consideration of that issue in the Conference, and agreed to the re-establishment of an ad hoc committee, appropriately mandated, in which to carry the consideration forward. The Conference made a good start on its work during the 1985 and 1986 sessions. Clearly, the Committee's mandate has not been exhausted, and the Conference should again take up its work under that mandate when it convenes in 1987.

In the nuclear and space talks in Geneva between the United States and the Soviet Union negotiations on the range of issues related to the outer space environment have continued in the relevant negotiating groups. Given the nature of those issues, the United States believes that the appropriate forum for negotiations at this time remains the nuclear and space talks.

Earlier in my statement I spoke of the grave concern that the United States shares with other nations with regard to compliance with arms control and

(Mr. Okun, United States)

disarmament agreements. My remarks referred specifically to the Geneva Protocol of 1925 and the biological and toxin weapons convention of 1972. Moreover, as Ambassador Adelman made clear in his statement, those concerns also extend to bilateral agreements between the United States and the Soviet Union. In fact, the concern of the United States is universal. We believe all States should comply strictly with all their obligations. The future success of our efforts in the field of arm control and disarmament requires no less.

The United States delegation will again introduce, with others, a resolution on compliance with arms control obligations, in order to express the strong conviction that the orderly conduct of international life depends upon compliance with commitments undertaken. A reaffirmation of the absolute indispensability of compliance can contribute to the strengthening of the barriers against violations and to making arm control agreements more effective and viable. Last year 131 States supported the resolution and none opposed it. I hope that even more States will join in approval this year.

There is another issue closely related to that of compliance: the important matter of openness, of a free exchange of views on disarmament issues and related security questions. Its importance as a productive and reliable contribution to our work should be recognized. The cause of arms control and disarmament would be well served if every citizen of every nation had the right to question or to criticize openly the policies of his or her Government.

(Mr. Okun, United States)

As I noted before this Committee last year, to seek openness is to recognize in a very practical way that openness with others invites a reciprocal willingness to be open, to co-operate, to tolerate, and to build further on a relationship in which, if there is not trust, there is at least greater understanding. It is for this reason that I raise this issue again today.

The First Committee can play an important role in the advancement of peace and disarmament. But the quality of its contribution is directly related to the willingness of Member States to distinguish clearly between empty rhetoric and serious, measured initiatives designed to further the objectives that we all say are so important. Accordingly, my delegation regrets those occasions when this body is used for purposes that are not serious or constructive. Likewise, the United States opposes the misuse of other United Nations bodies for disarmament propaganda that seeks to dilute the proper missions of those bodies and makes the task of disarmament even more difficult.

My delegation has also noted the interest expressed by a number of delegations in rationalizing the Committee's work, in particular to reduce the burden of draft resolutions that we consider each year. Their number is so large that we surely cannot give them all appropriate consideration. Consistent with the strong support of the United States for the recommendations of the Group of High-level Experts who recently suggested concrete steps for enhancing the efficiency of the operations of the United Nations, my delegation welcomes proposals designed to achieve that objective in the work of the First committee as well.

I should like to conclude my statement today by recalling a point which President Reagan has made many times - most recently in his address to the United Nations General Assembly on 22 September. The President has noted that., at bottom, it is the lack of trust among nations that leads to the acquisition of armaments,

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and that it was not armaments in themselves that caused a lack of trust. The United States believes that in all our efforts, both multilateral and bilateral, this point should be kept prominently in focus.

In the long history of peace-making, no policy has proved more shortsighted and no error more mischievous than to separate questions of weapons from the political differences that result in conflict and war. To do so will doom our own efforts to the fate of the disarmament conferences between the two world wars. As Walter Lippman once observed, those conferences were "tragically successful in disarming the nations that believed in disarmament", while permitting those bent on aggression to amass arsenals that first threatened and later breached the peace. In the nuclear age we cannot afford to repeat that mistake. Our work, whether it deals with nuclear, chemical or conventional weapons, must result in equitable and verifiable agreements which move us away from, not towards, the brink of conflict. The United States is dedicated to accomplishing that task.

Mr. LAUTENSCHLAGER (Federal Republic of Germany): Allow me at the outset to extend to you, Hr. Chairman, and the other officers of the Committee my delegation's and my own congratulations on your election to your important posts. I am confident that under your guidance the Committee will make further progress in its work.

On 14 October the representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland made a comprehensive statement on behalf of the 12 member States of the European Economic Community (EEC). My delegation would like to add a few observations to that statement.

In the opinion of the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany, the meeting between President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev in Reykjavik



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Republic of Germany)

confirmed that the time is ripe for concrete results in the field of disarmament and arms control. After Reykjavik that goal seems to be within reach.

The meeting was an important landmark in the process of dialogue and understanding between East and West that has been under way since the autumn of 1984. It proved possible to reduce differences between the two sides, and in some cases considerable convergence was achieved on important arms control issues and in other fields. In the case of intercontinental nuclear weapons, intermediate-range systems and questions concerning a nuclear-test ban, the two sides made greater advances than ever before. The fact that Reykjavik did not produce palpable results is therefore no cause for disappointment. Both sides are agreed that their proposals will remain on the table. This holds out the prospect of tangible agreements being achieved in the foreseeable future.

As far as the Geneva negotiations are concerned, the Federal Government feels that there are now good prospects for early results in the field of intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF).

The two sides reached agreement on the elimination of long-range intermediate-range nuclear forces (LRINF) in Europe and on a global ceiling of 100 warheads, the delivery vehicles to be deployed only in the Asian part of the Soviet Union and on United States territory. That would reduce the Soviet Union's destabilizing superiority in this category of weapons and produce a result very near to the global, mutual zero option for long-range INF advocated by the Federal Government. Such a long-range INF agreement should, however, take account of short-range INF systems in such a way that no new grey area in disarmament emerges and that the existing imbalance is not perpetuated. The continuation of negotiations on those systems, as envisaged in Reykjavik, would be a contribution towards solving this problem. We now expect the Soviet Union to act in accordance with its view that the solution of the INF question is not contingent on any

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conditions and to carry on ~~negotiation in~~ Geneva on the basis of the progress achieved at Reykjavik with the aim of initiating an early reduction of long-range INF. Any approach that envisages a limited geographical separation of nuclear-weapon systems in Europe and creating a partial and arbitrary nuclear-weapon-free Zone would only sidetrack the basic purpose of eliminating those weapons.

In the field of strategic weapons, too, the structure of a future agreement on a 50 per cent reduction of the strategic arsenals of the united States and the Soviet Union within five years is now also emerging following the Reykjavik meeting. Moreover, the two sides are basically in agreement on reducing their nuclear arsenals to the greatest extent possible within 10 years. In the Federal Government's opinion, that point is of paramount importance. All efforts should now be devoted to translating this objective into practice. To do so it is above all necessary to settle the important problem left unresolved at Reykjavik - that of the future relationship between offensive and defensive systems. In this respect, too, fundamental agreement was reached to the effect that predictability as regards defensive systems must be achieved for the next 10 years. Proceeding on this basis, the negotiations in Geneva should concentrate on finding a co-operative solution that does justice to the interests of both sides.

In the opinion of the Federal Government, the meeting at Reykjavik was thus an important step on the path towards far-reaching agreements in the field of arms control and disarmament. What has been attained so far must now be made the basis of further negotiations; nothing must be lost. The aim must be to conclude agreements which ... to the noble goal, as agreed between the united States and the Soviet Union on 8 January 1985, of preventing an arms race in space and terminating it on Earth. Thanks to Reykjavik, the conditions for doing so are better than ever.

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Republic of Germany)

The Federal Government also **detects** an encouraging **convergence of** the **positions** held by the two super-Powers on the **important question** of a comprehensive nuclear-test **ban**. The **remarks** made by President Reagan on a test ban in his **address** at this year's session of the General Assembly were **confirmed by** the **United States** at Reykjavik and given **greater** substance. **In** our view **this and the attitude** now adopted by the Soviet Union towards the **verification** of nuclear tests and the **process of reducing** them open up a **realistic path** for achieving a comprehensive test ban step by step.

The Federal Government **advocates** agreement on a comprehensive nuclear-test ban at the earliest possible date. In April of this year Chancellor Kohl publicly suggested that the two super-Powers adopt a graduated approach, which is now being **discussed**. As a first step he proposed the limitation of tests to agreed intervals, which could ultimately lead to the complete cessation of tests within the framework of agreed reductions of nuclear weapons.

Decisive importance attaches to solving the **problems** of verification. In our view settling this **issue** poses no **insurmountable** difficulties in view of technological **progress** in the **seismological** field. In 1985 the Federal Government submitted to the Geneva Conference on Disarmament a **proposal** for the **progressive** development of a global **seismological** system for monitoring nuclear explosions. The Conference's activities should focus on developing this **system** to the point where its introduction can be agreed on. We have noted with particular **interest** the increasing support for this project.

In the letter he sent to the New Delhi Six in July of this year, Chancellor Kohl **thanked** them for **their** readiness to make the territory of their countries available for the purposes of **seismological** verification.

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Republic of Germany)

In this connection we also welcome the Soviet Union's readiness, as declared at the Geneva Conference on Disarmament on 22 July 1986, to participate in the acquisition and evaluation of so-called level II data, which are particularly important for detecting concealed explosions. As the report now available shows, the test run carried out in 1964 under the direction of the Geneva experts produced good results and showed which problems must be given priority treatment.

The Federal Government will continue to participate intensively in the efforts to solve outstanding verification problems and, as a non-nuclear-weapon country, underscore its commitment to the goal of a comprehensive test ban by offering its expertise in this field.

As far as the European area is concerned, the Stockholm Conference on Confidence and Security Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe already constitutes an important step along the path towards greater stability through arms control and disarmament. All participants rightly regard the successful conclusion of the Conference as a victory of reason, responsibility and realism. For the first time since 1975, concrete effective arrangements have been concluded on security in Europe. Indeed it is the first time that a multilateral arms control agreement has covered the entire European continent from the Atlantic to the Urals.

In the documents adopted on 22 September 1986, the participants agreed, in accordance with the mandate of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) follow-up meeting in Madrid, on a set of new, effective and concrete measures designed to "make progress in strengthening confidence and security and in achieving disarmament". In this way greater transparency in the military sphere is to be attained and misjudgements of military activities avoided. The behaviour of

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States is to be made more predictable, and the risk of surprise attacks and the fear of attempts at intimidation reduced. The aim is also to improve the foundations for progress in the field of arms control.

At Stockholm it proved possible to develop considerably further the measures agreed upon in Helsinki and to improve them in substantive terms. The arrangements for early notification of military activities were considerably expanded. The invitation of observers to manoeuvres is now obligatory and no longer left to the discretion of countries. The most important aspect was the agreement on on-site inspections, on the ground or from the air, without a right of refusal. Obligatory on-site inspections have thus been acknowledged as a central element of an effective verification régime for arms control agreements. This is a fundamental breakthrough of importance to all arms control endeavours.

Then, measures adopted in Stockholm give effect and expression to the global duty of States to refrain from the threat or use of force. They must now prove their worth through consistent application in keeping with the letter and spirit of the document.

Following the Stockholm phase, progress must now be made in other multilateral arms control forums and every opportunity seized for the achievement of substantive results.

At the mutual and balanced force reduction talks, the East should also show a willingness to consent to a verification régime providing for on-site inspections without a right of refusal.

Results in the negotiations on chemical weapons also hinge on the Soviet Union's willingness to accept an effective verification régime involving mandatory inspections. In addition to routine inspections, on which a large degree of agreement is emerging in the negotiations at the Geneva Conference on

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Disarmament, obligatory on-challenge inspections are needed. The British proposal of 15 July 1996 offers an acceptable solution. If the Soviet union and its allies follow the path marked out by the Stockholm document, the early adoption of a convention liberating the international community from the scourge of chemical weapons would be possible.

In this connection the Federal Government welcomes the encouraging progress made on confidence-building and verification in a related field at the recent Second Review Conference on the biological weapons Convention.

The outcome of the Conference on Confidence and Security Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe also paves the way to new, more extensive negotiations on conventional stability in the whole of Europe, from the Atlantic to the Urals.

At Halifax the NATO Foreign Ministers stated that the alliance's objective is to strengthen stability and security in the whole of Europe through increased openness and the establishment of a verifiable, comprehensive and stable balance of conventional forces at lower levels. There are too many conventional weapons in Europe, and there is an imbalance to the West's disadvantage.

At the third CSCE follow-up meeting due to start in Vienna on 4 November, we intend to continue along the path successfully embarked upon in Stockholm and make progress in other CSCE areas as well. The Vienna meeting will deal with the entire range of questions concerning security.

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Ever since the start of the CSCE we have advocated that security be built on a broad foundation. For us, security is not just a question of the military balance but also one of respect for human rights and other basic rules of conduct among States, economic co-operation as well as opportunities for contacts between people and the free flow of information across frontiers. Confidence-building can only be accomplished with such a comprehensive approach. Consequently, all CSCE areas must be further developed at Vienna in a balanced fashion and fresh impetus imparted to that process, which is unique in the world.

We expect the Vienna follow-up meeting to provide a fresh impetus, not least in the field of military security. We must discuss how, after the Conference on Confidence and Security Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe, the process of negotiations concerning conventional arms control in the whole of Europe can be advanced. In the opinion of the Federal Government, the objective of such negotiations must be to establish, in accordance with the declaration made by the foreign ministers of countries members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) at Halifax, military stability and a situation where not only Western armed forces, but those of both sides, exclusively serve defence needs.

Concentration of arms-control efforts on concrete, practical solutions to clearly defined problems - that is the conclusion drawn by the Federal Government from the preparatory meeting in Reykjavik and the success achieved at Stockholm. We share the view of the Soviet representative who, speaking in the Committee on 14 October, indicated that what was now needed was concrete action instead of mere declarations.

This also determines the direction in which, in the Federal Government's opinion, the central debate on disarmament within the United Nations should evolve. It must be geared more than hitherto to genuine opportunities and concrete approaches. Declaratory appeals and general programmes are of no use. In the

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First Committee, all countries must strive for tangible answers to the central question of how war can be effectively prevented in this age.

The Federal Republic of Germany focused on this question with its specific initiative for the prevention of war, which was launched two years ago. That initiative has a comprehensive approach: any war, not just a nuclear one, must be prevented. That objective must be discussed in the First Committee with due regard for all aspects. The Federal Government remains convinced that the Committee's debate must concentrate on the fundamentals and prerequisites of tangible, global efforts towards the prevention of war.

Demanding the prevention of nuclear war alone is not sufficient. Conventional warfare also poses a great threat to nations. It is horrifying to note the number of conflicts waged by conventional means in numerous countries since the Second World War and the huge number of lives they have exacted.

Like its partners in the Atlantic Alliance the Federal Republic of Germany holds the view that stability and international security remain dependent on the determination of countries to protect their existence through autonomous defence efforts, be it on their own or in league with others. The Charter of the United Nations expressly acknowledges the legitimacy of such efforts aimed at individual or collective self-defence.

However, in the opinion of the Federal Government that right to self-defence requires that all countries should gear their military armaments, the strategy for their use and their practical conduct strictly to defence needs. Countries with excessive arms not geared to defence needs not only deprive their own development efforts of urgently needed resources, but also force other countries that feel threatened as a result to use additional resources for their own security, resources that they urgently need for their own development.



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Another no less **important** demand in this context is that autonomous **security** efforts cannot, on **their own**, reliably prevent **war**. They **must** be supplemented by **co-operative** efforts. All **countries** must therefore **participate** in **arms control** activities. The aim **is to conclude** concrete **agreements** at the **regional** and the global level that will strengthen **mutual trust** and effectively **limit arms** at the **lowest possible** level. In our view, **this implies** above all the establishment of a **stable military equilibrium** between the **countries concerned**. Stability serving to **prevent war must** therefore be the true objective of **co-operative efforts** aimed at **arms control and disarmament**.

**These co-operative efforts must** go beyond factors of the military **balance** and cover the entire range of **international relations**. **Military confrontations** are not caused by military arsenals but by political **tensions** and **conflicts**. This means that both military **and political stability** must be achieved.

The **policy** of the North Atlantic Alliance **combines** defence **efforts** to ward off military threats with **co-operative efforts** for **arm control and political détente**. This **policy** of the **Alliance has made** a decisive contribution to the **preservation** of peace in Europe. **Its comprehensive approach is** also reflected in the broad-based concept of the **CSCE process**.

In line **with** the objective of **undertaking comprehensive efforts to strengthen security**, the **Federal Republic of Germany has, ever since** the first special session Of the **General Assembly devoted to disarmament** in 1978, advocated the **development** of a concept of confidence-building **measures** applicable in all regions of the world. It therefore welcomes the fact that **guidelines for confidence-building measures, which were** elaborated on **its initiative**, were adopted by **consensus**, albeit in **preliminary** form, at **this year's annual session** of the **United Nations Disarmament Commission** and have now been submitted to the **General Assembly at its**

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forty-first session. The results of Stockholm, especially in the field of verification, give rise to the hope that agreement on a complete text will soon be possible.

My Government, together with the French Government, has drafted a resolution on the success of the Stockholm Conference and its perspective for confidence-building and conventional arms control. We shall be discussing it in the First Committee. Now, the countries outside Europe must build confidence in their regions by ensuring maximum transparency of their military capabilities and activities. The United Nations should also be encouraged in its efforts for greater transparency. Here, I especially have military budgets in mind. The creation of the standardized system for reporting military expenditures was an important step, but many more countries should participate in it.

Another important task of the United Nations in this connection is, in our view, to obtain greater transparency of international arms transfers. Foreign Minister Genscher proposed to the General Assembly that a register be established containing details of arms imports and exports by all countries. That would facilitate the monitoring of arms flows and help to solve the problem of excessive armaments world wide.

Another important subject to which the First Committee should devote greater attention is that of verification of arms control agreements. In this connection the Federal Government welcomes the fact that at its fortieth session the General Assembly adopted new resolutions on such subjects as "Verification in all its aspects," "Compliance with arms limitation and disarmament agreements" and "Objective information on military matters." Those initiatives, whose continuation and advancement the Federal Government supports, are important steps towards a security debate within the United Nations geared towards concrete, practical issues.

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The British representative, speaking on behalf of the 12 countries of the European Community, stressed before the Committee that energetic efforts were needed in the various negotiating forums so that unresolved problems could be solved. For this purpose, all countries must participate in a responsible fashion and help to find concrete solutions that are possible now. The United Nations must not stand aloof either.

If it proves possible to meet the need for comprehensive co-operation in urgent security issues by means of practical arrangements, then countries of different regions and social systems will be able to regulate their conflicting or divergent interests in peaceful competition and safeguard world peace through a sense of common responsibility.

The successful outcome of the Stockholm Conference shows that a readiness to compromise and persevere in negotiations leads to results. All countries should therefore consider themselves duty-bound to emulate the example set in Stockholm.

Creating peace with ever fewer weapons is not a Utopian notion. It is one of the paramount tasks facing mankind at the end of the twentieth century.

Mr. KNIPPING VICTORIA (Dominican Republic) (interpretation from Spanish): Although at the beginning of our work, Sir, you urged us to omit congratulations, allow me none the less to disobey your suggestion, since it is the wish of the delegation of the Dominican Republic to congratulate you on your excellent conduct of our debate and extend that recognition to the other officers of the Committee.

I should like to make a brief statement of principles, stating the position of my Government on several aspects of the items before the Committee. Although I come from a small, developing country - a country which does not have the slightest possibility of possessing nuclear weapons - I cannot but take this opportunity to

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participate in the debate, since there is no doubt that both disarmament and peace are universal concerns, of equal interest to the great Powers that possess nuclear weapons and to the rest of the international community.

That concern over disarmament issues could not be more valid, legitimate and manifest, for it involves the very survival of the human race. It has not escaped the reason, logic and understanding of peoples that the outbreak of a nuclear conflagration would necessarily sow the seeds of total self-destruction and the annihilation of the human race - hence the importance of this question. We can thus state, without fear of exaggeration, that a possible nuclear disaster constitutes the greatest problem facing mankind today.

Given the recognition of this terrifying prospect - total holocaust - and the conviction that the principal purpose of the United Nations is to "save succeeding generations from the scourge of war", disarmament issues - particularly nuclear disarmament - are accorded highest priority in the United Nations. Furthermore, this unchallenged competence of the United Nations on disarmament questions is rooted in its organic characteristic of universality, since it would be nonsensical were the security of all States and the very survival of mankind to depend on the security interests of a handful of nuclear-weapon States. Consequently, we cannot overlook the fact that the United Nations represents the organized international community of States of the contemporary world. The central role of the Organization and its primary responsibility in the field of disarmament derive from that fact.

Although the work of the United Nations in the sphere of arms limitation and disarmament has contributed to creating a resurgent awareness of the need for disarmament as a key element in the quest for peace and international security, contributing to the conclusion of important treaties and agreements among various States and to the adoption of numerous resolutions relating to this question, the

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arms race - both nuclear and conventional - has nevertheless continued apace quantitatively or qualitatively.

Leaving aside for the moment the question of the adverse consequences of the arms race on the developing countries, I should like at this point, to focus attention upon current trends and developments in disarmament activities at the United Nations.

Under the provisions of Articles 11 and 26 of the Charter, which attribute a central role and major responsibility to the Organization in the sphere of disarmament, the United Nations has been carrying on a series of activities whose ultimate aim is general and complete disarmament under effective international control. Among those activities, special mention should be made of the two special sessions of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament and the creation of the Conference on Disarmament and the Disarmament Commission, the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, the Advisory Board on Disarmament Studies and other deliberative bodies and various specialized agencies dealing expressly with disarmament, including, naturally, the work of this First Committee.

For my delegation, this constant United Nations activity geared to reaching world disarmament has one very interesting and promising feature: there has been the gradual emergence of the view that any use of nuclear weapons would be a flagrant violation of the Charter of the United Nations and, in fact, a crime against mankind. In that respect, it could be stated that a true legal awareness of this view has been growing. Similarly, a result of that continuing work has been the increasingly clear need for an effective international instrument prohibiting the threat or use of such weapons against the territories of non-nuclear-weapon States.

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Although the Conference on Disarmament has not yet been able to begin

- UtilateKa1 negotiations on a treaty prohibiting all nuclear-weapon tests or a9 cubing the arms race and nuclear disarmament, it is clear that the urgency of arriving at agreements on these questions has been gaining ground in public awareness. Accordingly, we urge all States, particularly the nuclear-weapon States, to give due consideration to these questions, not only in the light of their particular interests but also bearing firmly in mind the interests of the entire international community.

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In that regard, the delegation of the Dominican Republic wishes to **express** its support for the initiative **taken** by the **Heads of State** or Government of Argentina, Greece, India, Mexico, Sweden and the **United Republic of Tanzania**, who, moved by a genuine desire for peace and international **co-operation**, urged the **nuclear-weapon States** to suspend all testing, production and deployment of those weapons and their delivery **systems**, with the aim of proceeding later to a substantial reduction of their nuclear forces. Similarly, those six leaders **publicly recognized** the role **that** the United Nations should play in this field and reaffirmed the urgent necessity to transfer **substantial** resources from the arms race to social and economic development.

In the **same** spirit, my delegation cannot fail to express its **views** on the recent meeting of the leaders of the two super-Powers in Reykjavik. Whatever the immediate results achieved, my delegation **believes** that such meetings necessarily have a constructive impact. The **dialogue** between the <sup>two</sup> greatest nuclear-weapon **States provides** an opportunity for the leaders of those two great Powers to acknowledge the tremendous **responsibility** they bear before international public opinion to **assist** in efforts to achieve a better world, free of the nightmare of **destruction** and poverty.

My delegation believes that we should not **leave** disarmament, whether conventional or nuclear, to be decided by those two great Powers. We firmly believe that other States have an inescapable obligation to **co-operate** in attaining that noble and urgent goal. My delegation also believes that we should strengthen the role of the United **Nations** in disarmament **matters**. In that respect, it should be pointed out that one way of contributing to the **achievement** of that objective would be for States periodically to inform the General Assembly and its **bodies specializing** in disarmament, such as the Conference on Disarmament and the

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Disarmament Commission, about the measures adopted or agreed upon in their bilateral negotiations. We share the view that bilateral and multilateral negotiations in disarmament are not mutually exclusive; on the contrary, they are complementary, since, in the final analysis, all such negotiations have but one beneficiary - mankind.

The Dominican Republic, a party to the Treaty prohibiting nuclear weapons in Latin America, considers that we should contemplate the possibility of reaching more agreements of this nature in other regions of the world, because there can be no doubt that agreements such as the Tlatelolco Treaty are an effective way of fostering disarmament.

Just as we recognize the urgent priority that should be given to nuclear disarmament, we identify ourselves fully with the international movement seeking to draw up a treaty prohibiting the development, production, use and stockpiling of all chemical and bacteriological weapons. We vigorously condemn the hateful practice of using those deadly weapons, which do so much harm to mankind.

Similarly, we reiterate our view that outer space, the common heritage of mankind, should be used solely for peaceful ends, for the well-being and benefit of all the members of the international community.

In view of the uncertainty created by the arms race, we urge that greater efforts should be made to reach agreement on a freeze of nuclear weapons, a freeze which according to the General Assembly, although it may not be an end in itself, would none the less constitute a first step to preventing the continuing quantitative and qualitative increase in nuclear weapons.

In the same context, we share the view that another effective step leading to disarmament would be the adoption of a convention banning the use or the threat of the use of nuclear weapons in my circumstances.



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Dominican Republic)

I now turn to the question of the adverse consequences of the arms race for the developing countries. Beyond the dreadful threat represented by nuclear weapons, whose destructive capacity is unprecedented in mankind's history, the arms race imposes other heavy burdens on the international community as a whole and particularly on the developing countries. Everyone knows that each new generation of weapons, whether conventional or nuclear, is costlier and deadlier than the previous one. That endless spiral of military expenditure has a significant effect on national budgets, and does particular harm to the social and economic plans of nations.

According to statistics presented here at the United Nations, it is estimated that worldwide military expenditure today exceeds \$900,000 million a year, which is approximately equivalent to \$2 million a minute.

It is clear that as the arms race speeds up the danger of provoking a senseless and irrational conflagration is increased. Moreover, there can be no doubt that that situation in turn increases international tension, thus creating a general feeling of fear that gives rise to greater instability and insecurity in international relations.

The diversion of a large part of those military expenditures to the promotion of socio-economic development would help to bring about the necessary conditions for the creation of a better world and the establishment of peace. We must not lose sight of the fact that in today's world socio-economic tensions are threats to international security, and that underdevelopment, with all its consequences, represents a non-military threat to international peace and security - hence, the intimate relationship between development, disarmament and peace.

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Dominican Republic)

For all those very valid reasons the Dominican Republic has been supporting the planned International Conference on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development. We must exert our very best efforts to ensure that the General Assembly at this session can arrive at a decision on the date and venue of that very important meeting which, in our judgement, should not be postponed further.

The delegation of the Dominican Republic cannot disregard the fact that although nearly a decade has elapsed since the historic tenth special session - the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament - it has thus far been impossible to make any substantive progress in this area. We are therefore concerned about this state of affairs, which indicates that it is still necessary to mobilize international public opinion more effectively on issues which by their very nature should be given very special attention and unquestioned priority because, as we have repeatedly said, they involve the very survival of the human race.

To conclude, the delegation of the Dominican Republic believes it is becoming more urgent every day for all States to contribute substantially to halting and reversing the arms race. In a world which is increasingly interdependent, it is a logical imperative to devote all possible efforts to reaching harmonious, peaceful and civilized coexistence and that cannot be achieved if we do not foster the conditions for peace, development, equality and justice upon which human relations should be based.

The CHAIRMAN: I should like to inform the Committee that the following delegations are inscribed on the list of speakers for this afternoon's meeting: Uruguay, Cuba, Italy, Thailand, Morocco and Cameroon.

The meeting rose at 1.05 p.m.