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GENERAL AND COMPLETE DISARMAMENT

COMPREHENSIVE SYSTEM OF INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY

Letter dated 23 July 1987 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the
Permanent Mission of Poland to the United Nations addressed
to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to transmit to you herewith the text of a memorandum of the Government of the Polish People's Republic on decreasing armaments and increasing confidence in Central Europe, dated 17 July 1987 (see annex).

I should be grateful if you could arrange for this memorandum to be circulated as a document of the General Assembly under items 63 and 74 of the provisional agenda.

(Signed) Mieczysław GORAJEWSKI
Chargé d'affaires a.i.
of the Permanent Mission of the
Polish People's Republic to the
United Nations

• A/42/150.

ANNEX

Memorandum of the Government of the Polish People's Republic
on decreasing armaments and increasing confidence in Central
Europe, issued at Warsaw on 17 July 1987

The Government of the Polish People's Republic reiterates its will to contribute substantively to efforts leading to disarmament and the strengthening of international security, particularly in Central Europe, as evidenced in its previous initiatives. It is in Central Europe that the two political and military groupings **are in direct contact**; it is also here **that the** greatest concentration of military potential in the world exists. The situation in this region weighs particularly heavily **on the** security of all States on this continent as well as of those States **whose** security interests are closely linked with it.

In the past, the Government of the Polish People's Republic has presented a number of proposals, the purpose of which was to restrain the arms race in Europe and to create conditions which would lead to more **comprehensive** disarmament measures. These included the 1957 **plan to establish** a nuclear-free zone and the 1964 plan envisaging a freeze of **nuclear armaments, both concerning** Central Europe. For many years, **these plans were** continually the subject of international dialogue and contributed to the search for solutions which would **enhance** security in Europe and in the world.

The Government of the Polish People's Republic presents the view **that the** shape of political, economic and cultural relations in Europe, **which has** developed particularly in the **wake** of the process of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, renders the present **high level of armaments and** military preparedness in Europe unwarranted. The Polish Government is convinced that conditions exist at present to initiate steps which would assure the European States undiminished and equal security **at a** considerably lower level of military potential. The outcome of **such** steps would be to diminish the still existing danger of a military conflict breaking **out** in Europe and, particularly, to prevent the possibility of **a** surprise **attack**. These steps, if **taken**, would contribute to establishing **common** security in Europe, **through** co-operation and by taking the interests of all States participating in the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe into greater consideration.

Taking the **above premises as** its starting point, the Government of the Polish People's Republic submits herewith a plan to decrease **armaments** and increase confidence in Central Europe. It covers the territories of the Kingdom of Belgium, the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, the Kingdom of Denmark, the German Democratic Republic, the Federal Republic of **Germany**, the Hungarian People's Republic, the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the Polish People's Republic, together with their territorial waters **and airspace**.

The plan **envisages**:

1. The gradual withdrawal and/or reduction of **specified, mutually agreed** kinds and quantities of nuclear **weapons**. Such **undertakings** would encompass all I

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kinds of **nuclear weapons**, as long as they are not the subject of other agreements, in particular **such** weapons as operational and **tactical missiles**, particularly those with a range of up to 500 kilometres) **nuclear** artillery) nuclear-capable aircraft) and **any** type of **nuclear charges**, including nuclear mines and **bombs**. All **these** should be reviewed with **due regard for measures** related to the withdrawal and reduction of conventional **weapons**.

2. The gradual **withdrawal** and/or reduction of specified, mutually agreed kinds and quantities of conventional **weapons**. The first to be considered should be weapons of **the** greatest destructive power and accuracy, which could be employed in offensive operations including **surprise attacks**, for example, strike aircraft, **tanks**, *armed* helicopters and **long-range artillery**, including rocket artillery. An exchange of the lists of **weapons** considered by each **State** to be particularly threatening and offensive might **prove** helpful.

These **measures** could find substantiation through the withdrawal of the weapons and their crews **from** the zone envisaged by the plan, by destroying those **weapons** or by withdrawing them **from** operational military stockpiles with the aim of converting them to peaceful purposes or placing them in internationally controlled *storage* premises.

3. Joint actions **which** would ensure **such** an evolution of the nature of military doctrines **that they** could reciprocally be assessed as being strictly defensive. To achieve this, **the** doctrines would **have to be based on the** principle of adequacy, which would justify **the** possession by a State only of such a military potential as is indispensable for effective defence. A joint discussion and comparison of military concepts and doctrines and an analysis of their nature and development trends could prove helpful.

4. Agreement on appropriate far-reaching confidence- and security-building measures and **the** mechanisms for **the** strict verification of compliance with the commitments undertaken, including **those** which, for various reasons, it would be difficult to introduce in Europe as a whole.

Such measures would be complementary to **those** already in existence and could envisage, inter alia, an agreement on parameters to **constrain** the size and/or the intensity of **the** specified types of military activities (for example, exercises and concentrations of forces on the respective territories), **the exchange** of military information and procedure for **the** prompt clarification of **situations** arousing the concern of either side. The efforts of the States should also be aimed at **bringing** the independent activities of air and naval forces within **the** framework of confidence- and security-building measures.

To ensure that the accepted measures are effectively implemented, an appropriate **system** of verification would be **established**. It would **encompass** means of national and international control mutually accepted as **effective**, including observation and on-site inspection. An international institution or institutions of control could be established, with **the** participation of the States concerned and

others. The control mechanism might envisage, inter alia, an exchange of information indispensable for effective verification) notification of the commencement and completion of the withdrawal or reduction of armaments and their observation; establishment of control points on the borders of the zone through which the arms would be withdrawn, as well as at large railway junctions, airfields, seaports) and other measures. A procedure of bilateral and multilateral consultations could be included in this system.

For its part, the government of the Polish People's Republic expresses its readiness to accept, on a reciprocal basis, any method of control indispensable to attain the purposes of the plan.

The nuclear powers would issue appropriate, agreed guarantees to ensure the effectiveness of the measures envisaged in the plan and the security of States included in the zone and to ensure that the status established by the agreement is respected.

In presenting this plan the Government of Poland considers it useful to negotiate and introduce parallel, stage-by-stage disarmament measures in Europe, depending on their substance, procedure and time, in three territorial realms, that is, in a corridor on both sides of the line of contact of the two opposing politico-military groupings, in Central Europe and in the whole of Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals.

The plan dovetails aptly with other propositions related to the above-mentioned territorial realms, including the 1986 Budapest appeal of the States parties to the Warsaw Treaty (see A/41/411-S/18147 and Corr. 1 and 2, annex If) and the initiative of the Governments of the German Democratic Republic and the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic relative to a corridor along the line of contact between the Warsaw Treaty Organisation and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (see A/42/333).

The measures proposed in the plan constitute a mutually complementary entity. Nevertheless, each of its postulates may be negotiated and implemented separately and in stages with regard to territorial scope, as well as their stated subjects and objects.

The Government of the Polish People's Republic accepts that the zone of application envisaged by the plan could, with time, be enlarged through the access of other European States, including neutral and non-aligned States.

The substance of the plan could be the subject of the negotiations currently being held or to be held in the future within the framework of or in connection with the process of the Conference on Security and CD-operation in Europe.

Decisions on the withdrawal and reduction of the kinds of weapons mentioned in the plan would be accompanied by a consent not to substitute them with new designs of weapons and equipment or those obtained by conversion as well as not to introduce entirely new kinds of weapons with particularly offensive characteristics.

Another **issue on which agreement could be sought** is that of historically formed disproportions and asymmetries **in** particular Kinds of weapons **and** military forces, **together** with ways to eradicate **them** through a **reduction to an agreed level by the side which possesses** the superiority.

The agreed **measures** would **be** based on the principles of equality of **rights and security** of all parties, balance and reciprocity and would be taken without detriment to the security **of** any State.
