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Item 89 (a)SPECIAL ECONOMIC AND DISASTER RELIEF ASSISTANCE: SPECIAL
PROGRAMMES OF ECONOMIC ASSISTANCEEmergency assistance to SomaliaReport of the Secretary-General

1. In its resolution 43/206 of 20 December 1988, the General Assembly took note of the message addressed to the Secretary-General by the Head of State of Somalia, in which attention was drawn to the grave humanitarian situation that had developed in the northern provinces of Somalia as a result of attacks by "armed bandits" on towns and villages and on public installations, and to the urgent need for emergency assistance to help the Government cope with the large numbers of displaced persons and the repair, rehabilitation and reconstruction of vital public facilities and installations.
2. The General Assembly recognized that the widespread destruction that had taken place required the immediate response of the international community for an emergency assistance programme that would provide food, water and shelter for the inhabitants made homeless as a result of those events, and for a programme of emergency assistance and rehabilitation to enable the affected population to return to their homes and become self-reliant.
3. Accordingly, the General Assembly requested the Secretary-General to continue his efforts to mobilise international assistance and to co-ordinate the efforts of the appropriate organisations of the United Nations system in order to respond in a concerted and effective manner to the request of the Government of Somalia for humanitarian assistance. The Secretary-General was also requested to carry out an assessment of priority humanitarian needs, in close co-operation with the government authorities and with the organisations of the United Nations system, and to bring the findings to the attention of the international community without delay.

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4. Following consultations with the Somali authorities, the Secretary-General dispatched a United Nations **inter-agency mission** to Somalia **on** 25 February 1989 to **assess the urgent humanitarian requirements of** the accessible population, in the fields of (a) food supply and nutrition **and** food aid, (b) health, (c) water **and sanitation**, (d) relief and survival items, (e) priority agricultural, pastoral and fishery inputs and (f) logistics requirements and arrangements needed to insure effective delivery of those commodities **to the affected** population.

5. The mission was also **charged** with the task of **carrying out** a preliminary assessment of urgently **required** rehabilitation **activities to facilitate** a return to **economic** self-efficiency for the people affected by the emergency. The initial assessment would **focus on specific projects** and activities amenable to rapid **and** safe implementation. It would also include consideration of the possibility of reorienting projects **that had** recently been begun **again in** order to satisfy some of the affected people's urgent requirements.

6. The mission was asked to discuss **and define** with the Government the setting up of a **monitoring** mechanism that would make it possible for **donors to** be kept informed of the use and purpose **for** which their contributions **were** applied. **In** addition, the **mission** was requested **to** assess the feasibility **for** international staff to work effectively and safely **in** areas hosting large numbers of affected people, and to **review** with **the Government** existing **or** required mechanisms needed to facilitate the **effective** implementation of the proposed emergency and rehabilitation activities,

7. The inter-agency mission completed its field **work** on 12 March 1989 and prepared the **annexed interim** report, **aimed** at responding to the immediate humanitarian and rehabilitation needs of displaced people.

8. It should be noted that the **recommended** assistance programme is aimed **at** satisfying the immediate humanitarian needs **of** a limited number of the civilian population who have either been displaced or whose livelihood has been disrupted by the conflict.

9. Further international **assistance** will be required to meet the urgent needs of the remainder of the displaced population when they return to their places of origin and normal conditions **are** restored. Such assistance should include humanitarian aid and urgent help **for** the rehabilitation and reconstruction of public services and infrastructures **in the affected** areas.

ANNEX

Interim report on emergency assistance to Somalia

I. INTRODUCTION

1. On 31 October 1968, President Mohamad **Siad Barre** of Somalia addressed an appeal to the Secretary-General requesting the assistance **and** the involvement of the United Nations and the international community in helping the People and **Government of** Somalia to address the large-scale **emergency** situation prevailing in the northern part of the **country**, in which **more than** 600,000 people were estimated to be in camps and another 400,000 scattered here and there in the countryside. According to the President, in Hargeisa alone, **70** per cent of **permnrnt dwellings** had either been destroyed **or** badly damaged. Schools, hospitals, public **markets**, power houses and water installations had been destroyed,

2. The Secretary-General, in response to this appeal, **dispatched a United Nations** inter-agency mission **to Somalia** to carry out an on-the-spot **assessmant** of **u gent** humanitarian and rehabilitation requirements to help the people and the **Government** of Somalia cope with **the** complex emergency situation that had developed in two of the northern provinces of the **country**.

3. The **mission** was led by the Special **Adviser** to the **Administrator of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)** on Refugee Matters and Displaced Persons Issues, and comprised senior officials **from** the Office of the United Nations **Disaster Relief Co-ordinator (UNDRO)**, the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), the Office of the United **Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)**, the World Food **Programme (WFP)**, the Food and Agriculture **Organization** of the United Nations (**FAO**) and the World Health **Organization (WHO)**. The **mission** was **in** Somalia from 25 February to 12 **March** 1989. The President of Somalia **met with the** leader of the mission, accompanied by **che** UNDP Resident Representative and the Special Co-ordinator **for** Emergency Relief Operations in **Somalia**. The mission was briefed by the Vice Prime Minister **for Economic Affairs**, the **Minister** of State **for Foreign Affairs**, the Minister **of** Interior, the Minister of National Planning and **Juba Valley Development** and the Extraordinary National Refugee **Commissioner**. It had discussions with **the co-ordinator** and members **of** the technical sub-group and committee, exchanges with ambassadors and heads of diplomatic missions, with the heads **of** the United Nations agencies in Somalia and also with representatives of non-governmental organisations in Mogadishu. In addition there were bilateral contacts between the mission and officials of the sactoral line **ministeries**, as well as with representatives of the donor community. During its **stay**, the mission carried out field visits from 3 to **8** March, travelling by air to **Berbera, Borama, Hargeisa, Burao, Erigavo, Las Anod** and Garoe, where discussions were **held** with government and military representatives in charge of the administration and security of their reapactive regions and towns.

4. Documentation was provided by the Government in Mogadishu and in the regions. Comprehensive written briefings were also received from the United Nations **agencies represented** in Somalia.

5. The mission held a final working **session** with the Somali **Government** interministerial committee responsible for the emergency situation in northern Somalia, and shared its findings, conclusions and action proposals **with** the committee. It had similar exchanges with **ambassadors** and **heads** of diplomatic **missions** as well *as* with ~~the~~ heads of the United Nations agencies and representatives of non-governmental organisations **in Mogadishu**.

II. AFTERMATH OF EVENTS OF MAY AND JUNE 1988

A. Immediate effects

6. Unrest in **some** parts of northern Somalia led, in **May** and June **1988**, to armed operations that were mainly centred in the north-west (West Qalbeed) **and** Togdheer regions (see the map of Somalia (appendix I)). The intensity of the **conflict** had a wide and devastating impact **on** the life, safety and living conditions of populations in the area, as well as on the socio-economic situation **of** the affected regions. In brief, the consequences of the conflict between government forces and the armed rebellious groups were perceived as **follows**.

7. **A** marked deterioration of the human dimensions of the situation occurred through loss **of human** lives, disablement, and disruption of family life and of the general living conditions of individuals and communities. Women, children and elderly persons, in particular, have **suffered**. **Fear** seems to have pervaded and vitiated human relations.

8. Destruction or heavy damage to physical facilities, **premises**, houses and property (both public and private) took **place**. Widespread looting occurred **and**, according to reports, still continues **in** the areas affected. **Loss**, destruction and damage to infrastructures and logistics **resulted in** a crippling of public and private services, the majority **of** which **have** become inoperative. Health facilities are functioning **on** a **very** limited scale. They have been severely disrupted **owing, inter alia**, to shortages **of** water and energy, inadequate staff and lack of medical supplies and equipment.

9. Civil administration in general is not functioning because civil servants have fled the area. The education **system** is at a complete standstill as teachers also fled; schools were damaged or taken over to shelter displaced persons or used for other emergency purposes. Banking is **paralysed**, which has blocked economic transactions and salary payments. The radio station in Hargeisa was destroyed, disrupting the major communication link with the population at large.

10. In Hargeisa and Burao, no visible attempt has been made to clear the debris from destroyed and damaged buildings or to retrieve usable **items** that **still** lay scattered about.

11. Massive population movements are reported to have taken place both **within** the country and **across** borders to neighbouring countries. Some urban **centres** in the north have become "ghost cities", with only limited signs of life. Many of the inhabitants of the north have fled the **area** of conflict. Some have sought safety even as far afield as Mogadishu, more than 1,600 kilometres away.

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12. Normal **livestock movements and** trade have almost **been** brought to a halt. it is reported, **however**, that livestock **is** being traded **across** the **border** to **obtain** essential commodities not available locally. This **situation** contributed to a sharp drop in the official livestock export figures **for** 1988.

13. The **terms of** trade between livestock and staple food have been altered, resulting in comparatively lower income **for** livestock **owners**. Absence **of** economic **activity** has, therefore, led to a lack of purchasing **power** to buy food.

14. The human resources component of the socio-economic **fabric** in the north has been severely disrupted through, for example, disappearances of **staff**, and the inability of remaining personnel to **perform** their **work** functions **because of** a lack of **basic** life amenities. International or expatriate staff have been evacuated or have had their functions terminated. This adds **to** the delicate nature and complexity of any attempt to resume activities and restore normal working , conditions.

15. Problems related to human **resources** have led to **a** suspension of ongoing development projects and of **the** launching of new projects by both the **Government** and the donor community (intergovernmental and non-governmental organisations), **some** of which **were** ready for immediate implementation.

16. The expropriation by the authorities of facilities (**e.g.**, physical **premises**, transport) normally available in the area for ongoing humanitarian, socio-economic and development activities has hampered attempts to resume developmental activities or engage in effective relief operations. There **are** shortages of water and power because of disruption to **systems** and infrastructure.

17. The mission **was** not presented with a plan of action **for** the repair and rehabilitation **of** essential infrastructure, **services** and facilities.

B. Security

18. While urban centres are guarded by the authorities, security inside those centres **is** still of great concern to the population. Many very young people in civilian clothes were **seen** to be carrying **arms**. Such a situation could lead to all sorts of abuses and incidents. In all the towns visited, mention was made of incidents happening along the roads or in the vicinity, which involved mines, sniping, skirmishes and ambushing. Many **injured and** wounded **persons were** seen in the hospitals .

C. Refugees

19. Refugee camps have repeatedly **come** under attack with significant loss of life. **As** humanitarian assistance cannot be provided to persons having become party to the conflict, measures to ensure the safety of refugees and the civilian nature of those assisted had to be taken.

20. By the end of February 1989, an **agreement** was reached between **UNHCR/WFP** and the Government to relocate and re-register the civilian population of **camps** east of Hargeisa to sites to be jointly selected in the **Borama** area and/or **the** south. During this operation, which is presently under way, **UNHCR/WFP** will continue to provide food to those in the **eastern** camps for a **period** up to three months.

21. **Some** refugees directly affected by the conflict have already sought safety in other localities, such as new temporary camps where they have been assisted by the international **community**, or have mingled with the local population. In some cases, this **movement** has strained resources, water being a particular case in point.

22. It is believed that a not insignificant number **of** refugees have repatriated.

III. FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND PROPOSALS FOR ACTION

A . Prevailing circumstances

23. In considering proposals for assistance, the mission gave careful thought to the specific circumstances prevailing in the affected regions and adjacent districts.

24. Although nine months have elapsed since the events, the situation still has all the components of an emergency. Hargeisa and Burao as well as other nearby villages and rural centres remain in the condition that prevailed immediately after **the** events. Moreover, large areas in the hinterland show no sign of ongoing activity.

25. The May-June 1988 events took the Government by surprise, **After** the first shock, it reacted with all the **military** might it could **muster**. Once the Government had regained control an interministerial committee was created, in September 1988, under the chairmanship **of** the Vice Prime Minister for Economic Affairs. **An** appeal for international assistance was launched in the same months. To restore public confidence and strengthen the protection of human rights the Government introduced **a series of** measures including amendment of the Constitution with regard to the principle **of** **habeas corpus**, proclamation of a general amnesty and the setting free of political detainees. The response has, so far, been limited. High-ranking officials **were** sent to **major** capitals to explain the events and the steps the Government was taking to cope with the situation.

26. On 5 March 1989, a special three-man committee was established with extensive powers to bring about a normalisation of conditions in the affected regions of the north.

B. General objectives

27. Against such a background, the mission was of the opinion that its action **proposals** should comprise the elements discussed below.

28. Humanitarian assistance **should** be extended to people displaced by the conflict, **Such** assistance should be limited to those in clear need and should **be** provided in the areas where they have congregated. However, modalities governing the provision of that assistance should be such that they encourage the displaced persons to return to their places of origin, thereby preventing the development of a dependency syndrome.

29. Immediate assistance should be provided in the most vital sectors, **namely**, water, health, sanitation, nutrition, power supply and **logistics**.

30. The necessary condition⁶ should be created to launch large-scale Operation⁶ for paving the way to proper resumption of normal socio-economic activities in the regions, **districts** and urban centre⁶ of the **affected** areas. In this **connection**, reactivation of the port of Berbera and the Berbera cement factory are of paramount importance **as** catalytic factors that would bring about chain reactions **in** the economy of the northern part of the country, thereby contributing to a restoration of confidence at all levels and among all segments of the population.

31. In accomplishing these **tasks**, the property of the United **Nations** and other aid **organizations** must be respected under all circumstances and previously requisitioned items returned as quickly **as possible**.

C. Populations affected

32. The mission was able to determine the following locations where, according to local government figures, displaced population⁶ are to be found:

<u>Region</u>	<u>Location</u>	<u>Approximate number of displaced people</u>
Awdal	Borama	21 000
North-west	Berbera	5 000
Sanaag	Erigavo	1 000
	interior	5 000
Sol	Las Anod	5 000
	interior	15 000
Nugal	Gareo	7 000
	interior	<u>8 500</u>
	<u>Total</u>	<u>67 500</u>

33. Although a significant number of displaced persons has reached the **southern** part of the country, including **Mogadishu** and even **Kismayu**, no precise figure or even approximation is **possible** of the actual number of displaced persons. It should be recorded, however, that the generous hospitality **of** relatives and friends has provided virtually all such persons with shelter and immediate relief assistance during the nine months that have elapsed since the events. No sharp increase in mortality has been registered; malnutrition rates have not shown any

abnormal rise. **Families** and individual⁶ **have**, in all probability, **borne the brunt** of the additional burden⁶ which **the** presence of displaced person⁶ ha⁶ provoked, in itself a new and laudable **aspect of the unfolding situation**. Nevertheless, there **is** a limit, both in time and availability of **means**, to what individuals **and families** can **afford in such** emergency assistance situations. "**Coping mechanisms**" have been seriously overburdened, and there is **a severe lack** of purchasing power to buy food.

D. Food assistance and its implications

34. It is, therefore, **recommended** that appropriate food aid (cereals, oil, sugar etc.) be provided for a three-month period, for targeted distribution to displaced persons **whose** identification is secured. Recommended daily **ration!** cereals (rice/wheat flour),. 350 **gm**; oil, 30 **gm**; sugar, 20 **gm**; total requirements: 400 gm x 90 days x 67,500 persons = 2,430 tons of food aid.

35. Following this initial **and** one-time food **assistance** operation, a special ration of food should be given for six month⁶ to **those who** return to their places of origin, and this is **included** in the "returnee **packages**" recommended hereinafter. For planning purposes at this stage, **the** mission recommends such packages on the basis of the 67,500 internally displaced **persons** already identified. While it is not **possible** to **provide** figures of the total numbers of internally displaced, these are significant. Actual needs for returnee packages would be determined through joint United Nations/Government technical mission⁶ and the proposed screening process. The food requirements initially foreseen **for** the package⁶ are therefore 400 gm daily requirement x 180 days x 67,500 persons = 4,660 tons. It **may** be noted that **as soon as** condition⁶ permit the **voluntary** return of **Somali refugees** from **Ethiopia**, appropriate arrangements to **assist** them would be made by UNHCR. Within Somalia, these arrangement⁶ would be closely integrated with **those** recommended **for** the internally displaced.

36. The **appropriate** methodology of distribution and monitoring should be determined a⁶ the prevailing **conditions** in each **district may warrant**, it being understood that the situation in the district⁶ adjacent to the **conflict** area (**Erigavo**, **Las Anod** and **Garoe**) is quite different from that in **Berbera** and, **more** particularly, from that in **Borama**.

37. In **Borama**, displaced persons **constitute** the only readily identifiable group, as they live in **small gatherings** on the periphery of the town. Their needs include food, water, **immunization** and sanitation.

38. In **Hargeisa** and **Burao**, the two cities **most** affected by the events according to Government, there are approximately 100,000 people living: 70,000 in Hargeisa and 30,000 in Burao. **Some of** them might be the original inhabitants who remained in the cities during and after the events; another part represents families of the military; **while** the third and last part could be given as including refugees and, **in some cases**, squatters who have simply occupied the **houses** and are using the property of those who have fled. For proper identification of those affected, a

screening process is required **that** would also serve as the **basis for** the distribution and monitoring of relief assistance. Such assistance should include, in addition to food, **tents for initial shelter** during the rehabilitation or **damaged houses** and incentives **for** productive activities.

39. The **contents of those "returnee packages"** would be determined by the technical missions, which would **consider the** implications **of** the rehabilitation of the **urban** areas. To curtail **the** effect⁶ of any dependency syndrome, the returnee package⁶ would be limited in time and scope. To encourage the achievement **of** self-reliance and **self-sufficiency at the family and** community levels, to assist in Creating employment opportunities and to reach the poorest segments of the **population**, examination **of** the possibilities for starting food-for-work and public **works** project⁶ for the reconstruction of **Hargeisa** and Burao **is strongly** recommended.

40. WFP development projects - institutional feeding, **rangeland** development and, especially, feeding **of** vulnerable groups - should be reactivated as **soon** as possible, and the supplementary feeding **programme** should be expanded as necessary in **Hargeisa** and Burao, **as** well as in the drought-affected northern **districts** of the Awdal region.

41. The establishment **of** efficient monitoring mechanism⁶ **is** essential both **for** securing donor support **and** for ensuring the success of **the** assistance **programme**. To this **effect**, United **Nations** international monitoring **staff** should be **posted** in **Berbera, Hargeisa, Burao, Borama, and Garoe** (to **also cover** Erigavo and Las Anod). Responsibilities **of this** corps of monitor⁶ would include, beside monitoring **relief** supplies, the establishment, in close co-operation with the local authorities of an **effective relief distribution system**. In addition, the staff in **Hargeisa and Bureo** would **devise** appropriate mechanisms for and effectively participate in the screening of all would-be beneficiaries, **i.e., the** returnee⁶ **as well as the** population presently residing in both towns. Such a screening is suggested to ensure that assistance be provided only to **the** needy former inhabitants.

42. The transportation of all food and shelter relief **assistance** would require some transport facilities and logistics that should be considered and defined when the magnitude of the programme is defined. This component of the relief **assistance** should be done by logistic expert⁶ (**one** of whom is already on the staff in the **UNHCR Branch Office** in Somalia), with due consideration being **given** to all existing facilities that could be tapped in the country. Although Berbere is considered the main port **of** entry, **authorization** to use alternative access routes that are direct and practical for the delivery of supplies from abroad would also be necessary.

E. Health

1. General

43. Health services are intended for all - locals, **refugees and** displaced persons. Apart from problems due to destruction of facilities and staff absenteeism that have severely impaired those services in the affected areas, those Preventive and curative health-care facilities which are still functioning are

already **overburdened, notwithstanding** the fact that movement and concentration of population **increase the risk of** epidemics of communicable disease, Predictable risks in the **northern regions include** malaria, tuberculosis, meningitis and water-borne **diseases**. Sanitation facilities **and conditions are far** below **minimum** standards, where they exist at all, thereby compounding an **already** precarious health situation. The **findings** of a general overview of the health **sector** facilities visited in the northern **regions are** described below,

2. Hospitals

44. Problems **facing** hospitals **in the area include:**

- (a) Shortage of drugs, mainly systematic antibiotics
- (b) Shortage of medical officers and nurses (**either** missing **or** fled);
- (c) Impairment of blood transfusion **facilities;**
- (d) Shortage of surgical instruments and **supplies;** anaesthetic equipment that is either not working or **not** available;
- (e) Laboratory services that are **not** functioning **owing to** a shortage of equipment or **reagents;**
- (f) X-ray units that are not functioning **and,** where functioning, that lack film and X-ray developing reagents]
- (g) Inadequate **and** unsafe water supply, which constitutes a constant threat of water-borne diseases (cholera, typhoid and **hepatitis);**
- (h) Unavailability of electricity in **most hospitals;**
- (i) Lack of food for in-patients;
- (j) Critical shortage of supervisory vehicles, ambulances and fuel.

3. Community health services

45. The situation **affecting** community health includes the following problems!

- (a) Primary health care network that is virtually inexistent, except at **Las Anod;**
- (b) No expanded programme of **immunization;**
- (c) Disease surveillance **activities are** paralysed; data collection is non-existent:

(d) Water **is poor** in **quality and unsafe** for **human consumption**;

(e) Nutritional status is apparently adequate **for the** displaced persons*
There is no evidence of malnutrition **among** the displaced persons visited, but malnutrition, **anaemia** and vitamin **A** deficiency were observed among children and pregnant women. There is no ongoing supporting feeding programme

if) Essential drugs in primary health care activities **are in short supply**;

(g) No emergency preparedness and response policy has been formulated **for the** health sector to **date**;

(h) Co-ordination and co-operation between the Ministry of Health and local authorities are **weak**. This also extends to other governmental sectors and to the non-governmental **organizations**.

4. Proposals for action

46. In addition to the total needs in drugs and equipment, **which have** been estimated at \$5 million according to specifications provided **by** the Government, it **is** advisable to consider also the following!

(a) Formulation of a national emergency preparedness and response policy, especially in the northern **areas**;

(b) Establishment of a monitoring **system for** epidemics and other health **emergencies**;

(c) Strengthening and rehabilitation of existing national health facilities to cope effectively with the requirements **of** local populations, refugees and displaced **persons**;

(d) Preparation **of** a plan for environmental health to prevent the spread **of** diseases leading to epidemics in order to maintain the health **of** the population and to ensure that essential **services are restored** and improved;

(e) Improvement of **water** supply and sanitation in the **areas** of concentration of displaced persons and *in* the refugee camps, with **emphasis** on the primary health **care** approach, and with maximum involvement of local administration, **organizations** of the United Nations system and non-governmental organisations.

F. WaterTable. Summary of **water** data

	Harqsisia	Burao	Borama	Las Anod
Source				
Earth dams	4 dry	Unknown	2 seen	Unknown
Shallow wells	Many	30	Yes	Yes
Suction pumps	2	Yes	Not open	4
Buckets	Many	Yes	Unknown	Unknown
Deep wells				
Usable	12+	10	9+	3
Unusable	0	2	0	0
Pump sets operable	0	2	6	2
Pump sets not operable	12+	6	0	0
Main current supply	Shallow wells	Deep wells	Deep wells	Shallow wells
Quality				
Physical quality	OK	Good	Good	OK
Chlorination	Yes	No	No	No
Distribution				
Bucket/barrows	Pee	Yes	Yes	Yes
Donkeys with tins	Yes	Few	Yes	Yes
Donkeys with drums	Yes	Few	Yes	Yes
Tankers	21	20	Yes	6-20
Elevated storage				
Used	0	0	0	1
Damaged	1	6	0	0
Not damaged	2	0	1	1
Distribution pipes				
Used	No	No	No	No
Damaged	Yes	Yes	No	No
Other data				
Price* per: Tin (20-litre)	20/=	100/=	10/=	10/=
Drum (200-litre)	100/=	400/=	100/=	200/=
Tanker (7 000-litre)	2 100/=	Free	1 000/=	700/=
Uses per day of 1-m ³ tankers	166	192	248	360

* Prices quoted are in Somali shillings (UNDP rate: \$US 1 = So.Sh. 291).

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1. Water situation in Berbera

47. Water was not reported to be a problem except during the **Haj** (June/July) when demand rose to service livestock awaiting export. The city water facilities were **not** visited.

48. The city is **supplied** principally from two water sources: a borehole, reported to be brackish, and fresh springs in the mountains, a **former project** of the Danish International **Development Agency (DANIDA)**. The city piped-water supply was operational. The International Committee of the Red **Cross (ICRC)** carried out an extensive water and sanitation **survey** in February 1989. Needs to be met: **(a)** extra water storage **facilities**; **(b)** shallow wells with handpumps in villages; **(c)** sanitary sludge tanker (formerly served from **Burao**); and **(d)** water chlorination.

Proposals for action

49. The immediate needs **are to** ensure chlorination of the existing water supplies in order to protect health,

50. The longer-term development needs **of** the city **and** district are noted above but, before **action** is taken, the **ICRC** report should **be** studied and further surveying carried out as necessary,

2. Water situation in Borama

51. **Water** was expressly mentioned as a primary concern **by** the Awdal regional **authorities**, who indicated that they **were** unable to **meet** the additional needs of displaced people. A brief survey of the current water supplies was carried out.

52. **Borama** currently **receives** water by tankers from boreholes about 5 kilometres from the town, and additional water is **tankered** to **Dunug refugee camp**, which is close to the water **source**,

53. The old Borama water **system**, dating from 1961, is still in place and the pipeline to town, storage tank and distribution **pipes** are intact. The water was pumped from buried shallow wells, although the latest equipment supplied in 1984 by the **Save the Children Fund** (United Kingdom) is not operational. **As** a result of the latest technical mission of October 1988, OXFAM had **promised** spare parts for the pumping equipment, but apparently they have **not** yet been received.

54. Water is pumped from two **of** six fully equipped boreholes (electric submersible pumps and diesel generators) constructed as **the** first phase of **a** Chinese project that ended in early 1980. The second phase **was** apparently **to** lay new pipelines to **Borama**, to construct additional storage and to extend the distribution **system**.

55. Tanks and piping for the supply **of** water to **Dunug** camp have been delivered, as recommended by **UNHCR/OXFAM** in the October 1988 technical mission, but have not yet been connected.

56. The following projects are to be considered (status or rough guideline costs indicated in parentheses) :

(a) Ascertain the status of supply of pumping spares (project in progress);

(b) Installation of water supply facilities for Dumug camp (project in progress) ;

(c) Provision of a stand-by pumping set for the old system (\$100,000);

(A) Extension of the distribution network to serve displaced persons (\$100,000) I

(e) Supply of maintenance and repair spare parts for the Chinese pumping sets (\$50,000);

(f) Chlorination of the existing tanker supply (minimal costs);

(g) In the long term the second phase of the Borama water project should be completed (\$500,000). This and proposal (d) require further study.

3. Water situation in Hargeisa

57. The water supply was one of the first concerns expressed by the North-west regional authorities, and a brief survey was carried out,

58. Hargeisa currently receives water through a tanker-delivery system. Water is pumped into tankers using two contractor-type suction pumps from a number of shallow wells from the Tuug pumphouse in the city and is then chlorinated by the Ministry of Health sanitarians. Additional water of poorer quality is manually drawn and delivered using donkeys. This fragile system is barely adequate to meet water needs. Water had also been previously pumped from four earth dams around the town but those seen were dry,

59. Emergency water-supply assistance through UNICEF/USAID is planned, and includes pump6, collapsible tanks, storage tanks, distribution sets and water test-kits. Many supplies are in Mogadishu awaiting delivery.

60. The old Hargeisa system of 12 interconnected shallow wells in the Tuug pumphouse and the header tank are undamaged, although there is probable damage to the rising main. There is no pumping equipment.

61. More recent additions to the Hargeisa water supply date from 1974 and 1988, and were supplied from Chinese-drilled well fields at Ged Deeble some 23 kilometres away. Of the two more recent town-elevated reservoirs, one is damaged, though repairable. The city distribution system is also damaged in many places. The damage is probably extensive throughout the city.

62. It was not possible to visit the well fields, pumping stations and supply mains, although a report of an inspection carried out in January 1988 by the

Hargeisa Water Agency of **some of** these facilities is available, with additional data.

Proposals for action

63. Consideration should be given to the following projects:

(a) **The** delivery and installation **of** the **emergency** water supplies, which should **be** adequate for short-term needs (\$200,000 for project **in progress**);

(b) In the **intermediate** term, the revival of the old **Hargeisa water system** and repairs where **necessary** to the town distribution **system (\$400,000)**;

(c) In the longer term, implementation **of** the recommendations of the Hargeisa Water Authority **in** order to serve a fully revitalised Hargeisa city **(\$3,000,000)**. A further survey **on this** and project (b) will be necessary.

4. Water situation in Burao

64. Togdheer regional authorities expressed **concern** about the water supply and a brief survey **of** water-supply facilities **was** carried out.

65. **Burao** currently **receives** water through a tanker-delivery **system**. **Water is** pumped **from one borehole in** the city and from **another some 4 kilometres away**. Both pumping sets **are** electric submersible pumps connected to diesel generators. **At** both sites, the **engine** had been brought **from another** pumping set to replace a damaged one. The two operational sites appear to **have** been chosen for the convenience **of** human and livestock water supply, respectively, on the highest yielding boreholes. Current supply needs appear to be **met**, although there is not chlorination **of tanker** supplies. Additional water is drawn from **a** number of shallow wells and distributed mostly by hand barrows.

66. The old **Burao** piped supply dates **from** 1958. Prior to the 1988 events, none of the old boreholes was being used, although two elevated **storage** tanks, which are now irreparably damaged, **were in** use.

67. The **more** recent supplies date from **1980-1986** as part **of** assistance funded by the Gesellschaft **für Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ)** (Federal Republic of Germany) and the Chinese Government and are divided into urban and rural supplies. Of the urban boreholes, two had already collapsed, and four, **altho** gh now usable, have extensive damage to pumping sets and electrical switchgear. These boreholes pumped water to two elevated storage tanks, both of which have now been damaged. **Al** though the town distribution system was not inspected in detail, damage was observed in many places.

68. Of the eight boreholes in rural areas, two are currently supplying the town, and only one of the remaining six was inspected. Additional boreholes at the technical college, school and orphanage were not inspected. The office of the Water Development Authority suffered from extensive damage and looting **of** tools and

materials. It **does, however,** have an **operational** service rig. The city electrical supply generators are all working and date from a 1985 project **of the Office of Development Assistance (United Kingdom)**. The city electricity supply lines were extensively damaged.

Proposals for action

69. These include the following projects;

(a) In the short **term**, supply **of** spare parts for the maintenance and repair of the **boreholes** currently in **use**, and the chlorination **of** existing tanker supplies **(\$50,000)**;

(b) In the intermediate term, (i) repair and replacement **of** two of the urban boreholes, the smaller **of** the elevated storage tanks and part of the town distribution system, **as necessary (\$600,000)**; and (ii) a **more** extensive survey **of** the city electrical services by an electrical expert (\$20,000 for the survey alone)]

(c) In the longer **term**, the full revival of both the urban **and** rural water supply to **meet** the requirements of a **revitalized Burao city (\$1,500,000)**. A **further** survey is required, particularly **in** this regard,

5. Water situation in Las Anod

70. The regional authorities expressed concern **over** the water supply available to **meet** the needs **of** displaced persons, **A brief** survey of the water-supply situation at **Las Anod** was carried out.

71. The requirements **for human** consumption are largely **met** by **means of a** tanker-distribution **system**. Water is pumped **largely** from two challow-well **sources** situated in the town.

72. The mission visited one shallow-well site. It was equipped with two diesel-driven suction pump-sets. These were operational, although the pump-sets were old and without adequate spares. There is no chlorination **of** supplies and the current arrangement **of** the pump-sets allows oil contamination **of** the well. An **elevated** storage tank was at the site and was linked to a distribution network. It was, however, not used, although it appeared to be in reasonable condition. The supply **of** water to the hospital by **tanker** was insufficient to **meet** the hospital's needs,

73. The livestock needs of the town **are met** by two boreholes about 6 kilometres **from the** town, one equipped with solar panels and an electric submersible pump and the second with a portable diesel generator and electrical submersible pump. Both **systems** feed water to storage tanks and thence to cattle troughs. **Some** assistance is given through the Ecumenical Development. Group for Somalia.

Proposals for action

74. These include the following projects;

(a) Chlorination of existing tanker supplies and the modification of the position of the pumping set to avoid contamination of the shallow wells (minimal costs);

(b) The longer-term development needs of this growing town should be met by an adequate piped distribution network, particularly to the hospital (\$150,000).

75. The total cost of revival of the water sector is **\$6,370,200.**

G. Agriculture

1. General

76. With a small, rain-fed crop-production base and a relatively higher nomadic Population, the north is traditionally a cereal-deficit **region**. It relies on the trade of livestock, livestock products and other commodities, such as incense, in exchange for domestic and imported foodstuffs, particularly cereals. Even in normal years, the northern crop producers only contribute approximately **8** per cent of domestic cereal production and supply, although they number 30 per cent of the population of the country. Fortunately, in 1988, sufficient Gu-season rains over the limited production area resulted in an above average harvest, but with agricultural activities occasionally disturbed by the civil unrest.

77. At present, Africa is experiencing one of the worst desert locust plagues in history, and the Somali territory is under a continued **threat of** invasion. The entry of locust **swarms** can be expected from three areas, namely, from the Arabian peninsula across the Gulf of **Aden** onto the northern **coast**, over the north-western border with Djibouti and Ethiopia and from the **Ogaden** into the northern and central ronge lands.

78. The office of the Desert Locust Control Organisation (East Africa) (DLCO-EA) in **Hargeisa** is intact, including its equipment and supplies, and its facilities are available for use. A base for monitoring and control operations was manned and equipped by the Department of Plant Protection/Locust Control of the Ministry of Agriculture in Gardo, **Bari** Region, in late 1988. Furthermore, DLCO-EA was able to carry out aerial monitoring of reported locust **swarms** and hopper bands near the border with Ethiopia and along the northern coast. The plan to establish a second base in **Berbera** had to be abandoned.

2. Livestock

79. In northern Somalia, estimates of the number of livestock by region are as follows :

	<u>Cattle</u>	<u>Sheep</u>	<u>Goats</u>	<u>Camels</u>
	(in thousands)			
North-west and Awdal (West Galbeed)	113	1 266	1 339	279
Togdheer	24	1 681	1 350	387
Sanaag	28	2 043	1 321	205
Bari	7	672	1 132	109
Nugal	<u>30</u>	<u>1 100</u>	<u>1 062</u>	<u>324</u>
Total	202	6 762	7 204	1 304

The relatively few cattle are principally found in the higher rainfall areas of the North-west region (West Galbeed). Sheep and camels are evenly distributed between regions, with the exception of Bari in the east, where the concentrations are significantly smaller. Goats are evenly distributed over all regions. The dominant management system is nomadism, with some settled livestock production west of Hargeisa and at Erigavo. The nomads normally herd their cattle, sheep, goats and camels separately, in order to take advantage of browsing and grazing and to use water on the range.

80. Before the closure of the port, Berbera handled approximately 85 per cent of all exports from Somalia. Until the conflict erupted, nearly all sheep and goats were exported through Berbera, in addition to considerable numbers of cattle and camels, although the ports of Mogadishu and Kismayu have been developed to handle increasing numbers of these two species.

81. Large numbers of cattle and camels are now reported to be concentrated near the border with Djibouti, apparently in an attempt to use this route as an alternative. For the same reason livestock prices in the north are said to be extremely low.

3. Fisheries

82. Fishing activities in the north were also hampered by the hostilities in the area. After careful evaluation of the security in the region, the staff of the fisheries project returned to Zella in November 1988. A phased return to Berbera in early 1989 was under consideration, but was not found feasible under the prevailing conditions, since the fishing fleet is not allowed to operate outside the immediate port area. Furthermore, the export of fish from the 400-ton storage plant constructed by DANIDA in Berbera is still not possible. The is, however, maintained to keep over 120 tons of fish at a cost of .5 million per month.

4. T e c h n i c a l

83. The **most** important bilateral and multilateral technical assistance programmes operating before the eruption of the crisis were carried **out** in the following **areas**:

(a) Agriculture:

(i) North-west **region** agricultural development project, phase II (IDA credit \$10.6 million) **IFAD** loan \$7.0 million) grant **from** the European **Economic** Community (EEC) \$5.4 million);

(ii) **Introduction** of jojoba plantations (**RAB/84/035**);

(iii) Emergency assistance in locust control (**UNDP/FAO, SOM/88/014, \$50,000**);

(b) Livestock:

(i) Livestock health services project (IDA credit \$4.3 million; **IFAD** loan \$6.3 million);

(ii) Primary animal health care (**FAO, TCP/SOM/8853, \$205,000**);

(iii) Livestock marketing and health project (**USAID**). As part of the assistance to the Government of Somalia to **meet** the export requirement for **Somali cattle**, it is expected that a modern and internationally acceptable quarantine station in Berbera would be constructed under the project;

(c) Forestry and **range**:

(i) Range water development and rehabilitation (**UNDP/FAO, SOM/86/034, \$700,000**);

(ii) Afforestation for refugee **settlement** and village communities in **north-west** Somalia (**GTZ, DM 5 million**);

(iii) Development of oases in northern Somalia (Association **Francaise** des volontaires du **Progrès/EEC**, FF 2 million; **So.Sh.** 12 million! Animal husbandry and health, **dryland** farming, **horticulture** in **Bari** region;

(iv) Northern rangeland project (FAO, **UTFN/SOM/022, \$2.9 million**). The project has been discontinued.

5. Proposals for action

84. The following factors should be considered:

(a) Accessibility of project sites and security for staff **must** be maintained to allow effective monitoring and operating a-rangements related to relief and rehabilitation activities:

(b) The civil administration, with specific reference **to** agriculture, plant protection, livestock, forestry and range, water resources **and fisheries**, **should** be restored as **soon as** possible;

(c) The port **of** Berbera should be reopened to handle exports **and** imports without restrictions, as well as relief assistance including food. **Normal** port operations are **of** particular importance, first **to** the livestock sector of the northern **regions** and of Somalia **as a whole**, **and secondly** to the fisheries projects operating in the north, since they rely on the **chilling** facility in and exports from Berbera;

(d) Fishing activities should be resumed and boats allowed to leave the port of Berbera to proceed to their traditional fishing grounds;

(e) To combat the expected locust invasion in 1989, it is imperative that free and unhampered operations, both by **air and** by land, are made possible in order to carry out effective control and **monitoring** operations and to maintain logistic **backstopping**;

(f) **Development projects** should be reactivated and activities resumed where possible. Their objectives should be **carefully reassessed in view** of the **rehabilitation** requirements and possibly reformulated to facilitate a return to economic self-efficiency for the people affected by the emergency;

(g) **To** restore normal production levels, efforts should be made to supply sufficient quantities of agricultural inputs, such as seeds, fertilisers, insecticides, spare parts and fuel to the farming community.

H. Electricity

85. The reconstruction of the electricity systems in **Hargeisa** and Burao has been estimated **by the government** technical missions at approximately \$12.0 and **\$7.5** million respectively. **As** such an operation is likely to take a considerable **time**, the mission recommends the acquisition of 30 generators and the appropriate quantity of fuel for one year. The estimated **cost** is \$1 million.

IV. GENERAL REMARKS AND SUGGESTIONS

86. It is the view of the **mission** that this urgent appeal for emergency and **humanitarian** assistance, which addresses the current identified situation, should be launched without delay. The preliminary breakdown of the assistance required, amounting to **\$19,385,000**, is set out in appendix II. It is also the **firm** belief of the mission that, **as** political and other conditions **permit** the return of internally displaced population and refugees to their places of origin, an additional programme of assistance to respond to their reconstruction **as well as** **rehabilitation** needs would have to be prepared.

87. **There** is an urgent need for the government to **establish**, at the central level, a high-powered crisis-management entity that would be the focal point for policy definition, evolving **appropriate** strategies, planning and supervision of the implementation of all relief, rehabilitation and **reconstruction activities**, projects **etc.** The creation and the **terms of reference** of the three-man committee established on 5 March 1989 indicate that such responsibilities could be carried out by that committee. It is hoped that the committee will **conceive** its **role as** being based mainly on open co-operation with all parties, especially the affected populations, and with all aid partners, be they national **or** international. To embark **on** the achievement of **such** an objective, it would be **appropriate, for** example, to think of rapidly reactivating the radio **station in Hargeisa so as** to re-establish an **effective** channel of communication with the local population.

88. This proposed crisis-management body, on the government side, should have a replica within the United **Nations system**, both at Headquarters (New York) and at Mogadishu. While in New York such a body exists (the **Office** for Emergency Operations), in Mogadishu there should be a crisis-management unit within the UNDP office. The latter would ensure close liaison and co-operation with the **government entity**, on the one hand, and with the United Nations agencies and the representatives of the donor community, both governmental and non-governmental, on the other hand. It would also be appropriate for both the government entity and the United **Nations** unit to have representatives **in the field in** those areas which have suffered from the events.

89. The office **of** the Special **Co-ordinator for** Emergency **Relief** Operations in Somalia should also have at its disposal adequate human, technical and financial means, including a United Nations aircraft (which **may** be less expensive than the frequent chartering exercises) for the proper discharge **of** its delicate and complex responsibilities.

90. Such an institutional framework would **create** a **co-ordinated** approach to emergency **relief** assistance and to rehabilitation and reconstruction activities. At the same **time**, it would **ensure** that the macrolevel policy-making body is working in unison with **the microlevel** executive unit towards achieving the common objectives **for** relief, rehabilitation and reconstruction.

91. For **such** a harmonious functioning to evolve, there is an urgent need to define a comprehensive rehabilitation and reconstruction programme. A **swiftly** moving exercise from joint **technical sectoral** missions to global planning for the medium and long term should be set **in** motion and achieved within the next two to three months to allow for properly planned activities to intervene without delay.

92. The **mission was well** received both at Mogadishu and during its field visits. There was an evident effort to provide the necessary information and to supply explanations as the situation would **warrant**. Unfortunately the **comprehensive** documentation on the events that the mission had hoped to receive from the authorities did not **materialize**.

93. The mission was concerned to note a **sense of uneasiness** among the United Nations **staff** about their living and work **conditions**. This **uneasiness** is said to have developed following the reactions of the authorities to the evacuation from the affected **areas** of the international and expatriate staff during the conflict, and a number of **measures** taken by the authorities,

94. Relief operations and, thereafter, the planning for rehabilitation and reconstruction cannot be isolated from such a background. The **success** and credibility of all such activities are predicated **on** the assumption that there exist conditions conducive to the **effective** discharge by the United Nations and other expatriate personnel of their **duties** and responsibilities, **as well as** on the general understanding of, **adhesion to and respect** for the principles underlying international co-operation since they are harmoniously intertwined with the safeguard and respect of national sovereignty.

95. One other aspect of co-operation that has its **repercussions** on the security of the **staff** working in the **areas** hosting large numbers of affected people is the need for the United Nations to operate **its own** communication and radio network. **This** would allow United Nations staff in remote areas to keep themselves regularly informed and would facilitate their work towards the implementation of emergency activities.

96. Implementation of **some of the** proposals for action contained in the **present** report is predicated **on** a general improvement in the security situation and the **subsequent** lifting of current travel restrictions on United Nations **personnel**.

97. It is important also that, while a significant and positive evolution of the political atmosphere could be witnessed at the central level, **it has** been slow to permeate to lower levels. Reaching out to all segments of the population in the **present** circumstances **seems** to be of utmost importance **and** of urgent need. Restoring confidence is a task and a **duty** that could be undertaken by the people talking to **the** people, and explaining how all **citizens** could and should live together in peace. The **media** could do a lot to **restoring** mutual understanding, **particularly** if they are placed at the disposal of those who inspire respect and confidence. And this, in itself, would be an achievement more important by far than any material assistance that the international community could provide.

98. The initial confidence-building measures undertaken by the Government constitute a step in the right direction. In addition to such morale-boosting efforts now under way, the mission would like to **emphasize** the urgent need for prompt action to be undertaken to **mobilize** and provide humanitarian assistance. Such action is needed in order to trigger a return to normalcy, the restoration of security **conditions** and the resumption of economic activities. The humanitarian assistance must, however, go hand-in-hand with the normalisation process. Both will attract the displaced to **return** to their **areas** of origin. Otherwise a vicious circle will be set in motion, bringing about paralysis and despair, in lieu of the much needed **hope** and reconciliation.

Preliminary breakdown of humanitarian assistance costs

1. Food aid

Total	7 290 tons (x \$250 per ton)	1 822 500
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2. Returnee packages (67 500 x \$50)*	3 375 000
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3. Transportation of food and non-food aid	600 000
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4. Rehabilitation of the water systems	“	6 370 200
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5. Assistance in health	5 000 000
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6. Emergency assistance to provide electricity for hospitals and basic services in Hargeisa and Buraor

Generators	500 000
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Fuel 500 000

7. Management

(a) Additional United Nations personnel:

(1) Five monitoring officers (P-3) for one year (\$70 000 x 5)	350 000
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(ii) One deputy **resident** representative (P-5) for emergency
for two **years** (\$100 000 x 2) .I,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,, 200 000

(iii) Local administrative personnel	I.....	40 000
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(iv) Equipment	20 000
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(b) Radio network 100 000

(a) Additional transportation (aircraft chartering, etc.)	500 000
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(d) Miscellaneous * . . . * 7 300

Total	19 385 000
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✱ Initial amount used for planning purposes.