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Chairman: **Mr. ZACHMANN (German Democratic Republic)**

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The meeting was called to order at 3.10 p.m.

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GENERAL DEBATE ON ALL DISARMAMENT ITEMS

Mr. ADELMAN (United States of America) : It is a great pleasure to be here again in the **First Committee**, where I spent two and a half years of my life working on the important **issues before this Committee**. I think it is a **marvelous** time to be here **because of the** events in Reykjavik and the **follow-up**, and I would like to **discuss with members of the First Committee** what was accomplished there and what we can look forward to in the future if we are **to move**, as the President would like to **move**, towards a safer world.

In his report to the American people last Monday, **President** Reagan said:

"The implications of these talks are • normum and are **only just** beginning to be understood."

We now have a week behind us for more reflection and for more interpretation of the importance of the speech. Today I would like to **speak to this Committee about the significance of the meetings and the United States-Soviet relationship** in general. **First**, what was the **purpose** of the United States in going to Iceland? **Our purpose was serious**, but it was modest. We went to Iceland in order to see if we could narrow the **differences, where possible, between the United States and Soviet positions and to lay the ground for more productive negotiations**. We went to Iceland to discuss not just **arms control**, but the other critical issues that divide us and divide our political systems: human rights, the peaceful resolution of regional conflicts and bilateral exchanges. In fact, during the **previous summit** meeting at Geneva in **November 1985** the President **said**, in his joint **appearance** with **Mr. Gorbachev**, that the report card for the **summit** would not be known for a matter of months or even **yearn**, but we knew **the questions that must be** answered, and he

(Mr. Adelman, United States)

listed four questions. To me, they are still the appropriate questions to answer in order to judge the United States-Soviet relationship. One, will the Soviet join us in deep cuts of nuclear weapons and moving towards defensive systems to increase safety? Two, will the Soviets join us in resolving regional issues in a way that will allow the people in the region to decide their own destiny without outside interference? Three, will the cause of liberty spread and be advanced around the world? Four, will the treaties of the past and of the future be adhered to or followed?

We want to Iceland hoping for serious and incremental progress in arms control in addition to or in terms of those four primary questions. The goal in arms control is the total elimination of the threat of nuclear weapons and, in particular, the most destabilizing weapons, ballistic-missile warheads. A lot of questions have been asked since that time about the wisdom of eliminating nuclear weapons and eliminating ballistic-missile warheads. Let me say that when we have considered this issue over the years we have done so in a context of greater international security. Certainly, the claim is made right now that, in today's world, an elimination of nuclear weapons would make a more dangerous world, not a safer world, because of the disparity in conventional arms between the countries members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Warsaw Pact countries, because of the disparity in chemical weapons between NATO and the Warsaw Pact, with the Warsaw Pact having a clear superiority in those two realms. We have always tied and continue to tie the elimination of nuclear weapons to a redressing of the chemical and the conventional balances and other conditions that concentrate on more diplomatic work to resolve regional issues.

(Mr. Adelman, United States)

What did **we accomplish** in **Reykjavik**? Vastly more, I think, than any of **us** who journeyed there from **Washington** had **expected** when we took off. Let me say that I believe that **history** will record **these meetings** at **Reykjavik** as representing some of the **most** intense and **dramatic** international negotiations ever held. In **this** intense and **serious effort** of **bargaining**, our **two** countries reduced differences in virtually every aspect of nuclear-**arm8 control**- strategic arm8 reduction, intermediate nuclear-**arm8 reduction**, verification, nuclear testing and even aspects of **strategic defence**.

These **were not** - let me be clear - **arms-control agreement.9 per se**. Regrettably, it **is necessary** to **add** that an agreement by the two leaders at a general level is **quite** different **from** arriving at the specifics of an arms-control accord. There **is** a lot of **distance** to be travelled between having the two leaders agree on a **50** per cent cut, for **example**, in **strategic arms** and having the negotiator agree on **exactly** what element8 of strategic **arms** will be cut by **50** per cent and how, **and** how **these** will be verified.

In the **course** of **these crowded** two day8, we **also** spanned the other critical **issues** in the United **States-Soviet relationship**. For our part, we **stressed** the critical **importance** of **human right8**, making clear that real improvement in **relations** between our two countries **must be accompanied** by improvements in this area, in the **human right8** area, making clear our conviction of the irreducible linkage **between** peace and **freedom**. We have **said** for quite a while now that a country **that** does not **trust** its **own** citizens and cannot trust **its** own citizen8 to be free is not a country that can be **trusted** on the international level to **abide** by its **commitments**.

(Mr. Adelman, United States)

We also had vigorous discussions on regional issues. The regional issues most critical to this Organization are those dealing with Afghanistan; dealing with Cambodia, which I believe is the subject that Mr. Walters is now addressing in the General Assembly on behalf of the United States; dealing with Nicaragua; dealing with Angola; dealing with Ethiopia and other issues. We laid down important markers concerning Soviet behaviour on these regional issues. We spoke of bilateral exchanges at Reykjavik between our two peoples, the American and the Soviet peoples, and the two sides agreed to a work plan to accelerate negotiations on bilateral exchanges related to opening of consulates, to space co-operation, to nuclear safety and to nuclear proliferation.

(Mr. Melman, United States)

Let me say that, on nuclear proliferation, an area in which our agency is heavily involved, that this has been the one area of arms control that has been successful over the years. I recall that in 1963 President John F. Kennedy said that we should be fearful of a world that by 1975 would have 15 to 20 nuclear-weapon States. Today, 11 years after that due date of 1975, the world has nowhere near the 15-20 nuclear-weapon States that President Kennedy warned against; in fact, it has very few more nuclear-weapon States than the three or four that existed in 1963. It is not only the one area of arms control that has been successful, but the only one in which the United States and the Soviet Union co-operate quite nicely. We have meetings each year on nuclear non-proliferation, and I think it safe to say that those meetings are very non-polemical, very serious and very dedicated to a common purpose.

The real importance of Reykjavik is that, for the first time in history, we were able to get the Soviet Union to engage with us in serious negotiations, not just about regulating the growth of offensive nuclear arsenals but on genuinely reducing those arsenals.

In the past, SALT I and SALT II, in my opinion, were arms-control accords that were concentrated not on reductions in nuclear forces but at the most on limiting the growth of those nuclear forces on both sides and at the worst allowing the growth to take place. Since signing SALT II, for example, the Soviets have doubled the number of their ballistic missile warheads and added three new intercontinental ballistic missiles and two new submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and so on - all within the terms of SALT II. Likewise, the United States has built up enormously under the terms of SALT I, because it was an agreement that allowed such large numbers on both sides that it permitted such growth.

(Mr. Adelman, United States)

At Reykjavik we talked, I believe for the first time, about real reductions in the nuclear arsenals. At what I believe history will see as the climax of the Reykjavik meeting, President Reagan put before General Secretary Gorbachev an offer of historical dimensions for an agreement to eliminate entirely offensive ballistic missiles from the face of the earth within a period of 10 years. It was an offer expressly designed to meet the objections and concerns raised by the Soviet Union about defensive systems. It was an offer designed to demonstrate once and for all that defensive systems can be a sure and secure path from mutual threats to true, reciprocal security. It was an offer designed to take both sides towards a vastly safer world.

The origin of that idea came out of the first summit in Geneva almost a year ago. The President came away from that summit convinced that General Secretary Gorbachev was quite fearful that a United States strategic defence initiative programme would be a shield behind which the United States could launch a successful first strike. The President decided to meet those concerns by laying out a programme under which we would both eliminate offensive ballistic missiles during the time we were researching the strategic defence initiative. In that way the Soviets would have no fear of the strategic defence initiative being used as a shield behind which the United States could launch a first strike, because there would be no ballistic missiles with which to strike first. I think it was a real way that the President saw to try to meet that major Soviet concern expressed by Mr. Gorbachev.

Under that offer both sides would begin over a five-year period a reduction of all strategic nuclear arms - bombers, air-launched cruise missiles, intercontinental ballistic missiles, submarine-launched ballistic missiles and the weapons they carry. Those weapons would be reduced by 50 per cent in the five-year period. During the next five years we would continue to eliminate all remaining

(Mr. Adelman, United States)

offensive ballistic missiles of whatever range. In the meantime, we would continue with the research, **testing** and development of advanced strategic defences consistent with the **anti-ballistic** missile Treaty. At the end of the **10-year** period **both sides would** be free to deploy strategic defences. The President **also** urged the General Secretary to join him in sharing widely the benefits of the research.

To put it simply, **what** we envisage is a period of time during which the **United States** and the Soviet **Union** would **research** strategic **defence**, as the Soviets **have** been doing for a **good** number of years. During that period we would stay within the anti-ballistic missile Treaty **in our** research and the Soviets we would hope, would come back within that Treaty in their activities. During the **10-year** period we would eliminate offensive ballistic missiles, in two five-year periods, so that there could be no fear of a successful first strike at the end of the **10** years. Then, on each side, we could deploy the defence after that **period**. At that time the deployment, with the elimination of offensive ballistic missiles, would be to protect each side against cheating by the other side and against other countries' **acquiring** ballistic missiles and putting nuclear warheads on them.

With that offer we had on the table for the first time in human memory a genuine, serious and fully practical proposal **for** the total elimination of a whole class of nuclear **strategic** weapons - **indeed**, the most powerful and dangerous **weapons** ever devised. "The question has come up since that time, why **concentrate** on strategic offensive **ballistic** missiles and not strategic arms in general? The reason is that we have known since 1957 that offensive ballistic missiles are the most dangerous element in the nuclear arsenal. Why is that? It is because they go at tremendous speeds, **hitting** the homeland of the other party within 25 or **30** minutes; because they have pin-point accuracy and devastating destructive

(Mr. Adelman, United States)

capability; because they cannot be recalled once launched; and because for all these years there has been no effective defence against them. In addition, they can be vulnerable in the host country before launch, which could give a leader at a time of crisis a "use it or lose it" kind of mentality, which, in our line, is very destabilizing and dangerous.

What made the President's whole offer practical was the prospect of deploying advanced strategic defences, the strategic defence initiative system, at the end of that 10-year period. Those defences would make reductions and the elimination of ballistic missiles possible by offering each side insurance against the possibility of cheating, of clandestine ballistic missile deployment by the other or by a third country, and by offering the free world essential insurance against Soviet non-compliance with an agreement.

One of our major efforts at Reykjavik was to explore and address Soviet concerns - not least the concern that the Soviet Union had expressed about our strategic defence initiative programme. The Soviets expressed the concern, as I mentioned, that defensive systems could contribute to a first-strike capability.

(Adelman, _____ United States)

The President responded by proposing the elimination of everything that could be used for this first-strike capability, namely offensive ballistic missiles. The Soviets expressed the concern that we would use the strategic defence initiative to exploit our technological potential to their disadvantage. I think the question comes up constantly: why do the Soviets fear the strategic defence initiative so very much? I think there are many possible reasons for this, but my own thought is that the Soviets have researched ballistic-missile defence for all these many years, spending in fact more money on strategic defence since signing the anti-ballistic-missile Treaty than they have on strategic offence since that time. So I think they are getting to know, and do know, the field of ballistic-missile research very well. I think they realize that there is something to this field, that they can be successful in ballistic-missile defence, but they realize that the United States, because of our technological lead, has tremendous advantages. So while they may not be able to succeed very much in strategic-defence-initiative research, we are the kind of country that can succeed very much on ballistic-missile defence research. Moreover, I think that the Soviets have invested a great deal of time and resources and effort to the ballistic missile, especially the land-based and the heavy ballistic missile, as a way of increasing their arsenal.

What the President is saying, by and large, is that we should not compete on the heavy-missile-to-heavy-missile and, land-based-missile-to-land-based-missile kind of situation. Let us not have this kind of competition on yet more offensive destructive nuclear weapons, but let us go to a new kind of situation with some kind of defence, and in that way the Soviets may think of this as a strategic end-run around what they have been doing in the strategic realm for all these many years.

(Mr. Adelman, United States)

As I mentioned before, the President responded to Mr. Gorbachev's concern of last year with an offer to share the benefits of strategic defence as well. That was repeated constantly over last weekend: that we would be willing, with an elimination of ballistic missiles and deployment of strategic defence, to share that kind of defence for the good of both sides and for the good of the world.

The Soviets expressed the wish that deployments of defensive systems be postponed. President Reagan responded positively to that wish by agreeing to a postponement of deployment in conjunction with the simultaneous elimination of ballistic missile forces. Party Secretary Gorbachev wanted a 10-year postponement. That was not our policy before Reykjavik, and the President did offer him this deal. We had begun at Reykjavik with a willingness to postpone deployment of defensive systems for seven-and-a-half years while we conducted research, testing and development. As I have mentioned, the Soviet Union wanted a 10-year postponement, and when Secretary Gorbachev finally asked for a 10-year postponement, President Reagan agreed to provide that we could move at the same time towards this elimination of ballistic missiles and have some acceptance of deployments at the end of that 10-year period. In that way we had thought we had met the Soviet concerns that might stand in the way of this historic agreement to eliminate ballistic missiles.

So it can be seen from my description here that Reykjavik was a time when the Soviets did make real concessions and real moves in arms control. In the past, as the Committee is aware, including in this chamber, I have not been shy about criticizing the Soviet policies in the arms-control field and their intransigence to move in the intermediate-range nuclear forces field at the start. In fact I cannot think of anybody who has been more critical of the Soviets in this regard, at least in this chamber, than myself since 1981. But I think that we have to recognize it when the Soviets move in arms control, and they have moved in arms

(Mr. Adelman, United States)

control in very critical aspects in the offensive side. And we have moved as well to try to accommodate some of their concerns from the last summit and from some of their concerns in the Geneva talks themselves.

The Soviet Union raised one more demand that ended up being the deal-buster of the whole weekend. In addition to postponing deployment of defences, General Secretary Gorbachev wanted to place additional restrictions on defensive research, restrictions that go well beyond anybody's interpretation of the anti-ballistic missile Treaty and well beyond the language of that Treaty, restrictions that would confine testing of space-based strategic defence systems to laboratories, restrictions that would have the effect, in our opinion, of killing the strategic-defence-initiative programme.

Now there have been hints around in Geneva, in Moscow, in Washington that the Soviets may be reforming their ideas on this, not wanting us to stop or to confine all research to the laboratories for the strategic defence initiative, in which case we would invite them to come forward - instead of dropping hints hither, thither and yon to come forward and tell us what kind of restrictions they think would be consistent with the restrictions we agreed upon in 1972 in the anti-ballistic missile Treaty.

Also, the Soviet Union's proposals over the weekend differed from ours in that they did not make it explicit that at the end of the 10-year period both sides, or either side, could be free to deploy its strategic defence systems. Not only would such an agreement as the Soviets wanted us to tailor cast a dark shadow on the world's future by closing off a path to defence against nuclear missiles; it would also remove the one guarantee against cheating and against third-party attacks that makes the total elimination of ballistic missiles a realistic and plausible proposition. Much as we might have wished for such an outcome in the past, it was

(Mr. Adelman, United States)

never reasonable to hope that this goal would be achieved until the promise of defences came along to transform the strategic equation. We are confident of our own ability and willingness to keep our commitments, indeed it would be well known around the world and to the First Committee if the United States ever did not keep our commitments. It would be on the front page of every newspaper in the United States were we ever to break an arms-control agreement; it would be the lead item in the evening news; it would be the source of endless congressional inquiries and endless hits of investigative reporting by journalists and by private groups around the United States. I have often quipped that for verification all the Soviet Union needs to do is to subscribe to publications in the United States, such as Aviation Week, Time, Newsweek, The New York Times, The Washington Post, The Wall Street Journal and other publications. They can look at them every morning and tell if the United States is complying with an arms-control agreement. On our side it is quite different, given the closed nature of the Soviet society; we could not tell exactly what their forces were doing. So, while we are confident of our ability and willingness to keep our commitments, we are confronted with the fact that the Soviet non-compliance with the existing arms-control agreement has continued over the years.

Defences are thus in our view the key to unlock a new future in arms control. We saw just a glimpse of that future at Reykjavik. Fourteen years ago, when our two nations signed the anti-ballistic missile Treaty, the theory was that an agreement to remain permanently vulnerable to massive nuclear attack would pave the way for weapons reductions and indeed for meaningful reductions that would follow. In fact, at that time the head of the United States delegation, Gerard Smith, my predecessor, said that if the United States were not to receive deep reductions in offensive nuclear weapons within five years - that is, before 1977 - that would be grounds for getting out of the anti-ballistic missile Treaty, so inherent was the

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understanding in the deal that we would **restrict**, or really eliminate, **defences** in exchange for offensive cuts. But if we did not **get those** offensive cuts by 1977, then we could **get out of the restrictions on defence**. As the Committee well knows, we did not **get those offensive** cuts by 1977, and here we are in 1986, almost 1987, and we have yet to receive **those** cuts that were **promised** in the anti-ballistic missile Treaty negotiations.

(Mr. Adelman, United States)

For nearly a decade and a half, the United States has sought reductions in offensive weapons and consented to vulnerability. All we have got as a result are vastly increased numbers of offensive weapons and increased vulnerability.

As we suggested to the Soviets at Reykjavik, it is time to think these ideas through once again. We believe there is a real basis for dialogue on them. We see no signs that the Soviets object in principle to defensive systems. Quite the contrary. I think when one looks at the history of the Soviet Union, at the history of its military forces, its strategic thought, its strategic writings, one sees a constant theme that the Soviets are keen on protecting their homeland. That is what their army, air force, navy, strategic forces are designed to do.

Likewise, in the strategic realm, the Soviets are been concentrating for years on strategic defence, even while they have been building more and more offence. As I may have mentioned, since signing the anti-ballistic missile Treaty, the Soviets have spent more money on strategic defence than they have on strategic offence, even though, to use Khrushchev's previous phrase, they have cranked out missiles like sausages.

They have not been against defence, as they are pretending to be right now. How could they when they have spent all this money and done all this research for defensive systems? They have today a formidable air defence programme with some 10,000 interceptors around the Soviet Union. They have today the world's only deployed strategic defence system, the Galosh system around Moscow. They have today the world's only deployed system for anti-satellite capability - their ASAT system. They have an extremely active military space programme, with some 70 to 80 per cent of their space launches for military purposes, despite their protestations and their propaganda claims about the militarization of space. And long before we began our strategic defence initiative they were, as everybody in this room knows,

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heavily involved in the research and development of advanced technologies for strategic defences.

In sum, the Soviets are active in virtually every aspect of strategic defence, including a violation of the anti-ballistic missile Treaty, the Krasnoyarsk radar, in pursuit of their objectives.

There are several basic questions that now confront the Soviet Union in arms control, that I would put to the Soviet representative and ask in this forum. First, what do the Soviets really want? Does the Soviet Union merely want protection for itself? If that is so, then it should be eager to move with us toward a world in which both offensive ballistic missiles are eliminated and defences play a greater role. If that is so, it should be ready to move with us to a world in which security based on mutual threats gradually gives way to a world based on reciprocal safety.

Or, on the other hand, does the Soviet Union wish not merely to protect itself but also to threaten others? If that is the Soviet Union's goal - if the Soviet Union needs to threaten others in order to feel secure itself - then the chances for meaningful reductions and for lessening the risk of war through arms control agreements, are very bleak indeed.

But this does not have to be. There is a promising road ahead. It is time the common interest in defences shared by our two countries be put to productive use to make the world a genuinely safer place for both our nations and for all other nations of the earth. It is time that defensive research be permitted to unlock the door to real arms reductions. As we move forward on our broad arms control agenda, that is the highest challenge for the arms control process in the coming months and years.

Secondly, after that first question, let me ask the Soviet representative: is there any room for compromise on research during the seven or 10 years that

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follow - not the renegotiating of the anti-ballistic missile Treaty, but an understanding with respect to that Treaty that we both adhere to what was agreed to in 1972 and not try to renegotiate it? During all the sessions I had with the Soviets over the years, including the all-night session we had on Saturday night a week ago, I heard the Soviet representatives give a blanket answer against research outside the lab for the strategic defence initiative programme for future systems. If there is any refinement on this, as I said previously in my remarks, the Soviets should come back and tell us exactly how they would define research and how this was what was agreed to in 1972 in the anti-ballistic missile Treaty.

The third question I would pose is: can we move ahead on reducing and eventually eliminating an entire class of weapons, nuclear weapons - the intermediate nuclear force, the SS-20's on the Soviet side, the ground launch cruise missiles and the Pershing 2's on the American side, without an agreement on the strategic defence initiative? Now the Soviets have been back and forth on this issue over the past few years. In January 1985, during the Shultz-Gromyko talks, the Soviets told us explicitly that progress on the intermediate-range nuclear forces and progress on the strategic forces would be linked inherently to progress in the strategic defence initiative. We said we wanted to make progress wherever progress could be made. We did not like linking one problem with another problem - arms control was too important for such linkage, let us just move ahead where we can move ahead.

The Soviets, by the fourth round of the talks in Geneva, told us that while the strategic round would continue to be tied to progress on the strategic defence initiative, the intermediate-range nuclear forces - the intermediate realm - would not any longer be tied to the strategic defence initiative. That negotiation could make progress as quickly and as freely as progress could be made.

(Mr. Adelman, United States)

Now, **questions** have been **raised** since Reykjavik by the Soviets going back once again to the position they took **from the first to the fourth round, that no progress on intermediate-range nuclear forces as possible and no agreement on that point is possible until we work out things with the strategic defence initiative.** If that **is** the case, then I think that **is** a **real** setback **from where we were on the fourth round.** If that **is** not the case, then **let us** just get that **clarified and let us** move **ahead** on the intermediate-range nuclear **forces**, because **I think** we have the **general outlines** of an agreement **there** - the **general outlines of** an agreement which **would** eliminate **intermediate forces altogether from Europe, and within** the range of Europe, **and would leave very few** systems in **Asia - 100 warheads, where** the Soviets have over **500** today - with a right by the United States to have **100 warheads** on the **continental United States.**

The **fourth and last question** I would pose relates to what we **could do** about **this** twin problem of **compliance and verification** that the **leaders** talked about in **Reykjavik**, so that we **do not** have a legacy, as **we** do now, of a pattern of **violations by the Soviets and questions about their sincerity towards arms control** by those **of us** participating in the arms control process. We need good **verification for arms control agreements - a verification that is central, because** when these agreements that we are talking about are executed, we are going to have **real reductions in nuclear weapons, and that** makes the **benefits of a violation even** greater than **they would be** in respect of an **arms control agreement that allows a** **build-up** on either side. So we have to work on **this** problem and it has to be something that comes out **a lot better** than **it** has in the past. We have to work on the problem of the **violations of arms control agreements.**

(Mr. Adelman, United States)

The meeting at Reykjavik went at a lightning pace; me had to be there to believe what a lightning pace it really was. Now is the time for some reflection. We hope that the Soviet Union will re-Elect on the logic and the promise of the President's offer and see the benefits it holds. We hope the Soviet Union will come forward in a frank and constructive way - the way in which it addressed so many of these issues in Reykjavik - with the answers to the four questions I have posed here today.

Much good was accomplished at Reykjavik, much too much good to let it go to waste. At the Geneva summit last summer the two sides agreed to make progress wherever there was common ground. We should not abandon that agreed-upon principle now. As I said a minute ago, let us not hold progress in other areas of arms control hostage to an unreasonable demand to kill the United States strategic defence initiative. Such a move would be contrary to the spirit of the Geneva summit and an unnecessary impediment to progress in arms control.

Where we made progress in Reykjavik, let us build on it in Geneva. In the strategic arms reduction negotiations we saw Soviet recognition of the principle of 50 per cent cuts in offensive arms, to be implemented by reductions to 1,600 strategic nuclear delivery vehicles and 6,000 ballistic missile warheads and air-launched cruise missiles. Important advances were made in counting rules. Most important, the Soviets recognized the need for significant cuts in heavy missiles. This is the first time in my memory that any Soviet delegation has been so forthcoming on the acceptance of significant or considerable cuts in heavy land-based missiles. Let us build on this progress.

In the negotiations on intermediate-range nuclear forces, we were moving towards agreement at Reykjavik on a global 100-warhead limit for each side on longer-range intermediate-range nuclear forces. That proposal would provide for zero warheads in or within range of Europe, 100 warheads in Asia on the Soviet side

(Mr. Adelman, United States)

and 100 warheads in the United States. We were also moving towards agreement on a ceiling for shorter-range systems of intermediate-range nuclear forces, pending negotiation of reductions at a later stage. That would mean that the Soviet Union would freeze its number of short-range systems - basically the SS-12 and the SS-23 - and we would have the right to match them on the basis of equality in those categories. Let us build on this progress.

In the area of nuclear testing, the United States put forward a plan for ratification of the two existing treaties that have languished before the United States Senate and the Soviet Parliament for more than 10 years: the threshold test-ban Treaty and the peaceful nuclear explosions Treaty. Those were contingent on achieving adequate verification. The United States also put forward a plan for follow-up negotiations on further testing limitations in association with nuclear weapon reductions. The Soviets have essentially agreed to this approach. I would even go beyond that and say that the Soviets have really worked out and Mr. Gorbachev has presented to the President a plan of steps on the nuclear testing issue that resembles in most ways our plan of action on nuclear testing: verification first, ratification of the two existing but unratified Treaties, some kind of a build-down in the number or yield of nuclear tests on each side in association with reductions in the number of strategic forces, and then, in conditions of eliminating nuclear weapons, a comprehensive test ban.

I think there was a good meeting of minds at Reykjavik on that kind of work programme; I know there was on Saturday night when we met with the Soviet arms control experts in that all-night session. But this was never an issue that came to a conclusion, because the Soviets wanted to tie everything at that meeting to an outcome on the strategic defence initiative that was favourable from their

(Mr. Adelman, United States)

standpoint. In negotiations on anti-ballistic missiles and the strategic defence initiative programme we saw the possibility of defensive deployment after a number of years in conjunction with the total elimination of offensive ballistic missiles. Let us build on this progress.

In the talks at Reykjavik on the strategic defence initiative, we made the point - and it is a critical point for us in the arms control business to realize - that the strategic defence initiative and arms control are not incompatible at all. In my own mind, the strategic defence initiative is the one element that brought the Soviets back to the arms control talks, which they had walked out of in 1983. It has been, to my mind, the engine behind their proposals, the incentive for their proposals for deep reductions in the offensive nuclear realm. I think the strategic defence initiative has been the main force in the past three years that has led to Soviet seriousness in moving arms control from being an exercise of legitimizing a build-up on both sides to being one of deep reductions in nuclear weapons on both sides.

All this gives us a great deal of hope. We gave ground in Reykjavik in some critical areas and, as I mentioned before, the Soviets, much to their credit, gave ground as well in some areas. We applaud the Soviet Union for its willingness to do this.

A 1,000-mile journey, President Kennedy once reminded us, begins with a single step. Reykjavik was the first step - an important step, a tiring step, I think a productive step - towards real arms control, towards meaningful, real arms reductions and towards resolution of the broad issues that divide our two nations and our two societies. Reykjavik was one step towards a world in which peace relies less and less on the threat of massive nuclear retaliation and more and more on defences that threaten no one. Reykjavik was one step towards an expanding and

(Mr. Adelman, United States)

more productive dialogue on human rights, on regional conflicts and on bilateral exchanges between the people of the Soviet Union and the people of the United States.

In the bilateral realm we must build on the progress in Reykjavik. But let me say that the bilateral discussions between the United States and the Soviet Union are just a part of the larger mosaic of arms control about which the United States cares deeply. We are intent on moving forward the multilateral arms control activities of the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva and the forums for conventional arms talks, which have been successful in Stockholm and are continuing in Vienna, and the important work of the First Committee and other multilateral arms control forums as quickly and as productively as we possibly can.

Let us, in all these realms, bilateral and multilateral, build on the progress in Reykjavik. Let us continue our journey in steadfastness and prudence, in firmness and resolve, towards a safer, freer and more peaceful world.

Mr. ABULHASAN (Kuwait) (interpretation from Arabic): It is my humanitarian duty to begin by extending the heartfelt condolences of my delegation and myself to the Permanent Mission of Mozambique. Through that Mission I wish to convey our condolences to that friendly country on the grave loss it has suffered as a result of the accident to the aircraft carrying President Samora Machel and a number of other high officials of Mozambique. We are fully confident that the determination of the people of Mozambique will enable them to overcome the consequences of this tragedy. We fully appreciate the extent of those consequences and the depth of their feelings, particularly since President Machel embodied the aspirations of his people to a more stable, better life.

(Mr. Ahulhasan, Kuwait)

Allow me, Sir, to congratulate you on your election as Chairman of our Committee for its forty-first session. Your experience, wisdom and vast knowledge of the topics to be discussed, as well as the contribution of your friendly country, the German Democratic Republic, to the disarmament efforts within the framework of the United Nations, guarantee the success for which we all yearn. My delegation expresses its readiness to co-operate with you to achieve our common ends.

I am also happy to congratulate the vice-Chairman and the Rapporteur on the well-merited confidence placed in them.

We are meeting this year in changing, dangerous circumstances for world peace and the prospects of halting the arms race. The gravity of the situation is such that collective international work faces the threat of inaction and ineffectiveness. The world had high hopes of the summit meeting of the President of the United States and the General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, as leaders of the world's two major military and economic Powers, on whose differences depends world peace and whose relations affect many regional problems. We regret the failure of that round of talks and the impact of that failure on many urgent regional problems. We add our voice to all the voices calling for prudence, voices asking that the common interests of humankind, world peace and stability shall prevail over the narrow interests and competitive goals of those two super-Powers. We live in a world in which no part can be isolated from the rest, either of its own choice or by coercion. We share one destiny because we have common interests.

One of the most important topics for discussion by the General Assembly at its current session is the question of improving the efficiency of the administrative and financial functioning of the United Nations. Such an improvement in performance is urgently needed in our Committee. For years attempts have been made

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to introduce changes and improvements into the Committee's affairs. The events of the past few years have made it clear to us that the problem concerns the approach to reform less than the willingness of Member States to change the way in which they deal with the problems of disarmament and the arms race. The number of resolutions adopted every year on the basis of proposals by a State or a number of States representing various ideologies has multiplied. But while the number of resolutions increases, reaching nearly 70 at the previous session, not one of them leads to the desired results. Instead of merely repeating those resolutions year after year, we must examine ways of enforcing them. Our responsibility for peace and security and our participation in achieving peace and security oblige us to move from words to deeds.

We again emphasize that the agreement of the two super-Powers is the key to establishing world peace and security. We therefore attach great hopes to their making a consistent, continuing effort to solve the problems between them, so that the world may be assured of peace and security. We appreciate the significance and the difficulty of the problems between the two super-Powers, but we believe that those Powers have a special responsibility for maintaining international peace and security, a responsibility commensurate with the power they enjoy. We therefore hope that their efforts will continue, despite the present obstacles, which we regard as temporary, and that they will reach an understanding yielding benefits to the whole world.

That leads me to the responsibility of other States with regard to nuclear disarmament. Proposals on the creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones have been discussed in our Committee for several years. Except in regard to Latin America, those proposals remain a dead letter, notwithstanding the importance of establishing the zones and the contribution they can make to freeing various areas

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of the world of nuclear arms, and the fact that the countries of the regions in question have a vital interest in implementing those proposals.

Since 1965, when the General Assembly endorsed the 1964 Cairo Declaration making Africa a nuclear-weapon-free zone (resolution 2033 (XX)), the continent has continued to face the obstacle to its implementation: South Africa's nuclear capability and its rejection of measures to free the continent of nuclear arms. There is no doubt that South Africa maintains that horrible option, first, in order to preserve the apartheid régime; secondly, to terrorize those African minorities that support the liberation movements; and, thirdly, to guarantee its continued illegitimate rule over the black majority, which possesses the legitimate right to rule. The nuclear alliance and co-operation between two entities with identical goals - South Africa and Israel - is no longer a secret.

In the Middle East there is a situation similar to that in Africa. Year after year since 1974 the General Assembly has considered a resolution to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East. It provides for, inter alia, the non-development, non-production and non-stockpiling of nuclear weapons as well as accession to the nuclear non-proliferation Treaty and the subjecting of nuclear facilities to the inspection of the International Atomic Energy Agency. The countries of the region have approved the resolution year after year, and the General Assembly has been able to adopt it by consensus. In other words, no country in the area opposes any of its provisions.

However, the fate of that resolution is similar to that of others of the same kind; it remains a dead letter, because there is in the area a Zionist entity whose nuclear capability has been confirmed - for example, in the Secretary-General's 1981 report on Israel's nuclear capability. Moreover, information from scientific and other sources indicates that Israel not only has a nuclear capability - the technological, human, scientific and financial capacity to produce an atomic bomb -

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but **has** gone **beyond** that stage to the extent of **being** unofficially **regarded** as one of the nuclear nations. If that information came from a single **report** or **news** bulletin, we should **disregard** it, but the published reports on the Israeli **entity's** ability to produce nuclear **weapons** date back to the early **1970s**. There are many reports since then pointing to the procurement of several **bombs** by that entity. My country **is** convinced that that **is** the reason for the non-implementation of the **resolution** on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone **in** the Middle East.

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The latest such report was published in The Sunday Times of London on 5 October 1986 in an article on the secrets of the nuclear weapons owned by Israel, as reported by an Israeli nuclear technician who had worked at Dimona, the well known Israeli nuclear centre in the Negev desert. There can be no doubt that those concerned have learned of the content of the article. Among the fundamental aspects of the article are, inter alia, that the secret Israeli nuclear facilities are built underground at Dimona, where the necessary arrangements are made for the production of nuclear war heads.

we are also told that Israel is considered the sixth nuclear Power in the world and that it has possessed the nuclear capacity for more than 20 years. It has been able to hide its factory for the production of plutonium from satellite observation by building the facilities for that industry under ground. It can be understood from the statement of the Israeli technician that that facility produces 40 kilograms of plutonium every year. That quantity is sufficient for the production of 10 bombs. In the past six years new equipment has been added to produce various parts of a thermonuclear bomb.

The Sunday Times said that the statement of the Israeli engineer was submitted to European and American scientists, who indeed confirmed that 100 or 200 bombs had been stockpiled. One of them said that there should be no doubt that Israel had become a nuclear Power and that it had been one for at least the past 10 years. That report is one of many that have been published, concerning not only Israel's nuclear capability but also the procurement of nuclear weapons by Israel for many years.

so much for Israel's nuclear policy. The delegation of my country has no doubt whatsoever that Israel uses this option to continue its arts of aggression and terrorism against the population of the occupied territories, to keep those

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territories Under its control and to avoid any situation that would lead to the establishment of peace and security in the region on the basis of withdrawal from the occupied territories and recognition of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people, who have been suffering now for more than 30 years from the policy of terrorism and intimidation followed by the Zionist régime.

Those are the circumstances surrounding the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, yet my country's delegation supports the principle of the resolution because it calls for the establishment of peace and for receding the area from the nuclear threat. However, it is a sine qua non to consider the new developments relative to Israel's nuclear armament, which increases the threat to peace and security in the area.

For years our Committee has been debating, without any results, the topic of the implementation of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a zone of Peace. In recent years it has dealt with preparations for holding a conference to tackle the enforcement of that Declaration. However, there are deep, fundamental differences that prevent reaching a solution unanimously agreed upon by the members of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean, for reasons that I shall not dwell on here, since they are well known to all. Yet we do hope that those differences will not discourage the parties to the discussions from continuing to exert the necessary and persistent efforts needed to find any solution or arrangements that could lead to the convening of the Conference and the initiation of negotiations on the core of the issue rather than wasting time on procedural issues.

At an earlier session the General Assembly decided that its third special session on disarmament should be held during a period between 1967 and 1988. In the light of the events at summit meetings and the fact that the results derived therefrom do not match the expectations of the international community, we consider

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that there is an urgent need to convene a third special session to reconsider the world situation, and to find a new impetus and momentum to continue disarmament efforts in spite of the difficulties and obstacles they face. We hope that, at this session, the Committee will approve the establishment of a preparatory committee that will next year begin preparator.s for the third special session on disarmament.

It was also hoped that the first International Conference on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development would be held last summer. However, circumstances prevented the holding of that Conference, and the General Assembly has decided to delay it until 1987, leaving to the current session the appointment of the place and time for it. We consider that the Conference has a very important goal for the international community, particularly for third world countries that are still waiting for arrangements for disarmament to achieve the financial savings they must in turn expend on economic and social development. Those countries now suffer from drought, famine and desertification, and conditions exist that threaten world peace and security. We hope that the General Assembly will designate a time and place for the Conference and that the Preparatory Committee will continue the work it began and carried out successfully until the spring of this year.

Mr. BELONOGOV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (interpretation from Russian) : I should like, first of all, to express, on behalf of my delegation, our profound sorrow at the tragic deaths of the President of the People's Republic of Mozambique, Chairman of the FRELIMO Party, Samora Moiaes Machel, and other important party and Government figures of that country. We would ask the delegation of Mozambique to convey our condolences to the people and Government of the People's Republic of Mozambique and also to the bereaved families. under the leadership of Comrade Machel, the fraternal people of Mozambique achieved tangible success in building a new society, following an anti-imperialist, anti-colonialist

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and anti-racist policy, in solidarity with the position of the forces of peace and social progress in the world. The leader of the people of Mozambique frequently visited the Soviet Union and did a great deal to strengthen friendship and co-operation between our two countries. We mourn his untimely death and the loss by the people of Mozambique of their tried and true leader. The Soviet people will preserve the glorious memory of Comrade Machel.

The Soviet delegation has already had an opportunity to speak in the First Committee on some of the problems concerning the elimination of the nuclear threat, the limitation of the arms race, and disarmament, all of which call for an urgent solution. Today, we should like to share our ideas regarding the most pressing problem of our time, namely, the prevention of an arms race in outer space and the preservation of that region for peaceful activities.

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This problem has now moved to the forefront of world politics. Whether outer space will become a firing range for shooting at earth or this common heritage of all mankind will remain a peaceful sphere of co-operation in the interest of all States depends on the solution of this problem. The representatives of Mexico, Austria, the German Democratic Republic, Sweden, Bulgaria, India, China, Czechoslovakia, Nigeria and many other countries have already spoken out in the First Committee in defence of a peaceful Outer space. This is a cause for rejoicing and arouses our optimism, for what we need now more than ever before are resolute, responsible actions by all States, large and small, regardless of their social systems, to put an end to the arms race on Earth, prevent its spreading to outer space and embark on concrete measures of disarmament, above all nuclear disarmament.

The whole world now is discussing the results of the Soviet-United States meeting in Reykjavik. Although literally only a few steps away from adopting decisions which could have become historic for the whole nuclear and space age, the participants in the Reykjavik meeting were unfortunately unable to take those final few steps. It is well known who it was that did not summon up the necessary political will, courage and responsibility to do so. Nevertheless, the Reykjavik meeting was a new stage in the complex and difficult dialogue and the search for mutually acceptable solutions to difficult problems. The ground that was covered before and during the meeting itself provided valuable experience and represented a considerable gain.

I have noted with satisfaction that today, in the statement of the representative of the United States, we heard some positive assessments of the results of the Reykjavik meeting. We hope that the American side will analyse seriously all the possibilities opened up by that meeting and the genuinely profound movements and major concessions made by the Soviet Union in order to

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accommodate American positions. We hope that the American side will draw the necessary conclusions and make the necessary adjustments in the position that made it impossible to achieve the successful conclusion of concrete agreements at the meeting between the leaders of the Soviet Union and the United States in Reykjavik.

The Reykjavik meeting has once again clearly highlighted the critical importance for the fate of the world of the problem of preventing an arms race in outer space. As was stated by the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Mikhail Gorbachev:

“after Reykjavik, the notorious SDI has become even more conspicuous a symbol of obstruction in the way of peace, as a concentrated expression of militaristic designs and unwillingness to remove the nuclear threat looming large over mankind. It is impossible to perceive it otherwise. This is the most important lesson of the Reykjavik meeting.”

The meeting - which, as everybody now knows, opened up real opportunities for abolishing nuclear weapons from this planet in the shortest possible time - came to a standstill; it did not lead to the desired result precisely because of the position taken by the United States Administration on strategic defence initiative and the anti-ballistic missile Treaty.

The so-called strategic defence initiative, which even now consumes significant intellectual and material resources of the United States and some of its allies in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and outside it, is in striking contrast to the logic of the scientific and technological revolution. It was precisely when world space science and technology entered the age of maturity and could yield a handsome return on the investment in it, and the contributions of scientists and design engineers made it possible to begin mankind's space age, that an ominous plan emerged the implementation of which dramatically changes the system of priorities in scientific and technological progress.

(Mr. Belongov, USSR)

What really is the strategic defence initiative? Its basic content - and the United States makes no secret of it - is space-strike systems based on new physical principles. They include various types of beam weapons, elementary particle accelerators, electromagnetic cannon and interceptor missiles. By means of the massive deployment of such space-, air- and land-based systems in several consecutive stages, the Pentagon strategists hope to provide for the shooting down of enemy missiles. At the same time, according to authoritative specialists, including American specialists, space-strike systems can also be used as an offensive weapon to strike land, air and sea targets from space. Obviously, such targets could include missile-launching sites; command, control and communications centres; industrial targets, including nuclear power plants, and many other targets, both stationary and mobile. The detection, guidance and destruction techniques at present being developed in the United States of America could well be used for attack. There is no way of hiding this. That is the very crux of the matter, which is such a threat to the destiny of mankind, no matter what attempts are made to camouflage it with honeyed phrases about the supposedly peaceful nature of the strategic defence initiative.

Mr. Adelman, in his statement today, took great pains to convince us of the defensive nature of the planned undertaking. Other attempts are also being made to dress the future space wolf in sheep's clothing, but those attempts cannot hide the claws with which its inventors are trying to equip their creature.

I should like to point out that not everyone in the United States believes in the possibility, as we say, of beclouding a bright day and not everybody will be persuaded to see white as black. In this regard, I should like to refer to the views of the Republican Senator from Maryland, Charles Mathias, who as recently as 16 October 1986, in an article in The Washington Post, issued the following warning:

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He wrote, "No matter how many attempts we undertake to try to get the 'star wars' weapon, the Label that reads 'For peaceful defence purposes only' will never be able to convince anyone." I think that is an entirely correct prognosis on the part of the distinguished Senator: indeed it will not be possible to convince not just the Soviet people, but the people of many other countries also, that the planned endeavour is going to be a boon to mankind. Why will it not be possible? Because, to the accompaniment of soothing statements of disinformation, intensive development is under way on space-strike weapons - I stress "space-strike weapons"; and because explanation is under way into the question of how effectively to develop and deploy them, what orbits to choose, how many space platforms are necessary, and what types of weapon it would be worthwhile to use in space and from space.

Under the leadership of the strategic-defence-initiative organization, a special group of ten corporations which are contractors to the Pentagon has considered various alternative versions of the system, which in the beginning included four, and subsequently five or six, and now, it is reported, even seven echelons of space-strike-weapon deployment. In the United States they are known as layers or tiers.

Calculations have already been made for the initial deployment of "star wars" systems. According to United States press reports, the initial deployment phase alone should result in the emergence in outer space of 3,200 combat space platforms - at the initial stage, I would stress. By itself, that single figure reveals the scale of the introduction of arms into outer space planned by the United States. Equally noteworthy are the estimated financial costs. They also enable one to judge the scope of these planned programmes. As recently as last Friday readers of The New York Times were able to read an article which reported how much it is going to cost the United States just to deploy these space weapons:

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nothing less than a trillion dollars. Furthermore, just the annual cost of running the strategic-defence-initiative system would, according to that newspaper, cost \$100 to \$200 billion dollars, which is about **half** of the current military budget of the United States. So the question arises: in that case, what will be the aggregate total of United States military spending in the next few years?

Of course it is not for us to worry about the military expenditures of NATO countries, but there is a very **important** aspect here that is of concern to the whole of mankind. Instead of throwing to the cosmic winds such genuinely astronomical sums of money, one could allocate them for the development of **strictly** peaceful sectors of **one's** own economy and give tangible material **assistance** to the developing World to help it overcome its economic backwardness and promote its social progress.

The "**star** wars" programme represents an extremely dangerous attempt to deal with the problems of the contemporary world **from** old militaristic positions. For all **its** apparent novelty, this programme virtually **boils** down to **yet** another attempt by the ruling circles of the United States to achieve absolute security and in essence to **acquire** a position of strength for themselves while placing everyone else in a position of absolute insecurity. What they have failed to obtain over decades by means of one round after another of the nuclear **arms** race on Earth, they intend to accomplish now through the use of the most **advanced** space technology.

During the meeting in Reykjavik, as is **well** known, the USSR formulated a new and told **platform** which makes it possible to stop the arms race on Earth and to prevent its extension to outer space.

Allow me to recall the main elements of that platform. According to our **proposal**, the USSR and the United States would pledge not to use in the **next 10 years** their right to withdraw from the anti-ballistic missile **Treaty**, which is of **unlimited** duration, and to comply strictly with all its provisions throughout

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that period. The testing of all space-based elements of an anti-missile defence in outer space would be banned, except for research and tests conducted in laboratories. We propose that during the first five years the strategic offensive arms of the two sides be reduced by 50 per cent. The next five years would see the reduction of the remaining 50 per cent of the strategic offensive arms of the sides. Thus by the end of 1996 the USSR and the United States would have totally eliminated their strategic offensive arsenals.

Later, after Reykjavik, in an attempt to justify his position on the strategic defence initiative, which became a sticking point during the talks, the United States President said that he needed that programme to ensure that the United States and its allies remained invulnerable to a Soviet nuclear strike. As can be seen, the so-called Soviet threat has once again been dragged out. And today in his statement Mr. Adelman continued to develop practically the same argument with regard to the alleged need for the strategic defence initiative in order to ensure the security of the United States against a possible nuclear attack by the Soviet Union, which, as he attempted to convince us here, does not comply with the agreements it has entered into.

But, as Mr. Gorbachev stressed the other day, this is nothing but a trick. From what does the need to secure America's freedom and that of its allies against Soviet nuclear missiles arise, if by 1996 there are to be no such missiles? There is no point in thinking that in agreeing with a measure as radical as the destruction of strategic nuclear potentials we should trust the United States more than it trusts us at present.

As was stressed by the Soviet side, we shall insist on the very strictest control - three-fold control, as Mr. Gorbachev put it - and verification of absolute implementation of an agreement on the elimination of the nuclear potentials if we can achieve that with the United States. It is a matter of simple

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logic. **Once** there **is** no nuclear **sword**, why will one need a shield against **that** sword? If there **are** no nuclear **weapons**, why is **defence** against them needed?

Unfortunately we did not get any **striking** answer to that question **today from** the representative of the **United States**.

(Mr. Belonogov, USSR)

He talked about all kinds of things but **was disrespectful** to our Committee. He departed from that critical question. **He** avoided it. He did not answer it on behalf of the **United States**. And that is **understandable** to people here. **why is** it necessary to have a strategic **defence** initiative; **why does** one need a space shield, if by that time all nuclear weapons will have been eliminated? The **conclusion is** obvious - the **whole idea** of Star Wars **is** aimed not at defensive but at quite different 'purposes. It is not difficult to guess which ones.

It **is** the **same** old question of attaining the **military** advantage **or** supremacy of the **United States** over the **Soviet Union**. This conclusion is **not** just an **arbitrary** interpretation of the situation. It **comes** from an analysis of existing trends in **United States** policy, which **are** potentially dangerous **in** at least two **regards**. On the one hand, the American administration pursues a course of continuing tests and **subsequent** deployment **of** its anti-satellite system. Here the threat to **security** and stability **is** due to the fact that in launching an attack against satellites **designed** primarily for **early** warning against a missile attack, the aggressor - to **put** it figuratively - could count on blinding its victim, thus making **its surprise** disarming nuclear strike more effective.

Secondly, as has already been pointed out, base strike weapons, as they **become** more highly developed and modernized, will eventually become capable - inevitably - of destroying targets on **Earth**. Thus, a space shield will **become** a space sword - **and**, what is more, the only **sword** in existence. In a situation where nuclear weapons will have been eliminated from the Earth, there will be nothing to restrain its **use**. Incidentally, in the opinion of prominent **United States** physicist* and **government** experts, laser weapons developed within the **framework** of the strategic defence initiative can be **more** easily used to burn **enemy** cities than to protect the **United States** from in-coming missiles.

We cannot fail to notice the **persistent** attempts by the United States administration to represent the strategic defence initiative as a kind of

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non-nuclear defensive system, which, so we are told, is itself a boon to mankind. There is every ground not only to be doubtful of the sincerity of those assertions, but even to affirm the opposite, or at least to suppose the possibility of such a course of events.

Reporting to the United States Congress on appropriations for military purposes for 1987, Secretary of Defense Weinberger said that the strategic defence initiative programme placed particular stress on non-nuclear means of destruction. One can conclude from that phrase that the nuclear element is also being developed, albeit without unnecessary publicity.

Our judgement is based on the fact that a special role in the Star Wars programme will be played by an X-ray nuclear pumped laser, which, according to Edward Teller, is the most innovative and potentially the most, as he called it, fruitful of all future weapon systems. It is precisely the X-ray laser that in the view of United States experts is one of the major reasons for the refusal by the White House to join the Soviet moratorium on nuclear testing. If we add to this the work going on to develop a whole new set of exotic weapons, such as chemical lasers, electromagnetic rail guns, kinetic weapons and others, it becomes quite clear why the Pentagon is fighting so obstinately to legitimate practical experiments and tests in space.

In other words, this means that the elimination of nuclear arms on Earth, as the United States sees it, would be carried out concurrently with the development by the United States of fundamentally new weapons of mass destruction in space comparable to nuclear weapons and, in some cases, even superior to them.

Attempts have been made by certain American statesmen to reassure us that the United States will at some point or other be ready to share with the Soviet Union its secrets in the field of Star Wars. We do not believe these promises. We have absolutely no grounds for believing them. Quite the opposite: the whole practical

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policy of the **United** States administration has so far shown us by **concrete** example that exactly the opposite is true.

Mr. **Adelman** also posed **some** enigmas about why the Soviet Union is, as he put it, afraid of the strategic defence initiative. We are not afraid of the strategic defence initiative. We will find a way of responding to that plan, **if** it comes to fruition. This has been repeatedly stated, with all seriousness, by Soviet leaders. **But** it **is** precisely the feeling of responsibility for future generations of mankind that impels **us** to talk in such detail about the real dangers, which are connected with the possibility of the massive placement of strike weapons in outer **space**.

I have said **this** chase is extremely dangerous primarily because rapid changes in military technology could lead to the **appearance** of **such** types and systems of weapons as would make verification of arms limitations and reductions **extremely** difficult - even inconceivable. **And** this threatens to add to the suspicion, hostility and mistrust in the world today. But mankind needs **exactly** the opposite.

I should like to stress that the ideas put forward at today's meeting about the Soviet **programme** in the field of anti-missile defence and the militarization of space have nothing in common with the actual **state** of **affairs**. Those assertions we leave to the conscience of those spreading them and thinking them up. Of course, this does not help to build confidence or trust.

The attempt to argue that the strategic defence initiative is a means of enhancing strategic stability does not stand up to criticism. Quite the opposite is true. The development of the space shield, **under** cover of which some American strategists expect to **acquire** the capability of delivering a **disarming** nuclear **strike with** impunity, would bring about a radical **change** in the existing balance of forces, total destruction of the basis for strategic stability, and an acceleration of the strategic arms race, both offensive and defensive.

(Mr. Belonogov, USSR)

From what has been said one is bound to draw the conclusion that if the Star Wars programme is implemented the world could within a few short years find itself facing an absolutely uncontrollable arms race, with stability dangerously undermined and with the risk of nuclear catastrophe greatly increased. Thus one can hardly speak of the "mission of salvation" of Star Wars.

The destabilizing effects of the Star Wars programme would be felt in the political sphere and in the international legal sphere. Judging by its aims, the programme is clearly in violation of the USSR-United States anti-ballistic missile Treaty, for it has as its aim the development, testing and deployment of systems and components of a large-scale anti-ballistic missile defence covering the Country's territory, including space-based elements and components; this is explicitly prohibited by the Treaty.

For many years, with both sides having offensive strategic systems, the anti-ballistic missile Treaty remains, as before, the basis of strategic stability and international security. In the present situation, now that the possibility has emerged of working out agreements on strategic offensive weapons and medium-range missiles, the anti-ballistic missile Treaty has of course now taken on truly crucial significance.

That Soviet approach to the anti-ballistic missile Treaty is motivated by the fact that since we are now entering an entirely new situation where nuclear weapons will begin to be substantially reduced, and even eliminated in the foreseeable future, we should protect ourselves against any contingency, preclude anything in the disarmament process that could undermine equality, and rule out any possibility of the development of new types of weapons that would ensure military superiority. The reasoning and logic of this position is perfectly obvious.

However the United States is taking a different approach to the problem. In fact, it wants to weaken the anti-ballistic missile Treaty and to revise it so as

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get a free hand to develop and deploy a large-scale ~~space-based~~ anti-ballistic missile system in its own selfish interests. The United States is literally itching to introduce weapons into outer space.

As representatives have **seen** today, there are attempts to present the matter as though the United States is protecting the anti-ballistic missile Treaty while the Soviet Union is asking for some kind of revision. Anyone even remotely **acquainted** with these matters knows that the Soviet Union is in favour of an agreement on arms limitation and reduction, while everyone knows that the United States has **already declared** the first and second Treaties on the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (SALT I and II) to be dead letters. To claim that the strategic defence initiative is not in contravention of the anti-ballistic missile Treaty **is** to claim that **black is white**. The strategic defence initiative is at the opposite pole to the Treaty and **is** its deadly enemy. With that programme, the **United States** is attempting to **destroy** the only existing shield against nuclear weapons.

It **is our** position that each side must **consolidate** the anti-ballistic missile Treaty **régime** and take on the **obligation** not to **exercise** the right to withdraw from the Treaty for as long a period as possible, and that during that period, neither side must do anything that could undermine its **régime** or the limitations it **sets**. Then, as we proposed at Reykjavik, the **USSR** and the **United States of America** should enter into **negotiations with a view to deciding** on **subsequent** steps.

The **United States** position, **as** we saw once **again today, is** that **it would not** withdraw from the Treaty for a maximum period of **10 years**, but that during that time **it would** carry out research **and testing of** the new weapon system so that it would be ready to **deploy** the new **weapons** the day following the expiry of that **10-year period**.

(Mr. Belonogov, IJSSR)

Clearly, those are essentially different approaches, and it would be extremely difficult to reconcile them.

In the present situation only a madman could deny the negative effects of introducing nuclear weapons into space. Yet however paradoxical it may seem, it is precisely on nuclear weapons in space that some are pinning their hopes for eliminating the nuclear threat to Earth. Such thinking is strange, to say the least. An arms race in space would create a totally new situation. It would inevitably shorten the time for decision-making and would hand over that responsibility more and more to computers and technology. And technology, even if tested over and over again, sometimes breaks down as demonstrated by the Challenger disaster, by the explosions of Titan and Delta missiles, by the Chernobyl accident and by other similar cases. But in certain situations, that "sometimes" could mean once and for all. Can we really afford such a risk?

In an attempt to avoid answering that question the United States has tried to lend credence to the argument that the United States of America is allegedly lagging behind the IJSSR in the development of a strategic defence. United States activities are being depicted as efforts to "close the gap". Such assertions exemplify the Orwellian technique of the big lie. It is well known that the USSR, as officially stated, is not engaged in the development of space strike weapons. References to a Soviet strategic defence initiative are used mainly in attempt to justify the plans for Star Wars and pass them off as a response, although we have not challenged and are not challenging the United States in this area.

The General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Comrade Gorbachev, has publicly affirmed that the Soviet Union has no plans like those proposed by the United States for deploying a defence system in space.

(Mr. Relonoqov, USSR)

I wish to draw attention briefly to the irrefutable fact that at the **Reykjavik** negotiations the Soviet side did not make any impossible demands of the **United States** side. We merely propoaed that for 10 years the strategic defence initiative programme should not go beyond the limits of the anti-ballistic missile Treaty. If the **United States President** and his Administration truly believe that the strategic defence initiative would be limited to research for that period of time, why does the **United States** refuse to join us in stating this in a document?

(Mr. Belonogov, USSR)

We believe that that **position** can be explained **only** by the **fact** that the United States really intends **to go** well beyond research and laboratory tests. I stress that with regard to the anti-ballistic missile Treaty and its strict observance the United States has a **double** standard. That **is shown** by the fact that, despite its obligations **under** the Treaty, the **United** States is building in Greenland a **new** radar tracking station which will be **hooked into** the ballistic missile early warning system. According to the Treaty, such a station can be built only within **United** States national territory and aimed outside the territory. But the **United** States **int** de not **only** to carry out **its** plans on the territory of Greenland, but also to implement a **similar programme** on United Kingdom territory.

Incidentally, the **Uni** ted States is **accus** ing the Soviet **Union** of violating the Treaty by building a radar **track** ing station on its own territory, near **Kr** asnoyarsk. But that station is **only** for space observation and **its** range is of no use for anti-missile **defence**. To avoid argument we proposed to the United **States** that the problem be **ended** with the **United** **Sta** tea **stop** ping the building of its Greenland station, while we stop building our own **near** **Kr** asnoyarsk. However, the **United** States has rejected that **solu** tion. It wants to build its Greenland station by the end of this year, in clear violation of the Treaty. **There** fore, any talk about the **United** **States** proceeding **on** the basis of the need for **strict** observance of the Treaty is not borne out by **today's** events, and still less by United States plans for the future.

The unique character of the present situation requires courage, responsibility, political determination and new approaches. **What** we need now is new political thinking, which presupposes a qualitatively higher level of flexibility in foreign policy and a **willingness** to make **reasonable** compromises in the interest of **strengthening** global security. Meanwhile, time is running out. The situation demands not **only** that the **United** States and the Soviet **Union** redouble

(Mr. Belonogov, USSR)

their efforts, but that other States, too, contribute to intensifying the activities of multilateral negotiating forums and that those activities become more dynamic in order to implement United Nations decisions of preventing an arms race in space.

Unfortunately, not all countries have yet come to realize the need. While paying lip service to the prevention of an arms race in outer space, a number of countries are virtually blocking the beginning of multilateral negotiations within the framework of the Geneva Conference on Disarmament. They are trying there to substitute a general discussion of the problem for negotiations. We share the view repeatedly expressed here by socialist and non-aligned countries that the Conference must make a practical start on resolving in practical terms the problem of outer space, and the more effectively and concretely the better. A major step in that direction could be taken, as we proposed earlier, if an international agreement were worked out at the Conference to ensure the immunity of artificial Earth satellites and to ban the development, testing and deployment of anti-satellite systems and eliminate existing systems. Furthermore, the Soviet Union proposes that discussion be started on a ban of offensive space-to-Earth and space-to-space weapons.

The Soviet Union takes a comprehensive approach to the problem of outer space. In reality, at issue here are two aspects of a single task: stopping preparations for star wars and countering them with the alternative of star peace - that is, exploring outer space through the joint efforts of all States for peaceful purposes. Such co-operation should be equal and equally beneficial to all. Having entered the space age, States should also abandon the old notions of the strong and the weak, of subordinates and those in command.

Today the achievements of space science and technology are in one way or another making their way into the everyday life of an increasing number of States,

(Mr. Helonogov, USSR)

those that are themselves **developing and using space equipment** for various purposes and others. **Orbital systems** are now **carrying out** important economic missions, such as prospecting for and **assessing** the **Earth's** natural resources, monitoring the environment, **ensuring reliable** and **rapid** communications and **assisting navigation**, meteorological observations and all kinds of cartographic surveys.

A striking example of the contribution made by space science and technology to world science was the carrying out of a multi-purpose programme to study Halley's Comet by the Soviet automatic space stations Vega 1 and Vega 2. The successful execution of the international project to study the planet Venus and Halley's Comet, which involved large teams of scientists and experts from socialist and capitalist countries, demonstrated the real possibilities and broad prospects of the peaceful exploration of outer space, provided different States combine their efforts.

The peaceful co-operation of States in outer space will serve as a bridge to build trust and mutual understanding between them on Earth, too. The Soviet Union is ready to develop such co-operation with all States, both bilaterally and multilaterally. We are in favour of co-operation that is open and accessible to all, without any discrimination.

There are serious economic reasons for such co-operation. It is unwise to fragment and duplicate the efforts of States in the exploration of outer space. The rational application of such efforts, on the basis of co-ordination and combination, would have a cumulative effect and make a reality of what is beyond the capacity of any one country, even if it is highly developed. Even if we assume that the space programme will initially appear scientific development, the price is bound to be the development of truly suicidal weapons. But the peaceful exploration of outer space opens up a fundamentally different, direct and promising path to speeding up progress in science and industry.

(Mr. Belonogov, USSR)

As realists, we are aware that the United States and some other capitalist countries have established an aerospace industry which is at present primarily manufacturing space systems for military purposes. We propose that the productive potential of the aerospace industry be converted to the peaceful exploration of outer space and broad international co-operation - on a commercial basis, too.

(Mr. Belonogov, USSR)

'The profits now earned by those companies engaged in the aerospace business would thus remain profits, but their provenance would be different. Programmes for the extensive utilization of outer space, including those to be carried out jointly by States, will make it possible to give an unprecedented impetus to the progress of science and industry and enable each country to discover its potential and make the best possible use of its industrial and scientific capacities. According to the United States space expert Mr. Manno, such a course of events is sure to bring greater, not smaller, profits to business. We invite the United States and other countries that have agreed to join in the strategic defence initiative to weigh all this most seriously and to make their choice, ultimately, in favour of a peaceful outer space.

Last summer the Soviet Union submitted to the consideration of the international community a programme of joint practical action for the peaceful exploration of outer space. That programme consists of three stages, with the idea of creating by the year 2000 the material, political, legal and organizational foundations for star peace.

To co-ordinate the efforts of States in the qualitatively new stage of co-operation in the exploration of outer space, including the implementation of large-scale material projects, the logical and necessary next step would be the establishment of a world space organization. The Soviet Union envisages such an organization as a universal international organization with its own charter, in the form of an international treaty, and linked to the United Nations by an agreement on co-operation and co-ordination of the implementation of specialized programmes. The organization would be financed primarily by countries with major space capabilities and by other economically advanced States.

The efforts of the world space organization would be aimed at the peaceful exploration of outer space and the verification of compliance with agreement3 - as

(Mr. Zelonogov, USSR)

concluded - on preventing the extension of the arms race to outer space. For the purposes of such verification, the world space organization would initially make use of the technical means provided by the space Powers and, subsequently, of its own means.

The world space organization would facilitate accession by all States to the opportunities to make practical use of the achievements in space science and technology for the purposes and needs of their own social and economic development, and it would assist the developing countries in becoming direct participants in the great process of space exploration.

Thus, we have before us two approaches, two philosophies. On the one hand, we have the star wars programme, inherent in which is a threat to turn outer space, the common heritage of mankind, into the abyss of Lucifer. On the other hand, we have the road to star peace, which is designed to place intellect at the service of mankind and to use the results of space research for the benefit of all peoples, regardless of the social system or level of development of States. We call upon the United Nations to use its authority to tilt the scales of history in favour of the second option.

Mr. WONGSAY (Lao People's Democratic Republic) (interpretation from French): On behalf of my delegation, I should like first to convey to the delegation of Mozambique our heartfelt condolences and feelings of sorrow at the news of the tragic disappearance of His Excellency Mr. Samora Moises Machel, President of the People's Republic of Mozambique, and some of his close colleagues in the recent air disaster. The people of Mozambique, with whom the Government and people of the Lao People's Democratic Republic enjoy relations, have suffered an irreparable loss, as have all peoples who welcomed the valuable contribution President Samora Machel made to the cause of justice, peace, disarmament and

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Democratic Republic)

international co-operation. Our sympathy is with the people and Government of Mozambique at this moment of painful trial.

Allow me, Mr. Chairman, on behalf of the Lao delegation, to congratulate you on your election to preside over this important Committee. your diplomatic skill and the vast experience you have acquired during your long career in the service of your country, the German Democratic Republic, whose active contribution to the cause of peace, security and disarmament in the world is well known, are a guarantee that the work of the First Committee will achieve the hoped-for results. My delegation conveys to you and to the other officers of the Committee assurances of our full co-operation.

It has become a commonplace to say that in the course of the general debate, which has just been concluded, at this year's session of the General Assembly, the overwhelming majority of the heads of delegations of Member States emphasized the need - indeed, the urgency - of speeding up the process of nuclear disarmament and thereby improving the international climate. True, in this International Year of Peace the world situation has not been free from grave conflicts and tensions. It is equally true, however, that we are also seeing the emergence, albeit tentative, of a denuclearized era, for which the peace-loving peoples of the world have been tirelessly and actively striving for many years.

The final and crucial phase of that happy event was not, unfortunately, entered into at Reykjavik; the fault for that lies, as is well known, with the very same elements that have refused to accept the alarming and blinding truth that nuclear war cannot be won or that in such a war there will be neither victor nor vanquished. That is a truth Mr. Gorbachev, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, and President Reagan did, however, recognize at their summit meeting at Geneva in November of last Year.

(Mr. Vongsay, Lao People's
Democratic Republic)

My delegation is grateful to Deputy Minister Pctrovsky, Vice-Chairman of his delegation, who, in his statement in the Committee on 14 October, informed us of the content of the Reykjavik summit meeting and of the respective positions adopted by the two Parties. My delegation, of course, is unable to go along with the version of the facts put forward by the United States representative a short while ago.

The entire world is well aware that the Soviet Union made tremendous concessions at that summit meeting on behalf of the over-all interests of mankind that are being threatened by the nuclear peril. My country welcomes and firmly supports the whole new series of constructive and realistic initiatives and proposals put forward by the Soviet Union, in particular those contained in the statement of Mr. Gorbachev of 15 January of this year, in which he called for the total and comprehensive elimination of nuclear weapons by the year 2000.

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Democratic Republic)

It is comforting to note that the Sviect-American negotiations on the reduction of nuclear and space arms resumed last week in Geneva, and it is hoped that the party which showed unreasonable obstinacy in Reykjavik will demonstrate a more conciliatory, realistic attitude and political will which the situation demands.

We do not share the views expressed by certain Powers according to which peace and security can be guaranteed only by force, or by conventional or nuclear deterrence. Those are obsolete military doctrines built up to continue the arms race on Earth and extend it to outer space, and thus achieve military supremacy. The advocates of such a theory must realize that in a nuclear space age the only conceivable concept of global or collective security must be the same for all individuals, peoples and nations, whatever their size, economic condition, political or social system. That security cannot be guaranteed by disarmament alone.

In that regard, my country firmly supports the proposal made by the 10 socialist countries and included in the agenda of the present session calling for the establishment of a comprehensive system of international peace and security. The establishment of such a system that would encompass the political, military, economic and humanitarian spheres would enable the peoples of the world to enjoy the material guarantees of such comprehensive peace and security. It is obvious that such an environment of peace and security is possible only when a stop has been put to the unbridled arms race and disarmament achieved. That is a prior condition for the establishment of such a system. All those of goodwill will admit that the cessation of nuclear testing is a decisive and effective first step towards ending the continuing sophistication of nuclear weapons.

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Democratic Republic)

In that connection, we associate ourselves with the tribute paid recently by the international community to the Soviet Union for having observed and extended for the fourth consecutive time its unilateral moratorium on all nuclear explosions. It is to be regretted that the United States side has adopted a contrary, negative attitude. We hope that those who have thus refused to join their hands to this brave and responsible action by the Soviet Union will agree, in the near future, to reconsider their position on this matter during the bilateral and multilateral negotiations in Geneva.

It is well known that no progress has been made in the process of negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament towards the conclusion of a comprehensive nuclear test ban owing to the obstructionist attitude adopted by a handful of countries which have attached only secondary interest to the consideration of this crucial priority agenda item. Indeed the arguments advanced by those against the cessation of nuclear explosions are not convincing, because virtually the whole world has agreed that the technical verification means at present available to the international community are effective and credible. In this respect, we welcome the positive assessment of the recent Summit of Non-Aligned Countries in Harare and the valuable contribution towards on-site verification made last August by the Heads of State or Government of the five continents during their meeting in Mexico.

We have been told that the negotiating Committee of the Conference on Disarmament at Geneva has shown substantive progress in the elaboration of a global ban on chemical weapons, and we welcome that. But our misgivings and suspicions have not been dispelled owing to the continuation of the project for the production and possible deployment in Europe of binary chemical weapons.

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We equally deplore the fact that the Conference on Disarmament's Ad Hoc Committee on Outer Space has not yet tackled the substance of the problem regarding the prevention of an arms race in outer space. In this regard, we welcome the overall programme for the international exploration and exploitation of outer space for peaceful purposes for the benefit of all mankind - a programme submitted by the Soviet Union. That programme is also known as star peace, as opposed to star wars advocated by the present United States Administration, which, unrestrained even by its own public opinion, openly threatened to violate the anti-ballistic missile and SALT II treaties or to consider them null and void. It is interesting to note that to date almost 7,000 American scientific experts have voiced their strong opposition to the star wars programme or the strategic defence initiative. According to The Washington Post, this opposition movement, which includes 110 research institutes and 15 physics and chemistry Nobel Prize winners, has denounced the idea as being destabilizing, dangerous and technically impossible to achieve.

My delegation has noted again this year, in the light of the present debate here in the Committee, that a handful of delegations continue to place the nuclear threat and the conventional threat on an equal footing. The consequences of a conventional conflict are certainly devastating, but they do not have the exterminating element that would result from a nuclear catastrophe. It has been scientifically demonstrated that if a nuclear holocaust took place it would destroy all forms of human life and civilization. Those who hold a different view are directly or indirectly playing into the hands of the military-industrial complex of the warmongering forces of imperialism.

Be that as it may, we welcome the results of the Stockholm Conference with regard to the measures for strengthening security and confidence and disarmament in

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Europe. Since peace and security are indivisible, the Stockholm Agreement will have a **beneficial** influence on the future of international relations in general. In this spirit, we support the **proposal** recently submitted by the countries members Of the **Warsaw Pact** to **reduce** substantially armed forces and conventional weapons in **Europe**.

As I have already said, peace and security are indivisible; that is a point on which the world at large is in agreement and therefore makes sense only when the world as a whole can effectively and **equitably** enjoy such peace and security. That is why we **will** always speak out in favour of the **proliferation** of **zones** of peace and nuclear-weapon-free **zones** in various parts of the world, including **South-East Asia** where my own **country** is **located**.

Let **me** now turn to the problem of the relationship between disarmament and development which, in my view, is of crucial **importance**. In his statement of 1 **October** of this year, made in **the** general debate in the plenary **Assembly**, the Head of our delegation **said** the following:

"There can be no doubt that if only a **tiny** fraction of the astronomical **sums** devoted annually to military expenditure throughout the world could be freed it would suffice to relief the suffering and **poverty** of a **sizeable** number of **children**, women and old people in **Africa**, **Asia** and **Latin America**, or even the **world** as a whole.

"In **this** connection, my delegation has learned with **disappointment** and regret that it was the negative uncanpromising attitude of certain **Western Powers** that prevented the convening this year in Paris of the **United Ration**6 Conference on the Relationship between **Disarmament** and Development."

(A/41/PV.19, pp. 88 and 89-90)

(MC. Vongsay Lao People's
Democratic Republic)

The problems of peace, security and disarmament are indeed extremely complex, crucial and acute. The road to paradise is, as we say in my country, always long, torturous and difficult; the road to hell is shorter and easier. That is why we must all redouble our efforts and show great patience and political realism so that in the foreseeable future we may go through the gates of the paradise on earth that general and complete disarmament would bring, as the advent of a better, safer world free of nuclear weapons.

Those are some of the general comments my delegation wished to put forward at this stage of our work on the disarmament items. I am sure that I shall have an opportunity of speaking again when we consider other items on our agenda.

Mr. EL-HOUDERI (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya) (interpretation from Arabic):

The sad news of the death of one of the Presidents of Africa, President Samora Machel, is a catastrophe not only for Africa but for my country and the whole world. My country sympathizes with Mozambique in its sorrow at the loss of its leader and some of his assistants. We hope that the experience of President Samora Machel will guide other countries in their efforts to achieve freedom for Africa and the rest of the world.

In the name of my delegation I wish to convey to you, Sir, our congratulations on your election as Chairman of the Committee. I also congratulate the other officers of the Committee. We assure you of our complete co-operation in bringing your onerous task to a successful conclusion.

There is no doubt that the whole world has begun to realize the deteriorating state of international peace and security as a result of the exacerbation of tension throughout the world. The nuclear-arms race is escalating. It is in contradiction with the aspirations and will of the international community at a time when the States of the world are endeavouring to create a more secure, better

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and more peaceful in international situation. The spectre of the nuclear threat still looms over the entire world, especially since the nuclear States have not yet been able to take practical measures designed to ease nuclear tension. International peace and security cannot be attained merely through hopes or good faith. More patient serious efforts are necessary by all the States of the world, especially those possessing destructive nuclear weapons.

It was hoped that 1986 would be the International Year of Peace throughout the world. We have to note with great sorrow, however, our disappointment at the failure to fulfil that desire. International tension has increased, not only because of the nuclear-arms race and the chemical and biological weapons race, but also because of the persistence of hotbeds of tension and their proliferation, which hardly augurs well for peaceful coexistence of States.

The arms race embodies the desire of certain States to resort to the threat or use of force in international relations. This has become characteristic of the imperialists and colonialists as they attempt to impose their hegemony by such means as direct acts of aggression and the spreading of terror and destruction using military bases and fleets and committing acts of provocation throughout the world.

The act of aggression against my country in April last by a super-Power using the most sophisticated means of destruction, fleets, aircraft and modern technology, reminded the world of the danger to small countries posed by the colonialist and imperialist States.

Despite the disappointment felt by many States at the lack of positive, practical formulas in the field of nuclear disarmament the increasing tension in many parts of the world, the continuance of which is an obstacle to the easing of world tension, we remain hopeful, as do all peace-loving countries, that tension

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can be eased and that natural conditions of peaceful coexistence of small and larger States on a basis of mutual respect can be created. We cannot accept the use of force to resolve political disputes among States.

Disarmament in all its aspects, particularly nuclear disarmament, has become an essential demand, especially given the worsening situation in many parts of the world, which is reflected in instability and tension coupled with the economic problems that afflict many States, especially the developing countries, which are in difficult situations and facing difficult choices. They are trying to break the circle of backwardness and deprivation and achieve a better standard of living for their peoples, while at the same time having to deal with the colonial legacy of problems that jeopardize their very security.

The increasing military expenditures, whether on nuclear or on conventional weapons, have increased tension in the world and jeopardized international peace and security. The aggressive policies of the colonialist régimes have contributed to the creation of more hotbeds of tension, whether in Central America, the Middle East, Africa, Asia or the Mediterranean.

The entire world has begun to realize the dangers involved in the arms race, especially as regards nuclear weapons, which have brought horror to all States, including those that produce such weapons. Security cannot be achieved through military superiority alone; it is governed by other factors - political, economic and humanitarian.

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Jamahiriya)

Security based on so-called nuclear deterrence is insignificant, because terror cannot create security. Nuclear arsenals have not been able to establish this alleged security. On the contrary - they have created conditions of lack of confidence and suspicion, creating horror not only for the nuclear States but for the rest of the world as well.

Despite the fact that a handful of nuclear Powers possess nuclear weapons, we believe that the responsibility for nuclear disarmament should not be the sole monopoly of a handful of States. Rather, it should be one of the main concerns for all the countries of the world. They should all play an important role in reaching positive results in nuclear weapon reductions, in the hope of ultimately achieving their elimination in order to save mankind from a destructive nuclear war.

In the field of disarmament, the United Nations, as well as its bodies, should contribute, with the co-operation of all the States of the world, to finding solutions that would achieve humanity's hope by eliminating destructive weapons and avoiding the danger of nuclear war through serious participation by all States. We must not let disarmament be the exclusive concern of the two super-Powers.

At a time when we believe that there are certain responsibilities borne by those two States, we still believe that the responsibility for disarmament belongs to all mankind. Just as mankind is affected by the dangers of war or nuclear threats, so it has the responsibility of limiting those dangers by making a positive and serious contribution through co-operation with the two super-Powers.

The United Nations must assume its responsibilities in accordance with the Charter by playing a major role in disarmament, as well as by strengthening those subsidiary bodies concerned with disarmament and security.

(Mr. El-Houderi, Libyan Arab
Jamahiriya)

Despite the efforts of the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, we note the failure by the Conference to achieve further nuclear disarmament. My delegation reaffirms the idea of directly linking the Conference on Disarmament with the United Nations. The task of achieving disarmament is that of the international community as a whole. It should not be limited to a handful of nuclear Powers.

For the Conference on Disarmament to be effective, it should seek out the reasons and factors that have prevented it from achieving concrete results, including the modus operandi of the Conference, in such a way as to help it to assume its duties and to remove all the obstacles that led to its lack of effectiveness.

Despite the worldwide disappointment over the Reykjavik meeting between the United States and the Soviet Union, which could have contributed to the reduction of nuclear weapons had the two sides reached agreement, the world should not confine itself to wishes, as if awaiting a miracle to help in eliminating nuclear weapons. Intransigence and the sinister intentions of certain States directly led to the failure to arrive at positive formulas for nuclear disarmament.

At a time when the whole world is looking forward to ending nuclear armament, especially on the part of the two super-Powers, which have enough weapons in their arsenals to destroy the world many times over, we notice that the United States of America speaks out the so-called deterrence strategy known as star wars. My country, as well as many peace-loving countries around the world, denounces the militarization of outer space. Outer space is the common heritage of humanity, including succeeding generations. It should be used exclusively for peaceful purposes, in the interest of mankind as a whole. Militarization of outer space

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Jamahiriya)

will not contribute to ease nuclear tension. On the contrary, it will open the way for other parties to follow suit in this evil behaviour that brings no benefit to humanity at all.

The threat posed by the racist régime in South Africa, as well as the Zionist entity in occupied Palestine, and their possession of nuclear warheads, are causes for concern and increased tension in the Middle East and Africa. We note in particular that those two racist régimes, despite the inhuman practices in both occupied Palestine and southern Africa, are helped by certain colonialist States to acquire nuclear technology. We cannot fail to warn against the dangers inherent in nuclearizing those regions at a time when none possesses such weapons in Africa and the Middle East except those two racist régimes. This runs counter to the resolutions calling for the denuclearization of both Africa and the Middle East by turning them into nuclear-weapon-free zones.

Nuclear disarmament can only be achieved through taking certain practical measures, starting with the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapon; as well as the cessation of nuclear tests, together with a ban on nuclear weapons coupled with effective measures to eliminate chemical, biological and radiological weapons.

The reduction of nuclear weapons will not take place except through halting all attempts to perfect lethal weapons, together with eliminating present arsenal and halting their production, in addition to halting all nuclear tests. We believe that the position of the Soviet Union, expressed through the moratorium on nuclear tests, is a step in the right direction, towards limiting nuclear weapons. We hope that this initiative will be followed by the other nuclear Powers, in the hope of curbing the arms race.

(Mr. El-Houderi, Libyan Arab
Jamahiriyah)

The conclusions of the Stockholm Conference, together with measures that have been agreed upon, are a positive step towards easing tension and creating an atmosphere of confidence. We hope that deeds will match words. The non-aligned States, considered to be the largest international gathering, after the United Nations, have taken certain steps and made recommendations concerning disarmament. These should be a guiding factor. The will of the international community should be given practical effect. My country welcomes all sincere efforts in regard to nuclear disarmament.

Military expenditures in one year equal or exceed the entire world debt. The human and material resources used for military pursuits, if released for peaceful purposes, would contribute significantly to bettering the standard of living for millions of people.

(Mr. El-Houderi, Libyan Arab
Jamahir iya)

My delegation had hoped that the International Conference on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development would be held in 1986. We hope that its postponement will provide an opportunity to do everything possible to make the Conference a success.

The establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones, if properly carried out, is a positive step. We believe that measures of that kind will help to curb the nuclear-arms race and so promote international peace and security.

MY country welcomes all positive initiatives aiming at disarmament and the limitation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons; a complete ban on nuclear testing) and the use of outer space exclusively for peaceful, non-military purposes. My delegation reaffirms its support for all previous resolutions promoting the creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones and the elimination of the spectre of nuclear war, so that succeeding generations may live a normal life, free from nuclear-weapon and other threats. We commend all sincere efforts and initiatives intended to free mankind from the threat of nuclear war. We are in favour of freeing all human and material resources and making them available in the service of mankind, eliminating all sources of tension and creating a climate of confidence and coexistence among all States based on justice, freedom and peace.

Mr. SINCLAIR (Guyana): As the forty-first session of the General Assembly was convened this year questions of disarmament occupied a particularly prominent place among the concerns of all delegations. This is consistent with the growing recognition throughout the world of the reality of the threat posed to the survival of human civilization by the existence and continuing refinement of nuclear weapons. At its first special session devoted to disarmament, the General

(Mr. Sinclair, Guyana)

Assembly emphasized that the removal of the danger of nuclear arms was the most acute and urgent task of the present day. The truth of that assertion is even more compelling today.

Only recently the Secretary-General, in his report to the Assembly at the present session, stressed that the goal of the complete prohibition of nuclear weapons was one that should be energetically pursued. Nuclear armament must be reduced, in respect both of numbers and of destructive content, and nuclear weapons must be limited in deployment and further development. An arms race in outer space must be prevented.

Guyana therefore attaches special importance to all United Nations activities in the field of disarmament and to the work of this Committee in particular.

It was a fortunate coincidence that the start of this debate on disarmament followed immediately the summit meeting between General Secretary Gorbachev and President Reagan in Reykjavik, Iceland. What was unfortunate was that a historic opportunity was missed in Iceland not only for concluding far-reaching disarmament measures but also for giving a much-needed impetus to negotiations at the Conference on Disarmament and to the bilateral arms talks in Geneva and Vienna, and for lowering the level of international tension.

Yet we will not yield to despair. When my Foreign Minister addressed the General Assembly on 6 October last he sounded a note of guarded optimism, saying that, despite some negative tendencies, the goal of disarmament had not been obscured and that initiatives in respect of its attainment were being proposed and pursued. He cited in particular the Soviet moratorium on nuclear testing as a practical demonstration of a desire to reduce the threat of nuclear war, and regarded the successful outcome of the Stockholm Conference on Confidence and Security Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe as a source of optimism. Likewise, the bilateral exchanges in Geneva between the super-Powers, he considered, also give cause for hope.

(Mr. Sinclair, Guyana)

We urge the super-Powers to respond **positively** to the **six-nation initiative** and to the **Harare appeal**, articulated by the Heads of State or Government of **Non-Aligned Countries 1st September**, which gives voice to the **concerns and longings** of the overwhelming majority of the **people of this planet** for peace. We express the **sincere** hope that the **leaders of the Soviet Union and the United States** will soon resume **their dialogue** in the interest of the **peace and security of all mankind** and that no **obstacles** will be allowed to **stand** in the way of agreement between them.

We make this plea in **acknowledgement** of the particular importance of **direct negotiations** between the **two States** possessing the largest stockpiles of nuclear weapons. But we must **stress** at the same time the need for progress in negotiation, also in the **multilateral framework**, in accordance with the **stake** which all the **inhabitants of this planet** have in the **elimination** of the danger of nuclear destruction, Guyana therefore hopes that the Conference on Disarmament **will be allowed to proceed** in a purposeful and result-oriented manner in fulfilment of the **mandate** it received from the General Assembly.

Guyana is fully supportive of **all initiatives aimed at the reduction** of nuclear armaments. **The dangerous escalation of the arms race must be halted and reversed.** In this regard, we believe a **comprehensive ban on nuclear-weapon testing to be imperative.** We note **with regret**, however, that the mandate given to the Conference on Disarmament to embark on negotiations on a nuclear test ban has not been translated **into action because of disagreement on verification mechanisms.** We fully share the reservations **expressed by preceding speakers on the credibility of the argument about verification mechanisms in view of rapid developments in the areas of seismological observation and remote sensing.** We regard the negotiation of a **comprehensive test ban treaty as a priority item**, and we believe that **some kind of mechanism could be helpful at this stage.**

(Mr. Sinclair, Guyana)

On the other hand, we welcome the re-establishment of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space and trust that **agreement will soon** be reached in Geneva to keep outer **space** for ever free from military weapons. The lesson of past experience **is** that every new weapon system, on whichever side it has appeared and however benign it has been claimed to be, **has** led to another upward twist in the spiral and ultimately to a heightening of the danger of nuclear war and a rise in the level of global insecurity. There **is** every **reason** to fear, therefore, **that** a **space-based defence** system will lead to even greater global insecurity.

Guyana **is** passionately committed to the objective of making nuclear weapons obsolete, but we believe that **the first steps** towards that goal **must** be taken here on Earth. This **brings** us right back to nuclear weapon testing. The only purpose of **such tests** is to ensure that the destructive capacity of nuclear weapons **is** enhanced. It is contradictory to talk of wishing to make nuclear weapons obsolete while at the same time ensuring that they can kill more effectively. It **seems** to my delegation that if we wish to make such weapons **obsolete** a cessation of testing **is** a first, major **step**. If an effective ban were imposed on **testing**, then there would be no production. Thereafter, initiatives could follow for a comprehensive ban on nuclear weapons. The **Committee** must resolve that outer **space** must **not** become another **arena** for the arms race.

Guyana's concern about the **preservation** of peace and security has roots **also** in recent technological advances in the area of chemical and biological **weapons**.

(Mr. Sinclair, Guyana)

We reiterate our call for the early conclusion of a convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons. In this regard we note with appreciation the results of the Second Review Conference, in Geneva, of the parties to the Convention on biological weapons. We hope that the actions of those States which possess these weapons, or the capacity to produce them, will respect the provisions of this Convention.

Other delegations have spoken at length on the interrelationship of disarmament and development and my delegation fully endorses the view that more should be spent on development and much less on armaments. We regret that the United Nations Conference on this issue, originally scheduled to be held in Paris last July, was not held, despite extensive and elaborate preparation. We hope that the necessary conditions can soon be created for this Conference to be definitively convened in the course of 1987.

Finally, we would again like to place on record our support for regional disarmament initiatives and for wider recognition of and respect for nuclear-weapon-free zones in all regions of the globe open to participation by all States of the respective regions. We pledge our readiness to co-operate with other delegations, as usual, in the shared effort to ensure a nuclear-free planet and a future of peace and security.

The CHAIRMAN: I call now on the representative of the United States, who wishes to speak in exercise of the right of reply.

I remind members that with regard to rights of reply the procedure that I have alluded to on an earlier occasion will be followed by the Committee.

Mr. **CORDEN** (United States of America): My **delegation** regrets the **need to speak** at this late hour and I shall be very brief.

I want to make two points. **First**, it should be very clear that the **programme of strategic defence** that the United States Government **envisages** has a very different **purpose** from that which we have just heard described by the **representative** of the Soviet Union. **Defence is**, as **Ambassador Adelman** described it in his **statement**, the key to unlock a new feature in **arms control**. It is not a **programme designed** to acquire an offensive capability or military **superiority**.

Second, the representative of the **Soviet Union**, if his **remarks** were correctly interpreted, argued that **Ambassador Adelman** was **disrespectful** of **this Committee** in **refusing** to respond to the **question** why the United States **believes** that the **strategic defence initiative** would be useful if strategic nuclear missiles had been abolished.

Ambassador Adelman's experience in this body **speaks for** itself, but in **fact** he **did answer** the question. **Ambassador Adelman** said that a defence against nuclear missiles

would make **reductions** and the elimination of **ballistic missiles possible** by offering each **side** insurance **against** the possibility of cheating, of clandestine missile deployment by the other or by a third country . . ." (*supra*, pp. 9-10)

The **CHAIRMAN**: I should like to inform the **Committee** that the **following** delegations are inscribed to speak tomorrow morning: **Brazil, Japan, the German Democratic Republic, Australia, Venezuela, Turkey and Spain.**

The meeting rose at 6.05 p.m.